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Abstract 
This thesis analyzes the causes and processes of the East German revolution of 
1989. The first half explains the demise of the USSR and its East European allies 
in terms of their insertion into a changing global environment. A Marxist 
explanation is given of the economic and social decay of East European 
‘Communism’ in general and of East Germany in particular. The latter state was 
characterized by two fundamental contradictions. The first was between its 
economic nationalist form and the developing internationalization of the world 
economy. The second was between the attractive power of the economically 
superior West and the GDR’s dependence upon the USSR. East Germany’s 
rulers, despite being uniquely grateful for Moscow’s ‘bear hug’, were also 
tempted to embrace the West. The East German economy became ever more 
entangled with and dependent upon Western businesses and states. Albeit to a 
lesser extent than their counterparts in Poland and Hungary, East Germany’s 
rulers found themselves seduced by the superior technologies, commodities, and 
economic structures of the West. They were torn between loyalty to orthodox 
Communism and to Moscow, and a tacit awareness of Western economic 
superiority. This contradiction was compounded when, under Gorbachev, the 
Kremlin ceased to be identified with Communist orthodoxy. 
 The second half of the thesis is devoted to the revolution itself. The 
interaction between the regime’s reaction to the developing crisis and the 
mobilization of protest is examined. Among the questions addressed are why the 
SED was unable to prevent mass emigration and why the security forces were 
unable to crush the protests. In the context of a narrative of the protest 
movement three aspects are given particular attention. The first is the 
transformation of society. Over the course of some five months of weekly 
demonstrations in which millions participated, political institutions were 
transformed as well as other core features of social and political behaviour. 
Secondly, the importance of conscious deliberation, debate and strategy is 
emphasized. Detailed consideration is made of how people became conscious of 
the developing national crisis, how they scented the opportunity to protest, and 
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how they acted to effect political change. Thirdly, the question of why a 
divergence developed between the ‘Citizens’ Movement’ and the rest of the 
movement is addressed. In particular the radicalization of the mass movement is 
examined, as are the strategies of the Citizens Movement and of the regime. 
Finally, the history of the overthrow of the forces of the old regime is narrated, 
culminating in the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
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   1 cf. Kappelt (1981:35). 
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Preface 
My interest in East Germany developed during several visits in the early and 
mid-1980s and, in 1987, regular weekly trips to the East during a six-month 
sojourn in West Berlin. I count myself very fortunate for having been introduced 
not only to the humourless, droning Stalinists who earned East Germany its 
nickname as ‘the most boring country in the world’, but to many others who 
found ways of shrugging off or challenging the prevailing authoritarianism and 
cultural conservatism. Having been told by theorists of ‘totalitarianism’ that 
resistance was impossible, I was fascinated to encounter lively exponents of 
‘deviant’ behaviour, forms of everyday ‘refusal’, and political opposition; people 
who challenged and tested the state’s ability to regiment society and crush 
opposition. There were squatters and punks, hitch-hiking hippies and 
conscientious objectors and everywhere, satirical political jokes. I was introduced 
to books, such as Victor Klemperer’s ‘LTI’ and Stefan Heym’s ‘König David 
Bericht’, which cryptically criticized GDR Stalinism, and were eagerly 
interpreted as so doing. I was invited to back room exhibitions, where the 
photographs and artworks either depicted aspects of East Germany’s dirty 
underbelly or wrenched artistic form with a ferocity that expressed, it seemed, a 
bitter hostility to the SED’s conservative aesthetics. Most fascinating of all, I was 
taken to the ‘Environmental Library’ in Berlin, where an oppositional spirit, 
utopian aspirations and critical ideas were kept alive. For these introductions to 
‘alternative’ East Germany I owe my thanks to Bert Konopatsky, Annette Büsse, 
Susi Menachem and many others. 
 In August 1989 I moved to Potsdam to take up a teaching post at the 
Pädagogische Hochschule (PH). The PH was steeped in authoritarian traditions. 
Run until 1965 by a Stalinist and former Nazi, when I arrived it was still a bastion 
of SED orthodoxy. No sooner had I settled in to a new job and new home than the 
political climate became truly electrified. My experience of the revolution was of 
intense interest and involvement combined with frequent astonishment. The 
combination of keen individual engagement, which demands great clarity of 
perception, and the abrupt and violent heaving of the social and political terrain, 
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with its perpetual surprises, has been well put by Régis Debray (1973:99). He 
describes the personal experience of major political crisis as a ‘disturbing, rapid 
precipitation of a mass of unforeseen events, experienced in uncertainty and 
confusion; its result remains uncertain.’ People who live through a crisis situation, 
he adds, ‘find it at once intensely clear and intensely confused.’ For participants 
and onlookers alike, ‘"Anything might happen" is the general feeling. In other 
words nothing is certain.’ 
 The joyous, thrilling and fearful experiences of that autumn and winter 
are too innumerable to list. They included attendance at a meeting organized by 
New Forum in a Potsdam church in early October. With open publicity still 
impossible, the organizers had expected that only a hundred or so would come. 
In fact around four thousand turned up. Even a church was too small for such 
crowds, so three meetings had to take place, one after the other. In a sense, we 
became accustomed to dramatic, seemingly ‘impossible’ events. I recall sitting in 
a café in the heart of East Berlin when somebody came in and passed the news of 
Honecker’s ‘resignation’. The scene was memorable. Amazement etched itself on 
the faces of all present. Animated exchanges followed, before the motions of café 
normality continued, almost as if nothing had happened. By this stage ordinary 
people were beginning to test the possibilities of change. My immediate social 
environment — the PH — began to lose its rigid conservative atmosphere. 
Teachers there began to propose small reforms. After some dispute with 
colleagues, I was able to show the film ‘1984’ to students, a liberty that would 
have been unthinkable only a few weeks before. 
 The ‘confusion’ which Debray identifies as characteristic of a 
revolutionary situation was, in my experience, very creative in nature. Each day 
brought new questions and plans for discussion with friends and comrades. What 
is happening to the regime? Will there be a crackdown? Where is the next vigil, 
meeting or demonstration? What are these opposition groups and where can we 
find them? What would your friends say about it, and shall we go and meet 
them? In their role as discussants, guides to the nature of East German society, 
and companions in the roller coaster ride through 1989 and 1990, I must thank 
my friends and comrades of the time. At the PH they included Gabi Horn and 
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Ellen Ziegler, as well as Madelen, and Ilona Schölz and, on my housing estate, 
Göran Gnaudschun, Kai and Martin. In East Berlin, the revolution was enjoyed 
with the companionship above all of Bert Konopatsky, as well as Antje Neubauer, 
Matti, Andrea and many others. My political activities in Potsdam centred on the 
Potsdam branch of the United Left. To my comrades there I owe my gratitude 
(except the one who, according to my Stasi file, was the servant of a different 
cause). Of the many other members of the organized opposition with whom I 
became acquainted special mention should be made of Uwe Bastian who, despite 
the insidious attentions of the Stasi, remained determined in spirit and original in 
thought. For helping to achieve clarity and to hone our sense of purpose amidst 
the political turbulence, the discussions amongst my comrades in the Sozialistische 
Arbeitergruppe are unforgettable. Thanks go out to Rosi Nünning, Volkhard 
Mosler, Werner Halbauer, Gabi Engelhardt, Peggy Strobel and, of course, Med 
Dale, Simone Käfer and many others in West and East Berlin. Finally, I was 
grateful for the view from Britain provided by ‘revolutionary tourists’ in the 
shape of Kay Phillips and Geoff Brown. 
 As to the preparation of this thesis itself, I must thank Geoffrey Roberts 
for supervision in its early years and above all, for helping to ensure that the 
disruption wreaked by two serious illnesses in succession was treated with 
consideration by the relevant authorities. During the first stages of the thesis, 
Geoff Brown was a welcome discussant. On later trips to East Germany I received 
valuable assistance from and engaged in useful consultations with Uwe Bastian, 
Steff Konopatsky, Perry Deess and Jonathan Zaitlin. 
 Most of the information in this thesis derives from secondary literature. 
For their occasional assistance I am grateful to librarians at the German Historical 
Institute, the British Library of Political and Economic Science and the British 
Library in London, at the Staatsbibliothek in Berlin, and at the John Rylands 
University library in Manchester. In addition to secondary literature, this thesis 
was based upon original data, interviews, and archive sources. The data used 
included the survey results of the research prepared by of Karl-Dieter Opp et al, 
of the Universities of Hamburg and Leipzig, and that compiled by Carsten 
Johnson, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein et al. at the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin. I am 
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indebted to both groups of researchers for their generosity in allowing me to use 
their data. Extensive interviews were conducted with the following people 
between September 1989 and April 1995. Those between 1989 and 1992 were 
usually discussions of political and autobiographical questions at which notes 
were taken. 
 
NAME   YEAR  POSITION / TOWN 
Anon. 1990 Employee at Zentral Forschungsinstitut, 
Berlin 
Uwe Bastian  1990-5  Leading member of IUG 
Michael Brie  1995  SED reformist, Berlin 
Gabi Engelhardt 1995  Member of UL, Karl-Marx-Stadt 
Barbara Fuchs 1995  SED member, theatre employee, Berlin 
Göran Gnaudschun 1989  Member of ‘Antifa’ group, Potsdam 
Martin Gutzeit 1995  Founder member of the SDP 
Gabi Horn  1989-95 Student, Potsdam 
Ramona Hübner 1995  Member of UL, Karl-Marx-Stadt 
Achim Hürtgen 1990-3  Leading member of IUG 
Renate Hürtgen 1990  Leading member of IUG 
Mario Kessler  1995  SED dissident, Leipzig 
Jens König  1995  Apprentice sailor, Rostock 
Steff Konopatsky 1989-95 Member of a ‘Citizens’ Committee’ for the 
      dissolution of the Stasi 
Bert Konopatsky 1987-95 Supporter of the Environmental Library 
Tina Krone  1995  Leading member of NF 
Lily   1990  Berlin SED member, employee in government 
      ministry 
Helmut Meier and Rolf Richter Former senior administrators of the Academy 
  1995  of Social Sciences 
Antje Neubauer 1987-95 Apprentice / Student, Berlin 
Ollie   1995  Apprentice, Dresden 
Petra   1995  Teacher, Berlin 
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Marianne Pienitz 1995  Psychotherapist, Leipzig 
Gerd/Ulrike Poppe 1989 Leading members of IFM and DN respectively 
Karl-Heinz Rother 1990  SED dissident, philosopher, Leipzig 
Uwe Rottluf  1995  Leading member of Berlin NF 
Peggy Strobel  1993  Nurse, Plauen 
Hans-Jochen Vogel 1995  Radical priest, Karl-Marx-Stadt 
Andrea Vogt  1995  Secretary, Berlin 
Klaus Wolfram 1995  Leading member of Berlin NF 
Gabi Zekina 1995 Member of the ‘Independent Womens 
Association’ 
Ellen Ziegler  1989-93 Student, Potsdam 
 
Beyond these formal interviews and discussions, political discussion was 
conducted with hundreds of other individuals, notably those mentioned at the 
beginning of this preface, but also Karsten Helbing, Heiko, Sebastian, Kerstin 
Hailer, Heike Schröder, Karsten Schuster, Ralph Würfel and Katrin Bastian. Many 
of their comments were recorded in my diary. 
 In addition to my own modest collection of materials, the archives I used 
were those of the FDGB on Unter den Linden (now housed in the BA-SAPMO 
Archiv); the BA-SAPMO Archiv of parties and mass organizations (especially the 
subsection ‘Büro Mittag’; the Havemann Archiv; the 15 Januar Archiv; and the 
Environmental Library. Thanks to the generosity of Uwe Bastian, Perry Deess, 
Steff Konopatsky and others I had ample access to copies of Stasi files, both from 
the Normannenstrasse (usually denoted ‘ZAIG’ in the text) and the Leipzig 
headquarters (denoted ‘BVfS). Thanks are also due to Hans-Jochen Vogel for 
copies of Dresden police files. 
 In its later stages I benefited from Sebastian Budgen’s motivation and 
bibliographical suggestions, and from hours of absorbing discussion with 
Andrew Wright. Above all, my thanks go to Colin Barker. His consistent 
encouragement, advice, and interest, not to mention the volumes of comments on 
previous drafts of chapters six and seven, make him by far the best supervisor I 
never had. For assistance in writing up I have many more people to thank. 
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Andrew Wright and Adrian Budd made astute comments on chapter two. 
Tehmina Boman performed wonders proof-reading several lengthy chapters. 
Med Dale did likewise. My appreciation also goes to Paul Dave, Alison Lord and 
Andrew Wright for proof-reading, to Emma for use of her library card, to 
Sebastian Budgen for printing, to Adi Boman-Behram for his homeopathic 
wizardry that helped dispel the migraines and flu of the final weeks; and to 
William Brownings for his insouciance and good humour. Above all, Tehmina 
Boman’s spirit, humour, passion and patience enabled the final months of toil to 
glide by. 
 Last but not least, I would like to express my gratitude to the Economic 
and Social Research Council. Without the ESRC’s ‘postgraduate training award’ 
from October 1991 to September 1994 I would not have been able to write this 
thesis at all. The ESRC also granted me an overseas fieldwork award which 
funded my research in East Germany between July and October 1993. Finally, I 
am very grateful to the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst for an overseas 
fieldwork award which funded research in East Germany from November 1994 
until March 1995. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Revolutions can be analyzed under three headings: causes, processes, and 
outcomes. This thesis concentrates on the causes and processes of the East 
German revolution; its outcome is considered in Dale (1996a) and at greater 
length in Dale (2001). Chapters two to five address the question ‘why did it 
happen?’ The responses given draw heavily upon a Marxist theory of the 
capitalist world system as developed within and for the Socialist Workers Party, 
notably by Tony Cliff, Chris Harman, Mike Kidron, Nigel Harris, Mike Haynes, 
Colin Barker and Alex Callinicos. This theory is not widely known, or where it is 
known, is often mistakenly reduced to its definition of the USSR as ‘state 
capitalist’. Two chapters are therefore devoted to its explication, as applied to 
world capitalism in general (chapter two) and to the formation and demise of the 
‘Soviet-type economies’ (STEs) in particular (chapter three). 
 ‘The causes of the East European revolutions of 1989’, suggests John Rees 
(1999:30), ‘exist in three registers’. The first is the international register, that of the 
STEs’ economic and military competition with DMEs. Although it is common to 
relate the demise of the former to their failures in international competition, the 
two sides are normally conceived as independently formed rivals, driven by 
inherently different dynamics. Competition between them is conceived as 
external to each. This thesis, by contrast, presents the two sides as internally 
related parts of the same world system.2 The STEs’ declining capacity to compete 
on the international stage was both cause and consequence of changes in Rees’s 
‘second register’, namely ‘the internal economic and political decay of the 
national economies and the Russian empire’. Chapter three discusses the Soviet 
Bloc as a whole, while the contradictions that shaped the formation and 
economic decay of the GDR in particular are examined in chapters four and five. 
Together these chapters provide the historical analysis necessary to 
understanding the underlying structure of the revolutionary conjuncture of 1989. 
The contradiction between the GDR’s ‘national economic’ form and the 
developing internationalization of the world economy is discussed here, as is the 
                                                          
     2 On internal relations see Ollman (1993). 
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contradiction between the attractive power of the economically superior West 
and the GDR’s dependence upon the USSR. Because the latter dependence 
locked East Germany into the STE form, and because that form entailed the 
centralized fusion of political, economic, and ideological institutions, major 
reform was invariably a difficult and politically charged process. As the twin of 
the more prosperous and democratic FRG, the GDR was existentially dependent 
upon the STE form and thus upon the USSR. This explains why its regime was 
loath to pioneer major reforms, as in Poland and Hungary in the 1980s, and why 
similar changes in the USSR under Gorbachev represented such a challenge. The 
GDR’s rulers, despite being singularly grateful for Moscow’s ‘bear hug’, were 
also tempted to embrace the West. National economic self-interest dictated 
increasing trade with DMEs and, given the GDR’s relative economic decline, 
burgeoning debt. Its economy became ever more entangled with and dependent 
upon DMEs, particularly West Germany. Albeit to a lesser extent than their 
counterparts in Poland and Hungary, East Germany’s rulers found themselves 
seduced by the superior technologies, commodities, and economic structures of 
the West, not to mention loans and transfers from Bonn. They were increasingly 
torn between loudly proclaimed loyalties to orthodox Communism and to 
Moscow, and a tacit awareness of the DMEs’ economic superiority. The 
contradiction was compounded when, under Gorbachev, the Kremlin ceased to 
be identified with Communist orthodoxy. 
 The third register identified by Rees is the way in which ‘these forces 
expressed themselves as class struggles and political strategies.’ The politics of 
reform and crisis management were fought out among STE ruling classes. 
Especially at times of crisis, or intra-nomenklatura conflict, extra-bureaucratic 
classes mobilized too. If the most pertinent and greatest example of the latter was 
the Solidarnosc-led uprising of 1980-1, in East Germany political expressions of 
popular discontent, including workers’ resistance, emigration, and the formation 
of opposition, grew throughout the 1980s and became thorns in the side of the 
regime. These movements served as seedbeds from which organized resistance 
was to spring up in 1989. 
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 Chapters six and seven ask the question ‘how did it happen?’ The focus 
shifts from the causes of crisis to the transformation of the ‘political opportunity 
structure’ in the summer and early autumn of 1989. The interaction between the 
regime’s reaction to the developing crisis and the mobilization of protest is 
analyzed in detail. Among the questions addressed are why the SED was unable 
to prevent mass emigration and why the security forces were unable or 
unwilling to crush the protests. In the context of a general narrative of the protest 
movement three aspects are given particular attention. The first is the sheer 
transformation of society. Formerly, oppositional activity had been 
systematically suppressed and even ‘innocent’ forms of self-organization were 
corralled by state institutions. Critical discussions amongst friends and 
colleagues could not be aired in public. Over the decades the experience of 
political impotence had, for most, become a fact of life. The dead weight of habit 
stifled the awareness that they possessed the capacity to force political change. 
But over the course of five months of weekly demonstrations in which over five 
million people participated, many of these shackles, both external and internal, 
were swept aside.3 Secondly, the importance of conscious deliberation, debate 
and strategy is emphasized. Detailed consideration is made of how people 
became conscious of the developing national crisis, how they scented the 
opportunity to protest, and how they acted to effect political change. Thirdly, the 
question of why a divergence developed between the CM and the rest of the 
movement is addressed. In particular we examine the radicalization of the mass 
movement, and ask why the CM rejected the possibility of taking power and 
why the regime began to make overtures to the CM. Finally, the history of the 
overthrow of the forces of the old regime is narrated, including the fall of 
Honecker and of the Berlin Wall. 
                                                          
     3 The figure is from Lohmann (1994:62). It tallies, broadly, with the data in Opp et al. (1993) and Eberwein 
et al. (1991). 
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Chapter Two: Capitalism 
This thesis accounts for East German history, notably the revolution of 1989, in 
terms of its capitalist nature. The term is not used as a shorthand way of referring 
to the GDR’s class divisions, or to the fact that GDR firms engaged in trade. 
Rather it is based upon a particular (and uncommon) interpretation of the global 
inter-capital and inter-state systems as integral elements of the capitalist mode of 
production. This chapter outlines what I consider to be the central aspects of the 
Marxist theory of capitalism, and of the theory developed by Cliff et al. of the 
capitalist nature of the STEs. It demonstrates some of the vital interconnections 
between capital’s ‘laws of motion’ and the workings of the inter-state system. It 
indicates some of the ways in which ‘structures of accumulation’ can form 
integrated ensembles, how crisis of one structure or region may affect others, and 
how the trajectory of each part is conditioned by the ‘uneven and combined’ 
development of the whole world system. 
 Part one highlights the compulsive competition that imparts capitalism 
with its peculiarly expansive dynamic, and notes its uneven development and 
crisis tendencies. Part two examines the relationship between capital(s) and the 
state / states-system. This theoretical preamble prepares the ground for an 
adumbration, in part three, of the changing nature of capitalism in the twentieth 
century. Attention is paid to the rise of ‘interventionist’ states and, in particular, 
the emergence of ‘war economic’ forms of capitalism, notably the STEs. Finally, 
some provisional conclusions concerning the nature of political crisis and conflict 
in twentieth century global capitalism are tendered. In short, a provisional 
theoretical framework is laid according to which the development of the East 
German economy, state and society, as detailed in the subsequent five chapters, 
is understood. The latter demonstrate how this theoretical conception — of the 
GDR’s capitalist, class-divided, nature, situated under Soviet imperial hegemony 
and within a wider capitalist world economy — explains the interests, powers 
and strategic options available to East German collective actors, notably the 
regime, as well as other relevant forces, including the East German working class 
and the West German and Soviet regimes. 
PART ONE — Competition and Exploitation 
Marx’s starting point in analyzing capitalism is objects produced for exchange: 
commodities. Commodities have two properties: they are exchanged (‘exchange 
values’) before being used (‘use values’). The latter process is determined by their 
qualitative aspects; the former by quantitative comparison with other 
commodities, with ‘socially necessary abstract labour time’ as the common 
standard. Each act of social production is validated through external comparison 
of the abstract labour (‘value’) that is imputed to its outputs through the process 
of exchange. Under generalized commodity relations the coordination of the 
activities of producers occurs ‘behind their backs’, through exchange. Such 
interaction is, on the one hand, based upon interdependence — the mutual need 
of independent producers for one anothers’ products. On the other, it is coercive, 
with competition forcing all producers to conform to prevailing prices or risk 
returning from the marketplace with their commodities unsold. The social basis 
of generalized commodity production is thus a systematic separation whereby 
interdependent producers assume the form of atomized units governed by 
relations of competitive antagonism. Governance of this activity is not direct — 
by custom or planning — but indirect, via the outcome of the relations between 
the units, between their products. 
 The imposition of the imperative to value-expansion occurs through 
competition. As John Weeks puts it (1997:95) the ‘purely formal conversion of 
concrete labour into its opposite becomes a real conversion through the process 
of competition. Competition among producers of a particular commodity 
establishes a standard input requirement, which Marx called socially necessary 
labour.’ Prices, ultimately, are regulated by socially necessary labour time, as 
established through the process of competition. Competition is not an addition to 
the concept of value but immanent in it. As Marx explains (in Callinicos 1978), 
 
 since value forms the foundation of capital, and since it therefore 
necessarily exists only through exchange for counter value, it thus 
necessarily repels itself from itself. A universal capital, one without 
alien capitals confronting it, with which it exchanges [...] is 
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therefore a non-thing. The reciprocal repulsion between capitals is 
already contained in capital as realised exchange value. 
 
 Competition is not a phenomenon explicable by reference to products in 
the sphere of circulation alone. Rather, it is crucially about competition of capitals 
for an increased share of global surplus value. Competition occurs in the sphere 
of circulation — to maximize realized surplus value, but its defining location is 
the realm of production, where the goal is to maximize created surplus value. It 
is in the latter realm that the second great ‘separation’ that defines capitalism 
appears, that between the means of production — conceived of as the private 
property of the capitalist class as a whole — and wage labour. 
 The compulsive aspect of value relations is apparent in the contradictory 
synergy of competition and exploitation. The process of conversion of use-values 
into values is coercive. Commodity exchange under capitalist relations occurs 
only if abstract labour is reduced to the ‘socially necessary’; this reduction is 
forced upon capitals by their relations with one another. Capitals are 
agglomerations of value creating more value; self-expansion, or ‘accumulation’, is 
their motive force. Each capitalist is driven to maximize its share of global 
surplus value. This entails maximizing the rate of exploitation. As Barker 
concludes (Barker/Dale 1999), 
 
 Capitalism must be understood as a system with a dual core set of 
relations: as simultaneously competitive and exploitative 
accumulation. The heart of the accumulation process is the 
continuous extraction of surplus labour using ever new methods, a 
process fuelled by the competitive relations existing among the 
various centres or units of accumulation, and constantly resisted by 
those subjected to it. 
 
The compulsive relation between these two processes, competition and 
exploitation, provides capitalism with its singularly Promethean, rapacious, and 
crisis-ridden nature. 
 The law of value regulates ‘anarchically’ through generalized exchange; 
but this, equally, imposes the necessity of ‘despotism’. In Marx’s words 
(1930:376), ‘the anarchy of the social division of labour’ and the ‘despotism’ of the 
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division of labour within firms ‘mutually determine one another’. The 
accumulation of capital entails highly organized processes within an anarchic 
order; it is, in Bukharin’s words (Haynes 1985:40), ‘the economics of organised 
chaos’.4 The actions of capitalist ‘despots’, however, are not mechanically 
determined by the law of value. Although the latter operates ‘automatically’ as 
the unconscious outcome of countless relationships, that outcome faces each 
commodity owner in general (including workers) and each capitalist in 
particular with the task of adapting to an ever-changing environment, 
interpreting their position and the direction of economic developments, making 
and implementing decisions, and developing strategies designed to improve 
their position. Capitalist relations are thus eminently political, in the general sense 
of being concerned with the exercise and organization of power and the 
management of conflict within and between organizations. Although any 
production process requires planning, and economic activity in any class society 
involves elements of despotism, in capitalism the degree of the socialization of 
labour and the dynamism of development combine with ever-changing market 
conditions and the remorseless imperative to raise the rate of exploitation to give 
a peculiar intensity to the force that impels capitalists to organize and to plan. 
This applies to the gamut of economic activity, including management and 
training of the workforce, the labour process, product palette, marketing, 
budgets, accounting, outputs, inputs, relations with other capitals (including 
alliances and mergers), and relations with political bodies. 
 
Crisis and Unevenness 
The theory of value posits capitalist society’s form as characterized by 
interdependent antagonistic capitals whose relations are governed by 
competitive exchange (or ‘repulsion’). As such it is simultaneously a theory of 
crisis.5 Without entering into the details of crisis theory I should note its major 
points. The fundamental contradiction of accumulation, for Marx (1992:323) is 
                                                          
     4 Bukharin was describing tendencies to state capitalism in the early 20th century, but the phrase 
applies to capitalism as such. 
     5 As Shaikh puts it (1977:1), for Marx, ‘the analysis of reproduction and the analysis of crisis are inseparable.’ 
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that between the drive to the ‘absolute development of the productive forces, 
without regard to exchange value’ and the imperative to ‘preserve existing 
exchange value’. Competition on the basis of the absolute separation of 
producers from the means of production ensures that a historically unsurpassed 
proportion of surplus product can and must be ploughed back into advancing 
productivity. There is a dual contradiction, however, between the methods of 
accumulation (expanded investment in means of production and labour power), 
and its goal (profits), and between the interests of individual capitals (in realizing 
profit) and that of the capitalist class as a whole in maximizing the rate of profit. 
The interaction of these contradictions underlies capitalism’s tendency to crisis, 
as manifested in the business cycle. Ultimately, for Marx, crisis expresses the 
forcible reining in of the Promethean means by the Scroogean ends, via the 
contradiction between the interests of particular capitals and capital-in-general. 
The key mechanism here is the tendency for the rate of profit to fall (TROPF). The 
advance of the productive forces (including accumulation of means of 
production, skills, and science) leads, on the one hand, to higher rates of 
exploitation and greater potential for further development, and, on the other — 
thanks to the tendency for investment in labour-saving advances to outpace their 
capital-saving counterparts — to a tendency towards a rising organic 
composition of capital. Given that living labour is the source of value, a rising 
organic composition generates difficulties for valorization. Although for an 
individual capital, in the short-term, rising productivity (due, for example, to 
improved technology and the shedding of workers) may lead to enhanced 
valorization, in the long run it tends to lower profitability in the system as a 
whole, as constant capital replaces variable. Accumulation tends to increase the 
technical potential for accelerated accumulation, but at the same time places 
greater obstacles in the way of actual valorization. The result is TROPF. 
 Marx also identified a number of countervailing tendencies through 
which the system evolves means of counteracting the TROPF (Grossmann 1992). 
Raising productivity is one. It reduces costs directly and, if higher productivity 
reduces wages relative to total capital, indirectly too. Similar effects are achieved 
by reducing turnover time, expanding the scale of operations, the emergence of 
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new, labour-intensive sectors, trade and capital export, and the centralization 
and internationalization of capital. A longer-term drag on the TROPF is provided 
by waste expenditure (for example, on bureaucracy or arms). Finally, crises 
themselves counteract the TROPF. As a rule, each (uncoordinated) round of 
investments raises productivity but results in oversaturated markets. This leads 
to lower than anticipated prices and profits, and the devaluation of commodities 
and capital — as expressed in unsold commodities, hoarded money, and 
overcapacity. In Mattick’s words (1981:64) ‘the uncontrollable passion for surplus 
value [...] drives accumulation beyond the point at which valorization is 
possible’, resulting in overproduction, and, consequently, a revitalization of the 
factors enabling renewed accumulation, including devaluation, rationalization, 
and unemployment. 
 For Marx (1992:323), ‘[c]rises are always but momentary forcible solutions 
of the existing contradictions, violent eruptions which act to restore the disrupted 
equilibrium.’ A crisis is not conceived of as an abnormal disequilibrium irrupting 
into a normal state of equilibrium. As Dobb observes (paraphrased by Shaikh 
1978:233), ‘within Marxist analysis, a crisis is not to be viewed as a departure 
from equilibrium; instead, crisis is the equilibrating mechanism itself.’ 
‘Throughout the entire remainder of the capitalist cycle the contradictions of 
capital’, as one Soviet economist put it (Day 1981:93) ‘create a constant lack of 
equilibrium.’ The law of value, in Shaikh’s words (1978:234) implies ‘a process of 
regulation through constant disequilibrium, in which prices of production act as 
centres of gravity of market prices.’ Such a system, in which temporary 
equilibrium requires the destruction of capital through crises, can hardly be 
described in terms of harmonization and stability.6 
 Accumulation is an inherently and radically uneven process. Capitals are, 
naturally, heterogenous. They operate in different sectors, possess different 
degrees of mobility, and are organized in different forms. Within industries 
different units of different sizes possess different organic compositions and 
                                                          
     6 As Perry Anderson observes (n.d.:6-7), even though Marx, like Smith and Ricardo, tended to see the 
process of capitalist development on a world scale as ‘basically uniform’, nevertheless, ‘his analysis of the 
internal dynamics of capitalist development was internally antithetical to theirs. Here the weight of his 
account fell on the inherent tendency of capitalist accumulation to cyclical dislocation and crisis’. 
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produce at different levels of productivity. All these factors change, continually 
and at varying rates. The result is an uneven terrain of competition. Although 
competition equalizes profit rates across sectors, consider, with Weeks (1982:67), 
an individual sector, 
 
 in which there are capitals of varying efficiencies, enjoying 
different rates of profit by virtue of selling at different cost-prices. 
Such a circumstance is by definition inconsistent with equilibrium, 
since the conditions are present for the expansion of some capitals 
relative to others. 
 
‘The tendency of the rate of profit to equalize’ between industries, he continues 
(1982:70), ‘hides a fierce competitive struggle within industries.’ The struggle 
intensifies in times of low demand, when socially necessary labour time falls to 
that of the most efficient capitals only (cf. Callinicos 1978:89). Those capitals that 
produce at lower value will tend to expand at the expense of others, a process that 
becomes especially clear in times of crisis. ‘Far from establishing a harmonious 
equilibrium’, as Weeks suggests (1997:105), 
 
 capitalist competition disrupts, eliminates the weak and challenges 
the strong, to force upon industry a new standard of efficiency and 
cost. The movement of capital to equalise profits across industries 
is the process of generating uneven development: equilibration in 
exchange (a single price in a market) hides the generation of 
uneven development in production. 
 
 The picture that emerges here is of accumulation as an inherently 
contradictory and fluctuating process. Given that capitals are connected together 
within a framework in which the behaviour of each is governed by coercive 
comparison with that of others, innovation in one centre threatens the viability of 
extant forms of production elsewhere, the accumulation of value at one moment 
engenders devaluation at another. It is a radically differentiated yet constantly 
combined system. Change in one part ramifies, inducing changes in others and to 
the whole. Diffusion of technology and of economic organization — whether 
through direct export or ‘creative adaptation’— occurs in an uneven way. It 
accentuates as well as lessens differences between capitals, in terms of value 
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and/or organizational form. Dynamic growth in one period gives way to deep 
crisis in another, accelerated accumulation in one part coexists with the depths of 
stagnation elsewhere. Early entrants into particular product lines tend to reap 
‘first-mover advantages’ (Chandler 1990:34). Market leaders gain crucial early 
experience in product development and distribution, attaining a leading edge in 
know-how, and ‘known-about’ (especially in branded products). Pioneers of 
successful innovations are likely to attract above average profits that, in a 
virtuous circle, provide the surplus necessary for further innovation. Well-
established firms reinforce their position, for example through advertising, or 
tied contracts (Chandler 1990:599); and their experience helps them to outwit 
challengers. Challengers face a riskier task. Not only must they match market 
leaders in efficiency, but have to win market share from them too. However, later 
entrants may discover advantages too. The ready availability of technology and 
technique developed, laboriously, by others is one such. Conversely, priority 
tends to involve the ‘sinking of large amounts of investment in complexes of 
fixed capital that tend to become outdated by technologically newer complexes’ 
such that ‘the "burden of the past" for pioneers takes physical shape as immobile 
blocs of technologically interconnected fixed capital’ (Anderson n.d.:22-3).7 
 
PART TWO — Capitalism and States 
 
The theory of value in Capital, in Engels’s words (Cliff 1974:189), ‘contains in 
embryo the whole capitalist form of production, the antagonism between 
capitalists and wage workers, the industrial reserve army, crises.’ In an 
innovative development of Marx’s method in Capital — moving from the abstract 
commodity form towards the concrete reality of capitalism — ‘state derivation’ 
theorists have shown that state power can be discerned in that embryo too 
(Pashukanis 1980; Holloway/Picciotto 1978). Probably the most interesting 
derivationist argument has been developed by Colin Barker (1998). In the 
following, I summarize Barker’s case. 
                                                          
     7 Although this is true, Anderson’s attempt, drawing on Brenner, to isolate this mechanism as the 
source of capitalism’s uneven development is misguided. 
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 Commodity exchange may appear as if regulated by its own ‘economic’ 
laws but it is in fact a social relation that relates the owners of commodities to one 
another. Exchange values are not disembodied economic entities but are 
incarnated in real things that are owned by real individual or collective 
proprietors. In Capital the first actual person introduced is the owner of 
commodities, and the first characteristic of such a person is that he can use force 
to impose his will upon his commodity. He takes possession of it, even if ‘it’ is 
another human being. Because exchange depends upon the alienability of 
commodities, ownership must be, in principle at least, absolute, with others 
excluded from possession. Some sort of rule-governed system of property must 
exist for generalized exchange to function. As Barker puts it (1998:26), 
commodity production rests not simply upon a social division of labour but also 
requires a ‘social division of property which is itself a fundamental condition of its 
own reproduction as a system of social relations’ [italics GD]. The relation of 
force between owners and their commodities is, normally, based upon a 
conception of property right. As Barker elaborates (1998:26), 
 
 For the social process of commodity production and exchange to 
function, the world of things must be divided up into discrete and 
delimited parcels of "property," each of which is attached by 
notions of "right" to particular production units. In other words, 
commodity production requires, in a fundamental sense, a system 
of "private property." 
 
In capitalism the whole world of use-values ‘is criss-crossed by innumerable 
property-fences, each in principle labelled "Trespassers Keep Out!" The 
distinctions between "Mine" and "Thine," "Ours" and "Theirs" must be clear, and 
in principle inviolable’ (Barker 1998:26). Property fences are erected on the 
principle of mutual recognition amongst commodity owners. This presupposes a 
practicable notion of right. Their exchanges involve consent — the right to buy 
from and sell to whomsoever they choose. Formally, exchange is ‘free and equal’; 
it is necessarily a ‘juridical relation, whose form is the contract’ (Marx 1976:178). 
As Marx continues, the possessors of commodities 
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 must place themselves in relation to one another as persons whose 
will resides in those objects, and must behave in such a way that 
each does not appropriate the commodity of the other, and alienate 
his own, except through an act to which both parties consent. 
 
However, this form of equality is formal only. Equal rights define property 
relations that govern an unequal distribution of resources. The latter is based 
upon a social division of labour in which producers relate to one another 
competitively, on the basis of the systematic separation of each ‘from the objects of 
their need’ (Barker 1998:27). The transgression of property rights is thus an ever-
present potential. If the freedom and equality of commodity exchange is to be 
upheld, and respect for property rights enforced, an apparatus of management 
and coercion is necessary. In short, property, and therefore exclusion and force, 
are essential to the generalized commodity form. As Barker continues (1998:28), 
 
 without the continuous organization of means of violence, the very 
possibility of the world of "value" relations would dissolve. [...] 
"Economic" processes demand, as a vital presupposition, the 
consolidation of a system of "rights" and "freedoms" and a set of 
means by which they may be maintained. 
 
These tasks, above all the constitution and arbitration of contracts and the 
enforcement of exclusion (right), require a segment of society, the state, to be 
‘separated out to act as the universal force that objectifies all particular rights’ 
(Kay/Mott 1982:61). Its juridical tasks in guaranteeing a framework for 
commodity relations, if nothing else, necessitate military might. As Barker puts it 
(1990a:47), ‘without the continuous organization of means of violence, the very 
possibility of the world of "value" relations would dissolve.’8 
 Thus far, the argument is common to many derivationist accounts of the 
state. At this point, however, Barker introduces an intriguing twist. At the most 
general level, he argues (1998:30), 
 
 the necessity and possibility of the state arises from the inability of 
civil society’s members, divided and fragmented as they are by 
                                                          
     8 Similarly, Peter Burnham concludes (1995:153) that ‘[t]he "moment of coercion" (the state) is [...] 
present in every economic act built on the commodification of social relations’. 
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special and antagonistic interests, to govern themselves directly. 
The state, in this sense, provides a political analogue to Adam 
Smith’s "hidden hand" or Marx’s "law of value." That is, the state 
develops, in connection with private property, as an integrating 
and socializing mechanism which is out of the direct control of the 
members of civil society. 
 
These imperatives gives the state an intimate interest in the economic success of its 
subjects and of their (and its) property. Barker again (1998:30): ‘Both to "protect 
its subjects" and to pursue what it determines to be the "general interest," the 
state must develop "policies" for the management of society."‘ In the process the 
laws of private exchange and property are modified. He continues: 
 
 the introduction of the state as guarantor of contract law, and 
indeed as a formative element in the very constitution of the 
parties to contracts as free and equal legal subjects, involves the 
practical introduction into every contractual relation of a "third 
party." This "third party" itself stands over the contracting parties, 
ruling and taxing them, giving them legal definition as members of 
civil society. 
 
The state is not just the guardian of law but has a direct interest in the 
administration of population, and the defence and augmentation of property; it 
is obliged to treat civil society, in certain senses, as its own property. Hence, 
Barker argues (1998:31), the development of states involves ‘much more than the 
development of civil law: it is a process of "state-building"‘. States do not only 
supervise, defend, and provide legal frameworks for processes of exploitation, 
they must also directly exploit their subjects. Therefore, in Barker’s words 
(1998:31), as we develop the concept of the state out of the legal-political 
exigencies of commodity production, 
 
 we find that it is necessary to introduce another, competing, logic, 
that of state tribute and taxation. Within capitalism, these two 
forms of surplus extraction [...] are not simply separated and 
opposed but are each mutually entailed and complementary 
features of the other. 
 
 32 
 Finally, if the state is to represent the ‘general interest’, how is that to be 
defined? Given the antagonistic structure of civil society, the political definition 
of the general interest will inevitably be contested. In Barker’s words (1998:32), 
 
 Given the competitive diversity within society, any given policy 
will tend to advantage some private interests and hurt others. If the 
state collects revenues and resources from its subjects, the actual 
pattern and level of tribute-exaction it follows will have significant 
consequences for all or some of its subjects. The very existence and 
activities of such a state, with its various "extra-economic powers," 
necessarily makes it an object of both fear and desire for its 
subjects. The politics of its control, its steering and its limitation 
becomes a vital matter for its various subjects. How far can it be 
lobbied, diverted, persuaded, corrupted, resisted, captured? The 
relation between state and society becomes, inherently, the object 
of political struggle. 
 
‘Consolidated States’ and Capitalism 
 
If Barker demonstrates that the development of generalized commodity relations 
should logically lead to and be enabled by the development of well-armed, ‘well-
built’ constitutional states, the mutual, synergetic reinforcement of such states 
and capitalist relations over the course of recent centuries provides historical 
confirmation. 
 Capitalism arose within an already-existing states-system. This had itself 
been forged through a process of crisis-propelled land-grabbing by feudal lords, 
which had encouraged a ‘self-perpetuating and escalating’ dynamic of 
competitive state-building, or ‘political accumulation’ (Brenner 1982:38).9 The 
modern states-system, although it evolved from the feudal states-system, is very 
much a product of capitalist development. Conversely, states and inter-state 
rivalry were central to the formation of capitalism.10 It was only on the back of 
‘political’ developments that labour power and means of production could 
                                                          
     9 Although Robert Brenner coined the phrase ‘political accumulation’, he was careful to point out 
(1982:40) that ‘much of feudal government, feudal "state" building, was about "economics", indeed 
"accumulation" — the extraction, circulation, redistribution and consumption of peasant-produced 
wealth.’ 
     10 There is insufficient space to address this question here. See Harman (1992), Rosenberg (1994), 
Turner (1999). 
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become commodified in a systematic and generalized way, and thereby allow the 
‘automatic’ compulsion of market forces to gain sway. When Marx discusses 
‘primitive accumulation’ — the sundering of social productive forces into 
objectified property on one side and producing but propertyless subjects on the 
other — he draws attention to the role of states, involved in a global process 
centring on the (often forcible) expropriation of the English peasantry and also 
embracing ‘the colonies, the national debt, the modern tax system, and the 
system of protection’ as well as the 
 
 discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, 
enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous 
population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and 
plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for 
the commercial hunting of black skins (1976:915). 
 
Inter-state competition spurred the process of primitive accumulation and the 
rise of new centres of capitalism. The logic of ‘political accumulation’ became 
increasingly intertwined with that of capital accumulation; the law of value with 
geopolitical relations (cf. Callinicos 1990:168). As capitalist relations developed in 
England, geopolitical competition spurred their development abroad. ‘Once the 
world market had come into being’, as von Braunmühl writes (1978:171), 
 
 and once the capitalist mode of production was established [in 
England], the remaining European states were compelled to open 
up to them on pain of economic stagnation or the loss of the 
material basis of their authority; where the social preconditions 
were lacking, this opening up was achieved through the active 
involvement of the state apparatus. 
 
The early modern European states-system offered a particularly viable 
framework for the transmission of capitalist relations. As Hall and Ikenberry 
have suggested (1992:39), it enabled a high degree of competitive emulation.11 
Characterized by states in close proximity and in constant geopolitical and 
                                                          
     11 Emulation, of course, always entails transformation. Just as the reproduction of existing structures 
over time involves transformation, so too does the reproduction of structures across space. If nothing else, 
the difference between priority and succession alone means that conditions for the copy are necessarily 
different to those for the original. 
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economic competition, success in one form of economic or military organization 
was rapidly and visibly translated into international competitive advantage, thus 
compelling other states to follow — or risk obliteration. One example is the 
imitation of Dutch mercantilism by neighbouring powers that, although 
primarily intended ‘as the most effective way of attaining their own power 
objectives’ also had the unintended effect of making them more ‘capitalist in 
orientation’ (Arrighi 1994:140).12 The British example was particularly striking. 
The increasing costs of war-making led to climbing public debt and taxation 
(Morton 1938). Britain’s ability to absorb these, thanks to its lead in the 
development of agrarian capitalism, underlay its military success (Tilly 1985:180). 
Colin Mooers notes that (1991:171): 
 
 From 1700 to 1820, a period which saw six major wars, [British] 
state expenditure on war never outstripped its ability to pay. [...] 
The systematic way in which debt-repayment overtook military 
expenditure in the final years of warfare in every conflict in which 
Britain was involved in the eighteenth century, is truly remarkable. 
Only a society which was just as systematically generating new 
sources of wealth could possibly achieve such a pattern. If the 
English state had become a "permanent war state" in the eighteenth 
century, as Mann contends, it was because it was sustained and 
underwritten by the exceptional vitality of capitalism. 
 
From the late 18th century onwards, notes Arrighi (1994:144) geopolitical logic 
was married to capitalism; ‘territorialism could succeed in its objectives only by 
"internalizing" capitalist techniques of power.’ It is in part the stimulus of 
geopolitical competition that underpinned the many state-led attempts to 
achieve a stronger fiscal and military base by fostering industrialization — even 
before the ‘industrial revolution’ (cf. Supple 1973). With the industrial revolution 
and Britain’s continued success on battlefields, states elsewhere were forced to 
emulate Britain, encouraging the assimilation of technology, railway building, 
the creation of unified markets, and so forth... or to face extinction. 
 The rise of capitalism witnessed an astounding development of the power 
and sophistication of states and the scale and extent of the inter-state system. 
                                                          
     12 For discussion of the way in which feudal inter-state competition could translate unintentionally 
into movement towards capitalism, see Mooers (1991:144). 
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Particularly remarkable was the way in which the centralizing effects of ‘political 
accumulation’, together with the (spatially) homogenizing logic of capital (the 
creation of free, albeit administered and territorially circumscribed, markets; 
unitary legal systems, etc.), gave rise to what Tilly (1993:35) refers to as 
‘consolidated states’. These are, typically, ‘large, differentiated, ruling 
heterogenous territories directly, [and] claiming to impose a unitary fiscal, 
monetary, judicial, legislative, military and cultural system on its citizens.’ 
Consolidation, Tilly suggests, accelerated in Europe from the eighteenth century 
onwards, alongside processes of ‘circumscription’ and ‘control’, whereby the 
capacity of states to demarcate and shape their territories and the people and 
social relations within grew dramatically. Bureaucratic apparati of rule, of 
surveillance and welfare provision, and all-encompassing legal systems, were 
constructed. A qualitatively new type of ‘muscular’ state (1993:29) resulted, one 
which reaches ‘daily — and nightly — into the lives of most of their citizens.’ 
 
States and Capitals 
 
As described above, functions performed by states are indispensable to capitalist 
social relations. They can be summarized as follows. Firstly, states act as ‘third 
parties’ to commodity exchange. Capitalist states typically administer uniform, 
standardized legal systems, giving legal form to the relations between capitals 
and between capital and labour. They enforce law — arbitrating disputes, 
enforcing contracts, and punishing breaches. They are the constitutors and 
guarantors of property rights. In this regard, Bob Fine suggests (1984:153), the 
‘state is the juridic aspect of capital’. But the role of the state is more than juridic. 
The juridical role alone requires possession and use of means of violence. 
 As an intrinsically fragmented social relation, capital depends upon 
certain forms of security. Capitals rely upon stable physical, economic, political 
and cultural infrastructures for their reproduction, and yet — because at 
loggerheads, their aims defined by self-interest — they are singularly ill-
equipped to establish such structures on their own. Accumulation, indeed, 
generates instability and undermines the conditions of its own existence. In a 
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capitalist world, states are obliged to foster conditions adequate to accumulation. 
As well as providing the legal and political framework for upholding the 
authority of the market, issuing currency and organizing unified markets, and 
administering the standardization of time, space, and weight, states erect 
physical infrastructures. These, generally, increase the mobility of capital and 
hasten turnover time.13 States regulate competition, supervise and influence the 
production and circulation of labour power, and supervise and control industrial 
and political struggles.14 They use their ‘political’ power to influence the global 
movements of surplus value — taking from one part of the system (if possible, 
from foreigners) to give to another. 
 States are evidently no mere ‘handmaidens’ or ‘nightwatchmen’. At one 
level they are self-supporting structures, engaging in economic activity in their 
own right. They obtain capital through non-market means, above all taxation 
backed by force, and redistribute it. They may use their funds to alter the 
domestic price structure and to provide ‘decommodified’ welfare and education 
services. They may socialize credit, write off the losses of fragile firms, give loans 
at generous interest rates, or intervene to lower interest rates in order to promote 
an ‘underpricing of risk’. They may use their economic and political muscle to 
force the combination or restructuring of capitals. They may protect trade and 
subsidize exports, mobilize investment where profit rates are low, and organize 
and fund R&D. They may even assume the role of capitalist themselves. In 
Barker’s words (1998:32): 
 
 The state collects and spends taxes; it recruits and may conscript 
personnel whom it deploys to its various apparatuses; it pays and 
may otherwise feed and provide subsistence to its personnel; it 
purchases and may commandeer land, goods and services; it 
shapes the supply of currency and, to the degree it borrows, affects 
the pattern of interest rates; it directly organizes the production of 
some goods and services; it may subsidize [prices of some 
products] while equally it may inflate the prices of other products 
by imposing a variety of taxes at the point of their production 
and/or sale; it enforces processes of economic "redistribution" 
                                                          
     13 For turnover time, surplus value and communication networks, see Marx (1959:70-1). 
     14 See Dale (1999c). 
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through a variety of specific policies, from investment promotion 
to welfare. 
 
 These political ‘modifications’ of the law of value are themselves 
competitively determined. Surplus value is created through the capital circuit as a 
whole, on the global scale. This fact, notes Barker (1978:28-9), gives the world 
‘capitalist class as a whole a collective interest in the rate of exploitation of the 
working class [as a whole]’. However, the appropriation of surplus value is by 
individual competing capitals. These are linked more or less closely to specific 
states. States, by dint of their dependence on and integration into the global 
circuit of capital, have an interest in establishing general global conditions for 
accumulation (including political stability). However, not least due to their close 
ties to certain capitals, especially those whose operations provide their revenues, 
they also have particular interests. States compete, against one another, to 
enhance the share of global surplus value ensnared by capitals with which they 
are linked. They are obliged to manage social, economic and foreign affairs in 
ways that are likely to enhance national productivity. Finally, they may be 
obliged to expand or defend their territory and influence by military means. 
 The inter-state system mediates commodity relations which are inherently 
transnational in potential. In Justin Rosenberg’s formulation (1994:129), insofar as 
‘capitalist relations of surplus extraction are organized through a contract of 
exchange which is defined as "non-political"‘ it becomes possible ‘in a way that 
would have been unthinkable under feudalism, to command and exploit 
productive labour (and natural resources) located under the jurisdiction of 
another state.’ The implications for the inter-state system are resounding. Each 
state is imbricated in a world society and economy whose movements it can 
influence but not control. It is not simply that capitalist states exist in relations of 
interdependence and antagonism to one another, compelling each to stake 
forceful claims to definite forms of control over territories and the people and 
things within them. That is true of any states-system. In capitalism, however, as 
Andrew Wright suggests (1997:12) ‘the state’s own stability and health are 
dependent upon social processes beyond its borders [...] Therefore in order to 
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play the role of the state the national state must strive to burst through its own 
national character’. States’ interests in securing the reproduction of the relations 
upon which they depend gives them a pressing ‘security interest’ in international 
economic competition. This entails intervention not only within but beyond their 
territories. Not only must they counter challenges from other states; they are 
themselves compelled to seek influence over property and populations 
elsewhere. Capitalist states are intrinsically imperialist in potential, even if the 
uneven geographical distribution of power has enabled some — the ‘world 
hegemons’ and other Great Powers — to enjoy that potential and deny it to 
others. 
 
Uneven and Combined Development 
 
Recent centuries have witnessed a world combined ever more intensively into 
one global system of unevenly distributed power and wealth, with each capital 
governed by a law of value that measures its productivity more firmly than ever 
against prevailing global standards. The transmission of the imperative to match 
productivity elsewhere also occurs, if less directly, through geopolitical 
competition, as discussed above in the example of the industrial revolution and, 
below, in that of Soviet industrialization. Geo-political and geo-economic 
competition together produce tendencies both to the equalization of conditions 
of production and to their differentiation. 
 As with the uneven development of capitals, that between regions (or 
countries) involves the establishment of leadership and its accentuation or loss. 
Early development of capitalist relations — or, indeed, of a particular industrial 
sector — tends to beget virtuous circles. These include: the development of social 
relations of capitalism, above all the separation of producers from the means of 
production, the backward and forward linkages whereby accumulation in one 
branch or sector elicits accumulation in nearby centres, a spatially concentrated 
stock of capital; the development of a trained workforce, of the infrastructures of 
law, finance, welfare, education and communications, and of a concentrated 
market and pool of savings which all combine to create advantages of 
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agglomeration.15 On the basis of — and contributing to — such regional strength, 
strong states arise, with the capacity to act in the interests of what David Harvey 
calls the ‘regional class alliance’ at home and abroad.16 
 Equally, priority may bring disadvantages. An early round of investment 
in fixed capital, whether steel plants or sewers, risks suffering rapid depreciation 
— and therefore valorization problems — in the face of more efficient techniques 
introduced elsewhere. A famous case is the British iron and steel industry (cf. 
Hobsbawm 1969:189). There, heavy investment in plant quickly become obsolete, 
thanks to competition from the US and Germany, where relative backwardness 
had provoked organizational innovations, notably the joint stock company, that 
enabled greater quantities of capital to be funnelled into large-scale high-tech 
operations. As the latter example indicates, the evolution of capitalism in 
different parts of the world system breeds different social forms. Different means 
of adapting local conditions to the imperatives of international competition 
evolve. New social agents emerge, and subjugate their societies to the logic of 
accumulation in ways that undermine Whiggish assumptions of unilinear 
capitalist development. In Barker’s words (1998:50): 
 
 Where in England small capitalist tenant-farmers and 
manufacturers [...] played a fundamental role in setting [England] 
on the road to industrial capitalism, [elsewhere and since] other 
kinds of social figures adapt their positions to play a similar 
functional part. Bankers, state bureaucrats, military personnel, 
former "feudal" samurai, Saint-Simonian socialists, nationalists, 
fascists, communists, Islamic ideologues and others were all [...] to 





‘Structures of Accumulation’ 
                                                          
     15 Hirschman (1958) notes how agglomeration allows economies to be reaped through ‘overcoming the 
"friction of space"‘. See also Tickell/Peck (1992). 
     16 Harvey’s concept of ‘regional class alliance’ (1982) refers to embedded sets of relations between 
property owners and others with a stake in existing relations of production. These are loosely organized, 
essentially through states, as a response to their shared interests in protecting already embodied values 
and promoting conditions for further accumulation. 
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There is a sense in which the relations of production and exchange discussed in 
part one, along with juridical systems, ideologies, and forms of state and 
international relations, exist in an ensemble. Accumulation depends upon a 
complex of social relationships over which individual capitals have little or no 
power. These include ‘economic’ factors such as the availability of credit and the 
soundness of money, and social, political and geopolitical factors such as the 
reliability of the labour force, the stability of foreign governments, and their 
hospitality to inward investment. One way of addressing the interrelationships 
between these factors is through David Gordon’s concept of ‘structures of 
accumulation’ (1980). For Gordon there are thirteen crucial structures: 
 
(i) ‘Corporate structure’ — the internal organization of capitals 
(ii) ‘the structure of competition’ — the nature of the relations of 
competition and collaboration between capitals 
(iii) ‘The structure of the class struggle’ — in particular the 
management of labour relations, the relation of forces between 
capital and labour 
(iv) ‘The structure of the monetary system’ — in particular the degree 
of stability and strength of currency 
(v) ‘The structure of the state’ — the degree of state stability, the 
nature of the relation between state and society, etc. 
 
The other eight involve the supply of raw materials and intermediate products, 
the family, labour market, labour management, consumer demand, finance, and 
corporate administration. These structures are organized on different but 
interlinked scales. Thus the Gold Standard, which provided security of value for 
international flows of capital, operated through national currencies administered 
by central banks. States are central to most structures of accumulation. Because of 
the strategic role played by states in shaping structures of accumulation, a certain 
‘structural interdependence’ between capitals and states develops (Harman 
1991:13). Thanks to their interlinked historical evolution in particular regions and 
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in connection with particular states, structures of accumulation tend to evince a 
more general interdependence. 
 Although the dynamics of accumulation are explained at heart by the way 
in which capitalist production relations entail constant pressure to alter the scale, 
location, tempo, techniques and technologies of the processes of production and 
circulation, accumulation is also affected by the institutional forms taken by 
capitals and states.17 Processes of innovation, learning and creative adaptation do 
not apply simply to technology and technique. They extend throughout all 
structures of accumulation: the organization of business, the labour process, 
labour relations, finance, law, physical infrastructure, welfare, defence, ideology 
and so forth. Other things being equal, structures that foster accumulation stand 
a greater chance of being selected (the selection mechanisms being inter-capital 
and inter-state competition). Structures in one region may bring competitive 
advantages and be emulated elsewhere. Just as fixed capital investment in a 
particular plant necessitates a long-term commitment to it and its associated 
structures of production and circulation, so too the evolution of particular 
structures of accumulation on the macro level breed interdependencies and the 
growth of vested interests that generate inertia. Structures of accumulation, 
however, must evolve. To a certain extent on the world scale, and also for 
particular states, they tend to go through processes of stable reproduction 
followed by crisis and restructuring. Particularly when a crisis situation, or a 
powerful lobby, enables certain structures to be widely interpreted as failing, 
contestation amongst interested parties occurs over the benefits of retaining, 
abandoning or altering them. Because states are the authorities that do the most 
to directly shape structures of accumulation, they play a vital strategic role in 
mediating and participating in battles over what institutional shape those 
structures should take (cf. Jessop (1990)). 
 
PART THREE — The Modern World 
                                                          
     17 Gordon’s framework, and similar schemes — e.g. Cox (1987), and regulation theory — tend to 
ignore or misconstrue the basic laws of accumulation and focus to an unwarranted degree on the 




The laws of capital accumulation, the imperialist nature of the evolving states-
system, and the uneven and combined development of structures of 
accumulation are concepts that can be usefully combined to provide a theorized 
account of modern world history. They explain fundamental trends in the world 
economy, including that towards the accumulation of capital on the one hand 
and of the proletariat on the other, the development and sophistication of money, 
the credit system and legal relations, as well as sectoral change, including the 
relative decline of agriculture and the relative rise of industry and services. 
Rather than focusing on these particular trends, or on the development of the 
productive (and destructive) forces, I shall examine the three phenomena that are 
most relevant to the rise and fall of the STEs: the expansion and polarization of 
the world economy; concentration and centralization of capital; and the trend 
towards state intervention. 
 At the global level the most notable trend is the sheer expansion of 
capitalism. The expansion of value is manifested not only in commodification 
and the accumulation of capital and the proletariat, but spatially too. Capitalism 
forms as a world system. The drive to accumulate makes for an inherently 
expansive system, one which strongly tends, at first, to become what Bukharin 
called ‘the conductor in the concerto of economic forms’ (1972:260) and, in the 
long run, to oust other modes of production, as production relations are 
supplanted by or transmuted into commodity forms. As Marx put it (1973:408), 
‘[t]he tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital 
itself.’ 
 It might be expected that the interplay of the advantages of priority and 
backwardness discussed above would lead to positive-sum leapfrogging; that the 
diverse regions of the world economy would engage in a cumulative upward 
movement towards higher productivity, accumulation, living standards and so 
forth. The mechanisms commonly assumed to produce this result are those 
elaborated by Smith, Ricardo, and neoclassical economics: the spread of the 
division of labour, the diffusion of technology, and factor mobility — including 
capital export. Marx, of course, held a version of this view. To a degree it does 
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capture real phenomena. However capitalism’s effects are in general not so 
benign. At the world level there is greater play for tendencies towards persistent 
unevenness and polarization, given national differences (e.g. in the value of 
labour power), and, above all, the role played by states. All the evidence suggests 
entrenched polarization.18 
 As regards the dispersal of capitalist relations, they did not spread like a 
contagion. Relations of exchange with West European capitalism, or the 
development of enclaves of capitalist production, did not necessarily lead to the 
transformation of a society into capitalism. As in the case of feudal Eastern 
Europe, trade relations could shore up traditional ruling elites, and encourage 
them to strengthen pre-capitalist forms of exploitation. 
 Where capitalism did take root the disadvantages of backwardness could 
outweigh any advantages, in a process which Gunnar Myrdal calls ‘circular 
cumulative causation’ (Preston 1996:201). The mechanisms of this vicious circle 
are various. Perhaps the most important is the combination of relatively late 
development of capitalism with political domination by imperialist states, 
entailing not only plunder, conquest and the undercutting of local industries, but 
also the denial or limitation of sovereignty. As a result, ‘initial conditions’ for 
catching up could be significantly worsened. 
 The basic problem facing late developing countries is that funds for 
accumulation must come essentially from savings out of current consumption of 
the domestic population. ‘And if the level of current livelihood of the population 
is low, and the political and administrative machine weak,’ in Harris’s words 
(1971:140), 
 
 then any surplus from this source is likely to be small. If the 
population is simultaneously growing, what surplus there is may 
only provide a basis for standing still rather than actually 
improving the situation. On the other hand, only a very powerful 
army and police force can snatch the surplus for national 
investment between the peasant’s hand and mouth. 
 
                                                          
     18 For summaries of the evidence, see Hoogvelt (1997), Marfleet (1998), Freeman (1999). 
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 Post-colonial states have attempted to pull their economies up by the 
shoelaces through managing their orientation to the world economy in two basic 
ways. One was to encourage nationally based enterprises behind protectionist 
barriers (ISI). ISI, however, faced the problem that low productivity, small 
markets, small-scale backward industry, limited capital and so forth represented 
poor conditions for generating industries of the scale and efficiency necessary to 
break into world markets. As Kidron put it (1974:171), ‘[t]he minimum cost of 
entry into the world market is growing every day. The resources from which to 
fund it in backward countries are not. The relative size of this critical minimum 
[...] is the nub of the problem of underdevelopment.’ To make matters worse, the 
liberal Great Powers have frequently set out to undermine such development 
strategies. 
 An alternative geo-economic policy orientation for late developing states 
was towards free trade, in the hope that Ricardian comparative advantages 
would ensue. However, as Anwar Shaikh has shown (1980), comparative 
advantage in an open system tends to disproportionately benefit those with 
absolute (‘competitive’) advantage. Shaikh demonstrates that absolute advantage 
in one region, instead of leading to mutual benefit, may well lead to chronic 
trade deficits, capital outflow, chronic debt and ‘foreign exchange strangulation’ 
on the part of the ‘absolutely disadvantaged’ country. It then has little option but 
to eke out an export position in niche areas of geographically determined 
competitive advantage. Thus, international free trade produces powerful 
tendencies generating a spatial mapping of the tendency toward the polarization 
of poverty and capital onto a widening gap between poor and rich nations. In 
Shaikh’s words (1980:211), 
 
 just as Marx derives the concentration and centralization of capitals 
(and hence their uneven development) from free and unrestricted 
commerce within a capitalist nation, so too is it possible to derive 
the phenomena of imperialism from free and unrestricted 
commerce between capitalist nations. 
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Although he refers to significant countervailing factors — most obviously capital 
export — Shaikh’s case that the inherent tendencies of capitalism tend to deepen 
geographical polarization is a powerful one, and helps explain the common 
reluctance of less developed countries to embrace free trade. 
 
Concentration and Centralization 
 
Accumulation involves, according to Marx (1930:690), a dialectic of greater 
competition and greater concentration of the means of production and command 
over labour into the hands of individual capitals. Increasingly developed forms 
of competition and credit stimulate the centralization of capital, with less efficient 
(usually smaller) capitals being destroyed, or absorbed by rivals through merger 
or takeover.19 Although in comparison to previous modes of production 
capitalism begets an astonishing universal devolution of economic rights, the 
opposite applies to economic power. 
 A variety of reasons lie behind capital concentration and centralization in 
particular periods and for individual businesses. They permit greater growth in 
the scale of production and distribution, enabling ‘technological economies’ as 
well as those of size, scope and speed.20 They enable firms to diversify into 
unrelated sectors in which potential profit rates seem more promising, or as a 
means of risk reduction. Horizontal integration enables greater control over 
output, price and markets. Vertical integration may assure supplies, insure 
against costs of fluctuating output, and lower other risks associated with dealing 
with external agents (such as breach of contract). Integration may be simply 
defensive. ‘[S]ize protects’, as Mike Haynes (1983:74) suggests, ‘it is necessary to 
be big enough to do the digesting and too big to be digested.’ As the latter quote 
implies, there is a thin line between defence and offence: centralization ‘protects’ 
but — at least when ‘horizontal’ — it eliminates competitors. 
                                                          
     19 Marx, at one point (1989:656), imagines the process continuing until all capital, in a given society, 
‘were concentrated into the same hands, whether those of an individual capitalist or of a single capitalist 
trust’. However, he was aware that competition also underpins countervailing tendencies towards the 
fragmentation and decentralization of capitals (cf. Grossmann 1992:147; Harvey 1982:140). 
     20 On vertical integration as enabling economy of speed (i.e. turnover time) as well as scale, see Alfred 
Chandler paraphrased in Arrighi (1994:239). By ‘economy of scope’ Chandler (1990) refers to the capacity 
to use a single set of facilities in a variety of processes of production or distribution. 
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 Secular tendencies towards both increased competition and concentration 
and centralization modify the dialectic of anarchy and organization. On the 
‘material’ side of things, as the productive forces grow and the division of labour 
becomes more specialized, we find (Marx 1930:693) ‘the progressive 
transformation of isolated processes of production carried on in rule-of-thumb 
fashion, into socially combined and scientifically managed processes of 
production.’ Thus the accumulation-driven development of the division of 
labour begets a trend towards ‘rationalization’. On the ‘social’ side of the same 
phenomenon, the importance of ‘organization’ (planning, bargaining) grows, 
though never escaping the ‘anarchic’ operation of the law of value on the world 
scale.21 The trend towards organization is more marked where capitals approach 
monopoly (in a sector, national economy, or even world economy).22 
 Concentration and centralization are facilitated by the development of 
institutions, notably banks, joint stock companies and MNCs, the growth of 
which has changed the face of capitalism. The invention of limited liability 
enabled the separation of ownership and control, and the diffusion of risk as a 
means of encouraging investment.23 In the process of its socialization, capital 
becomes depersonalized. In Chris Arthur’s words (1998:14), ‘the elimination of 
any idiosyncrasy, which the person of an individual capitalist may introduce, 
when he is replaced by the corporate person [...] results in a purer form of 
capital.’24 Capital becomes more obviously a social power based upon the 
separation of classes rather than simply the property of ‘private’ individuals. 
This is why Marx spoke of the joint stock company as representing ‘the abolition 
of capital as private property within the framework of capitalist production itself’ 
                                                          
     21 Even during the heyday of national planning the reality was of the constant jockeying of different 
interest groups. As Mike Kidron argued (1974:75) at the time, ‘internationally the system still forms in the 
classic capitalist manner — there is no goal, no a priori purpose, no fundamental check to the spontaneity 
of competition. Final authority is dispersed over a number of independent governments, each important 
enough for its decisions to be crucial to those of all the others yet each taking its decisions independently 
and privately, and so with inherently unforeseeable consequences.’ 
     22 Plainly, monopoly is not the same as concentration and centralization, but the latter do tend towards 
the former. 
     23 In Janos Kornai’s terms, this attenuation of the absoluteness of capitalist private property ‘softens’ 
the ‘budget constraint’ experienced by capitals. 
     24 In the paragraph from which this quote is taken Arthur believes that he is criticizing Marx; in fact he 
is agreeing with him. 
 47 
(1959:436); and as ‘the ultimate positing of capital in the form adequate to it’ 
(1973:657).25 
 These tendencies towards the increasing scope of the practical 
organization of economic activity and towards the depersonalization of capital 
underpin the separation of ownership and management. ‘Numerous workers 
collaborating under the command of a unit of capital’, wrote Marx (1930:348), 
‘must have, just like any army, commissioned officers (managers) and non-
commissioned officers (foremen, overlookers, etc.) who command during the 
labour process in the name of capital.’ Marx noted that, in the process, ‘only the 
functionary remains, the capitalist disappears from the process of production’ (in 
Chattopadhyay 1994:26), but he was careful to point out that the actions of these 
‘functionaries’ are determined by their firm’s capitalist nature. Drawing an 
analogy with Marx’s remark that ‘the Prussian estate inherited the eldest son’, 
Barker (1998:38) suggests that managers’ — and other capitalist functionaries’ — 
‘relation to property is that it owns them rather than the reverse.’ Reflecting these 
trends many observers — Hilferding, Veblen, Berle and Means, James Burnham 
and others — began to comment on the development of a ‘corporate’ or 
‘organized’ capitalism, emphasizing that growth in the scale and internal 
division of labour of firms promoted the role of corporate governance.26 
 If the trends towards the concentration and socialization of capital were 
prominent when Marx (not to mention Hilferding and Veblen) were writing, 
how much more so today. Thus Nigel Harris (1982:349), elaborating on 
Hilferding’s theses on the development of socialized capital and the distancing of 
ownership from control, has observed that: 
 
 In our own day, even the mass of shareholders can be removed 
altogether; for example, Pension Funds, "owned" by no-one, 
become owners of enterprises, even of those companies, the 
employees of which provide the contributions to the Pension Fund 
concerned. 
                                                          
     25 This process gives empirical grounding to Marx’s sense of private property as the monopoly of 
means of production by a particular class. On the two meanings of ‘private property’ see part one (above) 
and Chattopadhyay (1994). 
     26 See also Schmitter (1974). There are important countervailing tendencies that tend to ‘disorganize’ 
capitalism. These are discussed in chapter three. 
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The contemporary world has also witnessed the growth of MNCs — which 
exemplify how the tendency towards centralization combines with a tendency 
for the locus of competition to shift upward to the world scale27 — and of 
international economic engagement by inter-state institutions such as the IMF. 
The size and scale of operations of modern conglomerates is vast. In a 
comparison that I explore in chapter three, Simon Clarke observes that (1990:23), 
‘[t]he scope and scale of planning in giant corporations like Ford, Toyota, GEC or 
ICI dwarfs that of most, if not all, of the Soviet ministries.’ 
 These tendencies modify the dialectic of competition and concentration.28 
On the one hand, as capitalism develops, the interrelations between capitals in 
the various parts of the circulation and production process tend to become 
increasingly intense and dense; capital — especially in its money form — 
becomes more mobile, and the frictions of space and time decline. Competition 
becomes more ‘abstract’, in James Clifton’s phrase (1977:147), 
 
 since it is more general or economy-wide in nature. The abstract 
character is evident in the fact that it is now direct competition 
among cohesive sums of self-expanding finance that dominates the 
economic process, rather than competition among producers of 
soap on the one hand and producers of books on the other. 
 
Brenner and Glick (1991:89) elaborate the same point from a different angle when 
they write that capitalist development has ‘tended to create the institutional forms 
through which capitalists can mobilize enough abstract capital for entry into any 
field where producers are achieving a higher-than-average rate of profit.’ These 
developments establish the basis of more ‘perfect’ competition. Furthermore, the 
development of capitalism tends to involve a ‘deepening’ of commodification — 
                                                          
     27 Internationalization frequently involves centralization — e.g. one firm taking over foreign 
competitors. Thus the scale of competition may expand while the numbers of units involved diminishes. 
     28 Marx (Day 1981:32) writes that: ‘[i]n practical life we find not only competition, monopoly and the 
antagonism between them, but also the synthesis of the two, which is not a formula, but a movement. 
Monopoly produces competition, competition produces monopoly. [...] If the monopolists restrict their 
mutual competition by means of partial associations [...] competition becomes [more desperate] between 
the monopolists of different nations. The synthesis is of such a character that monopoly can only 
maintain itself by continually entering into the struggle of competition.’ 
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with ever increasing spheres of life brought under the actual or ‘shadow’ sway of 
the laws of capital.29 
 On the other hand, the tendency to concentration, compounded by state 
intervention, muddies the operation of the law of value. Centralization and 
cartelization (or other forms of collaboration and tacit collusion) enable a greater 
degree of calculability (of transaction and other costs). This becomes ever more 
vital to those many sectors that have seen a secular growth in the ratio of fixed to 
circulating capital. Investments in fixed capital, with their long turnover times, 
makes depreciation a greater hazard. Risk avoidance becomes the name of the 
game.30 As Hilferding showed (1981:164 and passim), cartelization provided an 
organizational means of allowing capitals to overcome problems of price 
fluctuation and to charge artificially high domestic prices thanks to tariff 
protection. Huge corporations producing specialized goods may ‘make’ prices as 
well as ‘take’ them. In the contemporary world, MNCs engage in discriminatory 
and transfer pricing. Profits are thereby siphoned from other branches — the 
extra profit reaped derives not from surplus value creamed from the process of 
production and circulation but is tribute — a tax on consumers. These 
phenomena, in Kornai’s phrase (1986:46-7), generate a ‘trend’ towards ‘softening 
of the capitalist firm’s the budget constraint.’ Summing up post-war 
contributions to this case, Kornai (1986:47) concludes that: 
 
 The growth of a firm depends not only on its success in atomistic 
markets but also on its power: the pressure it can put on its 
business partners, the relations it has with banks and, last but not 
least, the extent to which it can influence state decisions, taxes, 
subsidies and government orders.31 
 
 
                                                          
     29 For shadow subsumption see Murray (1998). 
     30 J. K. Galbraith (1979:103-119) has developed a powerful (albeit one-sided) case that risk avoidance is 
central to modern capitalism. Risk avoidance, moreover, is central to the rationale of planning. 
Significantly, Daniel Bell’s prognosis of the ‘Coming Post-Industrial Society’ (1973) envisaged its core 
characteristic as ‘the conscious, planned advance of technological change, and therefore the reduction of 
indeterminacy about the economic future’ through the ‘management of organized complexity’. 
     31 On post-war cartelization and other forms of ‘private protectionism’ and market-managing 




The final trend to be considered is that towards intensive state involvement in 
economic activity. Although capitalism evinces an emphatic, secular tendency 
towards the institutional separation of economic and political power there are, 
equally, strong tendencies towards heightened state involvement in economic 
activity (see table 2.1) and even, in particular periods and regions, to the 
institutional fusion of political and economic power.The point was reached and 
passed this century where the growth in size of capitals meant that the realm of 
‘despotism’ could feasibly coincide with entire national economies.32 
 
Table 2.1 Government spending as percentage of GDP (average of fourteen 
DMEs; from The Economist 20.9.97). 
1870 1913 1920 1960 1980 1990 1996 
8.3 9.1 15.4 28.5 43.3 46.1 47.1 
 
 The trend towards state intervention is linked to four major phenomena. 
Firstly, as the production process becomes more sophisticated, the provision of 
physical infrastructure and the equipping and management of the workforce 
tends to become more complex and more essential. With technological advance 
workers create more surplus value. Their education and training, and their 
supply and security, become more important. Insofar as states take responsibility 
for ensuring these attributes, their role grows in importance. In the long run the 
rising value of labour-power tends to coincide with (objective, relative) class 
polarization, and with the emergence of an increasingly educated, confident, 
skilled, concentrated, and urban working class. This has underpinned social 
movements, both industrial and political, which have striven to widen and 
politicize the public sphere, thus forcing states to take on a continued — usually 
greater — role in domestic political management (cf. Rueschemeyer et al. 1992; 
Mann 1993). 
                                                          
     32 This was most obviously the case in the USSR where, to quote Trotsky (1972b:43), ‘the Soviet 
government occupies in relation to the whole [national economy] the position which a capitalist occupies 
in relation to a single enterprise.’ 
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 A second factor is the transformation of state-capital relations that 
accompanies the evolution of competition and concentration. The latter leads to 
enormous aggregations of economic power that find it practicable to back up 
indirect pressure upon government with direct links — all major firms now have 
connections to one or other government office or department. Conversely, state 
bureaucracies interfere in the internal affairs of firms, organize international 
trade,33 and administer the rules of competition.34 Moreover, increasing technical 
interdependence between capitals tends to elicit state intervention, particularly in 
the management of crisis. As capitals grow more concentrated, crisis in one firm 
or sector may seriously destabilize reproduction of the whole. Banks, states and 
inter-state organizations tend to become directly involved in the management of 
crisis. State borrowing becomes a major factor in the mechanism of accumulation. 
It may rise easily during booms on the expectation of further prosperity, but also 
tends to rise or stick during slumps, under the pressure to shore up existing 
values and maintain social stability. 
 Thirdly, the dialectic of ever-extending technical interdependence and 
intensifying social competition maps onto the world scale, provoking intensified 
management by states. Historically, the internationalization of capital 
simultaneously involved its nationalization. The upshot is, as Neil Smith argues 
(1990:142), a hierarchy of nationally based laws of value, more or less integrated 
within an international law of value. The sluice gates are operated by states; 
these organize the relations between national economy and world economy. 
Various strategies may be deployed. Protectionism, for example, enables the law 
of value to be modified in its impact upon the national economy. As policy it 
may be primarily geared to raising revenue, it may be geared to protecting 
‘infant industries’, or to enable monopolization and rationalization (Harris 
1972:33). The latter strategy, as Hilferding argued (1981:310), by imposing tribute 
on domestic consumers, may facilitate an offensive on the international market.35 
                                                          
     33 In the 1980s about a quarter of world trade was countertrade (in effect, barter) (Zon 1994:254). 
     34 Interestingly, in the case of monopolies, states may attempt to impose adherence to the rules of 
competition upon private companies. 
     35 Protectionism, ‘once a defensive weapon of the weak has become an offensive weapon in the hands 
of the powerful.’ 
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State subsidies to capital — i.e. the redistribution from taxpayer to business — 
enable costs in certain sectors to be ‘artificially’ lowered. Subsidies, in a variety of 
forms, have blossomed over this century.36 
 State intervention has altered the nature of the whole world system. In 
turn, that changing environment has affected the nature of states, including their 
relations to civil society and to one another. For example, states’ attempts in the 
early 1930s to displace the pain of deflation (through ‘beggar thy neighbour’ 
devaluations) helped to hasten, generalize and deepen the world crisis 
(Kindleberger 1973). In turn, this induced a breakdown in international exchange 
relations and a fragmentation of the world economy into relatively autarkic 
patches. States took control of currency flows, and protectionist barriers were 
raised in an attempt to shut out the fluctuations of world prices and secure 
domestic markets for domestic firms.37 Direct state intervention became the norm 
permanently (not just in times of war). The trend was greatest in weaker areas of 
the world economy: Mussolini’s Italy, Peron’s Argentina, Brazil, and later, 
Nehru’s India, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Algeria. Ideologies of economic nationalism 
and state control (‘socialism’, Keynesianism, fascism, etc.) blossomed. A qualified 
form of statism became embedded in the international political economy of the 
post-war world, as exemplified in the Bretton Woods settlement (Brett 1985). The 
ever-changing matrices of world competition impose shifting pressures on 
national economies: prices fluctuate, strategic alliances change, arms competition 
intensifies. Their component parts present a kaleidoscope of converging and 
diverging interests. Generally, at the international level, the management of 
competition has become intensely politicized, with competitive interests directly 
reproduced within the state apparatus. This is especially so in times of crisis 
when ‘each section of capital seeks to identify the "general interest" with its own 
particular interests’ (Holloway/Picciotto 1977:97). As Gerd Hardach writes 
(1987:434), 
                                                          
     36 1. Direct subsidies to prop up domestic industry; 2. Direct subsidies to attract capital; 3. Hidden 
subsidies to support capital — in particular, relief from taxation. 
     37 Note that high degrees of protectionism may seem to be the acts of individual firms and states, but 
should be understood as the outcome of the interrelations of the whole. Note too that even the USA, as 
late as 1965, was highly autarkic, with imports at only 3.1% of GDP (Brenner 1998:92). 
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 In twentieth-century organised capitalism, bargaining is partially 
transferred from the market place to administrative centres, 
nationally and internationally: corporations bargain for privileges 
and subsidies, capital and labour bargain for collective wage 
schemes, governments bargain for influence in international 
institutions and programmes. 
 
 The age of ‘globalization’ has altered the nature of the trend towards state 
intervention. On the one hand, internationalization has spawned considerable 
pressures that promote privatization and the divestment by states of strong 
controls over currency and other capital flows. On the other hand, pressures 
towards state intervention remain powerful. As suggested above, states are 
inherently international, not simply by dint of mutual relations, but because they 
depend upon and are threaded into the transnational circuits of economic life. As 
those circuits intensify and interpenetrate across borders, states are drawn into 
not weaker but denser interconnections and experience, if anything, greater 
pressure to exercise influence in the interests of accumulation in general, and of 
nationally-linked capitals in particular. As Bill Warren has observed (1972), 
increasing economic interdependence, because it makes for ‘greater uncertainty 
and new problems of economic control, forces the national States to become ever 
more active in their internal economies and their external economic relations’, 
even as their room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis MNCs narrows. With intensified 
internationalization of the circuits of capital, according to Stopford and Strange 
(1991), ‘the rivalry between states and the rivalry between firms for a secure 
place in the world economy has become much fiercer, much more intense.’ As a 
result, they argue, the relationships between firms and governments have tended 
to grow closer, as the latter ‘have come to realise their increased dependence on 
the scarce resources controlled by firms.’ With the post-war internationalization 
of the world economy, competitive pressures have forced states to dismantle 
‘state capitalist’ modes of intervention, especially where these take the form 
national monopolies, and yet maintain other interventionist methods as well as 
seeking new ones. 
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 The fourth factor is uneven and combined development. Just as 
innovations in the pooling of capital through banking and the joint stock 
company enabled US and German capitals to match and outmatch their British 
rivals, later industrializing economies such as Russia and Japan saw the state 
used as a lever for instituting land reform, marshalling resources, and 
concentrating capital. Following the mid-century waves of decolonization, many 
more countries attempted to follow suit. The NICs witnessed widespread state 
planning and ownership of key industries and government manipulation of 
currencies, trade and prices. Under the aegis of repressive regimes, state officials 
were often directly involved in the running of business, and promulgated 
conformist ideologies that stressed the need for hard work and deferred 
gratification. As Harris notes (1987:145), the growth of NICs of this type, 
including Indonesia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Brazil has been ‘just as much a 
triumph of state capitalism as [were] the achievements of the first Five Year Plans 
in the Soviet Union or the People’s Republic of China.’ In all these cases, as well 
as in many less industrialized Third World countries, states supervised the drive 
to ‘catch up’ with DMEs, the protection or even insulation of domestic capital 
from the world market, and acted as ‘binding agents’ between the (‘political’) 
interests of stability and security and the (‘economic’) interests of accumulation, 
as well as repressing workers’ struggles and other social movements. 
 The fifth factor, and that which has done most to promote the fusion of 
states and capital, is war and militarism. The two world wars in particular 
elicited comprehensive changes in the relation of states to capitals. The First 
World War, in Trotsky’s words, ‘severed’ the world economy ‘at its roots’ (Day 
1981:50). Maximum production and its coordination to serve the needs of war 
could best be achieved through state control. The states of the warring countries 
actively intervened in the control of labour. They organized the supply of raw 
materials and foodstuffs, and ordered factories to produce certain goods. They 
organized key sectors directly, such as coal, railways and arms. If necessary 
private firms were confiscated. Such phenomena prompted Bukharin (1987:155) 
to argue that war had forced ‘the bourgeoisie to adopt a new form of capitalism, 
to place production and distribution under state power’. This new phase, he 
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argued (Day 1981:35), involved the conversion of national economies into ‘state-
capitalist trusts’, ‘new Leviathan[s] beside which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes 
appears as a child’s toy.’ Although Bukharin overemphasized the tendency 
towards the generalization of the war-economic form, his insight — that this 
form could become established even in times of peace — was profound. 
 The same trend reached new heights during the Second World War. By 
1943 the state was responsible for 90% of all investment in the US. The British 
state’s share of GNP soared to 75% (Gough 1975:58). Following the war, defence 
outlays of the major economies remained relatively high. The arms economy 
became permanent. Although Washington’s ‘open door imperialism’ was largely 
aimed at prising open the world market, and involved opposition to at least the 
more extreme examples of state intervention elsewhere, the strategy itself 
entailed a massive degree of the same. Washington’s efforts ‘became totally 
enmeshed in attempts to reform, shore up or recreate an entire social system 
threatened by collapse and rebellion’ (MacKenzie 1983:53, paraphrasing Kolko 
and Kolko). The Cold War profoundly affected American and Soviet economic 
activity and that of the other players involved. It involved massive investment in 
defence at the expense of investment in civilian goods, and militarized societies 
to greater or lesser degrees. It necessitated aid and diplomacy in the interests of 
maintaining allies. It motivated the space race, not only in regard to the 
development of delivery systems but also to enhancing the nation’s ‘prestige’, in 
a geopolitical equivalent of ‘brand name’ development. With global arms 
spending remaining at historically unsurpassed levels, confounding hopes of 
post-1989 ‘peace dividends’, it is not far fetched to speak, with Anthony McGrew 





State Capitalism in the USSR 
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The five factors examined above interrelate in different ways. 1930s Germany, for 
example, experienced the effects of world economic crisis particularly starkly. 
Major German capitalists came to promote the amelioration of domestic 
devaluation through ensnaring the productive potential of adjoining parts of 
Central and Eastern Europe.38 Extending German domination in the region 
initially occurred ‘peacefully’, but ultimately depended upon military power. 
Military build up, in turn, accelerated the tendency towards direct state 
intervention that had already begun (under Brüning) with exchange and price 
controls. Under Hitler, market allocation was replaced to a great extent by 
‘planned’ state direction. 
 Similar structures were instituted in the USSR from the late 1920s.39 With 
the failure of the mass movements that flared worldwide in the decade following 
1917, the Bolshevik project lay in ruins. Military invasion and capital flight 
combined with civil war to wreck the economy and unleash slaughter, mainly 
through disease, upon the population. The social base of the revolution — the 
militant workers’ movement — was decimated and demoralized, drastically 
attenuating the socialist character of the State and CPSU. The CPSU began to 
distance itself from socialism, with the elevation of national development as its 
main priority. These developments reacted back onto the international level, 
with the (Moscow-based) Comintern encouraging fraternal Communist parties 
to subordinate themselves to Russia’s national interests. As Harris explains 
(1978:271-3), 
 
 To secure the survival of Russia as an independent national entity 
in a world dominated by advanced concentrations of capital [...], 
the Bolsheviks had to build the material basis of national 
independence, an independent economy. [However, the] 
accumulation of capital in conditions of national backwardness 
imposes a division of labour independently of the wishes of the 
participants, the more so, the more urgent the need to accumulate, 
— in Russia’s case, in order to catch up with its foreign rivals. [...] 
                                                          
     38 Sohn-Rethel (1987:49) notes that sections of German business and government were already 
advocating capital centralization by means of annexation — ‘the violent overthrow of the post-war 
Central European order’ — in 1932. 
     39 For a comparison between Germany and the USSR, see Temin (1991). 
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Regardless of the aspirations of the new State, its behaviour would 
be shaped by the historically appropriate task — accumulation. 
 
The logic of ‘socialism in one country’ was to commit the CPSU to reestablishing 
the very social relations to whose overthrow it had been pledged. 
 Inherited backwardness, war and socialist revolution had produced an 
extremely adverse set of circumstances for capital accumulation. Even when, by 
the late 1920s, the economic dislocations caused by war had largely been 
overcome, the rate of surplus extraction was still extremely low. The success of 
the producing classes in gaining control of land and bringing to power a party 
opposed to exploitation had resulted in a high rate of producers’ consumption 
and a relative equalization of incomes. This resulted in an extremely low savings 
ratio. The scarcity of investable surplus was exacerbated by the absence of 
foreign capital that had been of such central importance to accumulation under 
Tsarism. Conditions were extremely poor, and getting poorer, for accumulation. 
The bleak prospect was of slipping yet further behind rivals and succumbing, 
ultimately, to the impoverishing logic of indebtedness and foreign exchange 
strangulation (as described above). The CPSU had been swept to power by social 
movements that had since dissolved away, but whose legacy was a land unfit for 
accumulation. This unsustainable contradiction underlay the explosive crisis 
period of 1927-9. 
 By the late 1920s the holders of state power were in an extremely tight 
corner. The regime was internally divided, its room for manoeuvre in the 
economic sphere tightly constrained. It was beset by problems — including the 
resurgence of workers’ struggles. Unconfident, lacking any clear idea as to how 
to surmount its fundamental contradictions, government policy was reduced to 
reacting to dire problems with short-term solutions. The regime’s base became 
increasingly demoralized. The USSR displayed in 1927-9 all the symptoms of a 
revolutionary situation. And indeed, a revolution (‘from above’) did take place.40 
 ‘Stalin’s revolution’ was not intended. In Reiman’s words (Gluckstein 
1994:215), ‘[i]t is doubtful that Stalin consciously intended to create the social and 
                                                          
     40 For similar views on this point cf. Cliff (1974); also Tucker (1977), Reiman (1987), Rutland 
(1985:75,82), Fitzpatrick (1984). 
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state system so inseparably associated with his name’. Rather, dominant sections 
of the nomenklatura became convinced of the need to respond to foreign military 
and economic rivalry. The process happened in a haphazard manner. The 
growing conviction of key sections of the state apparatus that industrialization 
was required at any cost explains the resort to forced procurements of grain in 
1927-8, and the intensification of repression in the face of massive peasant 
resistance. The urgency of the task was intensified by the war scare that followed 
Britain’s abrogation of trade agreements in 1927. Stalin’s faction used war 
paranoia initially to subdue political rivals and, later, to intensify the 
nomenklatura’s domination over society and justify the strategy of forced 
industrialization. As the government’s strategy hardened around a strategy of 
industrialization regardless of the human cost, state repression was intensified. 
Policy became driven by the need to finance industrialization by raising the level 
of investable surplus. To do so required imposing state control over production. 
This entailed massive social change. As Reiman concludes (1987:50), ‘[t]he 
extraordinary measures enacted in response to the economic crisis began to 
change the pattern of economic and social relations’. 
 The political and social transformation of these years involved an extreme 
projection of political power into the economic realm (especially with the 
collectivization of the peasantry). Collectivization expropriated peasants of any 
significant independent means of production. An agriculture that had hitherto 
consisted largely of petty production — involving market relations but a 
considerable element of self-sufficiency — was, within a matter of years, 
subjugated under a single many-headed landlord. This was no feudal fusion of 
economics and politics. Rather, it involved a distinctly capitalist moment: the 
sundering of property from proletariat. The peasantry was thrust en masse onto 
the labour market (or into the Gulag). Whereas in 1928 individual peasant 
farmers comprised over 75% of the population, by 1939 their number had 
slumped to 2.6% (Rutland 1985:86). This enabled the proportion of ‘workers and 
employees’ to rocket from 18% to almost 50% in the same period 
(Chattopadhyay 1994:158), enabling the USSR’s share of world industrial output 
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to soar from 4 to 19 per cent (Chandler 1990:4). This was a surge of a scale not 
even approached by Germany and Japan, not to mention other DMEs. 
 What explains such an astonishing expansion drive? Essentially, as 
Bornstein contends (1966-7), ‘one need simply point to the desire of a totalitarian 
regime to mobilize the economy for rapid development and to maintain and 
enhance its internal and external power.’ But this ‘desire’, as Cliff (1964) and 
Kornai (1992:160-1) have argued, is the product of geopolitical competition in an 
uneven and combined world order. The Soviet ruling class — typically for ‘late 
arrivers’ — became dominated by an oppressive awareness of having fallen 
behind more developed rivals; their impatience to catch-up was reinforced by 
military and defence considerations. The entire Soviet economy was driven by 
the imperative of matching foreign capital and military force. Thus, the same 
historical transformation that ‘married the state and capital’ (Haynes 1985:110) 
simultaneously ‘completed the subordination of the Soviet economy to the world 
economy’. Initially at least, the key form of competition was military — the arms 
race of the 1930s between the USSR and, most obviously, Germany and, later, the 
USA. To compete with Great Powers entailed matching their productivity. As 
Nigel Harris puts it (1983:170), 
 
 The arms race becomes a powerful factor defining the entirety of 
domestic activity — the more so, the more backward a country is. 
For the Soviet Union, contesting world supremacy with the most 
powerful single national State, the United States, from a position of 
relative economic weakness, the imperative becomes very 
powerful indeed, shaping all other subsidiary decisions down to 
how much investment should be devoted to agriculture. 
 
Military competition from a position of backwardness during an epoch of 
autarchy stamped the USSR with its characteristic ‘war economic’ form — 
relative autarchy, a high degree of industrial concentration, an emphasis on 
heavy industry, and a high savings ratio.41 
                                                          
     41 Lange (1969:171) wrote that the STE ‘can be described as sui generis war economy’, characterized by 
the mobilization of all resources towards one basic purpose, the centralization of the disposal of resources 
to avoid leakages to non-essential purposes, allocation by administrative decision, extensive use of 
political incentives and ideological appeals to increase productivity, and so forth. For earlier comparisons 
of state capitalism and war economy see Bukharin (1982), Cliff (1964). 
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 The trend to close-knit relations or even fusion between states and capitals 
was not ‘freely chosen’ by state leaders, but was strongly determined by the 
environment: the stage of development of productive forces; geopolitical 
competition; uneven development; and the dynamics of class struggle.42 The 
USSR marked the most extreme example of this trend. Its war-economic form 
was no historical digression, but the result of a peculiar condensation of those 
secular trends and specific conjunctures that saw the period from 1914 to the 
1950s witness a breakdown in world trade and great leaps forward for direct and 
indirect state intervention. It could pioneer the trend because, as Harman points 
out (1988:8), in Russia ‘the already weak forces of private capital had been 
smashed in the aftermath of 1917’, and because, as in Germany under Hitler, the 
state’s repressive apparatus was being exercised to the full in the demolition of 
the workers’ movement and civil society. 
 As regards the GDR, it belonged to what Winiecki (1986) describes as 
‘Soviet-type economies’. These were capitalist. The central mode of surplus 
extraction was the exploitation of (urban and rural) workers by the nomenklatura. 
Wage labour was, essentially, free.43 Most evinced a high level of state ownership 
of industry, although for many (such as Vietnam) its level was comparable with 
supposedly ‘market capitalist’ counterparts (such as Malaysia). The Eastern 
European STEs, including East Germany, arose upon autarkic, étatiste 
foundations that were laid during the Great Depression and under Nazi 
occupation (Harman 1988, Gross 1997). Ideologically, as Harris has shown 
(1971a), the main features of ‘Communism’ were similar to corporate 
conservatism, notably the strong emphasis on national, corporate and social 
                                                          
     42 This is particularly worth stating given the prevalent assumption in the literature on globalization 
that ‘national’ and state-led development strategies were ‘freely chosen’, whereas subsequent neo-liberal 
structures of accumulation are determined by global market forces. See, for example, Strange (1996:75). 
     43 This is not the place to enter the debate over the question of free wage labour in the STEs. For that, 
see e.g. Callinicos (1981) and Haynes (n.d.). Suffice it to say here that a considerable degree of labour 
mobility existed in the post-war STEs. For example, as Aganbegyan describes (in Chattopadhyay 
1994:135) ‘[e]very worker in the USSR can leave his job at two weeks’ notice. He then has the unrestricted 
right to compete for other jobs.’ In East Germany labour contracts were very similar to those in DMEs. 
Although firing workers was usually, in practice, difficult, the pattern of wages and bonuses was 
essentially determined by demand, as in DMEs under full employment (cf. Zander 1974). 
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security, class harmony, the common interest of all in the status quo, nationalism, 
and meritocracy.44 
 
PART FOUR — Political Crisis and Conflict 
 
Capitalism, like any other mode of production may be conceived as an evolving 
differentiated totality. In capitalism, however, each of these characteristics — 
change, unevenness, and totality — is particularly pronounced. It is an especially 
dynamic system, and extraordinarily uneven across space and time. Its totalizing 
imperative tends towards the subordination of all aspects of society and all 
nooks and crannies of the planet under the logic of capital. It is a system marked 
by intensive inter- and intra-class struggle. In Shaikh’s words (1990a:75), 
 
 capitalism as a form of social organization pits each element 
against the other in a generalized climate of conflict: capitalist 
against worker in the labour process, worker against worker in the 
competition for jobs, capitalist against capitalist in the battle for 
market position and sales, and nation against nation in the world 
market. Like the class struggle, these other conflicts also 
periodically erupt into acute and open combat between the 
participants, whether it be the battles of strikers against scabs, or 
capitalists against their rivals, or even of world wars between one 
set of capitalist nations and another. 
 
And it is a system that is, in Harvey’s words (1982:103), ‘inherently unstable and 
crisis-prone’.45 ‘The insatiable quest on the part of capitalists to appropriate 
surplus value’, he continues, ‘impels perpetual revolutions in the productive 
forces. But these revolutions create conditions that are inconsistent with the 
further accumulation of capital and the reproduction of class relations.’ The 
result is crisis. Although each individual crisis may, Harvey continues, ‘be 
resolved through a radical re-structuring of productive forces and social 
                                                          
     44 See also Moore (1956:416); Ray (1996:54). 
     45 In the following, the term crisis is used loosely to designate rough, tense, troubled, fraught periods 
of history. For more differentiated analysis of the various modes and tempi of crisis, see Gramsci (1971), 
Day (1981) and Hay (1995). 
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relations, the underlying source of conflict is never eliminated. New 
contradictions arise which generate ever more general forms of crisis.’ 
 In every aspect of capitalist development, rhythms of reproduction and 
crisis, of stability and instability, of order and conflict can be perceived. 
Economies go through cycles of boom and slump. They experience longer-term 
fluctuations, for instance in the pace of growth of GDP or prices. Industrial 
relations witness periods of relative ‘industrial peace’ when struggle is 
dampened and contained, punctuated by strike waves and what David Gordon 
(1980:13) calls ‘spreading brushfires’ of militancy. As society changes, the vitality 
of certain forms of organization, or the stability of certain forms of behaviour, is 
undermined. Organizational change tends to concentrate in periods of crisis. 
Crises form, in Debray’s phrase (1973:99), ‘strategic points’ in historical time; they 
are ‘"epoch-making" events in the sense that they mark the culmination of one 
process and the beginning of another.’ Crisis situations bring underlying 
contradictions to the awareness of collective political actors and, perhaps, of 
wider populations too. They seem to demand some sort of change — whether 
this be interpreted in terms of restructuring and reorganization or wholesale 
change. They are moments of disruption but also of transition and 
transformation. 
 Polities and international relations go through periods of crisis followed 
by some form of ‘settlement’ and either relative stability or what Gramsci (1971) 
terms ‘catastrophic equilibrium’. Those political forces that succeed in bringing a 
crisis period to a settlement tend to dominate the ensuing period until new 
contradictions come to the fore.46 Political crises unfold in the form of dramatic 
narratives in which events are central. If social structures may be described, with 
Sahlins (1987), as ‘historical objects’ that exist through events, then structural 
transformations pivot on what William Sewell (1996:844) terms ‘historical 
events’. An historical event is defined as ‘(i) a ramified sequence of occurrences 
that (ii) is recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (iii) results in a 
durable transformation of structures.’ ‘Rupture’ at a local scale or in one sphere 
                                                          
     46 As Therborn puts it (1980:201) (unconsciously borrowing from Poulantzas), ‘[a] realignment which 
resolves one particular crisis is frozen into the structure of the polity as a pack of solid ice; in a new crisis, 
however, this tends to crack up and melt away.’ 
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may well remain localized if stability reigns at higher levels and/or in other 
spheres. But if the latter are themselves in crisis, with the dominant powers’ 
repertoires of crisis management facing exhaustion, a local ‘rupture’ may trigger 
cascades, (or ‘cumulations’) of crises in other spheres and at higher scales (Tilly 
1985:610; Hay 1996:108). A mere ‘rupture’ becomes a ‘historical event’, for Sewell 
(1996:843), ‘when it touches off a chain of occurrences that durably transforms 
previous structures and practices.’ Historical events operate at particular scales, 
dislocating and rearticulating structures. They interconnect with other events in 
different spheres or regions of society. 
 Crisis in one sphere or one region affects the whole system. The crisis of 
capitals, as Harvey describes (1982:311), may begin as ‘private’ affairs, with the 
bankruptcies of individual firms and the stockpiling of unsold commodities but 
quickly ramifies into wider social spheres through unemployment, the 
diminished circulation of revenues, and so on. Economic crisis may 
simultaneously spill over into ideological crisis.47 Economic crisis and 
restructuring interrelate with the policy and organization of states. Most 
obviously, as Burnham puts it (1995:150), ‘capitalist crisis confronts the national 
state in terms of declining national productivity and fiscal crisis.’48 Economic 
and/or fiscal crisis in one major territory may provoke domestic political crisis 
and economic restructuring which, in turn, impact upon the world economy and 
international relations. The condition of one sphere may promote a similar state 
in others. To take an example from European history, Charles Maier (1987:179) 
has observed that, 
 
 The notable eras of European stabilization — the generation after 
Utrecht, for example, or the half-century after Vienna — have been 
periods of class equilibrium and international compromise 
                                                          
     47 In capitalism, to borrow Habermas’s (unfortunately mechanical) example (1973:47), ‘[e]conomic 
crisis is immediately transformed into social crisis; for, in unmasking the opposition of social classes, it 
provides a practical critique of the ideology of the market’s pretension to be free of power.’ 
     48 Harvey’s description of (1982:153) fiscal crisis as ‘the means whereby the discipline of capital can 
ultimately be imposed on any state apparatus that remains within the orbit of capitalist relations of 
production’ is pertinent, given the discussion above of the ‘shadow subsumption’ of state policy under 
the logic of accumulation. 
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simultaneously. The configurations of power amongst states tend 
to second those within societies.49 
 
 The contribution of Marxist crisis theory to theorizing modern world 
history is not confined to explicating the interaction of different elements of the 
system within the ‘conjunctural’ dimension of ‘historical events’. It is the 
‘structuring’ of ‘conjunctural’ crisis that forms the core of Marxist literature on 
the subject. One famous example is Gramsci’s conception of ‘organic crisis’, in 
which, as paraphrased by Callinicos (1989:94), ‘the underlying contradictions 
"mature", forcing the ruling class to struggle to "cure" them, or at least to limit 
their effects, faced with the constant threat of "social disintegration", or even 
revolution, if it fails.’ More generally, the workings of and obstacles to the 
TROPF powerfully condition the course of world history. The deliberate and 
unintended attempts by capitals and states to bolster countervailing tendencies 
to the TROPF affect the world system, often in unpredictable ways. For example, 
as Grossmann observes (1992:133), attempts to restore profitability impel 
capitalists towards ‘recasting trade relations on the world market (international 
cartels, cheaper sources of raw material supply and so on).’ In the case of the 
Great Depression of the late nineteenth century, falling profitability provoked a 
widespread shift towards capital centralization and protectionism. War, followed 
by the Depression of the 1930s, provoked a further global shift towards autarky 
and étatism. In tackling these issues, David Harvey (1985:156), following Lenin, 
emphasizes the interpenetration of economic crisis with ‘economic, political and 
military struggles between nation states.’ For Harvey, capitalism continually 
evades and overcomes obstacles through various forms of ‘spatial fix’ (1985:156). 
In the long run it is also punctuated by  
 
 intense "switching crises", cataclysmic moments that reshape the 
whole geography of capital accumulation, break down rigid spatial 
structures and regional class alliances, even undermine the power 
of state formations and reconstitute them all in a new geographic 
configuration that can better accommodate the powerful 
                                                          
     49 Maier’s insight is similar to that developed by Trotsky (1972a), viz., that periods of instability tend to 
affect the economy, international relations, and politics, as well as industrial relations, each being part of 
a differentiated ensemble. 
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expansionary, conflictual and technological dynamic of 
[accumulation] 
 
If the word ‘expansionary’ is disregarded, this quote may read as a prediction of 
the dissolution of the Soviet imperium. Harvey, however, was probably thinking 
of war as the classic example of a ‘switching crisis’. Imperialist war, as Lenin and 
Bukharin argued, develops on the basis of contradictions between dynamically 
uneven accumulation on the global scale and its organization under the auspices 
of national (or imperial) polities. Lenin perceived that wars parallel economic 
crises in the sense that they temporarily resolve disequilibria of power, through 
alleviating disproportionalities of geopolitical hegemony. Wars redistribute 
surplus. They shift the burdens of devaluation onto losers and protect the 
accumulated value of victors. Moreover, as Grossmann observes (1992:50), by 
offsetting the TROPF they provide a means of ‘prolonging the existence of the 
capitalist system as a whole’. 
 
The Politics of Crisis 
 
Crises in whatever form put the spotlight on states, as the organizations that 
assume overall responsibility for the management of inter-capital relations, the 
management of population, property and territory, as well as their own inter-
relations. Whatever the source of crisis, states are obliged to at least attempt to 
develop strategies for crisis management. Bourgeois democracies — with their 
institutionalized and regularized regime changes, and at least token 
incorporation of the masses into the political process — seem particularly well 
adapted to the task, but it may nonetheless raise difficult, if not intractable 
problems. As Habermas observes (1976), crisis management may simply lead to 
the displacement of difficulties from one site to another. For example, arms 
spending connected to the suppression of a border dispute may catalyze a wider 
arms race; easing credit to enable competing demands to be funded may fuel 
inflation and, in turn, economic instability. Generally, the repercussions of crises 
tend to breed instability. Economic crises illuminate and exacerbate uneven 
relations of power and wealth. Some property owners gain at the expense of 
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others. Savers see their futures evaporate and workers lose their jobs. Acrimony 
amongst ruling classes intensifies. Major crises spawn intra-ruling class disputes 
over strategy, which themselves provoke revelations of mismanagement and 
corruption. In such conditions, the potential for serious political conflict grows. 
Rulers’ visible weakness, together with the fact that future trajectories are less 
certain, elicits the raising of political questions throughout society. Challengers 
may organize, both within and without the polity. The ‘political opportunity 
structure’ alters. 
 At such times, writes Rosa Luxemburg (1970:186) ‘when the social 
foundations and the walls of class society are shaken and subjected to a constant 
process of disarrangement’ even a ‘partial little conflict between labor and 
capital’ can ‘grow into a general explosion’. This in turn may intensify the splits 
and confusion amongst the ruling class, and can turn a smouldering ‘passive’ 
crisis into an ‘open’ one. Luxemburg’s analysis was pioneering in that it drew 
attention to the uneven pattern of workers’ struggle. As Cronin (1979:11) 
remarks, ‘strikes tend to fluctuate together in all industries, to cluster and bunch 
up in several, relatively short, periods of time.’ Industrial struggle proceeds 
through irregularly alternating periods on the one hand of relative stability or 
‘pacification of class conflict’ and on the other of ‘resurgence of class conflict.’ A 
similar argument applies to social movements in general. Tilly (1995:25) 
identifies a ‘jagged rhythm’ of collective action. Tilly, Tarrow (1994) and others 
show that mass protest movements tend to come in ‘bursts’ — phases 
 
 of heightened conflict and contention across the social system that 
include: a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized 
to less mobilized sectors; a quickened pace of innovation in the 
forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; 
[...] and sequences of intensified interaction between challengers 
and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes 
revolution’ (Tarrow 1994:154). 
 
These are, moreover, ‘major watersheds of social and political change,’ and are 
frequently international in scope. New ideas are born, along with innovations in 
the repertoire of collective action. Such situations tend to be ‘crucibles’ in which 
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new protest movements emerge. If they provoke a ‘cascade’ of crisis symptoms, 
the result can be a conflagration of popular consciousness of crisis, mass social 
movements, and concomitant transformations of collective identities.50 
 
The Drama of Crisis 
 
Crisis involves lived experience, and — at least the acute, ‘open’, politicized sort 
— takes dramatic form. Crises are moments when ‘alternativity’ expands. As 
Barker (1996:13), paraphrasing Shanin, explains, 
 
 quite long periods of time pass when life appears bound to cycles 
of simple reproduction. Fundamental change seems improbable, 
the dominant images in society are of repetition and stability, and 
what [Shanin] nicely terms "the alternativity of history" is low. 
Then, relatively occasionally but often suddenly, there occurs an 
"axial" stage, 
 
in which established institutions are rocked, habits are broken, common sense 
stereotypes overturned, all bets are off. ‘In such moments, "alternativity" grows 
dramatically and the room for political creativity and choice expands. The 
outcome of such "axial" situations may then set the pattern of society for a whole 
succeeding period.’ 
 Debray (1973) has made an imaginative attempt to convey the dramatic 
nature of political crisis in theoretical terms. He depicts crisis situations as 
characterized by a special ‘density’, because the fate of ‘what is at stake’ is 
determined within a peculiarly ‘condensed’ period of time, and because human 
agency is decisive (1973:113). Crisis ‘sums up a complex past, and prefigures a 
period still to come.’ There is a ‘sudden contraction of past and future times into 
the present’. In crises the relationship between objective and subjective, Debray 
argues (1973:113), metamorphoses in strange ways. In his phrase crises are 
‘objectively over-determined, while subjectively indeterminate’. The underlying 
structural contradictions which precipitate crisis become highlighted, and indeed 
may carry the aura of inevitability, but equally striking is the role of ‘agency’ as 
                                                          
     50 On the different scales of class consciousness, see Gramsci (1971:181). 
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the crucial factor in determining which of many possible roads is taken. ‘One 
mistake, one false step, one error that would not normally matter at all, may 
become irreparable in a time of crisis’, he asserts (1973:114-5), ‘because it occurs 
in the place and at the time the condensation is happening.’ 
 Crises are climactic periods in which underlying contradictions seem to 
crystallize. They irrupt into the routine. In such periods the relations of social 
forces are illuminated through their dramatic interactions. ‘This mutual 
discovery’, Debray continues (1973:121), ‘reveals to each of the forces involved its 
own identity, by revealing to it the resistance and nature of the opposing force.’ 
The boundaries establishing allies and opponents appear more clearly. The 
possibility, urgency and indeterminacy of change make for fertile soil for political 
entrepreneurs to set about creating or galvanizing collective actors. The 
consciousness of crisis, in Burckhardt’s phrase (1943:269), 
 
 flashes like an electric spark over hundreds of miles and the most 
diverse peoples, who, for the rest, hardly know of each other’s 
existence. The message goes through the air, and, in the one thing 
that counts all men are suddenly of one mind, even if only in a 
blind conviction: Things must change. 
 
 As Colin Hay (following d’Hart and Habermas) emphasizes (1996:89), 
crises are ‘discursively mediated’. They are not simply reflections of objective 
contradictions but are experienced and interpreted in different ways. Contending 
actors propose different interpretations of the crisis (why and how it is occurring) 
and propose different strategies to its resolution, different alternative trajectories. 
Proffered strategies are fought over. Outcomes are often presented in retrospect 
as inevitable but rarely seem so at the time. Rather, crisis is experienced, 
typically, as radically indeterminate. For, Debray contends (1973:110), it is the 
product of ‘a unique fusion of contradictions, in which the [fundamental] 
contradiction itself becomes determined by a welter of elements of all kinds, 
which bring it to its breaking-point.’ When crisis arrives it ‘upsets all our plans 
and prearranged strategies, catching up on them from behind’. It is clear that 
vital changes in direction, historical leaps or sidesteps are about to occur, but 
 69 
which way, or whether movement will stall into ‘catastrophic equilibrium’ is still 
very open. Political leaders (1973:110), 
 
 get the sense that their hand is being forced, because a crisis pushes 
them into making choices, following lines, making certain breaks 
that they deplore. Crises, with their actor-victims, never radiate 
glory, never appear as great historical necessities. [...] The epic only 




Undoubtedly there are aspects of this discussion of crisis that are transhistorical 
in nature. For example, pre-capitalist political philosophers were familiar with 
and interested in the crises that marked passages between regimes of 
‘democracy, oligarchy and tyranny’, and between ‘servitude and liberty’ (cf. 
Aristotle 1981; Machiavelli 1970). Nevertheless, certain aspects have arisen with 
the development of capitalism. One such is the regularity and frequency of 
economic crisis. Under European feudalism major (‘general’) crises occurred 
roughly every two centuries and were limited in geographical extent. Under 
capitalism, by contrast, periodic crises occur roughly every seven to twelve years. 
‘General’ crises have occurred several times each century, and these are 
increasingly global in extent. A second feature of capitalist crisis is the systematic 
way in which modern ‘muscular’ states attempt to manage the repercussions of 
economic crisis. Finally, the role of agency in general and of mass participation in 
particular has matured. As Callinicos observes (1989:229), a secular shift has 
occurred in the balance ‘between the role played by structural contradictions and 
conscious human agency in resolving organic crises’, which ‘has shifted from the 
former to the latter in the course of the past 1,500 years.’ With the rise and 
expansion of capitalism over the course of the last 500 years, this movement has 
accelerated sharply. 
 The final chapters of this thesis examine the role of collective actors — 
notably the SED leadership, the ‘Citizens’ Movement’, and the ‘crowds’ — in the 
events of 1989. To understand why these actors behaved in the way they did, 
however, the development of East German society, notably the class 
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contradictions between nomenklatura and working class and between East 
German capital and its foreign competitors, must be explored. To begin with, in 
chapter three, the stage is set with an investigation into the peculiar nature of the 
STEs, their situation within an evolving geo-economic and geopolitical 
environment, and the causes of their systemic crisis the became manifest in the 
1980s. 
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 Chapter Three: Expansion and Crisis of the STEs 
If chapter two discussed the dynamics of global capitalism at, on the whole, a 
high level of abstraction, this chapter homes in on post-war Eastern Europe. The 
rise and fall of the STEs, notably the USSR itself, forms the backdrop against 
which the history of East Germany must be placed. The revolution of 1989 was 
one component in a wider revolutionary process that, arguably, began in Gdansk 
in 1980 and concluded in Moscow in 1991. 
 The chapter begins with an examination of the geopolitical post-war 
settlement, which was frozen into place during the Cold War competition of the 
late 1940s. It investigates the strengths and weaknesses of the war-economic 
structures of accumulation which were imposed, in their ‘STE’ version, 
throughout the USSR’s imperial domain. The characteristic features of the STE 
form were, economically, an unusually high degree of domestic monopolization 
and state ownership of industry, and state control of international economic 
exchange, and, politically, the extraordinary degree to which structures of 
accumulation were bound together under highly centralized, dictatorial 
command. It was a social form that proved relatively well adapted to organizing 
the conditions for capital accumulation in late developing economies during a 
relatively autarkic stage in world capitalist development. However, structures 
that emerged in response to these circumstances became obstacles to 
accumulation as conditions altered. STEs were forced to reform and adapt to 
domestic and international change. Due to the USSR’s experience of relative 
economic and geopolitical success, due to the tight-knit interdependence of STE 
structures of accumulation (in particular the politicized nature of economic 
restructuring), and due to their relative insularity, the STEs’ basic structures 
proved difficult to reform. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the 
symptoms of terminal crisis that afflicted the Soviet Bloc from the early 1980s, 
including relative economic decline, Polish Communism’s Pyrrhic victory over 





Cold War and Bloc Formation 
 
The outcome of World War Two reinforced the distinctive ‘war economic’ 
structures of the USSR. Obviously, the sheer fact of its triumph over a far more 
advanced power attested to the potency of Soviet-type structures of 
accumulation. Moreover, geopolitical manoeuvring occurred in such a way as to 
promote their replication in the conquered territories of Eastern Europe. 
 On the basis of closer historical links and shared structures of 
accumulation, the Western allies established particularly close bonds even before 
the end of the war (Kolko 1990:23). With victory new antagonisms emerged. 
These were expressed, notably, through disputes over the spoils of war. The war 
had seen the US leap to global economic and military preeminence. 
Washington’s geo-economic and geopolitical strategy shifted away from 
isolationism and towards an external offensive aimed at forging an Atlantic-
based world economy and political alliance. As Kees van der Pijl argues 
(1984:28), the vision was of the US as core of an Atlantic corporate liberal bloc, 
exerting hegemony over the defeated European powers. For its part, the USSR 
had massively extended its regional sway. The conquest of Eastern Europe, and 
the likelihood of a neutral or friendly Germany, brought the promise of a 
strategic ‘buffer zone’ as well as economic benefits. 
 Despite broad agreement at Yalta, Tehran and Potsdam, the aspirations of 
the victors tended to clash. Each side feared that an undesirably large portion of 
Europe might swing under the influence of the other. As Binns puts it (1983:21): 
 
 From the American rulers’ side their exclusion from eastern 
Europe (and then from China) was not something that they had 
fought a war for. From the Russian side too, the reemergence of an 
anti-Russian alliance of America, western Europe, and, worst of all, 
a reinvigorated and rearmed west Germany, was something that 
their whole wartime politics had been devised to prevent. 
 
Exacerbated by fears of instability and economic crisis, the consequence was a 
sequence of ‘security dilemmas’ (Parrish 1997), in which the — entirely rational 
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— fear of losing recently-gained influence or territory to the other side prompted 
each to interpret the other’s actions as offensive, and to react accordingly. For 
instance, when a speech by Stalin referred, in a conventional and vague manner, 
to the danger of renewed war, a senior American official, George Kennan, 
interpreted the words as a declaration of hostile intent (Ascherson 1998). 
 The crucial turning points towards Cold War were the Marshall Plan and 
the (concurrent) tightening of Soviet hegemony over Czechoslovakia. Marshall 
Plan aid was designed, primarily, to weld together an Atlantic alliance and 
temper the autarkic instincts of the European powers; secondarily, to avert 
domestic slump; and only as a subordinate, even tentative, aim, to undermine 
Soviet rule in Eastern Europe.51 The USSR quite understandably took this third 
aim most seriously. It responded by denying Eastern Europe access to Marshall 
aid, establishing the Cominform, and consolidating its hold on Eastern Europe (a 
process which included the Gleichschaltung of the German Soviet Zone).52 
 The Cold War thus began with the uneven slicing of the post-war world 
order. On the one hand, the Western powers swung yet further into the US orbit, 
bringing vital markets for its flagging (and demobilizing) economy. With 
Western Europe bound to the US, an Atlantic economy formed. As van der Pijl 
suggests (1984:28), the Atlantic economy formed the backbone of a series of US 
hegemonic offensives: it was ‘the essential axis along which the 
internationalization of US capital, the generalization of its most advanced mode 
of accumulation, as well as the restructuration of class relations it presumed, took 
shape.’ Using its economic and military prowess, the US pried influence from the 
European powers, and buttressed its global preeminence through networks of 
military alliances (NATO, CENTO, SEATO). 
 Against that, the USSR’s hegemony was geographically delimited and 
based largely upon military prowess alone — its blocking of Marshall aid to 
                                                          
     51 The three aims were not, of course, distinct. As one senior US official put it (Armstrong et al. 1991): ‘If 
these areas are allowed to spiral downwards into economic anarchy, then at best they will drop out of the 
United States’ orbit and try an independent nationalistic policy; at worst they will swing into the Russian 
orbit. We will then face the world alone. What will be the cost, in dollars and cents of our armaments and 
our economic isolation? I do not see how we could possibly avoid a depression far greater than that of 1929-
32 and crushing taxes to pay for the direct commitments we should be forced to make around the world’. 
     52 An additional factor contributing to these decisions was the vehemence with which the US imposed its 
interests upon Italy (cf. Binns 1983). 
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Eastern Europe symbolized its economic weakness as much as political and 
military strength. Many of the USSR’s newly-gained dominions were backward 
in world terms yet more advanced than their conqueror. They could only be 
maintained as ‘allies’, ultimately, by direct political incorporation into the Soviet-
ruled ‘bloc’. The curious result was a weak imperium, its regional hegemony 




The Kremlin’s goals were determined by the need to maintain military parity 
with its advanced rivals. In Joseph Berliner’s words (1988:162): 
 
 [I]f we are to capture faithfully the aims of the Soviet and Chinese 
elite then we must accord first place to military defence, and 
derivatively to heavy industry, as the aim of economic 
development. [...] the military and heavy industry attainments of 
the advanced capitalist countries are the principal goal towards 
which development has been directed. 
 
In part, the priority given to heavy industry accorded with world trends of the 
period, in part it reflected modern military dependence upon metal and 
chemicals. Although these priorities applied primarily to the USSR, they were 
transposed onto its allies. Thus, in the GDR, according to a top economic 
functionary (in Villain 1990:90), ‘military-political considerations were a decisive 
factor in the emphasis on the development of heavy industry’, which was 
strongly promoted from the early 1950s onwards (despite the GDR’s traditional, 
resource-related weakness in that sector). Economic policy favoured the 
producer goods sector, for example by means of the slanting of the price 
mechanism to keep prices for producer goods artificially low. In the USSR the 
share of consumer goods branches in total production declined sharply after the 





Table 3.1 Share of consumer goods branches in total production, USSR (per cent, 
from Flaherty (1992:125)). 
1928 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1986 
60.5 38.8 31.2 27.5 26.6 26.2 24.7 
 
 Similarly, in East Germany the growth rate of producer goods steadily 
outpaced that of consumer goods (Table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2 Growth rates of producer and consumer goods sectors, GDR (per cent, 
from Winiecki (1988:41)). 
 1960-5 1965-70 1970-5 1975-80 
Producer 37 41 39 29 
Consumer 27 25 33 23 
 
 As Kuron and Modzelewski (1969) observe, the goal of production in 
STEs was not, fundamentally, the profit of each particular enterprise but the 
appropriation of surplus product on the national scale. It was above all the 
Party’s task to organize the binding of each individual economic unit (and each 
element of society) into the national whole.53 A key aspect here was the 
management of labour. This task encompassed the provision of subsidized basic 
consumer goods to assure at least minimal welfare; the atomization of the 
working class and denial of independent representation of workers’ interests; 
and the promotion of a siege atmosphere and military-style campaigns, which 
were intended to achieve greater sacrifice from the workforce. In short, the Party 
acted as a ‘binding agent’ which strove to lash various social groups and 
institutions into a national corporate unity. The purpose was the remorseless 
subordination of society to the goal of accumulation, together with its necessary 
conditions of social and political stability.  
 Macroeconomic structures were bent to the same ends. A combination of 
‘taut plans’ and ‘soft budget constraint’ encouraged investment, especially in 
producer industries. Plans were not drawn up according to the procedure of 
                                                          
     53 See also Lockwood (1998, chapter five). 
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assessing actual economic activity, followed by a projection of possible growth 
rates to form the basis for setting targets. Rather, the reverse was the case: high 
targets were set, especially in the producer goods and military sectors, with the 
aim of forcing up growth rates (Filtzer 1986:40). Ultimately, targets were 
determined by the imperative of matching the scale of production and level of 
technology of rivals. In Harman’s words (1984:112) ‘The scale of resources going 
to each investment project is determined, not by what the national economy can 
sustain, but by what international competition demands.’54 In Berliner’s words, 
(1988:161), there are numerous ‘pieces of evidence to show that the concrete 
targets of the [Soviet] Five Year Plans were drawn up with the image of the 
capitalist countries prominently in view.’ 
 If taut planning acted as a positive factor encouraging investment, a 
permissive factor was that state ownership of enterprise involved the socialization 
of surplus appropriation which therefore ‘softened’ a firm’s ‘budget constraint’. 
This meant, in Janos Kornai’s words (1986:24), that ‘nothing keeps the firm from 
investment. Investment risk has ceased.’ Firms need not fear liquidation if they 
made investment mistakes, hence the restraints upon expansion were limited 
and ‘investment hunger’ prevailed. As Kornai puts it (1992:163), generalized soft 
budget constraint encouraged the ‘animal spirits’ of capital. In consequence, high 
rates of investment were characteristic of the STEs. In the 1960s, for example, 
Paul Gregory (1970:144) found that investment as a proportion of GNP 
compared favourably with a basket of DMEs, including high-investors such as 
Japan, West Germany and Norway. The STEs scored 27.8%, the latter only 22.9%. 
 Although these mechanisms operated through the despotic centring of 
economic power, national ‘planning’ was itself a competitive process. 
Competition characterized the relationships between the various STEs, between 
central planners and managers, between managers and workers, and between 
workers on the labour market.55 The planning process centred on competitive 
                                                          
     54 Subsidiary causes of taut planning were (i) the attempt by planners to compensate for the fact that 
managers hoarded inputs in the expectation of difficult targets; (ii) the fact that plans were developed at 
different organizational levels, with the careers of plan-setting officials at each level dependent upon the 
success of subsidiary layers. This resulted in the amplification of high targets (cf. Berliner 1988). 
     55 See Gerschenkron (1962:286), Lockwood (1998). 
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bargaining (Przeworski 1991:142; Fernandez 1997:121); it was ‘characterised by 
negotiations and disputes that [were] fraught with conflict and plagued with 
departmental selfishness, which result[ed] from the individual bureaucratic 
interests of the state bodies and from the scarcity of available means’ 
(Hamel/Leipold 1987:283). On the ministerial, sectoral, and enterprise levels, 
competition for inputs occurred in three key areas: on the labour market; over 
the allocation of investment resources (notably by currying favour with officials 
during the process of ‘plan-bargaining’); and between buying firms for inputs 
from sellers (especially in the ‘grey’ markets of inter-enterprise barter). Planning 
was reactive, not ex ante. In Eugene Zaleski’s words (in Bideleux 1985:142) 
‘[w]hat actually exists [in STEs] as in any centrally administered economy, is an 
endless number of plans, constantly evolving, which are coordinated ex post’. In 
the USSR plans were constantly readjusted, often dramatically (Wilhelm 1979). In 
East Germany the plan was overhauled four times in 1951-4; the 1956-60 plan 
only became law in December 1957 and was discontinued in 1959; the 1959-65 
plan was discarded in 1962; the 1964-70 plan only became law in 1967 and was 
revamped in 1968 ... and so on (Zwass 1984; Bentley 1984). The STE may thus be 
conceived, in Patrick Flaherty’s phrase (1992:120,130), as a conjunction of ‘plan 
anarchy’ and ‘laissez faire corporatism’, where a command-administrative centre 
strove to mobilize ‘a confederacy of competing and colluding economic subunits’ 
behind an overarching accumulation strategy. 
 
Crisis, Inflexibility and Waste 
 
The ‘tautness’ of planning, resting on the contradiction between aim of matching 
DMEs and the reality of relative backwardness, gave distinctive forms to the 
overaccumulation and disproportions that characterize the business cycle, and to 
the nature of inefficiency and waste.56 
 ‘[T]he drive for maximum economic growth and the great emphasis on 
the preferential growth of producer goods (in which military goods play an 
                                                          
     56 The latter terms are notoriously hard to define. Their use here does not include non-productive 
expenditure such as arms spending and luxury consumption of the nomenklatura. 
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important role)’, as Jan Adam explains (1979:xvii), is a strategy which entailed 
‘stepping up the investment ratio to a level which can be rightfully called over-
investment.’ At that level barriers to growth occurred. The symptoms included 
some or all of the following: exacerbated shortages of raw materials, capital 
goods or labour; debt and balance of payments difficulties; severe disruptions in 
the process of economic coordination; and consumer goods shortages (which 
may provoke open popular discontent). In response to signals of impending 
crisis, planners were forced to put many projects on hold, in order to free 
resources for priority investments (usually those in the capital goods sector). 
Severe bottlenecks resulted, as enterprises and retail outlets suffered from the 
absence of allocated goods. Once prioritized projects began production, however, 
more resources were released, and economic downturn gave way to boom. In 
turn, plan targets were forced up, and the cycle continued.57  Shortages were 
not merely a symptom of the apex of the business cycle, but were endemic. They 
resulted from the combination of three characteristics of STEs: investment 
hunger, the weakness of restructuring mechanisms, and the bias towards 
production with relatively little regard to cost. Managers coped with shortages, 
supply problems and the resulting climate of uncertainty in four ways. One was 
the attempt to compensate for irregular supplies through ‘campaign’ techniques 
(notably ‘storming’). These, however, tended to lower the quality of output, thus 
worsening problems for buyers. Second, with comparatively little need to worry 
about the relation of costs to revenues, managers were able to counter 
unrealizable targets and unreliable supplies by disguising figures, inflating 
requirements, and hoarding resources (raw materials, components, workers).58 
However, hoarding workers exacerbated the generalized labour shortage which 
was such an enduring obstacle to attempts to raise rates of exploitation. ‘[L]ike 
the two arms of a nutcracker’, as Cliff puts it (1964:262), high output targets 
combined with unreliable or insufficient supplies, 
 
                                                          
     57 For a full explanation of the STE crisis cycle see Harman (1976). 
     58 In turn, a veritable industry existed to track down hidden production reserves in the hope of promoting 
‘leaner’ production, with more efficient resource utilization and lower turnover times. In East Germany the 
institution responsible employed around 150,000 (Völker 1995:72). 
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 press upon the managers to cheat, cover up production 
potentialities, inflate equipment and supply needs, play safe, and 
in general act conservatively. This leads to wastage, and hence lack 
of supplies and increased pressures from above [...] and so on in a 
vicious circle. 
 
Third, supply problems could be partially remedied through semi-official 
horizontal barter relationships with other enterprises. Fourth, as Winiecki writes 
(1989a:73), enterprises (and ministries) tried ‘to minimize the risk of non-
execution of plan targets by producing internally as large a part of intermediate 
inputs as possible.’ This tendency to ‘DIY economics’ — what Winiecki 
(1989b:366) calls ‘import substitution on the micro-level’ and Cliff (1964:245) calls 
‘departmentalism’ — was a powerful obstacle to vertical disintegration, as semi-
autarky was reproduced at the ministerial and enterprise level. Each ministry or 
conglomerate tended to become a separate empire, producing most of its own 
component parts while others produced similar parts at similarly small 
production volumes (Filtzer 1992:27). The benefits of an inter-enterprise division 
of labour were thereby reduced. Large enterprises often produced on a 
surprisingly small scale, with relatively unsophisticated technology and 
unspecialized labour. This exacerbated the phenomenon of underspecialization 
which was in any case a characteristic of import substitution (on the macro-level). 
In a vicious circle, DIY economics amplified the tendency to input-intensive 
production which, in turn, exacerbated the climate of shortage and the 
imperative to minimize dependence on unreliable supplies by resort to DIY. In a 
related vicious circle, underspecialization entailed the production of a very wide 
range of products with correspondingly short production runs. Such products 
entailed high costs with low technology, and sold to small markets. Returns were 
therefore too low to fund the scale of investment that could provide a way out of 
the vicious circle. DIY economics could, moreover, gain strength as STEs became 
more complex. As Berliner explains (1988:282), 
 
 as a consequence of technological advance, products contain many 
more components manufactured by other enterprises. Ministry and 
enterprise are therefore more vulnerable to the deficiencies of the 
supply system and have stronger motivation to produce their own 
principal components and supplies. 
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Finally, the structures erected in the 1930s were biased towards ‘extensive’ 
growth — to mobilizing (rather than economizing on) resources. In Kornai’s 
explanation (1992:181-2) this was essentially because STEs arose ‘in backward, 
slow-growing countries that make poor use of their resources from the extensive 
point of view.’ In such conditions, the opportunities for extending the utilization 
of resources are numerous. These include: increasing the workforce, the length of 
the working week, and the area cultivated and mined; and whipping up a ‘war 
consciousness’ which ‘demands mobilization of all able-bodied men and all 
material resources’. The same incentive structure that encouraged the use of 
resources was permissive of resource squandering. As Winiecki puts it (1988:4), 
‘incentives to execute and exceed plan targets were positively correlated with 
volume or value of production, but were not at the same time negatively 
correlated with production costs.’ The pricing system, geared to maximizing 
output growth, also encouraged resource waste by breaking the connection 
between prices and production costs and, in particular, by setting low prices for 
raw materials, energy and labour (Cliff 1964:230-255). Thus in the mid-1980s the 
USSR was able to produce a national income of between half and two-thirds that 
of the US, but in doing so used 1.6 times more materials, 2.1 times more energy, 




The sources of inefficiency mentioned in the previous section, notably 
organizational autarky, hoarding, inter-enterprise barter, and the sacrifice of 
quality for output, but also the corruption that flourished along the joints 
between politics and business, were not in themselves causes of the STEs’ 
ultimate failure. As classic symptoms of the war-economic form, they abounded 
in rapidly growing war economies such as the US in the 1940s (Berliner 1988:286; 
Kemp 1990:101). Despite the irrationalities involved, the war-economic form 
evinced awesome strengths for the USSR, too. High levels of capital 
concentration within a command framework meant that many of the 
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uncertainties that hinder investment under laissez faire conditions were 
abolished, and production maximized. As Alec Nove put it (1975:74), ‘with all its 
defects the system had an overwhelming advantage: that of enabling the 
leadership to concentrate resources on its priorities, without being deflected by 
considerations of profitability, private-enterprise interests, or the pressure of 
public opinion.’ Similarly, Berliner argues (1988:246) that war-economic 
structures 
 
 enabled the Soviet government to generate very high rates of 
investment, to manage the transfer of unparalleled millions of 
workers from agriculture to industry, and to attain an impressive 
rate of economic and industrial growth during the first 35 years of 
the plan period. 
 
The USSR proved able to match the German military, tank for tank; to conquer 
and plunder most of Eastern Europe; and to reign for half a century as the 
planet’s second military power, with allies across four continents and a 
permanent seat on the UN Security Council. 
 For most of the six decades of Stalinism the gap — in per capita output — 
between the USSR and Western economies narrowed. It is only in the final two 
that the picture changed. As a percentage of Europe’s GNP the USSR’s share, as 
estimated by Paul Bairoch (1976:302), soared from 15% in 1929 to 20% 1950 and 
33% in 1975. Eastern Europe’s growth was impressive, too, particularly in the 
immediate post-war years (Chawluk 1988:415). 
 Histories of the early period of Soviet industrialization, notably Stephen 
Kotkin’s study of Magnitogorsk (1995), give a flavour of the astonishing, and 
breathtakingly brutal, achievement behind these figures. Kotkin describes the 
transformation of a remote rural landscape as an advanced steelworks, modelled 
on gigantic American ones, was stamped out of the ground. In a madcap 
scramble, and amidst squalid conditions, a city arose, and with it the ‘socialist 
achievements’ of colossal factories, brick houses, streets, schools, and the 
occasional health centre. One can see how this process, in its terrible grandeur, 
might have impressed eyewitnesses — notably the young Erich Honecker who 
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worked there in the 1930s. Honecker, and others like him, went on to reorganize 
Eastern Europe according to a similar formula of iron discipline and practical 
anarchy.59 
 The STEs’ achieved competitive success not only in erecting (and 
reconstructing) basic industrial plant but — astonishingly for backward countries 
— in highly sophisticated areas such as space, nuclear and military technologies. 
Remarkable advance was achieved, not only through import and emulation of 
technology and technique, but also through indigenous invention and 
innovation (Haynes 1987:12; Berliner 1988:201-5; Kornai 1992:183). Far from 
merely augmenting the extraction of absolute surplus value (as those who 
understand the STEs as simply systems of ‘extensive accumulation’ sometimes 
assume), output growth consistently outpaced increases in total working time 
(Fernandez 1997:309). It is worth recalling that, before 1989, the formidable 
success of the STEs was widely recognized. For example, even as late as 1985, in a 
generally hostile account of Soviet planning, Peter Rutland could write (1985:236) 
that ‘in certain respects the USSR no doubt still represents the shape of things to 
come.’ 
 
Crisis and Change 
 
As noted in chapter two, structures that promote rapid accumulation in one 
period — and in so doing change the nature of the world system — may later 
become fetters. In the case of the STEs changes occurred, both internal and 
external, that served to undermine their viability. 
 First, ‘advantages of backwardness’ tended to lessen as the STEs 
developed. The technology gap with Western economies shrank. So too did 
labour surpluses — generated when rapid industrialization compels rural 
depopulation.60 The latter, moreover, placed limits upon ‘extensive’ 
accumulation. As labour surpluses dwindled and as rivals’ productivity 
                                                          
     59 Such people may have been particularly suited to governing in times of crisis, war and post-war 
reconstruction. As Robin Okey has observed (1982:192), ‘their Stalinist heritage attuned them to the curious 
mix of messianism, cynicism and brutalization which characterized overwrought times.’ 
     60 In addition, the impetus of reconstruction, which enables quick and easy growth in war-damaged 
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advanced, the imperative to restructure grew. Harris sums up the problem 
(1983:176): ‘[t]he blunt instrument of the State and a monopoly of power, so 
effective, if so cruel, in bludgeoning crude output out of an obdurate nature, 
[became] a powerful obstacle to growth’. Reformed structures were required to 
encourage efficiency rather than gross output, and to allow greater flexibility to 
meet the changing conditions of global competition. 
 Restructuring of the various structures of accumulation (including 
economic structure, technology and technique, and the labour process) was, of 
course, a regular component of economic and social change in STEs as in any 
other capitalist economy. Major technological and sectoral changes were 
regularly implemented when decision makers, often reacting directly to changes 
in the world economy, became convinced of the need for rapid adjustment. 
Recurrent campaigns ‘sought to "catch up with and surpass" established Western 
practice’ which concentrated on ‘selected "leading links" or "structure-determining 
tasks" or "seminal processes"‘ (Bideleux 1985:154). Labour processes were 
rationalized, incentive structures were adapted to encourage quality rather than 
quantity, and limited experiments delegated greater initiative to enterprise 
managements, encouraged profit-seeking behaviour, and introduced market 
mechanisms. In 1960s USSR, for example, an overhaul of the system of planning 
was attempted, with the introduction of electronic data processing, a reduction in 
the number of prescribed plan indicators, and premiums placed on the efficiency 
of resource and equipment utilization and quality of output (Nove et al. (1992)). 
Even a regime that is generally perceived as conservative — the USSR under 
Brezhnev — was marked by its commitment, according to Timothy Lukes and 
Carl Boggs (1982:116), to ‘rationalization of the bureaucratic system — that is, 
creating a slightly more open, diversified, and particularly more efficient political 
economy without simultaneously setting into motion social forces that would 
undermine Party-state hegemony.’ 
 However, restructuring of STEs was a particularly complicated procedure. 
The very mechanisms that enabled firms to invest without fear also weakened 
the imperative of producing at globally competitive costs, with the continual 
                                                                                                                                                                         
economies, waned in the 1950s. 
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restructuring that that demands. With highly monopolized domestic economies 
where the authorities were reluctant to allow inefficient firms to fold (as this 
would have undermined the overall strategy of industrialization and the need to 
maintain military parity), and state monopolies of foreign trade, enterprises were 
able to produce with relatively little regard for comparative productivity.61 
 Relative isolation from external economic stimuli and a low propensity to 
restructure (see below) exacerbated the aforementioned problems of 
underspecialization and resource squandering. The same phenomena also 
enabled the STEs economic structure to maintain an entrenched bias towards 
heavy industries. From the viewpoint of Great Power competition this may well 
have made sense, but from the viewpoint of the world market it was increasingly 
irrational. For one thing, the bias to heavy industry entailed relative neglect of 
the service sector (notably telecommunications), which, in the long run, served to 
undermine the secondary industrial (and military) sectors too. For another, the 
trend in the world economy of the 1970s and 1980s was away from industries 
where vertical relations predominate (steel, cement, bulk chemicals) and towards 
those for which the concentration of production is relatively less important, and 
flexible, horizontal links between units more essential (electrical engineering, fine 
chemicals, toolmaking and computing) (Winiecki 1986:325). 
 Such difficulties in restructuring point to the problematic nature of the 
crisis mechanism in STEs. In ‘market capitalist’ crisis, values are reduced through 
bankruptcies, and capital is reallocated to areas of higher profitability. 
Meanwhile, unemployment reduces labour costs, which helps to raise 
exploitation rates, and to restore profitability by lubricating the process of 
restructuring. Nevertheless, restructuring is rarely easy. As Harman and 
Zebrowski put it (1988:14), 
 
 It can lead to bitter clashes between those managers who press for 
it and those who see their positions threatened. Each side will 
endeavour to use personal influence [...] to win over key figures 
                                                          
     61 The same factors also tended to brake the process of technology diffusion. For example, the GDR 
introduced the oxygen process in steel casting twenty-one years after its invention, while the figures for 
Spain, the USSR and France are eleven, eight and four respectively (Poznanski 1987:162). 
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within the firm. As a result, changes to the top management of 
major firms can often resemble military coups[.] 
 
With high degrees of capital concentration, states (and banks) tend to do their 
utmost to brake or at least manage the slide into crisis, and in the process 
strategic clashes arise which may reverberate throughout business and politics. 
In the STEs the politicization of crisis management took an extreme form. There 
was no simple mechanism for bankrupting inefficient enterprises. In highly 
monopolistic sectors, where an enterprise’s existence was practically guaranteed 
by the state, enterprises faced less pressure to innovate and to amortize. For this 
reason, and for reasons connected to the ‘shortage economy’ (see above), crises 
produced a relatively small reserve army of labour, or none whatsoever. More 
importantly, because economic strategy was highly politicized, with the various 
structures of accumulation tightly bound together into an organic whole, major 
restructuring became an operation fraught with difficulty, and tended to coincide 
with major (and often seismic) socio-political turning-points. 
 Examples of the intertwining of economic restructuring and political (and 
international) crisis were seen in the USSR in 1928-32, East Germany in 1947-52, 
1953, and 1956, Hungary in 1953-5, Poland in 1956-7, Yugoslavia in the mid-1960s 
and Czechoslovakia in 1963-8. ‘In each case’, as Harman and Zebrowski note 
(1988:15), ‘these attempts ran into political obstacles — and resulted in greater or 
lesser political convulsions.’ At such times, clashes between Party leaders 
reverberated throughout the apparati of political and social control, sowing 
confusion amongst loyalists and encouraging dissenters to mobilize behind 
alternative strategies. As Harman wrote in 1970 (in Harman/Zebrowski 1988:16): 
 
 The reforming bureaucracy cannot take control without 
immobilising its enemies, who normally control the police 
apparatus. It therefore begins to demand for itself the right to 
organise within the party and looks for allies to back it up. At a 
certain point the reforming bureaucracy calls in certain 
intermediate strata (intellectuals, journalists, students) [...] But this 
permits, even encourages, extra-bureaucratic classes (above all the 
workers) to mobilise[.]62 
                                                          
     62 See also Kagarlitsky (1989). 
 86 
 
The latter sentence refers to several occasions (1953, 1956, and 1968), in which 
splits in the nomenklatura sparked mass mobilizations that came near to 
overthrowing entire regimes, and shook the Soviet system to its foundations.63 
 
Contradictions of Authoritarian Rule 
 
A second set of problems which increasingly acted as a brake upon economic 
development were associated with the element of the productive forces that is 
commonly known as ‘human resources’. 
 Steep ascent industrialization was based upon maximizing production 
through centralized mobilization of resources together with a repressive strategy 
designed to yoke a muzzled workforce to the defence and accumulation of the 
national capital. In short, as Khristian Rakovsky wrote in 1930 (1981:33), Stalin’s 
strategy was an attempt to ‘jump directly to super-American tempos — by 
putting pressure on the working class’. Although indubitably effective, high-
pressure repression also resulted in serious inefficiencies and growing 
contradictions. For example, stressed and maltreated workers tended to produce 
shoddy goods, which then dislocated production further down the line, 
frustrated consumers, and disrupted the assumptions of planners. 
 As the STEs developed, and significant sections of the production process 
became more skilled, workforces changed. In the USSR, writes Callinicos 
(1991:47), ‘[t]he manual working class became an increasingly stable, self-
reproducing group, no longer recruited from peasant immigrants and possessing 
rising levels of skill and education’. Meanwhile, the white-collar working class 
expanded more rapidly still. Cities, especially large ones, grew swiftly. Rising 
levels of personal consumption characterized the European STEs from the 1960s. 
Already strongly positioned in terms of ‘tacit power’ on the shop floor, workers 
tended to become more discerning and demanding. In Kolakowski’s words 
(1971:58), the less the working class ‘feels to be violently torn out of its "natural" 
condition, the more adapted to industrial life, the more educated, the more open 
                                                          
     63 For 1953 see Dale (1996b); for 1956 see Fryer (1986); for 1968 see Harman (1988). 
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to the variety of life, the greater its ability to develop a class consciousness and to 
resist exploitation.’ Such social changes, Callinicos argues (1991:47), ‘created a 
literate and sophisticated population impatient with the lies, distortions and 
platitudes served up by the official media.’ 
 Many of the reforms in STEs in the postwar period attempted to address 
the problem of an alienated workforce. To win their motivation, to elicit their 
complicity in taking responsibility for efficient, high quality production, 
increasingly skilled and powerful groups of workers had to be spared the worst 
depredations of Stalinism and, if possible, given a greater stake in the production 
process. Thus, Khrushchev’s reforms reduced levels of direct political coercion of 
labour in favour of a more supple framework of economic incentives (Filtzer 
1992). A similar rationale lay behind various attempts to implement corporatist 
‘social contracts’ in the East European STEs. Similarly, attempts were made to 
give managers and ‘intellectuals’ a degree of security that had been absent in the 
pre-war USSR. Such groups require scope to take initiative, to experiment and 
innovate. Intellectual labour in particular demands a free flow of information 
and the liberation of research from dogma (Löwenthal 1976:86-94; Loeser 
1982:119). In response to such imperatives, periodic cultural liberalizations 
occurred, as did a gradual and partial shift from militaristic administrative 
methods towards a framework in which the rule of law played a greater role.64 
 Attempts to reform, however, sat astride a deep contradiction. As 
Rueschemeyer et al. have shown (1992), ruling classes that depend upon 
repressive methods of labour control are typically the fiercest opponents of the 
formal inclusion into the polity of the lower orders. The greater the 
depoliticization of the immediate process of surplus extraction, the simpler it is 
for ruling classes to permit formal incorporation of the working class. The strict 
institutional separation of economics and politics means that political rights are 
those that are confined to the merely political sphere. Rueschemeyer et al. 
(1992:295) go on to suggest that STE rulers are in an analogous position to 
labour-repressive landowners. They control the means of production only by 
                                                          
     64 In STEs the state bureaucracy overrode the competition of private interests to an unusual extent; the 
balance between command and legality was weighted to the former. But legal relations did tend to develop 
over time. 
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dint of their overall control of society — including overall political control of the 
labour process — via their ownership of the state. Even formal political inclusion 
of workers therefore posed a direct threat to STE rulers’ economic power. 
Moreover, with all sections of society continually whipped by centralized 
authorities towards the aim of accumulation, criticism in one section of society 
could readily generalize, and quickly become criticism of the state, Party and/or 
Party leadership. As Cliff put it (1964:319), 
 
 the fact that the state is the repository of all the means of 
production, is the centre of educational and cultural organisation, 
means that all criticism, of whatever aspect of the system, tends to 
concentrate towards the centre. Hence state capitalism by its very 
nature, unlike capitalism based on private property, excludes the 
possibility of wide, even if only formal, political democracy. Where 
the state is the repository of the means of production, political 
democracy cannot be separated from economic democracy. 
 
STE rulers faced a dilemma. The greater the success of industrialization, the more 
numerous, geographically concentrated and cultured grew the working class. 
They depended upon the cooperation (motivation, morale, and enthusiasm) of 
workers, who, along with sections of the middle classes, tended to press for civil 
liberties and expanded political participation. Yet they presided over (and 
existed through) structures that precluded the classic bourgeois means of 
containing these demands, i.e. formal democracy and civil liberties. This problem 
caused the STEs to suffer peculiarly aggravated forms of the tensions which all 








A third structural problem for the European STEs was that of ‘military 
overstretch’. The USSR’s ratio of arms spending to investment was the highest in 
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the developed world. Even in the late 1980s Western analysts estimated that its 
military expenditure commanded around 15-27% of GNP. If the higher figure 
were correct, it would signify a total military expenditure around fifty per cent 
higher than that of the US, on the basis of a GNP of only around half the size 
(Nello 1991:7; Reynolds 1992:248). Its European allies spent less, but still 
considerably more than most NATO members. 
 Military spending is not straightforwardly detrimental to capital 
accumulation. Military technological development may contribute to the civilian 
sector — for instance Soviet computer production was initially developed (in 
1953) for military purposes. For the USSR, its powerful military enabled the 
conquest of Eastern Europe, the plunder of plant, equipment and advanced 
technology in the form of reparations, and ‘favourable’ terms of trade. Moreover, 
on the global scale, as Mike Kidron has shown (IS 1:28), high military spending 
can serve to prolong economic boom by offsetting the tendency of the rate of 
profit to decline. 
 However, technological spin-off only indirectly benefits civilian 
production. The more advanced the weapons system, and the more backward 
the rest of the economy, the lower is the benefit of such spin-off and the less the 
possibility of the generalization of technique into civilian sectors.65 The allocation 
of capital to the arms sector, moreover, reduced the surplus for productive or 
infrastructural investment. Arms spending encroaches on civilian investment. 
For example, Günter Mittag estimates that the paving on military runways in the 
GDR was equivalent to hundreds of kilometres of motorway (1991:217). In the 
increasingly competitive post-war world economy, characterized by the rise of 
the notably less militarized economies of West Germany and Japan, the potential 
of military spending to brake capital accumulation became ever more apparent.66 
The USSR was particularly badly affected. An underdeveloped imperialist 
power, it was obliged to support the bulk of its bloc’s military outlay, and from a 
weakening economic base. Its military and political hegemony was erected upon 
                                                          
     65 This is compounded in STEs by the strict organizational separation of the military and civilian sectors. 
     66 In 1969-70, for example, R&D spending allocated to ‘defence’ was 2.2% in Japan, and 48.7% in the USA 
(Freeman 1982:191). 
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frail economic foundations. Thus, what had in 1949 seemed a glorious conquest 
began to take on the contours of ‘imperial overstretch’. In reaction to the growing 
self-assertiveness of the local ruling classes as well as periodic mass uprisings, 
the USSR was forced to accept decreasing returns on its influence over Eastern 
Europe; terms of trade swung away from Soviet advantage.67 
 
The Changing World Economy 
 
The drag of arms spending has to be understood in conjunction with other 
problems afflicting STE structures of accumulation. These include the 
evaporation of advantages of backwardness and the contradictions of 
authoritarianism outlined above, but above all a final factor: the inherent 
difficulty faced by relatively backward and étatiste economies of reaping benefits 
from internationalization. 
 During the 1960s it became apparent that the tendency towards the 
internationalization of capital was leaping forward following half a century in 
which economic nationalism had seemed the dominant trend. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 
show that the second half of the twentieth century witnessed a decisive 
acceleration in the growth rate of international trade, which even, during the 






Table 3.3 World industrial and trade growth (average annual per cent increase; 





















                                                          
     67 For explanations of the STEs’ crisis that focus on imperial overstretch see Hirst (1991) and Reiman 
(1991). In my view such explanations underestimate the rationality of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. 
As detailed above, the USSR’s backwardness, which rendered these gains intrinsically precarious, 






3.5 2.9 3.7 4.2 2.7 2.0 4.1 9.0 6.7 3.1 
World 
trade 
4.8 5.5 3.2 3.8 0.7 -1.1 0.0 6.6 9.2 3.2 
 
Table 3.4 Trade in manufactures as proportion of world output (1900 = 1.0; from 
Harman (1990:24)). 
1914 1920 1930 1940 1950 1985 
1.2 1.1 1.0 0.7 0.6 1.4 
 
Aside from the ‘laws’ of competition and capital concentration that tend to 
promote internationalization of the division of labour, a variety of factors 
impelled this explosion in world trade. These included falling transport costs and 
average weight:value ratios; the absence of war between the major trading 
nations; American economic hegemony, with stable dollar-based exchange rates; 
and the immense and sustained postwar boom of 1950-73. International lending 
blossomed, along with international trading in currencies and securities, thanks 
to the globalization of trade, the communications revolution, the emergence of 
offshore currency markets — above all the (Soviet-kindled!) Eurodollar market, 
and widespread financial deregulation that followed the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods regulatory framework. A world financial market came into being. 
Internationally operating banks, able to direct resources worldwide, represented 
an enormous centralization of finance capital. As finance centralized 
internationally, its role in organizing the restructuring of capital — e.g. forcing 
certain capitals in certain regions towards particular specialisms — increasingly 
operated on the international plane. 
 Major firms in many sectors became — and were compelled to become — 
multinationals. Smaller firms, too, became interlinked into ‘foreign’ production 
processes. As the ownership and even organization of manufacturing and 
services transcended national boundaries, foreign direct investment soared. 
MNCs can gain crucial advantages over nation-bound rivals. Transglobal 
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operation affords economies of scale (large production runs, specialization, 
standardization), enables greater scope in the areas of horizontal and vertical 
integration, and allows production to be located close to markets. In industries 
where technological complexity imposes high development costs, the 
geographical maximization of market size is especially important (see Freeman 
1982:140). In addition, MNCs can exploit the unevenness of the world economy 
— for instance, complex production processes may be sited in areas of highly 
skilled labour, with assembly plants located in low wage areas. Finally, MNCs 
benefit from (and contribute to) the competitive nature of the world political 
order. Relationships with multiple states enable MNCs to profit from transfer 
pricing, to bargain for inducements (such as tax concessions) from governments, 
and to invest, if appropriate, selectively in countries where consumer protection, 
union organization or labour regulation is weak. Such mechanisms serve to boost 
profitability, thus contributing to the virtuous circles whereby extra profits are 
fed back into R+D, advertising, and aggressive pricing, and MNCs thereby 
achieve ever greater dominance. 
 Globalization’s great leap forward within the ‘triad’ of North America, 
Western Europe and the Far East occurred during the long boom, and was 
reflected in a wave of innovative literature on the subject (for example, Hymer 
(1976); Murray (1971); Brown (1972)). But even when the ending of sustained 
growth and the resurgence of mass unemployment provoked renewed pressures 
to protectionism, the basic trend was not reversed (Harris 1983:68). Indeed, firms 
could seek protection from falling profitability by searching more keenly for 
extranational low-cost sources of inputs, or production locations, and 
shareholders and pension funds scoured the globe for improved margins. The 
mechanisms of globalization, meanwhile, were oiled by states, which lessened or 
abolished exchange controls, deregulated financial markets, and privatized state 
industries. If the first half of the century had seen the concentration of capital 
tend to take the form of national mergers (frequently state-supported, as in 1920s 
Britain) or nationalization, in the second half mergers were increasingly 
international and more likely to involve privatization. By the 1980s the balance 
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between nationalization and privatization swung decisively towards the latter.68 
These developments were reflected in another, often paraphrastic, welter of 
literature on globalization (for example, Reich 1993; Ohmae 1994). 
 Globalization placed new types of constraint on national economic 
policymaking. Keynesian, monetarist, and especially socialist strategies were all 
affected.69 The deregulation of national capital markets eroded the walls of that 
captive pool of savings upon which Keynesian and ‘socialist’ strategies, in 
particular, were based. As Harman put it (1977:31), ‘[t]he era in which the state 
could protect national capitalism is drawing to an end.’ Although consistently 
defying predictions such as Kindleberger’s, in 1969, that ‘the nation state is just 
about through as an economic unit’ (Murray 1975:58), states’ capacities to 
manage economic growth and crisis did become ever more subject to the 
discipline of the world market. In an example given by Harman (1984:116), 
whereas in the 1930s states could ‘restrict the overall level of money and credit in 
the economy’, 
 
 the internationalisation of production and banking over the past 
three decades has destroyed much of the ability of [states] to 
enforce such restriction today. The huge bank funds that flow daily 
from country to country make it very difficult indeed for national 
states to control the national supply of buying power.  
 
 Meanwhile, the continual growth in the scale of MNC production put 
nationally restricted firms at a growing disadvantage. This was perhaps clearest 
in respect of Third World STEs. Thus in 1971 Kidron (1974:171) raised the 
possibility that failure of autarkic development in China 
 
                                                          
     68 For the Third World see Stopford and Strange (1991:121). Although the aims of privatization may 
include the depoliticization of economic regulation, the rejigging of capital-labour relations, and the 
encouragement of ‘hard budget constraint’ (i.e. a spur to raise the rate of profit), the recent popularity of the 
strategy is connected to the surge in economic internationalization. Privatization enables national capitals to 
more easily merge with or acquire foreign capitals, as a route to the mobilization of greater resources and the 
achievement of economies of scale that transcend those possible in the domestic realm. 
     69 A common critique of Keynesianism — that the internationalization of finance and the widespread 
reduction of exchange controls means that states’ abilities to steer ‘their’ economies is drastically curtailed — 
also applies to monetarism, based as it is on the attempt to control the quantity of money circulating in the 
domestic economy (cf. Smith 1991:153-60). Interest rates, for instance, increasingly form internationally. 
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 is bound to close the period in which a Russian-type state capitalist 
development could be thought feasible for backward countries, [...] 
in which the bloody, treacherous forced march through autarkic 
industrialization could be thought to constitute progress in some 
restricted sense. 
 
But the point applied more generally. As Harman put it (1990:45),  
 
 National ruling classes which attempted to keep the domestic 
market for the whole range of goods in the hands of nationally 
based firms began to discover that these firms simply could not 
mobilise the level of resources required to match the most 
advanced enterprises in the world system. Production that was 
restricted by narrow national boundaries was increasingly 
inefficient and technologically backward. 
 
In such ways globalization put the STEs at a distinct disadvantage. Geared to 
what Harris (1983) terms ‘national economic development’, they were 
structurally resistant to internationalization. Trade was mediated through export 
and import licenses, and administered by cumbersome foreign trade 
organizations. Their limited position on world markets was expressed in 
nonconvertible currencies which both expressed ‘trade aversion’ (F. Holzman, in 
Lavigne 1991:9) and hindered international integration — both within the CMEA 
and beyond. Trade aversion was compounded by the fact that DMEs, beginning 
with the 1951 Battle Act and lasting until (and to an extent, beyond) détente, 
treated European STEs as ‘least favoured nations’ (i.e. most despised rivals). A 
key tool in this was the COCOM list, described by Günter Mittag as a 
‘productivity-embargo and thus a factor in the worldwide competitive 
struggle.’70 
 The STEs’ aversion to internationalization and commitment to ‘national 
economic development’ was associated with several problems. First, it hindered 
emulation. Scientific and technological advance occurs internationally. In 
Berliner’s words (1988:213), it flows across borders through ‘publications, 
products and persons’. The STEs received many foreign publications, only some 
                                                          
     70 Winiecki has even argued (1988:145) that ‘if STEs "undertraded" with the West in earlier years, it was 
probably more the result of extensive COCOM embargoes on precisely those products that industrialising 
STEs were most interested in buying’. 
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foreign products, and very few foreign persons. Their borders remained 
relatively impermeable.71 The lack of immigration, and of student and business 
exchanges in particular, hindered technological and technical progress. A further 
impediment to emulation was the ideology of difference. Although the imitation 
of more advanced economies had to be sanctioned for some things — e.g. 
technology and the organization of production — the ideological insistence on 
the STEs’ difference from DMEs meant that the advocacy of emulation could 
invite the charge of heresy. 
 Second, given assured domestic markets, officials and enterprise 
managers faced a low direct pressure to introduce technical and sectoral change. 
As we have seen, this enabled overgrown industrial sectors to develop and 
persist, particularly intermediate input-producing industries such as iron and 
steel, chemicals, cement, and paper (Winiecki 1988:74). 
 Third, the aim of building a broad-based diversified economy, commonly 
justified in terms of national security, entailed a low degree of specialization. For 
example, the metalworking industry of little East Germany produced fully 65% 
of the world sortiment, as against 50% in the US and 17% in the FRG (Kusch 
1991:46). In the 1980s, Czechoslovakia manufactured 70% of the world 
assortment of machinery, Hungary, Poland, and the GDR each manufactured 
60% (Lavigne 1991:92). Diversification, limited markets, small scale production, 
and low productivity reinforced one another. A flavour of the problem is given 
by contrasting the GDR vehicles giant Ifa with Toyota. In the late 1980s Ifa 
employed 65,000 workers — the same number as Toyota — but produced 
200,000 vehicles per year as against Toyota’s 4 million (Kurz 1991:95).72 
 Protectionism, especially in relatively backward economies, tends to be 
self-reproducing. Protection of one industry tends to provoke the need to protect 
others, due to higher prices of inputs from the first. Vested interests develop 
which benefit from continued protection. As Engels noted in 1888 ‘the worst of 
protection is that when you once have got it, you cannot easily get rid of it’. 
                                                          
     71 Pittman (1992:88) notes that the Poland-GDR border was the first to be opened to visa-free travel, as late 
as 1972. 
     72 The comparison is somewhat unfair to Ifa because its depth of production was great, whereas Toyota 
relies on extensive subcontracting. I owe this point to Med Dale. 
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Conversely, if the sluices to the world market are opened, imports tend to 
increase faster than exports, resulting in chronic balance of payments difficulties. 
This, in turn, may culminate in ‘import strangulation’ — i.e. falls in (productive 
and infrastructural) investment and capacity utilization due to unavailability of 
imports (Taylor 1988:18; Adams 1993:156). If they remain closed, however, firms 
are forced to seek supplies in inefficient ways — including DIY economics. In 
STEs these problems were acute because, as Kornai suggests (1992:350), 
investment hunger spawned import hunger but, given the protected domestic 
market and the ‘hardness’ of external markets, there was no parallel export 
hunger. The outcome tended to be ‘a strong tendency for import expenditure to 
exceed export earnings’ which in turn spurred an ‘inclination to indebtedness’. In 
response, economic chiefs had little option but to impose strict import quotas and 
to promote import substitution — for, unlike exporting to hard markets, 




The relative success of the internationalization of DMEs (notably MNCs and the 
EEC) spurred STEs to internationalize, through attention to Comecon 
integration, trade on world markets, and other forms of East-West (and East-
South) cooperation. 
 Although founded in 1949, the CMEA only became active from the mid-
1950s, as a reaction to West European integration. From that period on, repeated 
attempts were made to foster CMEA internationalization. Its rationale was well 
put by Walter Ulbricht in 1964 (in Marsh 1973:54): 
 
 The technological revolution objectively demands the 
internationalisation of economic and scientific cooperation. From 
this stem new tasks for the CMEA which have not yet been 
mastered. The great monopoly groups of Western Europe have 
spread across national barriers due to pressure from American 
competitors, in their search for technical progress [...] Our party 




Ulbricht proposed that the CMEA act as a framework for administering national 
export specialization and pooling research. To some extent this did happen. 
Dozens of joint ventures between Comecon firms were established. In 1969 an 
integrated strategy for the computer industry was developed, while from the 
early 1970s a ‘Soviet-world car’ — the Lada — was manufactured, its 
components produced throughout Comecon. 
 However, there were serious obstacles to cooperation. Economic 
nationalism proved strong — for reasons of ‘economic’ as well as ‘national’ 
security. As Lavigne put it (1991:95), ‘[s]pecialisation is a risky undertaking as it 
may lead countries to forsake vital elements of their industrial base leaving these 
to partners who may then not be able to meet their obligations.’ Cooperation was 
also hampered by stringent property rules, not to mention the general problems 
of intra-Comecon trade: that prices were politically fixed, and that currencies — 
even the ‘transferable’ rouble — were non-convertible. The latter rigidities 
impeded not only cooperation but multilateral trade itself, for, if surpluses could 
not be used multilaterally one STE had less incentive to build up a surplus with 
another (Levcik 1990). But probably the greatest hindrance to integration was 
national egotism. Comecon agreements were habitually flouted. For example, the 
GDR imported cheap Soviet oil, processed it and — against Comecon accords — 
sold it for hard currency on world markets.73 As this example suggests, intra-
CMEA rivalry was amplified by the growing links between STEs and DMEs. STE 
firms generally sought to import everything possible from Comecon, and export 
everything possible to hard markets, making administered CMEA integration 
increasingly problematic. By the mid-1980s integration had reached an impasse. 
At the level of rhetoric it remained strong. For example, in 1985 Soviet Prime 
Minister Ryzhkov spoke at a CMEA meeting of the ‘political’ necessity of closer 
integration as a means of reducing STEs’ vulnerability to Western leverage 
(Hanson 1986). Moreover, serious initiatives in the field of technological 
cooperation — a sort of collective import-substitution in high-tech fields such as 
nuclear energy, biotechnology and electronics — did reach the planning stage, 
                                                          
     73 The cynicism involved was well expressed by Günter Mittag (in a small circle of trusted colleagues): 
‘Where it’s a matter of money, that’s where proletarian internationalism and friendship between the socialist 
states ceases!’ (Loeser 1984:64). 
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and significant joint enterprises were initiated, such as the Kalinin-Robotron 
computer partnership. But these were belated initiatives and scarcely got off the 
ground. By the late 1980s DME multinationals’ were showing greater interest in 
pursuing STE economic integration than STE enterprises themselves. For 
example, Volkswagen developed plans for producing pan-STE vehicles, which 




STE economic internationalization developed less through Comecon cooperation 
than through intensifying economic relations with the non-Comecon world. In 
the 1960s and 1970s external trade steadily outpaced intra-Comecon trade (Table 
3.5). The CMEA became much more integrated in the world market, as 
enterprises purchased plant, machinery, and raw materials from DMEs. 
Economic integration was among the factors promoting détente, which, in turn, 
spurred proliferating forms of East-West cooperation and exchange.75 Whereas 
in 1965 only about thirty per cent of these seven STEs’ trade was with DMEs, by 





Table 3.5 Foreign trade growth of USSR and six European STEs76 (annual 
variation, per cent; adapted from Lavigne (1991:388)). 
 1966-70 1971-5 1976-80 1981-5 1986 1987 
with 
STEs 
8.2 19.6 12.1 4.0 17.0 8.2 
                                                          
     74 The term is from Levinson (1980:18). 
     75 This was not the main factor contributing to détente. More important was the sheer stalemate (and 
expense) of the Cold War, which prompted the superpowers to recognize their respective spheres of 
influence. Détente also enabled the USSR to devote greater attention to the Chinese front, and gave the USA 
the opportunity to exploit divisions between the Communist powers during its war against Vietnam. 




11.6 27.5 14.6 -1.8 0.8 9.7 
 
 Trade expansion was accompanied by a growth in STE multinationals 
operating in the ‘non-socialist abroad’. Most involved marketing and after-sales 
services. By the 1970s some 500 STE firms were operating in the OECD, while by 
1983 231 were seeking out markets and low-cost materials and labour in the 
Third World (Lavigne 1991:173). According to Levinson (1980:307), STE leaders 
were thinking along the following ambitious lines: ‘Why strive to conquer 
capitalism when with a little ingenuity one can simply own a growing part of it?’ 
 Meanwhile, Comecon countries, with an eye to attracting advanced 
technology and hard currency, began to encourage a plethora of forms of co-
production and even joint ventures with DME firms. The number of the latter 
mushroomed (Table 3.6). Although small beer compared to normal import-
export operations, the growth of joint ventures was politically significant, 
particularly during the New Cold War. 
 
Table 3.6 New joint ventures (excludes Polonia; from Nello (1991:227)). 
1972-3 1974-5 1976-7 1978-9 1980-1 1982-3 1984-5 1986-7 
4 5 3 1 6 15 27 107 
 
 In Poland and, if to a lesser extent, throughout the CMEA, closer ties with 
DMEs opened up the possibility of ‘import-led’ (or ‘debt-led’) growth. The idea 
was that importing high technology equipment would enable higher 
productivity; the resultant cheap, high quality goods could then be exported in 
return for hard currency to pay off the debts incurred for the original imports. In 
the early 1970s such plans were encouraged by booming world markets. In the 
later 1970s they were fuelled by low (sometimes negative) real interest rates, 
contingent on reduced world demand and the recycling of the OPEC surplus. 
Western states, moreover, engaged in a race to provide STEs with soft export 
credits, as dampened demand in DMEs provoked heightened competition over 
sales to the small but seemingly stable CMEA market (van Ham 1993:81-4). As 
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with Third World countries in the same period, net debt of the STEs soared 
(Table 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7 Net debt of USSR and six European STEs, US$ billion; from Lavigne 
(1991:324)). 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
4.8 6.2 7.7 11.1 17.8 30.2 42.1 52.2 61.7 69.6 74.8 81.1 
 
 Accumulation strategies that included major technology imports from 
DMEs seemed to bring tangible results. For example, the GDR, with its 
homespun Wartburgs and Trabants, had hitherto been the STE leader in car 
manufacture, but in the 1970s it was overtaken by the Fiats and Renaults 
produced under license in the USSR, Poland and Romania. However, as 
subsequent years witnessed, ‘the whip to speed growth’ as Harris put it 
(1983:193), ‘could as easily turn into a noose to strangle.’ 
 
Internationalization and Crisis 
 
The surges of the STEs’ integration into the circuits of world capitalism occurred 
concurrently with the climax and cessation of the long boom. The same factors 
that ended the boom in the DMEs also undermined growth in the STEs.77 The 
rate of return on investment tended to decline; in other words, generating funds 
for renewed investment and increased personal consumption tended to grow 
more difficult (Harman 1988:328). 
 However, the tendency of the rate of profit to decline, although operating 
globally, does not operate homogenously. Although it is the underlying cause of 
crisis, the process of devaluation is fought over through competition, with less 
efficient capitals generally suffering most in crises. The STEs, as seen above, faced 
distinctive structural problems. Despite high rates of investment they were 
therefore comparatively unsuccessful in raising productivity. As comparatively 
                                                          
     77 If the fundamental cause of its expiration was declining profitability, its timing was strongly influenced 
by the global decrease in arms spending (relative to GNP). ‘[A] declining ceiling on arms outlay’, predicted 
Kidron (1968:54), spells ‘freer play for recessionary tendencies’. 
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weak capitals, the STEs’ decreasing competitiveness was both highlighted and 
aggravated when the end of the long boom ushered in an epoch of lower growth 
and relatively severe crises. 
 STEs’ strategies of internationalization were, as outlined above, a response 
to declines in profitability and competitiveness. But internationalization also 
spawned further contradictions. First, each move towards closer integration 
tended to pull the STEs deeper than intended into the circuits of world capital, 
over which their leaderships exercised woefully little control. The greater the 
level of integration, the less direct control over the pace and direction of 
economic development they had, and the greater grew the dependence on DME 
technology and credits. Each STE was, gradually but relentlessly, ‘sucked into a 
chaotic, disorganized, world system’ (Harman 1977:31), a process that included a 
growing intermeshing between the business cycles of STEs and DMEs. Second, 
somewhat softened geopolitical and ever-hardening (and internationalizing) 
economic competition meant that, as against the war-economic focus on 
increasing the mass of profit, the rate of profit regained its old importance. For 
only if the STEs ‘get an adequate rate of profit’, in Harman’s words (1984:115), 
can they ‘pay the internationally determined rate of interest they owe to the 
banks. Nationally based accumulation cannot proceed unless it can match 
internationally determined standards of profitability.’ 
 These contradictions were already becoming visible in the 1970s. As with 
the growth trajectory of many LDCs in the same period, each investment boom 
only served to raise the balance of trade deficit, while debt enforced an obsession 
with boosting exports. The path of import-led growth that some STEs — 
particularly Poland, but to a lesser extent the GDR — were pursuing depended 
upon continued growth of world demand, and low real interest rates. Partly 
because powerful firms and states shared these interests, governments 
worldwide reacted to the 1974-5 crisis with credit-fuelled expansion. However, if 
Keynesian measures could temporarily suppress the forces which demanded 
major devaluation, they could not annul them. The failure of Keynesianism to 
resolve the crisis (symbolized, notoriously, by widespread stagflation) prompted 
key sections of Western ruling classes to shift strategy towards tight budgets and 
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tight credit. This invited a return of the imperative of devaluation with 
redoubled force, with particularly devastating affects on weaker capitals and 
weaker regions of the world economy. The high-borrowing STEs of Eastern 
Europe suffered a three-pronged assault, which quashed all the assumptions 
which had predicated import-led growth. In the US, arms spending and tax cuts 
drove up the budget deficit, whilst the Federal Reserve underwent a monetarist 
shift (Scammell 1983:220). World interest rates rocketed, with drastic effects on 
the price of debt (both accumulated and current).78 The US dollar’s value — in 
which most loans were denominated — soared. Second, world recession entailed 
reduced demand and provoked increased protectionism (Kenwood/Lougheed 
1983:323), which together impaired the ability of STEs (and most LDCs) to meet 
their soaring debt-servicing costs through increased exports. Finally, the second 
great oil price rise of 1979-80 swung the terms of trade against oil-importers 
(including the European STEs), just when they most depended upon increasing 
exports. 
 The contradictions of STE internationalization were revealed in a glaring 
light when the Polish economy crashed in 1979/80. Poland, followed by 
Yugoslavia and Romania, teetered on the brink of defaulting, provoking a 
general loss of trust in Eastern Europe on the part of international finance. The 
best-laid plans of debt-led accumulation lay in tatters. 
 For the European STEs, as for much of the Third World, the 1980s was a 
‘lost decade’. Their underlying economic plight was exacerbated by debt-
servicing and high oil prices. Although the early 1980s saw the CMEA — for the 
first time — explicitly recommend a strategy of increased trade on hard markets, 
and on a hard currency basis, in fact the reverse occurred: trade involution. With 
foreign currency even more strictly reserved for interest and oil payments, other 
imports from DMEs were more likely to be paid in kind, if at all. Whereas in 1980 
54% of Comecon members’ trade was with one another, by 1986 this figure had 
soared to 65% (Bryson/Melzer 1991:63; Zon 1994:41). Overall, the six East 
European STEs’ share of world exports (in value terms) fell from 6.1% in 1970 to 
4.1% in 1980 and 2.8% in 1989 (Salgo 1992:209). 
                                                          





The crisis of the STEs inevitably spawned geopolitical contradictions and change. 
The period 1975-85 witnessed significant intra-Comecon conflicts as each STE 
responded differently to internationalization and world crisis, attempting to 
manage the effects to its own advantage. Competition for Western markets, 
loans, and investment infiltrated the supposedly cooperative relations between 
STEs. Each jostled for position over trade and good relations with the ‘non-
socialist abroad’. 
 Intra-Comecon transactions increasingly came to reflect world prices, with 
the Comecon area tending to become a ‘dollar zone’ (Lavigne 1991:302). A 
divergence of interests opened, in particular between the USSR and the more 
west-oriented of its Eastern allies. The latter were more closely bound into the 
non-socialist world economy and more dependent on good favour from extra-
CMEA organizations. Political tensions based on these phenomena became 
particularly apparent in the early 1980s. 
 Despite benefiting from the oil price rises of the 1970s, the USSR 
witnessed a sharp relative decline vis-à-vis Western Europe. If oil income served 
temporarily to veil the scale of the USSR’s plight, it undermined its hegemony, 
for pipelines carrying cheap oil had hitherto complemented military might as the 
skeleton that held Comecon together.79 Its oil-importing allies — suffering from 
deteriorating terms of trade vis-à-vis both the USSR and the OECD — reacted 
both by demanding higher prices from the USSR for their products, and by 
seeking to reduce their dependence on their ‘socialist brotherland’. In 1980, for 
example, in deliberate retaliation for a reduction in Soviet oil supplies the GDR 
reneged on its promise to purchase a Soviet colour television factory, buying a 
Japanese one instead. That the USSR permitted the price of its oil sold to STEs to 
approach and surpass world market prices, and that it increasingly diverted it to 
‘hard’ markets, was an early indication that, in crisis, motherland comes before 
                                                          
     79 If the provision of cheap oil encouraged political alliance, its withdrawal was deployed as a sanction: 
the tap was turned off on Czechoslovakia in 1968, and on Cuba when Castro demurred over the invasion of 
Afghanistan. 
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empire. Generally, STE policymakers became ever more concerned with 
investigating world market prices and haggling over the pricing of inter-STE 
trade (Hanson 1986:145). 
 
The Politics of Terminal Crisis 
 
The war-economic form was becoming exhausted as a framework for 
competitive success for the European STEs. Nowhere was this clearer than in the 
fact that, from the 1970s, despite maintaining among the highest rates of 
investment in the world, their growth rates decreased comparatively quickly, 
and the average age of fixed capital increased. 
 Economic crisis inevitably translated into political problems. One example 
is that falling rates of return on investment made it harder to ameliorate workers’ 
discontent through wage rises. The rise of Solidarnosc sent shock waves through 
the ruling classes of Eastern Europe.80 With hindsight, Jaçek Kuron has 
concluded (Rees 1999:37), that 1980-1 ‘was truly the moment when the 
totalitarian system in Poland was broken.’ It was a potent reminder that failure 
to solve fundamental economic problems risked punishment by working-class 
revolt, even revolution, and may be seen as the beginning of the end of the 
European STEs. 
 Secondly, with the technology gap with DMEs widening once more, and 
with oil prices falling (after 1980), the USSR’s ability to compete militarily waned. 
As Gorbachev recalled (Küchenmeister 1993:191), while ‘the rate of GNP growth 
declined [...] military expenditure rose constantly.’ Signs of ‘imperial overstretch’ 
mounted.81 According to Boris Kagarlitsky (1990:342), 
 
 The emerging lag in the field of modern technology produced a 
feeling of horror among the military especially when the United 
States proclaimed its idea of "space-based defence". Thus not only 
the lower classes were seized with discontent but also a significant 
section of those at the top. 
                                                          
     80 On Solidarnosc see Barker (1986), Ost (1990), Goodwyn (1991), Stefancic (1992), Zirakzadeh (1997). 
     81 Note that the same forces of military competition that in an earlier period had contributed to the 
development of the STE-form now assisted its demise. 
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If its inability to match Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ project inspired horror, Moscow’s 
inability to guarantee the security of an allied regime — Afghanistan — was a 
shattering experience, and inevitably raised questions as to the viability of Soviet 
hegemony elsewhere. 
 The USSR was weakening dramatically on the two main fronts that define 
‘national’ success: relative productivity and power projection. The crisis of the 
1980s, moreover, was a crisis not only of the basic Stalinist model but of the 
record of ‘reform communism’. From 1956 onwards STE policymakers had 
reacted to slackening growth rates with one reform strategy after another. There 
had been political liberalization, ‘gulash communism’, economic 
decentralization, economic internationalization, and so on. In the process, most 
STEs had drifted further from the self-sufficient autarkic command model and 
towards ‘market capitalism’. As Chattopadhyay has observed (1994:53-4), 
commodity relations widened and deepened over time. And yet growth rates 
continued to fall, trade deficits and foreign debt grew, and Soviet imperialism 
became more and more overstretched. 
 Each reform tended to run up against the limits of the war-economic form. 
Thus, workplace democratization tended to inspire demands for general social 
and/or political democratization, which, if conceded, threatened to undermine 
Party rule. Similarly, devolution of economic power raised the prospect of 
enterprises and/or ministries being able to form, and act according to, their own 
particular priorities, thus undermining the Party-organized integration of 
economic units into a fused ‘national interest’.82 
 If geopolitical competition on the basis of backwardness had, as Callinicos 
puts it (1991:44) locked the USSR and its allies into war-economic structures, the 
onset of world economic slowdown, and the failure of reforms to halt relative 
decline, served simultaneously to tighten and loosen the lock. On the one hand, 
the prospect of further relative decline strengthened calls for radical reform, 
certainly for participation in the worldwide trend away from strategies of 
                                                          
     82 This fear lay behind several of the retreats from reform, e.g. those in the late 1960s and early 1970s in the 
USSR and GDR. 
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‘national economic development’ and perhaps for the abandonment of war-
economic structures altogether. By the mid-1980s Poland, Hungary, China, and 
Vietnam had all turned in this direction. On the other hand, the fact of persistent 
relative decline meant that any serious opening to global competition would be 
that much more destructive, involving larger-scale restructuring, major 
bankruptcies and mass unemployment, and the prospect of greater resistance 
from those — managers and workers in weaker sectors, and the military — who 
would suffer most. The tight interconnection of the ensemble of structures of 
accumulation in STEs meant that any major reform very directly affected all parts 
of the system, and carried a high political charge. 
 The breaking of the logjam in the USSR — the political decision to weaken 
the centres of resistance to reform, such that experiments in internal competition, 
opening to the world market, and introducing ‘economic’ mechanisms of 
economic restructuring — entailed enormous political struggles. Restructuring 
affected all spheres, including the relation of the ruling class to society and to the 
state, industrial relations, and geopolitics. 
 Reform of economic structures involved, in addition to limited opening to 
world markets, the attempt to increase internal competition through encouraging 
cooperatives and private ownership, and floating the prospect of regulation by 
profit, loss and even bankruptcy. It also meant, in the words of one of 
Gorbachev’s advisors (Brzezinski 1990:190), that ‘whether we like it or not, 
whether we want to or not, we have to restructure the working class too.’ This 
involved promoting discipline and morale in the workforce, with old-style 
campaigns, experiments with ‘workplace democracy’, and floating the prospect 
of significant unemployment. On the geopolitical plane, reform entailed attempts 
to reduce military expenditure, conceding defeat in the New Cold War, and the 
renunciation of the Brezhnev doctrine.83 As a ‘dowry’ (Sieber 1994:87) for its 
desired engagement with the West, the Kremlin floated the prospect of ending 
the division of Europe, under the slogan of ‘a common European home’. All 
                                                          
     83 The end of the Brezhnev doctrine was adumbrated at a Warsaw Pact meeting as early as 1986 
(Hertle/Stephan 1997:34). 
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these substantial reforms were buttressed by political liberalization as a means of 
winning wider social forces behind the general strategy. 
 It is worth recalling the excitement of the period. Hearts beat faster — in 
anticipation, and fear — in the USSR, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere. Major 
crises involve immense and intense political and social conflict, they excite the 
interests of all domestic social classes, and those of other states, and are 
inherently unpredictable. Across all the STEs, the question of which way and 
how far to jump raised bitter conflicts. In the USSR, the reforms provoked intense 
resistance. The Gorbachev leadership was forced to tack back and forth, to 
reverse, stall or compromise at one stage, only to be pulled forward faster than it 
desired at another. Loss of central control over events threatened at every stage. 
Crisis and conflict not only provoked resistance from conservatives, but spurred 
the politicization of wide sections of society. Liberalization furnished space for 
the rise of mass movements of workers and oppressed nationalities. Reforms in 
the USSR, combined with its visibly waning enthusiasm for empire, encouraged 
and enabled furthergoing reform by political leaders in Poland and Hungary 
which, in turn, accelerated the disintegration of Comecon, the Warsaw Pact, and, 
ultimately, the USSR itself. 
 From the preceding arguments it can be seen that the outcome of the 
European STEs’ terminal crisis was strongly determined. The forces impelling 
the cracking open of sheltered economies, and undermining the USSR’s 
superpower status, were extremely powerful. The turn of swathes of bureaucrats 
to market reform was inevitable. However, quite different political developments 
could have occurred. Market reform under firm Party leadership, as in China, 
was a favoured vision of much of the East European elite. Market reform 
coupled with some form of democratization was advocated, not least by 
Gorbachev in the latter period of his rule. But ‘Gorbachev was too late’, as Rees 
argues (1999:32), because a wave of revolts, uprisings and associated regime 
shifts (notably the election victory of Solidarnosc in 1989) across the USSR and 
Eastern Europe was ‘already closing the road to the kind of reform for which he 
hoped.’ It is in this process that the potential for alternative developments may 
be discerned. Industrial struggles and the revolts of the oppressed nations of the 
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USSR, or the uprisings in Eastern Europe could all have taken different, more 
radical, directions. Conversely, conservative crackdowns — along the lines of 





The crisis of the STEs can be well comprehended in the terms spelt out in chapter 
two. As an organic part of the world economy and inter-state system, the STEs’ 
dynamic of accumulation was determined by international economic and 
geopolitical competition. Their success in raising productivity was a contributing 
factor to the downward pressure on profitability both domestically and on the 
world scale, as manifested in the increased propensity to crisis from 1974 
onwards. 
 However, crisis hits weaker capitals, and regions, hardest. The STEs were 
based upon structures of accumulation that had enabled backward economies to 
make comparative progress, particularly in terms of output growth, during a 
relatively autarkic stage of the history of world economy. As they advanced, and 
as world economic internationalization progressed, structures that had promoted 
growth became fetters. 
 The crisis, as it developed, affected the totality of structures of 
accumulation — including the structure of competition, relations between capital 
and labour, the monetary system, the structure of the state, and the structure of 
Soviet hegemony. Due to the tight-knit fusion of these structures under 
centralized state management, and as a consequence of earlier crises having been 
crushed by conservative forces, eventual economic restructuring was highly 
politicized, and the road to reform was long, hard, and dangerous. 
 Finally, the crisis has, obviously, proved false those such as Zygmunt 
Bauman (1971), David Lane (1976), and Peter Rutland (1985) who believed the 
                                                          
     84 For example, the June 1989 election in Poland could conceivably have been annulled. Such a course was 
unlikely, given the lack of confidence and cohesion of committed conservatives in the ruling class, and given 
that Gorbachev had — as part of the broader strategy of cautious retreat from empire and rapprochement 
with the West — backed the Round Table discussions Adam (1996:199). But it was not impossible. 
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STEs to be perdurable and intrinsically stable.85 Theories that predicted crisis and 
radical transformation have, in this respect at least, been corroborated. 
Advocates of the latter have included a number of liberal and conservative 
commentators (cf. Pryce-Jones 1995:21) as well as Marxists such as Tony Cliff 
(1964) and Chris Harman.86 
                                                          
     85 For Lane (1976:91) the STEs are ‘characterised by internal stability and an absence of popular revolt. So 
much is this so that state socialist societies have appeared to some to be, to use Bauman’s phrase, "revolution 
proof".’ For Rutland (1985:263) ‘the Soviet Union [...] works as a machine for the generation of political 
stability’. 
     86 The latter, for example, predicted in 1970 (in Callinicos 1991:19), that ‘[i]f reforms, in collaboration with 
foreign capital or otherwise, are not carried through [...], the chronic crisis of the Russian and East European 
economies can only grow worse [...] Yet it is also increasingly clear that the bureaucracy is unable to carry 
through reforms on anything like a successful basis without a split of the proportions that characterized 
Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in early 1968. Such a split could only be the prelude to an immense 
crisis throughout the USSR and Eastern Europe, in which the extra-bureaucratic classes would mobilize 
behind their own demands.’ 
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Chapter Four: East Germany: 1945 to 1975 
Although East Germany is depicted by some — for example, Stent (1998:16) and 
Glenny (1990) — as a ‘land without history’, in fact its development was as 
‘historic’ as any other capitalist society, and fundamentally determined by 
similar inter-class and intra-class contradictions. Its ruling class faced the same 
tasks as its counterparts elsewhere; to raise productivity, ensure military security 
and political stability, and uphold the legitimacy of the ruling order. Degrees of 
success varied. Under Ulbricht, economic growth was relatively rapid, but 
serious economic and political crises occurred (see Table 4.1). Honecker’s era, 
until 1989, was characterized by greater stability. However, economic growth 
slowed, and geopolitical contradictions developed, which, combined with 
growing social discontent, undermined the regime’s coherence and self-
confidence. 
 
Sovietized East Germany as Inherent Problem 
 
If the aforementioned general features of the GDR’s history are not unusual, 
another was quite unique: it was an awkward, not to say unwanted, child of the 
post-war division of Europe. In the immediate aftermath of World War Two the 
USSR’s strategy towards Germany was broadly determined by diplomatic-
strategic and national economic interests. These two sets of interests tended to 
conflict. The first was geared above all to securing a neutral Germany, preferably 
unarmed and USSR-friendly. The second focused initially upon spoils 
(‘reparations’). Its scale had been agreed upon by the Allies at Yalta and 
Potsdam. Although the publicly declared ideals of these conferences were the 
‘demilitarization, denazification and democratization of Germany’ (Heitzer 
1986:28), these provided a gloss for the mercenary goals of political domination 
and material plunder. At Yalta the Allies agreed on a reparations bill of twenty 
billion dollars, of which the USSR would receive half (Gluckstein 1952). It 
transpired, in fact, that the Western Allies, their economies less devastated by 
war, took less than planned while the USSR took more — mainly from its zone of 
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‘Middle’ (in English, ‘East’) Germany. Soviet reparations took four forms: the 
dismantling of industries and their transport to the USSR, profits from Soviet-
appropriated industries, goods transfers, and transports of (often highly skilled) 
workers (Nettl 1977). Even excluding the latter, the scale of reparations, at 
around a quarter of GDP each year, was greater than the whole of Germany’s 
payments following the previous world war.87 Reparations included about 
eighty per cent of the Soviet Zone’s iron and steel industry, and around half of its 
railway network and cement and paper industries (Venohr 1989:22). 
Compounded by the disproportionately deleterious affect of economic division 
(‘Middle’ Germany had been over twice as reliant on exchange with the West as 
vice versa), the Soviet Zone’s industrial capacity fell to fifty per cent of its wartime 
level, as against seventy-five per cent in the Western zones (Gregory/Leptin 
1977). Productivity relative to West Germany collapsed to only fifty per cent by 
1950 (Merkel/Wahl 1991:10,64; Schneider 1988:16). 
 Even as the USSR’s one arm busily eroded the economic viability of its 
Zone, its other — guided by imperial security interests, notably resistance to the 
eastward extension of American influence — oversaw the establishment of the 
infrastructure of a (semi-)sovereign state, which was incorporated into the 
structures of Soviet hegemony. The GDR was founded in 1949, as one moment in 
the wider gleichschaltung of Eastern Europe. 
 The GDR came into being, therefore, as a problem and a dilemma for the 
USSR. Although the red flag over the Reichstag marked a historical high-
watermark of Soviet imperialism, the GDR was merely a small territory carved 
out of the middle of the German Empire. Its economy — not to mention popular 
support for the Soviet occupation — was drastically weakened by reparations, 
and yet it was defined competitively against its Western counterpart that was 
thriving on Atlantic integration, boosted by large-scale infusions of Marshall Aid. 
For years, the Kremlin was torn between establishing the GDR as a strong front-
line state and relinquishing it as unviable (or at best a source of loot). For ten 
years the latter option was repeatedly floated even as the former was pursued 
                                                          
     87 One estimate (Cliff 1964:275) holds that between 1945 and 1956 goods worth fifteen billion dollars were 
shipped from Germany to the USSR, amounting to 75% of all reparations from Eastern Europe. 
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(Wettig 1992a, 1992b, 1995). On the one hand the Kremlin repeatedly offered the 
GDR as a bargaining chip to be exchanged for the neutralization of Germany. On 
the other, it was in practice becoming a keystone of Soviet empire. The Soviet 
army installed a new ruling class which oversaw the erection of Zone-wide 
economic and political administration. Its economy was gleichgeschaltet, and 
many of its traditional, west-oriented trade ties shrivelled or were cut. 
 By the early 1950s, then, an extraordinary situation had arisen. The GDR 
had come into existence as an independent frontline state under the security 
umbrella of an imperial regime that barely believed in its viability. Yet, with 
further falls in the temperature of East-West relations, the consolidation of the 
GDR state and the construction of a heavy industrial base proceeded apace. 
Despite continuing to exact enormous tribute, the USSR simultaneously 
encouraged a course of breakneck industrialization.88 Moreover, although 
‘Middle’ Germany’s economic forte had previously been light industry, its 
structure was now wrenched towards heavy industry. This was partly in 
reaction to an embargo on steel by the Western Allies, but largely due to the 
administered replication of the Stalinist model.89 
 If these contradictions were particularly stark in the immediate post-war 
decade, they were never overcome. The GDR remained a fragile linchpin of 
Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe — its fragility being determined, essentially, 
by economic weakness vis-à-vis West Germany. Moscow was the ultimate source 
of the East German nomenklatura’s legitimacy, the provider of its guiding rules 
and ideology. It was the creator and guarantor of the SED’s power, as 
demonstrated by the its role in containing and crushing the rising of 1953.90 
Moscow’s influence was initially very direct. For instance, at least one Kremlin 
representative attended Politbüro meetings (Harrison 1992:28). In later decades 
the relationship was less blunt, being mediated through normal administrative 
                                                          
     88 Seppain (1992:87-8) suggests that these contradictory strategies were represented by different factions in 
the CPSU leadership. 
     89 In 1945 only 2% of Germany’s coal and iron and 7% of its steel were produced in the area of the future 
GDR (Mueller-Enbergs 1991:101). 
     90 Following this dramatic demonstration of ‘fraternal solidarity’, Charles Maier suggests (1997:23), 
uncertainties within the Soviet bloc strengthened Moscow’s commitment to the East German state. ‘Any 
notion of trading it for neutralization of a united Germany became far too adventurous for even the 
reformist Khrushchev, once the Polish and Hungarian upheavals shook Eastern Europe in 1956’. 
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and diplomatic channels and personal contacts, but it was no less forceful for 
that. Conversely, East Germany’s economic potential was inhibited by Soviet 
domination, initially in the form of reparations (and other imperial taxes such as 
‘occupation costs’). In later years, it suffered from the fact that bilateral plan 
coordination tied the GDR to the small, backward, ‘soft’ economies of its allies, 
especially the USSR.91 Moreover, of all Comecon economies, the GDR was 
probably least suited to the STE form. Small and relatively developed, it was 
highly trade dependent. This, together with its skilled and ‘mature’ working 
class (Kopstein 1997:157) and low latent labour surplus, meant that STE 
structures conferred relatively little, if any, advantage. Thus its relationship to 
Moscow was based upon shared structures that were increasingly unable to 
deliver successful capital accumulation (not to mention living standards that 
could approach those in West Germany). 
 Not surprisingly, critical voices would grumble about the deleterious 
effects of ‘aping’ the Soviet model (e.g. Behrens 1992:141). More significantly, 
although they crushed open dissent of this sort, SED leaders were themselves 
aware that attempts to improve economic efficiency necessitated intensified 
engagement with non-STE firms and states and, therefore, an implicit 
downgrading of relations with the USSR. Usually in connection with attempts to 
strengthen economic or political bridges to the Western world, in particular West 
Germany, the SED leadership itself repeatedly chafed against the impositions of 
Soviet hegemony. At such moments Moscow could call Berlin to heel. For 
example, in 1970, when Ulbricht was seen to have overstepped the mark in 
asserting East German independence, Brezhnev wrote to Honecker (Sieber 
1994:86), reminding him that Ulbricht would find it ‘impossible’, 
 
 if he tries to go over our heads, or if he makes rash moves against 
yourself or other comrades in the Politbüro. Our troops are 
stationed there. Erich, I’ll tell you straight — and never forget this 
                                                          
     91 The GDR economy depended upon selling ‘soft’ manufactures to Comecon countries and receiving 
‘hard’ raw materials, particularly from the USSR, in exchange. In 1985, for example, 86% of its high tech 
exports went to Comecon countries. In an immediate economic sense it thus seemed to gain particular 
advantage from Comecon’s geo-economic enclave nature, and this was to provide arguments for the 
‘Comecon’ faction in the 1980s (see chapter five). However, what was of immediate advantage proved 
deleterious in the long run. 
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The imposition of the Soviet model of authoritarian rule did not occur by fiat, but 
was a fraught process punctuated by (often bitter) struggles. An early priority for 
the new powerholders was the construction of the state apparatus. They sought 
out and promoted acolytes and abolished or reshaped those institutions that 
posed a threat to their priorities. In addition to reliance upon the egalitarian and 
optimistic ideology of Communism, patronage and privilege were deployed to 
attract loyal cohorts into the ranks of the state apparatus. Loyalty was well 
rewarded. In addition to superior salaries, packets of cigarettes, alcohol and 
chocolate — in carefully differentiated quantities — were regularly distributed to 
functionaries, as well as to scientists, specialists, poets and artists (Leonhard 
1961:406). Such (exchangeable) lures, in a time of extreme shortages and 
hardship, helped to attract a layer of grateful, faithful cadre to key positions. 
 In addition to establishing a reliable apparatus, the ruling group sought 
means of broadening its ‘base’ in the population. Obvious pools of potential 
support existed in the form of those who had earlier been won to the communist 
(and social-democrat) cause(s), as well as hundreds of thousands who were 
benefiting from post-war upward mobility. Skilful political manoeuvring was 
required to effect the conversion of such potential into actual support, and to sift 
the obedient from the merely sympathetic. Its main moments were the ‘arranged 
marriage’ that incorporated the East German SPD into the Communist Party, 
followed by repeated purges of the resultant SED. 
 In the immediate post-war period, when the destiny of Soviet-occupied 
Germany was still far from decided, a certain political tolerance existed, 
including a controlled party pluralism. However, popular social movements, 
such as the ‘antifascist committees’ and the ‘works councils’ movement, were 
                                                          
     92 Chapter five describes how Honecker proceeded to forget Brezhnev’s advice and repeat Ulbricht’s 
‘error’ of undermining the Brezhnev doctrine by steering too close to the FRG, only then to cry ‘betrayal!’ 
when Gorbachev phased out the doctrine. 
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perceived by the nomenklatura, even before the Stalinization of the late 1940s, as 
an unqualified menace (Dale 1996b). The works councils in particular presented 
an obstacle to the imposition of managerial authority in industry. Many of them 
took in hand not only the material reconstruction of their workplace but its social 
organization (including the production process, exchange with other factories 
and remuneration of the workforce). They functioned as de facto directors of 
many large factories, particularly where previous owners had fled (Suckut 1982). 
Especially where works councils were well organized, the prevailing shop-floor 
ethic was, in Jeffrey Kopstein’s words (1997:21), ‘egalitarian, cooperative, 
defensive, and geared toward survival rather than the maximization of gain.’ For 
example, Kopstein (1997:27) reports that ‘[w]here management stiffened its 
resolve to increase wage and consumer good differentials, workers often 
spontaneously evened out the differences by purchasing goods for each other.’ 
The councils spearheaded resistance to the authorities’ promotion of an atomized 
and competitive workplace culture. Significant struggles against a series of 
management offensives occurred until the mid-1950s. Their targets included the 
imposition of wage differentials and piece work inherited from the pre-1945 
regime, wage-cuts, ‘socialist competition’, and the extension of Taylorist 
techniques (Sarel 1975; Bust-Bartels 1980:28). 
 The councils’ powers were curtailed in two ways. Firstly, as the 
authorities gained greater overall control over the economy money began to 
replace goods as the medium of remuneration and of exchange between plants. 
Given their lack of influence over the money supply, this restricted the influence 
of works councils over these matters. Secondly, the authorities deliberately set 
out to marginalize the councils. Given that, in 1946, over half the works 
councillors were SED members, and that the SED leadership hoped to retain a 
strong foothold inside the working class, the tactics used were at first relatively 
delicate. Those firms controlled by works councils were designated ‘firms 
without owners’. Individual directors were appointed, management hierarchy 
restored and the council’s powers cut to those of ‘normal’ works councils. Works 
councillors were raised above the shop-floor, in terms of both the locus of their 
activity and their wages, and were transformed into officials mediating between 
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management and shop-floor. The councils became increasingly institutionalized, 
either regulated by or incorporated into state structures. A somewhat more 
effective tactic proved to be the gradual usurping of their tasks through the — 
increasingly state-controlled — FDGB. Whereas many works’ councillors had 
been Social Democrats and unionists before 1933, and their loyalty was primarily 
to their colleagues, FDGB functionaries were predominantly patriotic 
Communists (Staritz 1984:139). Yet despite all such manoeuvres, the councils 
remained a power capable of contesting management prerogative. For example, 
in 1947, when attempts were made to divide workplace mealtimes and food 
quality into three groups, the councils opposed the move, generally with success. 
 These ‘delicate’ tactics had failed to fully subordinate the councils. This, 
together with the rapidly freezing climate of Cold War rivalry, prompted the 
regime to change tack. Its interest in soliciting a degree of popular consent to the 
attenuation of social and political rights subsided. Now it resorted to the 
dissolution or gleichschaltung of recalcitrant organizations. By 1949 the regime 
had either crushed or colonized all independent political and industrial 
organization.93 Opposition parties were gleichgeschaltet into ‘bloc parties’. 
Workers were denied access to any legitimate means of organized collective 
bargaining. With the workers’ movement crushed and the public sphere 
reduced, dictatorship could arise. 
 
Mechanisms of Domination 
 
The sharp socio-political transformation of the late 1940s set the pattern for the 
mechanisms of domination which were henceforth to characterize SED rule. The 
subordination of the mass of society to the rule of the nomenklatura, as with ‘late 
capitalism’ in the analysis of Abercrombie et al., was fundamentally ‘founded in 
the structure of economic relations which oblige people to behave in ways which 
support the status quo and to defer to the decisions of the powerful if they are to 
continue to work and live’ (in Lodziak 1988:15). The ‘powerful decision-makers’, 
                                                          
     93 Note that the ‘crushing’ was primarily of public political and industrial organization. In terms of 
immediate control over the production process, managers and officials only slowly gained ground in the 
later 1950s and 1960s. 
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above all the Politbüro, presided over hierarchies of command, which descended 
through General Directors, then middle management, down to foremen. All 
these positions were appointed from above. This high degree of political and 
economic centralization posed the problem, as discussed in chapter three, that 
dissent could threaten to converge from all points towards a central and easily 
identifiable ruling elite. However, its tight and disciplined coordination of the 
mechanisms of domination and exploitation generally enabled the state 
leadership to preside over a rigorously united nomenklatura. 
 The nomenklatura’s comprehensive command over resources was 
thoroughly capitalized upon through a system of patronage in which loyal 
executors of orders were rewarded with promotion and perquisites. As Charles 
Maier (1997) describes — under the heading ‘corruption of the public sphere’ — 
the nomenklatura attempted to govern through private bargains with citizens. 
Citizens were treated as clients in a relationship designed to promote public 
attitudes of willing submission. Accordingly, State-citizen relationships, although 
officially glossed as ‘cooperative’, were widely satirized as ‘freimüssig’ (i.e. ‘free-
forced’, or ‘volun-mandatory’).94 
 If the nomenklatura’s command of resource distribution transparently 
served to reward loyalty and punish disloyalty, a more insidious form of its 
political deployment was to undermine solidarity amongst the exploited. 
Because ‘economic’ mechanisms of atomization and division of workers — 
notably the labour market — were reduced in effectiveness by the persistent 
labour shortages that lent workers a certain ‘tacit power’, managers and officials 
were obliged to develop other ways to undermine workers’ solidarity and 
improve productivity. Above all, attempts were made to introduce ‘a rigorous 
Taylorist labor regime’ (Kopstein 1997:18). In addition, labour market 
competition was complemented by the granting of differential rewards related to 
performance and political loyalty. Schemes of ‘socialist competition’ were 
introduced in which workers (and work brigades) were pitted against one 
                                                          
     94 This is of course typical of relationships of unequal power that are dressed in the discourse of freedom 
and equality — such as management-worker or authority-citizen ‘cooperation’. ‘When two parties co-
operate and one holds considerably more power [...] than the other’, Harvey cautions (1982:118), ‘then the 
voluntary nature of the co-operation might reasonably be called into question.’ 
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another and differentiated into status groups (‘activist’, ‘modernizer’, ‘best 
worker’, and ‘hero of labour’). Such ‘heroes’ were rewarded for raising work 
intensity. Their quotas, or ‘norms’, were institutionalized as those by which all 
others should be measured. Competitive comparison was encouraged through 
‘personal accounts’: next to each worker was a noticeboard on which their 
‘performance’ was daily exhibited.95 By 1958, seventy-six per cent of workers in 
state industry received piece wages. Together with other forms of ‘performance-
related pay’, this ensured that, whereas differentials had decreased until 1949, 
they subsequently increased dramatically. At the extreme, one worker could 
receive over six times the pay of a colleague on the same job. 
 Such forms of workplace differentiation and atomization were buttressed 
by politically disorganizing the non-nomenklatura in general and the working 
class in particular (cf. Kuron/Modzelewski 1969:122). The state was particularly 
concerned to foster mutual suspicion and stereotyping between manual and 
white-collar workers and between workers and intellectuals. ‘Intellectuals’ were 
administratively classified in the same bracket as the nomenklatura, and were 
afforded privileged treatment. As a result, they tended to justify privilege and 
hierarchy through recourse to elitist arguments. Even dissident intellectuals, 
despite their sensitivity to various manifestations of alienation, generally paid 
little heed to its material roots in the economic dispossession of the working 
class. In turn a conservative dismissal of intellectuals was widespread amongst 
workers. Dissidents were widely tarred with the same brush, as exemplified by 
this quote (Leitner 1983:351): 
 
 What on Earth do they [dissidents] want? They’re always going 
over to the West, raking in hard currency, shopping in KaDeWe and 
cruising around in those Volvos that they’ve got hold of — on the 
fiddle — for a cool sixty thousand. And then all they can do is 
complain!96 
 
Dissidents themselves confirmed the phenomenon that such sentiment 
addressed. Thus Jürgen Fuchs (1984:66) insists: 
                                                          
     95 This technique, incidentally, was first used in Robert Owen’s mill at New Lanark. 
     96 For numerous similar quotes, see Fuller (1999). 
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 There is only one way to put it: the state, with the assistance of 
permits for travel to the West, creates a cleavage between authors 
and readers. Then everyone in Jena and Dresden simply shrugs, 
saying "he’s privileged", and [the dissident’s] political impact is 
stillborn. 
 
 These relatively subtle techniques of ‘divide and rule’ were sustained and 
complemented by straightforward repression. Any serious attempt to establish 
independent collective organization or to challenge state authority came up 
against the security services. Even the Protestant Church, which generally 
advocated cooperation with the SED, created a network of social relations 
outside the SED’s direct control and was therefore subject to intensive policing. 
With no independent organization permitted, the public sphere was effectively 
colonized by state institutions, from the media to the ‘mass organizations’ such 
as the FDGB and FDJ. 
 Even non-political ‘deviation’ from the SED’s value-system faced 
repression or official incorporation into the public sphere. For instance, the 
regime fought against Christian confirmation not just with police methods but 
simultaneously by promulgating a Communist facsimile of the ceremony 
(‘Jugendweihe’). Similarly, when western pop music threatened to become a 
mass counter-culture in the late 1960s, the regime attempted to incorporate and 
neutralize the movement by setting up ‘sing-clubs’ under the aegis of the FDJ 
and DT64, a youth radio station (Leitner 1983:63). 
 The nomenklatura’s rule was simultaneously mystified and theatrically 
staged. The political process was at once clearly visible and impenetrable. 
Although powerholders at the top of society were plain to see, access to the 
decision-making process, for the ordinary citizen, involved an uphill struggle 
through a tangled mass of bureaucracy. Hovering over the entire political 
process, in both its public and private dimensions, was the Stasi. Its true function, 
as Maier describes (1997), centred not so much on the specific information 
gleaned and the uses to which it was put than on the aura of secrecy and power 
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of mystification that its presence created. This greatly contributed to the 
corruption of independent initiatives and stifling of dissent. 
 If the real operations of power were mystified, its symbolism was 
theatrically enacted. With alternative actors suppressed, the SED’s officials and 
supporters were encouraged to exploit their semantic monopoly. Like cats 
marking their territory, they displayed the trappings of Communist rule at every 
opportunity, whether mass demonstrations and spectacular events or routine 
propaganda pasted on street corners and in shop windows. As with Edward 
Thompson’s discussion of the ‘theatricality of power’ in eighteenth century 
England (1991:64ff.), the importance given to the symbolic assertions of power 
(along with its implicit humiliation of the disempowered), would appear to be 
connected to the weakness of the actual foundations of authority, notably the 
regime’s lack of popular legitimacy. The reach of the SED’s ideology into the 
population was limited. Jan Pakulski’s conclusions for Poland (1990:40-58) apply, 
albeit with lesser force, to the GDR. He found that Communist ideology ‘did not 
permeate mass consciousness’, but nevertheless played a key role as 
 
 the backbone of the political formula adhered to by the political 
elite and the top layers of the political-administrative "apparatus". 
[It] structured elite consciousness by providing justifications for 
their rule and by blocking the articulation of alternative world-
views. [...] It was also important in legitimizing the rulers in the 
eyes of their crucial external constituency — the Soviet leaders. 
 
That is not to say that general socialist values, including social justice, 
participatory democracy, and egalitarian redistribution, were not widely held. 
But these could all too easily be perceived as contrasting with the Communist 
order, with its lack of democracy, corruption and unjust distribution of economic 
rewards. For many, the SED’s legitimacy claims were simply refuted by lived 
experience. Even an author sympathetic to the SED (Scharf 1984:133) worried 
that ‘the most sophisticated efforts to transmit socialist values — through the 
schools, the media and the arts — are quickly destroyed if the practical 
experience of daily life contradicts those values’. 
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 Ideological gleichschaltung therefore only really functioned in the official 
public sphere. For example, eighty per cent of respondents in one survey said 
that state influence was not, or only barely, noticed in the ‘living sphere’, while 
the figure for ‘leisure time’ was eighty-four per cent (Völker 1995:159). By 
contrast, the figures for education and the workplace were forty-one and thirty-
six per cent respectively. Suppressed in the strictly supervised and regimented 
public sphere, honesty and criticism could nevertheless blossom in low-profile 
‘niches’, amongst groups of trusted friends, colleagues and relatives. 
 Because hidden and isolated, niches hardly posed a threat to the ruling 
powers. Viewed as a ‘safety valve’, they performed a legitimating function, 
similarly to what Habermas (1973:106) describes as ‘civic privatism’ in bourgeois 
democracies. However, niches could equally function as sites of the creation and 
exchange of what James Scott (1990) calls ‘hidden transcripts’ of resistance, 
where ‘infrapolitical’ cultures of satirical humour, subversive anecdote and 
critical discussion flourished.97 A camaraderie based around an awareness of 
common conditions and grievances was common, and was entirely unlike — or 
even opposed to — the camaraderie of ‘class’ (i.e. national) struggle encouraged 
by official institutions. As Linda Fuller has shown (1999:137-40), the ‘lower levels 
of the workplace’ in particular formed an arena in which relatively genuine, 
trusting relationships developed, and where political discussion occurred that, in 
its broadness and frankness, contrasted sharply with that of the official domain. 
Such subcultures formed the seed-bed from which oppositional ‘public 





Sources of Opposition and Resistance 
                                                          
     97 Scott’s term, the ‘infrapolitics of subordinate groups’ (1990:19,183-4), designates ‘a wide variety of low-
profile forms of resistance that dare not speak in their own name.’ Such behaviour is, ‘like infrared rays, 
beyond the visible end of the spectrum’ and, like the infrastructure of commerce in relation to actual trade, 
‘provides much of the political underpinning of the more visible political action on which our attention has 
generally been focused’. 
     98 To thwart this, one of the Stasi’s functions was to detect and counter the emergence of informal 
oppositional groups in workplaces (Ausgedient 1990:42). 
 122 
 
Opposition and resistance to the Communist system or to particular government 
policies took myriad forms (for an overview see Neubert (1998), also Fricke 
(1984)). Two general ones deserve special mention. 
 The first is the infrapolitics of industrial struggle. With the exception of 
the 1945-49 period and severe crises (see below), the apparati of repression 
prevented independent workplace organization and rendered major strike action 
extremely difficult. Nevertheless, struggles at the infrapolitical level were 
endemic. 
 Labour shortages gave workers considerable leverage vis-à-vis 
management. Job security was, in Voigt’s words (1973:60), the worker’s ‘most 
effective means of self-assertion.’ The workers’ side in bargaining was frequently 
buttressed by the threat, whether voiced or not, of giving notice. Although a 
normal mechanism for redistributing labour-power, fluctuation in the tight 
labour market tended to promote ‘wage drift’.99 Especially in the late 1950s, 
variations in workers’ bargaining strength in different sectors resulted in an 
actual wage pyramid that was markedly different than that planned (Bust-Bartels 
1980:67). Although normally a comparatively immediate and individual form of 
struggle, there were also cases of organized threats of mass resignation.100 
Studies of shop-floor relations show that, thanks to the exercise of workers’ ‘veto 
power’, the introduction of measures to increase productivity usually had to be 
accompanied by compromises (Deppe/Hoß 1989). 
 Alongside the threat of resignation, workers possessed two main 
weapons. The first was working poorly, whether in terms of speed and intensity 
(‘Bummelei’), or quality of output. Bummelei could reach epidemic proportions, 
as in the late 1950s, when managers complained of a ‘Go-Slow-Movement’ (Sarel 
1975:168). Bummelei could be applied to a range of ends: to protest at unfair norm 
increases; to ensure that higher-paid overtime would be necessary;101 or as a tacit 
                                                          
     99 Fluctuation was hence cursed by Stalin as the ‘scourge of production’ (Voigt 1973:130). 
     100 One, in Berlin in 1969, succeeded in forcing management to reinstate the ‘thirteenth month’s wage’, 
which had been withdrawn (Degen 1988:35). 
     101 This was especially effective when the ‘Plan finish’ was approaching, at which time workers’ 
bargaining strength peaked. 
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work-to-rule, particularly when norm-assessors were measuring the pace of 
work (Sarel 1975:169; Voigt 1973:86; Bust-Bartels 1980:82). The second was 
sabotage and force. If, for example, norms were due to rise, conditional upon the 
introduction of new equipment or materials, it could prove rational to ‘eliminate’ 
the latter in order to thwart the former (Voigt 1973:86). Some of the most 
imaginative forms of Luddism were directed against those widely-despised 
Taylorist tempocrats, the norm-assessors. One such, for example, approached 
some bricklayers to assess their operations (in Bust-Bartels 1980:112): 
 
 The masons stopped work when he explained why he had come. 
Two sturdy chaps guessed that he had come to secretly time them. 
They shoved him to the edge of the scaffolding, and one of them 
whipped his stopwatch from its chain. They laid the watch on the 
fresh masonry, poured cement over it, and laid bricks on top. 
 
But perhaps the most deftly and widely practised of the Luddite arts was the 
taking by the people of ‘People’s Own’ property. Notoriously, workplace theft 
was ubiquitous throughout Eastern Europe, and East Germany was no 
exception.102 In Wolf Biermann’s words (Meier-Lenz 1981:129), ‘[i]n the GDR 
there is a highly developed form of workers’ Selbsthilfe [‘co-operative’ or ‘self-
defence’], in that workers personally enrich themselves at their workplace.’103 
 On the basis of workers’ strong shop-floor bargaining position, and 
connected to the prevalence of ‘infrapolitical’ resistance, a ‘rudimentary’ class 
consciousness prevailed. There was a sturdy sense that the interests of workers 
and of ‘them up there’ were antagonistic, and that workers who go along with 
managerialism and norm busting were breaking the rules of solidarity (Bendix 
1974:425-33). Western and post-1989 studies of GDR workplaces report 
comments such as ‘them up at the top of the company should work down here so 
they can learn how to think in the real world’ (Naumann/Trümpler 1990:50); and 
‘Why should we down here work shifts but not them up there?’ (Bust-Bartels 
                                                          
     102 One of the finest justifications was the popular Czechoslovak saying: ‘If you don’t steal from the state, 
you rob your own family!’ (Pravda 1979:221). 
     103 Biermann’s comment, incidentally, reflects the widespread view of East European workers that their 
paltry remuneration cannot justify maximum effort. It was summed up in the saying ‘We only pretend to 
work — they only pretend to pay us!’ 
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1980:161). One western researcher (Bust-Bartels 1977:54) concluded from his 
observations that ‘[a] conscious frontal antagonism towards management 
prevails amongst the majority of industrial workers.’ A more recent study based 
on research in the late 1980s confirms this conclusion (Fuller 1999:46). Clearly, 
few workers failed, in Scharf’s words (1984:151), ‘to appreciate the irony of their 
inferior status in a "workers state"‘.104 
 The second broad source of opposition was from members of the middle 
classes. This social layer may be taken to include most echelons of management 
and supervisory staff, middle-ranking officials, as well as the more privileged 
members of the intellectual professions — academics, architects, artists, and so 
on. The tasks performed by the latter included the ‘management of legitimation’, 
i.e. furthering the self-awareness and homogeneity of the dominant class, and the 
transmission of its interests and values throughout society (cf. Gramsci 1971). 
The middle classes were entrusted with a relatively high degree of autonomy 
and discretion and performed the lion’s share of ‘mental-creative’ work (Erbe 
1982:150). To ensure their compliance with their superior’s decisions, and to 
prevent their abilities being put to the service of dissent or opposition, they 
received generous reward. From 1950 intellectuals received special individual 
contracts. Some obtained monthly salaries as high as 15,000 Marks. More 
important were additional earnings, premiums and perquisites, such as high 
bonuses, extra rations of fuel and electricity, superior food at work, better health 
cover, high pensions, cheap loans, extra tuition for their children, long holidays, 
and reserved places at holiday resorts. Some were even given servants. If such 
privileges brought the gap in living standards between workers and intellectuals 
to an extreme in the early 1950s, subsequent decades witnessed a gradual 
levelling but no reversal.105 
 By and large, the middling layers were committed supporters of, or at 
least obediently served, the ruling order. They exhibited very high rates of Party 
membership and generally shunned the dissidents in their midst. Moreover, 
                                                          
     104 For substantiation of this point, see Anonymous (1974). 
     105 In certain respects intellectuals became more favoured still. For example, the social status of professors 
and functionaries, according to Ludz (1980:110), improved, as did the access of writers who published in the 
West to hard currency and ‘Intershop cheques’. 
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enjoying relatively rewarding work and privileges that were usually tied directly 
to their position, even those of a more critical bent faced strong incentives to 
avoid any action that might jeopardize their career. And yet, their class position 
was contradictory. The scope of their sovereignty over immediate tasks and 
decisions was comparatively great, yet the overall environment in which they 
worked was comprehensively controlled by their superiors. Intellectual labour 
was constrained by censorship and a tightly controlled information flow. In the 
1950s entire disciplines were banned from academia, including ethics, sociology 
and cybernetics. Creative intellectuals worked autonomously, under the 
influence of modern aesthetic traditions that uphold art as the site of unalienated 
labour. Yet they depended for their resources, livelihood, and success upon a 
state which was ever keen to impose aesthetic demands and constraints. In short, 
the rigidity with which all spheres of society were subordinated to the diktat of 
the nomenklatura exacerbated the alienation experienced by intellectuals. As 
Brecht put it (Jäger 1982:67), 
 
 They [the authorities] pressed the workers to increase production, 
and pressed the artists to beautify it. To the artists they gave a high 
living standard and promised it to the workers. Artists’ 
production, just like that of the workers, had the character of a 
means to an end, and was not seen in itself as gratifying or free. 
 
 As for middle functionaries and managers, they were often in the position 
of enforcing decisions over which they had little say, and yet would bear the 
brunt of criticism from subordinates over their execution. Some, though bound 
into a rigid chain of command, responded to problems and to criticisms from 
below by seeking changes in policy or personnel above. Alongside intellectuals, 
these layers were a prime source of reformist (or ‘reform-communist’) 
opposition, which combined basic loyalty to the system as a whole with criticism 
of certain of its characteristics and the desire to improve particular policies. Fritz 
Schenk has sketched an ideal-typical biography of a reform-communist (Jänicke 
1964:92): ‘Rebels are created, over and again, out of those on whose desks the 
reports of failures in Party policies pile up.’ These then, 
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 initially, stumble towards "operationalism", i.e. they attempt to 
counter the visible problems with an array of administrative 
measures [...] As soon as they become conscious of the futility of 
their efforts, they slip into "revisionism", i.e. they become seized by 
doubts about the system, come into conflict with the ideology and 
the Party apparatus, and seek fundamental changes. 
 
Reform-communist alternatives tended to be discussed when a liberalizing or 
divided regime evinced weakness or vacillation in policy or perspective. If such 
crises provoked major working-class struggle, the intelligentsia would polarize, 
with reform-communists forming a minority calling for concessions to be made 
to workers’ demands. Reform-communism first surfaced as a significant 
movement in 1953. Although intellectuals were notable by their silence during 
that year’s uprising, it did, in Steele’s words (1977:103), accelerate ‘a widespread 
move towards de-Stalinization in the lower levels of the party, in the trade 
unions, and among the intellectuals.’ During crises of this sort, critical 
intellectuals could become galvanized into oppositional activists. The 
biographies of such people generally show their turn to active dissidence as 
beginning at a time of crisis. For example, Stefan Heym, Erich Loest and 
Wolfgang Harich in 1953, Robert Havemann in 1956, and Rudolf Bahro, as well 
as many of the leaders of the 1980s opposition, in 1968.106 
 
Rhythms of Resistance 
 
Both workplace resistance and intellectuals’ dissidence was, at the infrapolitical 
level, endemic. However, at times of general social and political crisis, opposition 
tended to expand and generalize and could even break through into the public 
sphere. A number of crises can be identified, each of which included most or all 
of the following elements: 
 
(i) a significant political turn in Moscow and/or Berlin. 
                                                          
     106 See Janka (1989), Jäckel (1980), Havemann (1978, 1990b), Hoeft (1990), Loest (1981), Philipsen (1993). 
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(ii) open divisions between the CPSU and SED leaderships and/or 
within the SED. 
(iii) the emergence of organized opposition. 
(iv) strike waves or a significant upturn in working-class struggle. 
(v) economic crisis. 
 
Between 1949 and 1988 five crises occurred; six if 1960-2 is included. The first 
four will be discussed in this chapter, the final two in chapter five. 
 
Table 4.1 Crises, 1949-88. Major changes are marked **; minor ones *. 
 1953 1956-7 1960-1 1970-2 1976-82 1987-8 
(i) ** ** ** **  ** 
(ii) ** **  *  * 
(iii) ** **   * ** 
(iv) ** *  * *     
(v) **  ** ** ** * 
 
Each crisis was distinct in both scale and nature. Each ended in a more or less 
defined ‘settlement’, ushering in a distinctively new period. By far the greatest, 
and the only one that merits description as a ‘revolutionary situation’, was that of 
June 1953. Although I have discussed the causes and processes of that uprising 
elsewhere (Dale 1996b), three points about its settlement require attention. 
Firstly, its suppression was a decisive blow to the widespread aspirations for 
social and political transformation that had been expressed in the rising. The 
assertive and sometimes radical consciousness that had characterized large 
sections of the working class in the late 1940s and early 1950s began to fade from 
this point on. 
 Secondly, the uprising traumatized the nomenklatura. It came perilously 
close to toppling the regime, and could have developed into a serious challenge 
to Soviet control of East Germany. Analysis of internal SED documents reveals, 
according to Harrison (1992:28), that ‘insecurity among the East German leaders, 
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it is clear, deepened after the June 17 uprising. If it happened once, they feared, it 
could happen again.’ The June events starkly illuminated two of the constraints 
on the SED’s rule: its reliance on the Soviet Army and the limits of working-class 
subservience. Moreover, following the rising, managers failed to regain a quick 
and clear-cut control of the production process. In Kopstein’s words (1997:37), it 
‘effectively crippled the regime on the shop-floor. Norms quickly returned to the 
status quo ante.’ In the following two years average wages rose by sixty-eight per 
cent rather than the planned thirty-one per cent (Gensicke 1991:292). In short, the 
rising drastically limited the SED’s room for manoeuvre on the industrial 
relations front. In subsequent decades, as Kopstein avers (1997:18), ‘fearing a 
repetition of the June events, labor peace could be bought only at the price of 
long-term stagnation in labour relations, wage structures, and productivity 
incentives.’ 
 Thirdly, apart from concessions on the industrial front and a closer 
identification with the USSR, the settlement was marked by a thorough 
revamping of the instruments of repression, including a major strengthening of 
the Stasi. With this in mind, Ilko-Sascha Kowalczuk et al. (1995) submit that the 





Coming so soon after the 1953 settlement, in which the SED leadership had 
consolidated behind Ulbricht’s conservative and hawkish leadership, 
Khrushchev’s first liberalization was a particularly unwelcome surprise. The 
Communist world was hurled into debate and confusion. Reform-communism, it 
seemed, had been legitimized by the leader of world Communism himself. In the 
GDR, as elsewhere, SED leaders, Honecker recalls (Andert/Herzberg 1991:248), 
were ‘shocked’ by Khrushchev’s secret speech. Demands for reform suffused the 
SED. One group of Politbüro members proposed slowing the pace of ‘socialist 
construction’, restricting the power of the SED, dissolving the mass 
organizations, relaxing repression and improving relations with the FRG. 
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 However, despite some nods towards de-Stalinization (such as supporting 
a demand for ‘free discussion’ in the SED and accepting the concept of ‘various 
roads to socialism’) the Ulbricht leadership in practice cleaved to orthodoxy. 
Emboldened by de-Stalinization and frustrated by the lack of real change in the 
GDR, groups of intellectuals demanding more radical reform mushroomed. By 
the autumn, ‘problem discussions’ had spread widely and were nourishing a 
rising strike wave (Wolle 1991). That the situation did not escalate is thanks 
largely to the chance fact that in Hungary similar developments had gone further 
and faster, and were met with brute repression. This in turn served to weld the 
East German regime (and the Party) behind Ulbricht, giving it sufficient cohesion 
and strength to marginalize opposition through a combination of concessions 
and repression (Stern 1963:203).107 Early in 1957 orthodox conservative policies 
were restored on all fronts and the acceleration of ‘socialist construction’ 
announced. The expulsion of the reform faction from the leadership followed 




Although the 1950s as a whole witnessed rapid economic growth, it was from a 
very low base, and productivity slipped further behind that of the FRG. In 1950 
per capita productivity, according to one estimate, was fifty per cent of the West 
German figure, falling to thirty nine per cent by 1960 (Merkel/Wahl 1991:59).108 
At the end of the decade a downturn in the business cycle occurred, that 
exacerbated the problem of the open border to the West. 
 The regime had triumphed, brutally, over workers’ aspirations and 
organization in the late 1940s, in 1953 and in 1956. But if open resistance had 
been quashed, wars of attrition continued in the workplaces, thwarting planners’ 
attempts to suppress consumption in favour of investment. In the 1950s as a 
whole, wages rose eighty-four per cent as fast as productivity, as against a 
                                                          
     107 Ironically, some of the reforms — e.g. the introduction of ‘works committees’ — represented diluted 
versions of the recommendations of dissident intellectuals, such as Behrens, whose views were 
simultaneously being suppressed (Ludz 1970:59). 
     108 Another estimate puts the productivity gap at 15% in 1958, rising to 25% in 1963 and 32% in 1968 
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planned figure of only thirty per cent. Workers’ ‘tacit power’ was bolstered 
above all by the directness of comparison with the higher wages in the western 
half of the country, and their ability to move there if desired.  All told, over three 
million people emigrated between 1947 and 1961 — a haemorrhage the severity 
of which has to be understood against the background labour shortages that 
were becoming severe as the boom of the 1950s overheated. This sharply 
constrained the regime’s room for manoeuvre. As an SED theorist noted, soberly, 
in 1962 (Bust-Bartels 1980:71), ‘[the] constraint of the open border before 13 
August 1961 resulted in wage-fund excesses.’ 
 By the late 1950s overinvestment had led to severe shortages, especially of 
consumer goods, forcing the abandonment of the Plan in 1959. Economic crisis, 
in turn, fuelled emigration, which soared from 144,000 in 1959 to 207,000 in the 
first half of 1961. In particular, the collectivization of agriculture provoked the 
emigration of farmers, thus exacerbating food shortages. Then, in 1960, 
Adenauer announced the cessation of inter-German trade, forcing panic import 
substitution in the engineering and chemical industries (Richert 1964:274). 
 Economic slowdown was, as Table 4.2 indicates, severe. ‘The situation’, in 
Przybylski’s words (1992:145), ‘was heading towards a collapse which could only 
be avoided through the building of the Wall.’ 
 
Table 4.2 Economic crisis, 1960-2 (from Leptin/Melzer 1978:7). 
 1956 1958 1960 1962 
National income 
growth rate 
4.0 10.9 4.5 2.1 
Investment 
growth rate 
25.0 12.0 10.6 2.0 
 
 Of the settlements that followed crises, that of 1961 was the most clearly 
defined. An awesome display of power, the Wall blocked emigration as an 
alternative for the discontented, thereby curtailing workers’ tacit strength and 
enabling consumption (relative to GDP) to be cut significantly. A determined and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(Deppe/Hoß 1980:14). 
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successful assertion of its rule, the Wall elevated the confidence and cohesion of 
the nomenklatura. It reinforced the stability and ‘legitimacy’ of the GDR — both in 
terms of its sovereignty vis-à-vis other states, and domestic acquiescence towards 
the regime. As Scharf observes (1984:124), ‘Only with the permanent closure of 
the Berlin border in 1961 did the mass of the people begin to accept the durability 




The settlement of 1961 ushered in a decade of political stability. Throughout this 
period the regime, and its alliance with the Kremlin, were generally perceived as 
strong. The major threats to ‘order’ were marginalized. When the ‘Prague Spring’ 
once again highlighted the question of democratic reform, no reform wing of the 
SED emerged and public dissent was suppressed. Workers’ struggles remained 
quiescent. By the end of the decade, Ralf Dahrendorf (1968:433) could observe 
that ‘it would appear that today the regime of the GDR is quite legitimate in 
terms of the assent, or at least the absence of active dissent, on the part of its 
citizens.’ 
 The mainstay of the regime’s strength was economic growth, which was 
rapid and comparable even to West German rates. One estimate suggests that the 
productivity gap relative to West Germany was shored up at around thirty-six 
per cent (Merkel/Wahl 1991:59).110 Large swathes of the population experienced 
occupational upward mobility. Peasants and housewives became workers, and a 
significant minority of workers became officials and professionals. The 
percentage of unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the workforce declined from 
seventy-six in 1945 to twenty-five in 1977 (Rueschemeyer/Scharf 1986:65). 
Tertiary education grew until by 1971 admissions had reached 44,000. All layers 
saw living standards begin to rise from the mid-1950s. East Germany gradually 
became a ‘consumer society’. A modest minimum of material welfare was 
                                                          
     109 Although there was widespread and intense criticism of the erection of the Wall (Eckelmann et al. 
1990), it by no means increased the risk of an uprising as some argued at the time (e.g. Fricke 1964:174). 
     110 However, the 1960s was also the decade which saw East Germany’s GNP overtaken for the first time 
by a private company — General Motors (Brown 1972:214). 
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guaranteed to all, founded upon full employment and steady improvements in 
housing, healthcare, training, education, and leisure facilities. As biographies of 
East German workers who entered the labour force in the 1950s and 1960s (e.g. 
Herzberg 1987) reveal, these improved life-chances contributed to the increased 




The 1960s was a decade dominated by three rafts of reform geared to raising 
economic productivity. The first, education reform, was enacted under the 
banner of ‘education-competition’ versus West Germany (Laitko 1997:48). It 
entailed a further to higher education, particularly in the spheres of science and 
technology, to compensate for the pre-1961 haemorrhage of highly skilled labour 
and to meet the demands of an increasingly complex economy. Between 1951 
and 1971 admissions to higher education institutions rose by almost 400% (Erbe 
1982:177). Meanwhile, secondary education was restructured and systematically 
‘oriented to the personnel requirements of the economy’ (Laitko 1997:47). 
 The second arena of reform was industrial relations. Although the cutting 
edge of management offensives had previously been the introduction of piece 
wages, linked to ‘scientific assessment’, piece work encountered serious 
problems. Encouraging haste, it results in low quality output and high levels of 
wear and tear of — increasingly valuable — machinery. Moreover, the myth of 
‘objective’ setting of rates was rarely, if ever, believed by workers. Most learnt 
that they could influence piece rates, either through outwitting the ‘scientific 
assessors’, or by pressing management to make concessions. In conditions of full 
employment, the introduction of piece work could do very little to weaken 
workers’ bargaining position or to stem ‘wage drift’ (cf. Cliff 1970:46). 
 From 1958 piece work declined until, in 1967, only a quarter of public 
sector workers received piece rates. The replacement system of ‘performance-
related pay’ was designed to shift control over pay and performance towards 
management. The crux of the new system was the bonus. By 1972, bonuses 
amounted to almost half of total wages. They were granted according to the 
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criteria of hard work and quality of output, but also rewarded obedience, as 
measured by punctuality, discipline and even political conformity. Performance-
related pay provided managers with larger carrots and sticks with which to 
combat workers’ attempts to reduce work-time through late arrival, early 
departure, interrupting work, faking work-time, and so on. Although failing to 
eradicate the egalitarian shop-floor ethic (cf. Bahro, in Bust-Bartels 1980:131) or 
wage drift,111 these reforms did boast a qualified success. In particular, they 
helped to reduce real wage growth which, as a percentage of productivity 
increase, fell to an annual average of 71% in 1961-5 and 65.5% in 1966-70 (Adam 
1979:18,37). 
 Thirdly, major alterations were made to the structure of business planning 
and competition. Their thoughts sharpened by the crisis of 1960-2, key sections of 
the nomenklatura showed increasing concern about changes taking place in the 
world economy; they worried that the war-economic system was fettering 
growth (Baylis 1971). In the early 1960s, with both the Liberman debates and 
western methods very much in mind (Kopstein 1997:49), work began on a ‘New 
Economic System’ (NÖS) designed to stimulate trade and to encourage 
enterprises to focus on efficiency over output.112 The yardsticks measuring plan 
fulfilment were altered, with priority given to indicators based on deliveries to 
customers rather than total output. Prices were accorded an enhanced role in 
determining resource allocation, in order to put downward pressure on the costs 
of production, and force obsolete production methods out of use. In particular, 
raw materials prices were raised sharply. The bonus system was redesigned to 
give managers a direct interest in introducing new technology and disciplining 
the workforce. Profits replaced output as the criterion for managers’ bonuses. 
The NÖS also aimed to improved business flexibility by devolving powers from 
the centre to enterprises, enabling the latter to respond more rapidly to changing 
conditions. Enterprises were permitted greater scope to allocate resources for 
                                                          
     111 Kopstein (1997:158) notes that managers still tended to ‘set wages informally as [they] saw fit. In 1974 a 
mere one-quarter of wages fell within the centrally determined guidelines, and in industry and construction 
only one-tenth.’ 
     112 Once again, the publicly-scorned proposals of dissident or non-conformist intellectuals, such as Heuer, 
were quietly introduced, albeit in diluted form. 
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investment, collect their own income, borrow money, disburse their own profits 
and, to a certain extent, determine wages. In short, the hope was to spur 
productivity growth through the introduction of mechanisms that approximated 
more closely to a market system.113 
 
Contradictions of Reform 
 
In its initial stages the NÖS seemed successful. It attracted interest from other 
STEs (including a study visit from a young Russian bureaucrat, Mikhail 
Gorbachev). However, the reforms ran up against problems of two kinds. The 
first was opposition from workers and managers. In particular, one plank of 
NÖS, due to begin in trial form in 1966, involved a shift to profitability as the 
determinant of investment decisions, which would necessitate closures and lay-
offs. Kopstein relates how, in one trial scheme (1997:62), 
 
 [t]hose threatened with transfers to new work put up stiff 
resistance. Coal miners and their managers in Zwickau brought the 
situation to the edge of revolt. In the face of these prospects, plans 
to close down certain parts of the coal mine were quickly dropped. 
 
Following this and other ‘revolts’, these offending planks of NÖS were quietly 
withdrawn. 
 The second problem was that economic devolution raised the spectre of 
centrifugal forces undermining the ability of the central authorities to steer the 
economy. It allowed enterprise managers to partially break from the state plan, 
to develop informal links between enterprises and even to trade directly with 
DMEs. East German trade grew rapidly in this period, especially with DMEs. 
Between 1960 and 1970 total trade rose by 114%, while trade with DMEs grew by 
147% (Thalheim 1986:17). Perhaps sensing an incipient threat to the delicate 
relationship of bilateral planned trade, the Kremlin, in the mid-1960s, pressured 
the SED into accepting a massive trade deal, at terms very favourable to the 
                                                          
     113 Ulbricht sought to strengthen the private sector, spoke positively of the need for a ‘symbiosis of plan 
and market’, and even came close to endorsing the introduction of a market-based bankruptcy mechanism 
(Przybylski 1992:165; Grieder 1998:13). 
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USSR. This reinforced GDR-USSR integration and strengthened the role of 
central planners in the shaping of overall trade (Marsh 1973:60; Mastny 1972:15). 
 These contradictions explain why further advance along the road of 
reform was halted in 1966. A further, decisive nail in the coffin of NÖS came 
when similar economic reforms in Czechoslovakia became bound up with 
political liberalization, a burgeoning workers’ movement and a perceived threat 
to Soviet hegemony, which was met with invasion and political reaction. 
Although the NÖS was not yet entirely abandoned, Ulbricht loudly announced 
that his earlier championing of decentralization had been a vice from which he 
was now free (Marsh 1973:1). 
 
Crisis and the Fall of Ulbricht 
 
Rapid growth rates in the mid-1960s, together with a keen awareness amongst 
SED leaders that the central task of catching up with the FRG continued to elude 
them, prompted a major upward revision, in 1968, of the original 1966-70 plan 
targets. Extra investment was to be focused upon 183 automation projects. The 
resources involved were immense, as described later by Willi Stoph 
(Naumann/Trümpler 1990:39): 
 
 The number and extent of centrally confirmed structural projects 
was raised from 2.2 billion Marks in 1967 to around 10 billion in 
1970. In some regions the required investment in 1970 was 
therefore greater than the entire stock of industrial capacity. 
 
The extra investment in total, about twenty billion Marks, equalled the total 
investment for 1965. Not surprisingly, problems soon began to appear. They 
came to a head in the crisis of 1970. 
 The causes of crisis were clear. As Margarete Wittkowski explained to the 
Central Committee (Naumann/Trümpler 1990:81) the rate of return on 
investments was substantially lower than in other economies. A key reason for 
this, she suggested, was the recent investment spree, which had led to an 
extremely high level of unfinished projects. Overinvestment generated 
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inflationary pressures, which were manifested in acute shortages and 
‘disproportions’. Bottlenecks worsened, as resources had been diverted from 
existing ventures to new projects. These now had to be halted. Fully three-
quarters of the new automation projects were mothballed. Chaos reverberated 
throughout the economy, as halted investments disrupted short-term demand 
and scuppered long-term output plans. Imports were stepped up, from West and 
East. These could plaster a few of the most gaping wounds but at the cost of 
rising debt. Gross debt doubled between 1968 and 1971 (Schmidt 1985:267). 
Ulbricht’s somewhat desperate justification of this policy ran as follows 
(Kopstein 1997:68), 
 
 It is straightforward: We get as much debt with the capitalists, up 
to the limits of the possible, so that we can pull through in some 
way. A part of the products from the new plants must then be 
exported back to where we bought the machines and took on debt. 
 
 In addition to freezing investments and borrowing, other ‘solutions’ to the 
crisis, advocated above all by Mittag, involved increasing working hours, speed-
up, and cutting popular consumption. To a degree, these were occurring 
automatically. For example, managers responded to nigh-impossible targets by 
putting workers on ‘special shifts’ at weekends. Meanwhile, exacerbated 
shortages of consumer goods effectively devalued wages. Deliberate state policy 
focused on austerity measures, including cutbacks in the health service, and 
scrapping planned improvements in general work conditions and in social and 
cultural provisions for workers in certain industries. However, there were limits 
to this strategy, namely the sufferance of the working class. 
 1970-2 witnessed a chorus of discontent unprecedented since 1961, 
possibly since 1956. Discontent over goods shortages and speed-up readily 
spilled over into political criticism of the SED and its economic system. For 
example, as one top party secretary reported, referring to the retail trade (in 
Naumann/Trümpler 1990:113): 
 
 Individual customers are increasingly linking their criticism of the 
supply situation with expressions of discontent with the politics of 
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the Party and government. They say that shortages of goods is a 
result of the failure of the socialist economic system. 
 
Austerity was widely perceived as unjust. The causes of crisis were generally 
perceived as lying with the regime’s economic mismanagement, yet ordinary 
workers and consumers were suffering the consequences. The 1970 elections 
showed a sharp rise in the number of non-voters and ballot-spoilers. A series of 
short strikes occurred. In one or two factories the strength of protest even forced 
the director’s resignation (Steele 1977:133). 
 The regime faced a severe dilemma — with hindsight Honecker described 
it as ‘on the brink of catastrophe’ (Przybylski 1991:103). In order to overcome the 
recession and complete unfinished investment projects the intensity of work had 
to be raised and labour’s share of national product reduced. On the other hand, it 
seemed essential to stem the rising tide of criticism by making concessions to the 
working class. In the autumn of 1970 a faction in the Politbüro, led by Honecker, 
reacted to the growing unrest by pushing the balance of policy towards the latter 
goal. Assuaging discontent was prioritized over the resuscitation of halted 
investments. Measures were taken to reverse the erosion of workers’ living 
standards.114 Furthermore, the NÖS was finally buried. Although the system of 
economic controls was not returned to its pre-1963 condition of rigid 
centralization and enterprises still retained a certain autonomy, a recentralization 
did take place. In particular, tighter central controls were instituted over resource 
allocation, giving planners greater power to prioritize particular projects. 
Thereby, it was hoped, the risk of a future reprise of the overinvestment crisis of 
1970 would be reduced. 
 The course shift was sealed when Honecker’s faction ousted Ulbricht as 
Party chief early in 1971. Although a major reason for Ulbricht’s fall lay in several 
years of tension with the Kremlin over his bullish insistence on East Germany’s 
political independence from (and economic superiority over) the USSR, 
economic crisis was the key proximate cause of his ouster. Moreover, his fall 
provided a means to deflect attention from the underlying causes of economic 
                                                          
     114 Presumably the workers’ rebellion in Poland which broke out only days after the SED’s change of 
course strengthened the hand of its proponents. 
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crisis and austerity. For such problems, it was hoped, Ulbricht would be a 
convenient scapegoat. 
 The settlement that emerged from the crisis was shaped by the nature of 
Ulbricht’s ouster and the end of the NÖS. The new leadership’s interpretation of 
the crisis heaped blame upon the NÖS reforms and placed particular concern on 
mending relations with the Kremlin and with the working class. The ensuing 
period was thus marked by a greater concern for political stability and security, 




Under Honecker the more ambitious goals of the Ulbricht period — overtaking 
the West economically, the socialist unification of Germany, the transformation 
of the arts into cheerleaders of Communism, and the creation of a collectivist 
socialist culture — quietly faded away. In their stead came an additional 
emphasis upon stability, order, and social security. A greater degree of tolerance 
was observed, initially at least, towards the creative arts and, permanently, 
towards the apolitical realm of private ‘niches’ (Dennis 1988:197). 
 The early 1970s were marked, above all, by what Günter Schabowski 
(1990:32) has called a temporary ‘détente’ between the working and ruling 
classes. Whereas in the 1950s the ubiquitous slogan had been ‘work harder now, 
consume more in the future’, the new ‘unity of social and economic policy’ 
inverted the sequence, proclaiming that workers deserve a respectable living 
standard and, ‘in return’, should raise productivity. Honecker proclaimed 
(Zaitlin 1995:4) that ‘the economy is [...] a means for the ever-improving 
satisfaction of the growing material and cultural needs of working people.’ New 
social programmes were announced, including increases in house building and 
pensions. Wages rose significantly, particularly at the lower end of the scale.115 
These concessions were in part a response to workers’ resistance to the exactions 
                                                          
     115 The ratio of minimum to average wage fell from 1:2.8 in 1964 to 1:2.4 in 1978 (Bryson 1984:111). 
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of 1970-1, but they also served as a sweetener to accompany a new management 
offensive known as the ‘Scientific Organization of Labour’.116 
 SOL, announced in 1973, addressed problems associated with the GDR’s 
poor labour discipline, rising fixed capital intensity and record-breaking 
employment quota.117 It was essentially a rationalization drive designed to raise 
productivity by less expensive or politically sensitive means than raising wages, 
investment or imports. The emphasis was on ‘saving labour’ and enabling the 
continuous and efficient use of equipment, through extending the three-shift 
system, reducing the ‘pores’ of the working day, placing premiums on 
innovation and the quality of output, and imposing a seventy per cent tax on 
enterprise payrolls (Plock 1993:44).118 
 From 1971 rapid economic growth resumed. According to Merkel and 
Wahl (1991:10), productivity rose relative to West Germany, reaching 39% by 
1975. Real wages rose slightly faster, and welfare spending significantly faster, 
than in the 1960s. Support for the government and social system peaked during 
these years. Popular consent was ‘bought’, in Krisch’s words (1982:118), ‘by a 
loosely defined but widely acknowledged social compact under which the 
regime supplies guaranteed employment and rising consumption standards to 
the population in exchange for legitimacy’. Opinion surveys from the time 
(Niemann 1993:48) indicate that ‘the social-political programme had a very 
positive effect on public opinion until 1975/6.’ Those answering ‘completely’ to 






Table 4.3 ‘Complete’ faith in socialism (per cent; from Friedrich (1990:29)). 
                                                          
     116 As SED theorists put it, ‘The creation of the will to work [...] is one of the main functions of social 
policy’ (Strassburger 1984:134). 
     117 In 1975 the latter stood at 85% for women and 95% for men (Hübner 1994:177). 
     118 One in six industrial workers were on a three shift system in 1970, rising to one in four in the 1980s 
(Schneider 1988:74). This, in turn, required (and stimulated demand for) enlarged provision of creches, 
kindergartens and other welfare services. 
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 1970 1975 1979 1983 1988 1989  
apprentices 46 63 50 47 10 3 (Oct) 
young workers 35 56 39 45 6  
students 65 78 66 68  15 (May) 
 
Contradictions of Reform 
 
The reforms of the early 1970s, though boosting the regime’s legitimacy, were 
not an unmitigated success. The SOL’s achievements of extending the three-shift 
system and reducing the pores of the working day led to increased levels of 
stress and illness (Deppe/Hoß 1980:40-54). Absences due to illness — whether 
‘warranted’ or not — grew markedly (Röttgen, in Sarel 1975:232). Increased 
social and personal consumption, meanwhile, served to lower funds available for 
investment and to raise public sector borrowing. Even as the ‘unity of economic 
and social policy’ was being prepared, the state planning commission was 
warning that the welfare programme could not be afforded. Its effect, the 
commission argued (Kopstein 1997:82), ‘would be increasing indebtedness to the 
West and a ballooning domestic monetary overhang, as well as declining rates of 
capital accumulation.’ 
 In the long run, moreover, the popular response to the social contract 
helped to cement a relationship between rulers and ruled, in Baylis’s words 
(Heidenheimer/Kommers 1975:288), ‘in which legitimacy is based essentially on 
popular approval of the regime’s success in bringing about economic growth and 
satisfying popular demand for goods and services.’ A strong connection between 
mass tolerance of (or support for) a regime and improving living standards may 
be common in the modern world. But rendering the connection explicit and 
proclaiming it as a central project of Communism tended to turn the 
nomenklatura into hostages to the material fortune of their subjects. Thus, in 
Günter Mittag’s (perhaps jaundiced) view (1991:239), the social contract may 
have helped to ameliorate the discontent of the 1970-1 years, but its long-run 
effect on workers’ attitudes was less positive. The reforms, he holds, 
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 were based on the expectation that social improvements [...] would 
automatically, as it were, generate a greater desire to work, and 
thereby raise productivity. These expectations, however, proved to 
be unfounded. Welfare improvements were perceived as an 




Détente towards the masses was accompanied by détente towards the West, 
although in this case the role of the East German regime was largely reactive. The 
overall context was determined by the US-USSR détente and increasing East-
West trade (discussed in chapter 3); and by Bonn’s revised Ostpolitik which, as 
van der Pijl observes (1984:252), reprised Stresemann’s strategy in the 1920s of 
accepting existing borders the better to exert political influence and encourage 
trade. 
 The Berlin blockade and counter-blockade had politicized East-West 
trade, but in subsequent decades pressure grew to expedite such exchange. 
Soviet enterprise required Western technology and capital goods. West German 
industrialists sought raw material imports and expanded exports to ‘our natural 
markets’ in Eastern Europe (Spaulding 1996:141). They also tended to see STE 
markets as a stable ‘fallback should the Western world economy for some reason 
not function or lapse into another 1930s-style crisis’ (Berghahn 1996:27). They 
therefore chafed against Adenauer’s Ostpolitik, in particular its recourse to trade 
sanctions as a bargaining tool (Seppain 1992). Together with the Berlin Wall, 
which made the policy of ‘reunification through strength’ seem suddenly less 
viable (Tilford 1975:2), this stimulated a strategic reappraisal of Ostpolitik in the 
early 1960s on the part of key West German political strategists such as Egon 
Bahr (Engelhardt 1991:144). The new tone was set by the industrialist and CDU 
foreign minister Schroeder, with his call for ‘change through rapprochement’ 
(Dean 1992:27). Through the 1960s, both Germanies’ economic successes 
strengthened the case of those West Germans who were pressing for greater real 
assertiveness in international relations, as opposed to orientation to the 
increasingly fantastic formula of unification. 
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 The new Ostpolitik of the late 1960s thus represented, firstly, a chance to 
develop a distinct and autonomous foreign policy and thus enhance Bonn’s 
international stature; secondly, a ‘realpolitical’ recognition of the GDR’s 
durability; thirdly, a strategy of pursuing West German economic interests in the 
Soviet Bloc.119 Following a huge pipeline deal with the USSR in 1969-70 (the 
credits for which were organized by the Bavarian CSU government), FRG-
Comecon trade throve.120 In addition, economic and diplomatic engagement in 
the East enabled the application of more subtle forms of leverage than the 
previous confrontational methods had done, notably the encouragement of intra-
Bloc contradictions.121 The subtlety of this stance also benefited West German 
businesses, which were keen for their foreign clients and partners to forget the 
aggressive associations of Germany’s national image (von Braunmühl 1973:160). 
The new Ostpolitik’s basic guideline was, in short, to accept the status quo in order 
to more effectively project power, notably through opening Eastern Europe to 




Bonn’s new Ostpolitik presented the SED with a series of dilemmas. It certainly 
contained attractive aspects. Crucially, it was a response to the Wall, a 
recognition that the European states-system had solidified around the partition 
of Germany. The GDR was here to stay, with its leadership deserving of a 
grudging respect. Although the West German ruling class had hardly ever 
supported resistance or opposition in the East, the new Ostpolitik cemented this 
                                                          
     119 ‘As the comments by successive Foreign Ministers indicate, there was’, writes Timothy Garton Ash 
(1993:246), ‘a vague, unquantifiable sense that there should be a larger eastern market there in the future, as 
there had been in the past.’ For a clear example of such sentiment, see Willy Brandt, in Stent (1983:150). 
     120 By the late 1970s a third of West German machine tool exports went to the Soviet Bloc. Following the 
oil price rises of the 1970s oil and gas supplies were especially important to the FRG. By 1989 the USSR 
supplied fully 30% of its natural gas. 
     121 As Bahr wrote to Kissinger (Niedhart 1998:188), ‘A systematic but discriminating expansion of East-
West economic relations will exacerbate contradictions amongst Communist countries and contribute to 
further modifications of the system.’ 
     122 The point made here is also made by Ash (1993:360), who writes that ‘the reality of German foreign 
policy in general, and German Ostpolitik in particular, was a great deal more national [and] power-oriented 
[...] than its public presentation.’ 
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stance into a doctrine. Its catchword was ‘stability’, which in practice meant 
‘respect the legitimate authority of the Soviet Bloc elites’. As West German 
business engaged more extensively in the East, Bonn’s emphasis on ‘stability’ 
grew.123 Bonn’s tacit recognition of the GDR in the early 1970s sparked a flurry of 
diplomatic approaches from other Western states. The GDR at last received 
worldwide recognition and received UN membership. For Honecker, this 
marked a major triumph. 
 The GDR also stood to gain from increased trade with the West, 
particularly in the form of technologically advanced capital goods imports. The 
new Ostpolitik did not affect East Germany’s privileged trade relations with the 
FRG, nor its de facto membership of the EEC. Trade increased rapidly in the 
1970s, particularly with DMEs (Table 4.4). 
 
Table 4.4 Trade with DMEs as per cent of total trade (from Statistisches Jahrbuch 
der DDR). 
 1949 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 
Imports  34 24 27 22 23 27 29 30 40 53 
Exports  35 31 23 20 21 22 22 24 48 49 
Combined 35 27 25 21 22 24 26 27 44 51 
 
The motives for expanding relations with the FRG were not hard to see. As 
Alexander Schalck explained in his Ph.D. (Przybylski 1992:259), the 
nomenklatura’s ‘class vocation’ was 
 
 to damage the enemy [i.e. FRG] by using all the methods and 
possibilities at our disposal, as well as his own methods and moral 
categories; and to fully exploit the enemy’s economic potential for 
the all-round strengthening of the GDR. In the pursuance of this 
class duty we are met half-way by the enemy’s intention to 
intensify economic links with the GDR for the purpose of creating 
relations of dependence on West Germany and West Berlin. 
                                                          
     123 Following the imposition of martial law in Poland, for example, BDI leader Amerong ‘stressed’ to a top 
GDR official (BA-SAPMO Büro Mittag, 25.1.82) ‘that the West German business community, due to its 




For Schalck, ‘all methods’ included illegal practices, such as the repackaging of 
Romanian and Korean clothing, which could not be exported to the EC due to 
WTA quotas, as ‘East German’ produce for sale in the EC, as well as ‘normal’ 
trade. Trade, moreover, brought Western businesses to depend somewhat upon 
East German goodwill. This, it was hoped, could be translated into political 
advantage. For example, Mittag sought to exploit his excellent connections to 
FRG business leaders, persuading them to press for more political favours from 
Bonn.124 
 However, these positive equations ran in reverse too. As Schalck was 
aware, profit and power expansion also lay behind the desire of the FRG to 
promote economic and cultural ties. Given West Germany’s economic 
superiority the relationship, as Soviet and SED leaders were well aware, was 
heavily skewed. As Brezhnev said to Honecker in 1970 (Przybylski 1991:287): 
 
 We have not yet reached the time when the GDR can have a great 
influence on events in West Germany. West Germany is 
economically strong. It is trying to gain influence in the GDR, to 
swallow the GDR, and so on. We, the Soviet Union, the socialist 
countries, will secure the results of the victory [of WWII]. We will 
not permit a development that weakens or endangers our position 
in the GDR, or an annexation of the GDR by West Germany. 
 
Brezhnev was pointing to the key problems faced by East German Westpolitik. 
Stronger economic and cultural relationships with West Germany produced 
uneven relations of economic dependence. They encouraged, or were bought 
with, political concessions, such as the relaxation on visits from West Germany or 
the official permission for East Germans to watch Western television, which was 
granted in 1973. With such measures, East Germans grew more interested in and 
oriented towards the West, and their regime’s capacity to exploit and police them 
was further constrained. The contradiction was already apparent in 1974, when 
                                                          
     124 In the words of either Schalck or Beil (BA-SAPMO Büro Mittag 19.2.81), the opinions of FRG bosses 
could be ‘decisive for the position of the Federal government towards the prospective negotiations as to the 
nature of the Swing’. 
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Honecker warned Brezhnev that increasing inter-German contacts raised the 
importance of constructing an enviable welfare system (Kopstein 1997:86).125 
 A further problem was that Bonn’s new Ostpolitik, by reducing overt 
confrontation and by expanding bilateral trading and diplomatic relations with 
individual STEs, threatened Soviet Bloc cohesion. Significantly, Bonn’s first 
overtures were to Romania, then the black sheep of the Warsaw Pact, followed 
by Yugoslavia. Of course, this equation again worked both ways: by normalizing 
relations with Bonn, the USSR helped to weaken the USA-FRG axis. But here too, 
the USSR-USA and GDR-FRG relationships were not those of equals. The 




In his memoirs Günter Mittag (1991:202) bemoans the fact that the Cold War 
served to trap the GDR into a situation in which economic and scientific 
intercourse with the West was drastically restricted and a hypertrophied security 
consciousness could thrive within the SED leadership. Exemplifying both these 
phenomena was the Wall which, although solving medium-term problems, 
cemented the GDR into the increasingly inefficient structures of Soviet-bloc 
Communism. 
 The GDR was a creation of the Cold War, dependent upon the USSR and 
yet pitted competitively against its larger Western twin. Its economy and living 
standards were always measured against those of one of the world’s top 
performers. From the start it was the weaker economy, damaged by reparations 
and locked into a relatively backward region. Whereas the FRG benefited from 
access to the largest markets and most advanced technology, the GDR’s 
manufactured exports were politically directed to the ‘soft markets’ of the 
CMEA. Comparison was always to the detriment of the GDR, as evinced by the 
fact that East German workers invariably compared their living standards to 
those in the FRG but not vice versa (Messing 1981:286). 
                                                          
     125 Honecker demanded (in vain) that this required expanded economic assistance from Moscow. 
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 In each phase of East German history these contradictions developed in 
particular ways. As shall be seen in chapter five, the 1970s normalization of 
relations with the West served to buttress the legitimacy of the regime. The same 
development, however, began to undermine East Germany’s STE structures 
through orienting its business interests and popular aspirations and expectations 
ever more profoundly towards the West. 
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Chapter Five: 1975 to June 1989 — Cracks Beneath The Surface 
If the first half of the 1970s may be regarded as the highpoint of the SED-regime, 
the following years saw the contradictions discussed in chapters three and four 
become inflamed, even intractable. World-economic slowdown from 1974 
exacerbated and exposed the inefficiencies of the STE form. A variety of attempts 
were made to escape relative economic decline and alleviate or postpone the 
effects of crisis. These included strategies to intensify labour and reduce popular 
consumption, a massive investment programme in microelectronics, increased 
borrowing, and promotion of trade in general and economic involvement with 
DMEs in particular.126 As shown below, all such strategies either failed or 
exacerbated economic, social and geopolitical contradictions. Although no major 
crisis on the scale of 1953 or 1961 occurred, these years saw the regime beset by 
predicaments and disasters, both political and economic (see Table 4.1). The latter 
part of the 1980s, discussed in Part Four, witnessed a developing crisis centred on 
the challenge presented by glasnost and perestroika to the legitimacy of the 
Honecker leadership. 
 
PART ONE — Profitability Decline 
 
As Charles Maier puts it (1997:81), the 1970s saw ‘[c]apitalism and communism 
together [leave] behind the period of rapid and relatively easy capital 
accumulation that marked the quarter century after World War II’. They entered 
‘a far more troubled era’, marked by a global decline in capital-output ratios. The 
GDR shared in this downturn in profitability. Whereas in the first half of the 
1970s five units of investment produced one additional unit of output, by the 
latter half fully eight were required (Harris 1983:173). With reduced investable 
surpluses, the share of productive investment in national income sank from 
                                                          
     126 By the mid-1980s East Germany’s trade turnover was as much as 72% of produced national income 
(Bryson/Melzer 1991:50). By 1988 its export quota was substantially higher than that of West Germany 
(Köhler 1994:87). 
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16.1% in 1970 to 10.6% in 1988 (Kusch 1991:22). The rate of accumulation fell 
steadily (Table 5.1).127  
 
Table 5.1 Rate of accumulation (adapted from Kusch (1991:22) and Przybylski 
(1992:77)). 
1970 1971-5 1976-80 1981-5 1986-8 1989 
29.0 27.5 26.5 22.2 21.5 ca.18 
 
Rates of growth inclined downwards. Between 1977 and 1989 each year, with 
only five exceptions, saw declining or negative growth rates. The exceptions, 
1981, 1983-5, and 1988, averaged growth of only around 1%. Merkel and Wahl 
(1991:27,61) estimate that per capita average decennial growth rates fell from 3% 
in the 1970s to 0.6% in the 1980s. 
 The decline of productive and social investment led to a deterioration of 
industrial and public infrastructure, including transport and health. The age 
structure of industrial equipment declined steadily.128 By 1988, Kopstein reports 
(1997:3), 58% of industrial infrastructure was worn out, and an astonishing 17% 
of all employees in manufacturing and energy were occupied in repairs 
departments (Bryson/Melzer 1991:85). 
 Whether economic growth was substantially lower than elsewhere is 
debatable. Compared to other STEs, East Germany’s performance was 
reasonable (Table 5.2), although the Economist’s announcement (6.5.1985) that 
‘East Germany is quietly emerging as Comecon’s best performer’ can hardly be 
seen as major praise. However, opinions diverge over its position vis-à-vis the 
FRG. For Merkel and Wahl (1991:60-1), having matched the FRG from 1965 to 
1975, the GDR then began to fall behind. For Kornai (Table 5.2) and Schwartau 
(1988:718) however, economic growth held up rather better against the FRG and 
other DMEs. 
 
                                                          
     127 ‘Rate of accumulation’ here means investments (in both productive and non-productive sectors) as a 
proportion of national income (Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990:98). 
     128 Equipment under ten years old: GDR (1977) 59%; GDR (1989) 50%; FRG (1988) 65% (Kusch 1991:56-7). 
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Table 5.2 National income growth (from Kornai (1992:200)).  
 1961-70 1971-80 1981-8 
Bulgaria 5.8 2.8 1.2 
GDR 3.1 2.8 1.8 
Romania 5.2 5.3 -0.1 
USSR 4.9 2.6 2.0 
Austria 4.7 3.6 1.7 
Greece 7.6 4.7 1.5 
Netherlands 5.1 2.9 1.3 
FRG 4.5 2.7 1.7 
 
 Less open to dispute, and in many ways more important, is the fact that 
the competitiveness of East German commodities vis-à-vis DMEs tended to 
decline. One measure of this is East Germany’s terms of trade with DMEs (Table 
5.3). 
 
Table 5.3 Terms of trade with DMEs (1970 = 100; from Schmidt 1985:398). 
1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1983 




Fundamentally, declining competitiveness was rooted in the decreasing 
effectiveness of STE-type structures of accumulation, as discussed in chapter 
three. In particular, the economy was profoundly underspecialized. Despite GDR 
economists pointing to this as a problem from the 1950s onwards (Cliff 1964:280), 
little could be done within the parameters of STE structures. In the late 1980s, 
with its share of world trade at 1.1%, the GDR produced an astonishing 80% of 
goods available on the world market (Bauman 1990:259). Most industries and 
production lines were small-scale. For instance, in 1987 total car production was 
only 218,000, as against 4.3 million in the FRG (The Economist 30.4.88). Even with 
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extreme centralization of capital in the Kombinate, these remained hopelessly 
underspecialized. Each tended to autarky, with its own departments for 
construction, equipment, maintenance and repairs, transport, and so on (see 
Giersch 1992:259). 
 A classic example of the problems of underspecialization was the robotics 
industry (Deppe/Hoß 1989). A certain success was achieved in this field, with 
the number of robots in industry rising from 220 in 1980 to 4,500 only six years 
later — almost as many per worker as in the FRG (Kusch 1991:59). However by 
1987, robots were designed and produced in fully seven hundred separate 
factories, a fifth of all industrial plants. Each on average built only 6.6 robots that 
year. In comparison, on the global scale, several dozen firms dominate the world 
market, most of which specialize in robotics and benefit accordingly. 
 Another important and notorious example is the microelectronics 
industry. At the forefront of a drive to upgrade competitiveness by shifting 
investment into high-tech sectors (petrochemicals, electronics and data 
processing), microelectronics grew rapidly to become the fourth largest industry 
by 1989. This prompted The Economist (20.4.85) to suggest that ‘East Germany has 
made microelectronics the revolutionary barricade of the 1980s.’ Its products, as 
with robotics, were correctly seen as crucial for rationalization and 
‘flexibilization’ throughout industry, most notably in engineering (Deppe/Hoß 
1989). Certainly, favourable factors existed to justify this ambitious national 
microelectronics programme, including a highly skilled workforce and advanced 
scientific infrastructure. The GDR, as Maier explains (1997:75), hoped to 
‘mediate’ between Comecon and the world market; ‘that is, to exploit the 
monopoly position within the Eastern Bloc in order gradually to develop the 
expertise and resources to participate more successfully with the nonsocialist 
economies.’ However, there is a sense in which, as Roesler has argued (1993:560), 
the national nature of the programme was forced by unhelpful international 
circumstances. On the one hand the Soviet microelectronics industry showed 
little inclination to cooperate with its GDR counterpart; on the other, the 
COCOM list blocked Western imports of many microelectronic products, 
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particularly after its enlargement during the New Cold War.129 These factors 
alone, as Mittag has argued (1991:219), strengthened the rationality of import 
substitution in microelectronics. Their effect was compounded by the credit 
squeeze and subsequent ‘debt strangulation’ of the 1980s (see below). 
 The industry did chalk up certain admirable achievements both in 
copying western semiconductors (Kombinate 1993:95) and in the fields of 
espionage and smuggling of western computer technology (Macrakis 1997:81).130 
However, on the whole it remained backward. One principal problem was the 
lack of speed (in development, in ramping production, and so on). The sector 
lagged its rival in the FRG by four or five years, and the USA by seven or eight 
(Havlik 1990:137). The other was the lack of scale. Despite investment of scores of 
billions of Marks, which was immense relative to total national income, the GDR 
still invested in total less than any one of the major global players 
(Christ/Neubauer 1991:44). Its industries produced in small production runs 
aimed at a small market. For the 256kb chip, for instance, production runs were 
as low as 0.5 million compared to the normal international threshold of 120 
million (Kusch 1991:42). Consequently, its production cost was 538 Marks at a 
time when the world market price of similar chips was around DM 4 
(Christ/Neubauer 1991:43). In short, an investment programme designed to 
enable East German business as a whole to compete with technologically 
advanced rivals had become a devourer of copious state subsidies. Its world 
market share halved over the course of the 1980s, to 0.4% (Altvater/Hübner 
1990:16). Not surprisingly, the scale of investment in this expensive white 
elephant became a serious bone of contention between leading SED members, 




                                                          
     129 COCOM officially banned exports to Communist countries of industrial goods with potential military 
use, but these increasingly included products with civil applications. That COCOM was also wielded in the 
interests of economic competition is well known. Siegfried Hornich (Kombinate 1993:14) observes that ‘the 
embargo lists always grew longer whenever the GDR was receiving attention for high-class achievements in 
scientific-technical fields’. 
     130 In at least one case a complete plant was smuggled in (E. Koch 1992:75). 
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Demand and Oil Shocks 
 
With the exception of the prioritization of high-tech industries, several alterations 
to industrial organization and price structure,131 and increased cooperation with 
DMEs (see below), economic policy of 1975-89 was marked not by strategic 
design, but by panic reactions to the various manifestations of world economic 
crisis. 
 During 1979-82 the GDR suffered three major shocks. First, world 
recession brought reduced demand in external markets. Certain sectors were 
badly affected. For instance, exports of cars fell from 92,200 in 1978 to 84,800 in 
1980 (Bryson 1984:113). Similarly, one of East Germany’s major export industries, 
chemicals, suffered from falling prices for its products on the world market. 
 The second shock involved oil prices and supply. East Germany was ill-
furnished with energy resources, except lignite and uranium. It was heavily 
dependent upon oil, which was traditionally supplied at a low price by the 
USSR. Industrial policy was based upon the expectation of stable, low oil prices. 
From the mid-1970s oil refineries were expanded, with over one billion 
Deutschmarks spent on imported equipment (Kopstein 1997:93). In the early 
1980s, however, the country faced a three-pronged energy crisis. Firstly, coal 
imports from crisis-ridden Poland slumped. Secondly, in 1982 the USSR reneged 
on the delivery of a huge volume of promised oil, some of which was diverted to 
Poland (Table 5.4). Thirdly, the price of Soviet oil rose towards the world market 
price, which itself had soared in 1973-4 and 1979-80. Beginning in 1976, the Soviet 
oil price rose remorselessly, until by 1985 its price to STEs was even above the 
world level.132 
 As outlined in chapter three, economic crisis exacerbated tensions 
between the STEs. The oil question in particular sparked quarrels between Berlin 
                                                          
     131 These included the Kombinate restructuring. Enterprises were merged, in the interests of increasing 
speed and scale of production, simplifying chains of command, and reducing inter-branch coordination 
problems. A certain decentralization of authority from ministry to enterprise was once again instituted, with 
enterprises given rights to decide contracts and retain foreign exchange earnings. These measures, according 
to The Economist (22.2.86) and Kombinate (1993:13), did improve efficiency. 
     132 European STEs continued to buy it because it was ‘hard’, whereas their exports in return were ‘soft’. 
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and Moscow. Challenged by Honecker, Brezhnev justified his country’s position 
in the following terms (Hertle 1996a:46): 
 
 Our economists, Erich, have calculated that the direct gains made 
by the brotherlands through the import of fuel and raw material 
imports from the USSR in the last five years come to fifteen million 
roubles, and in the next five the amount will approach thirty 
million. That is a huge amount. 
 
Referring to the GDR’s not-so-brotherly dealings with Soviet oil, he went on to 
suggest that the brotherlands’ real gains may be much greater, ‘as the recipients 
of Soviet deliveries commonly sell it and its derivatives on to capitalists’. In 
response, the Honecker leadership appealed to Moscow to place geopolitical 
considerations above economic self-interest. In a pleading, threatening note to 
Brezhnev, Honecker warned that the oil supply reduction represented nothing 
less than ‘an earthquake under the foundations of the GDR’ (Przybylski 
1991:336). In another exchange (Hertle 1996a:47), he asked whether ‘it is worth 
destabilizing the GDR and undermining the trust of our people in the Party and 
state leadership for the sake of two million tonnes of oil.’ Schürer put similar 
pressure on his opposite number in Moscow. He warned him of the destructive 
economic consequences of the Soviet decision, and, with allusion to the rise of 
‘counter-revolution’ in Poland, reminded him ‘that a healthy, socialist GDR 
surely plays a key role in Soviet strategy’. 
 Such appeals to strategic interests were in vain. GDR policymakers had to 
make difficult decisions. Energy supplies to some industries were rationed, thus 
exacerbating domestic recession. Worst hit was asphalt production, which 
slumped from three million to one hundred thousand tonnes (Falkner 
1994:89).133 However, major closures of energy-intensive industries were not 
deemed a viable option. ‘Because radical measures of that sort were not 
pursued’, wrote Mittag (1991:277), ‘more had to be exported in order to import 
the same quantity of oil and gas.’ Oil imports from non-CMEA sources were 
stepped up; their share rose from 4% in 1979 to 14% in 1982 (Schmidt 1985:293). 
                                                          
     133 Consequently, the road network deteriorated markedly, until 18% was classified as ‘virtually unusable’ 
(Kusch 1991:61). 
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Power stations were, with difficulty, converted to burn lignite (Falkner 1994:89), 
and domestic lignite production was increased (Table 5.4). In the 1980s as a 
whole, the lignite industry swallowed one third of industrial investment and 
supplied around three-quarters of total energy requirements (Welzk/Wilde 
1993:138; Childs 1998:326). Finally, plan criteria were altered to place greater 
emphasis upon energy efficiency, in the hope of reducing East Germany’s high 
per capita energy consumption (which was twenty to thirty per cent above that of 
the FRG). 
 
Table 5.4 Oil imports from USSR, and domestic lignite production (million 
tonnes; from D.I.W. (1989:68)). 
 1970 1973 1976 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
oil 9.2 12.9 16.0 19.0 19.0 17.7 17.1 17.1 17.1 




The third major shock suffered by the GDR was soaring interest rates. In the mid-
1970s, with world recession damaging exports and rising oil prices harming East 
Germany’s trade position, the SED leadership — despite objections from 
Politbüro members such as Schürer, Sindermann, and, perhaps, Krolikowski 
(Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:185; Przybylski 1992:52) — nevertheless persisted 
with the priorities of the 1971 ‘settlement’. These included economic expansion 
based upon assumptions of world boom, and the ‘unity of social and economic 
policy’. In addition, the security apparati were considerably reinforced. These 
programmes sucked in imports. Over the decade an enormous trade deficit, 
possibly twenty-one billion VM, mounted (Schürer 1992a:1116). It was financed 
largely by borrowing. Gross debt rose from US$ 1840 million in 1973 to $11,670 in 
1980 (Schmidt 1995:267), a figure which, per capita, was higher even than that of 
Poland (Saxonberg 1997:54). A more significant figure, net debt to DMEs, 
increased during the second half of the decade by more than 20% annually 
(Kopstein 1997:84). By 1980 debt servicing equalled 54% of exports to DMEs 
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(Harman 1984:114). Thus, although 40% of hard currency earnings was 
swallowed by debt servicing (Luke/Boggs 1982:109), further borrowing was 
necessary simply to service existing debt. 
 The problem was compounded by world recession. Many import 
payments were predicated upon expected exports which then did not 
materialize. For example, the GDR purchased a brand new steel factory from an 
Austrian firm. The intention was to pay for it through subsequent sales of steel to 
DMEs. However, the international steel market promptly slumped. Payment had 
to come instead from borrowing. 
 
Table 5.5 Net hard currency debt (VM billion, from Ash (1993:157)).134 
1970 1980 1985 1987 1989 
 2 25 30 37 49 
 
 Meanwhile, world interest rates soared. From 1977-81 they rose 4½ times. 
East Germany was particularly badly affected, given that 40% of its foreign debts 
were short-term (under a year) (Lambrecht 1989). In the context of a global credit 
crunch which saw several countries (including Poland) default, the GDR faced a 
credit boycott from international banks. Searching in vain for new loans from 
banks in France, Austria, Japan, Britain and Kuwait, the GDR was brought to the 
brink of insolvency, and that, leading officials feared, (Schalck, in 
Bahrmann/Fritsch 1990:50), ‘would mean the ungovernability of the GDR.’ 
 The SED leadership faced a grave crisis. Somehow, exports to the USSR 
had to be raised due to the increased price paid for oil. Exports to DMEs were 
essential if the GDR was to service its debts. Simultaneously imports had to be 
throttled. But could balance of payments equilibrium be restored without risk to 
social or geopolitical stability? Those such as Schürer who had, in the 1970s, 
repeatedly warned of the dangers of mounting debt had offered only vague or 
risky solutions. One had been to seek aid from the USSR, as had occurred in 
1953, 1958, and 1960. However, as explained above, Moscow was now as much 
                                                          
     134 According to Volze (1996:701) net debt with DMEs in 1989 was in fact ‘only’ thirteen or fourteen billion 
dollars, some two-thirds of the figure given here. 
 156 
part of the problem as the solution. In Kopstein’s words (1997:92), ‘by 1981, the 
Soviets were no longer in a position to do what they had always done when 
necessary — bail out the SED.’ 
 Another attempted solution was to impose the costs of crisis upon the 
working class, through intensification of labour, lowering workers’ consumption, 
and the abandonment of subsidies on basic goods. To some extent such measures 
were pursued. Campaigns exhorted workers to raise productivity. Günter 
Mittag’s slogan ‘The economy has become the main battleground in the class 
struggles of our times!’ (Klier 1990a:154) was typical of the time. Prices were 
raised and wages held down. Commodities were diverted from domestic outlets 
for export to DMEs, whilst imports were cut. Severe shortages of meat and other 
goods resulted. Some officials even began to consider the need for radical 
austerity measures, including factory closure programmes, significant 
unemployment, and bringing women ‘back to the hearth’ (Simon 1990:43). 
However, such plans could not be taken very seriously. The influence on the 
nomenklatura of the settlements of 1953 and 1971 ran too deep, and was 
confirmed by current events across the Oder. As Mittag put it (1991:68), 
‘[b]urdened with the trauma of 17 June 1953, and compounded by the mass 
strikes in Poland in 1980-1, every proposal for economically sensible price 
formation was rejected amidst talk of the "incalculable risks" of the eruption of 
counterrevolution’. Given the GDR’s geopolitical frontline status the prospect of 
domestic social conflict was doubly dangerous. Although significant levels of 
unemployment did begin to appear — in East Berlin perhaps as many as 30,000 
(Büscher/Wensierski 1984:25) — serious closure programmes and austerity 
measures were studiously avoided.135 As Mittag recalls (1991:38-9) they ‘would 
certainly have led to social disorder with unforeseeable consequences, [and] 
probably to a catastrophe.’ 
 Ultimately, debt rescheduling was narrowly averted and respectable 
balance sheets restored, temporarily, in 1982. The two strategies that achieved 
this, however, exacerbated other contradictions and generated new dilemmas. 
                                                          
     135 Many workers were laid off due to the stalling of production lines in import-dependent industries 
(such as chocolate), as well as in industries whose requisite raw materials were diverted for export (Simon 
1990:43, Anonymous 1981:7). 
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The first was a systematic effort to cut imports wherever possible. Essentially, 
this involved a renewed commitment to import substitution, although the line 
between that and ‘import strangulation’ was a fine one. If the economy had 
always been structurally geared towards ISI (on both macro and micro scales), 
the debt and oil crises strengthened the tendency.136 Already in the mid-1970s, 
‘DIY production’ had been expanded by decree. Firms were compelled to 
produce consumer goods to the value of 5% of turnover.137 The credit squeeze 
and hard currency scarcity of the early 1980s added to the effect, prompting an 
increased internal production of inputs. By 1985, fully 18% of equipment was 
produced in house, the highest figure yet.138 Given the inefficiencies of monadic 
DIY production, it was far from ideal as a means of escape from debt 
strangulation. 
 The second strategy involved an urgent attempt to increase exports, 
particularly to DMEs. Bringing in hard currency rapidly became the paramount 
determinant of economic policy. The entire foreign trade apparatus was 
mobilized to this end and the short-term results were impressive. Exports, 
largely of raw materials and intermediate goods, rose steeply (Table 5.6), 
enabling major debt repayments to be made. The net transfer to international 
creditors in 1982 alone was greater than the total inward transfer from 1970-75. 
 
Table 5.6 Trade with DMEs, from Machowski (1985:6). 
 1980 1981 1982 
Imports +10.5% +2.9% -3.6% 
Exports +26.6% +31.2% +20.4% 
 
 In addition to established forms of trade, unorthodox methods were 
encouraged. One well known example is the reselling of Soviet oil. Having 
managed, if somewhat painfully, to reduce dependence on Soviet oil, a 
                                                          
     136 For oil substitution, see above. 
     137 This was essentially a desperate attempt to overcome consumer goods shortages. The results were 
often irrational. For example, a firm specializing in X-ray equipment was obliged to divert skills and 
resources to the production of frying pans (Giersch et al. 1992:259). 
     138 Yet the SED pledged to raise it further, to 25% by 1990 (in fact it sank to 16% in 1988). 
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remainder existed which, given the continued discrepancy between Soviet and 
world prices, could be profitably sold on hard-currency markets (Janson 
1991:99).139 Central to such ‘unorthodox’ means of restoring balance of payments 
equilibrium was Schalck’s organization, ‘KoKo’. KoKo’s origins lay in state-run 
covert trading operations, especially smuggling, in the 1950s — a time when 
around a quarter of imports was illegal (P.F. Koch 1992:17). KoKo operated 
essentially outside the official planned economy, with Schalck being answerable 
not to the Foreign Trade Ministry but directly to Honecker, Mielke and Mittag. 
Its income was generated largely from a hidden empire of trading firms run with 
the assistance of trustees in DMEs. Many of these firms were a strange form of 
joint venture, being owned de facto by the GDR, but de jure by trustees with 
Western citizenship. They operated as ‘normal’ capitalist businesses but 
funnelled profits to East Germany. 
 Being integrated into the Stasi, KoKo was the perfect instrument for 
covert operations that either were based in DMEs, evaded COCOM, or otherwise 
embarrassed the official Communist ideology. KoKo firms acquired western 
equipment to ameliorate critical shortages of spare parts, luxury goods for the 
nomenklatura, and consumer goods when popular discontent was deemed to be 
at dangerous levels. They merchandised GDR products and, increasingly, its 
material ‘heritage’ such as artworks and antiques. They also engaged in the (not 
especially ‘socialist’) practices of commodities and stock market speculation and 
insurance fraud. KoKo organized East Germany’s trade with South Africa when 
the official position was a boycott. As a major weapons dealer, it bought and sold 
NATO arms, and even supplied Soviet-bloc weapons and military technology to 
the US military and to the CIA, which channelled them to the Afghan rebels, 
Unita and the Contras (E Koch 1992:228-261; die tageszeitung 5.12.1990; Przybylski 
1992:309).140 By the 1980s, KoKo was feeding the official economy with a regular 
DM1½-2 billion per year — about one seventh of total hard currency earnings. 
By 1989 it had amassed 21½ tonnes of gold — five times as much as the state 
                                                          
     139 Moscow tolerated this, according to Janson, because ‘it was cheaper and, politically, more sensible than 
sending additional army divisions’. 
     140 When challenged about the morality of such business, Schalck would reply that all major countries, 
whatever their ruling ideology, engaged in the arms trade. 
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bank. It was largely responsible for the rise in value of East German assets held 
abroad to over DM 100 billion. 
 In short, the attempt to alleviate the symptoms of the debt crisis served to 
strengthen the reliance of the ‘official economy’ upon an organization that was 
not only external to the central plan, but based upon speculation in, and (often 
illicit) trade with DMEs. Whatever the intentions of its leaders, the GDR was 
becoming ever more directly subjugated to the world market. 
 
PART TWO — Between a Rock and a Hard Place 
 
As discussed in chapter four, East German industry, as the most advanced in 
Comecon, and with strong traditional links to the West, gained least from the 
STE form. Its long-run competitiveness suffered from the softness of its major 
markets. Yet of all the East European STEs, East Germany’s ruling class, being 
based upon the weaker segment of a divided nation, was the most existentially 
dependent upon STE structures and upon Moscow. The dilemmas of opening the 
sluice gates to the world market were therefore especially great. Increasing 
integration tended not only to pull East Germany into positions of dependence 
upon DMEs, but rekindled questions concerning its national — and therefore 
political — identity. In short, GDR policymakers were caught between the 
stagnation of the East and the dangers inherent in further interconnection with 
the West. In Mittag’s view (1991:154), his economy found itself caught ‘between a 
rock and a hard place: between CMEA and the West, between raw materials 
shortages and COCOM’. Intensified relations with DMEs tended to act as a spur 
to growth and a vital source of technology and markets. However, they equally 
exposed East Germany’s economic weakness and undermined the ‘national 
economic independence’ that was the structuring principle of STEs and the basis 
of the GDR’s sovereignty as a distinct German polity. 
 As with many of his East European contemporaries, Honecker’s policy is 
best characterized as, in Charles Gati’s words (Hanson 1986:146), ‘an attempt to 
move toward the West without appearing to move away from the East’. In his 
case, however, the attempt was marked by particular reluctance and 
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equivocation. Honecker’s rise to power, in particular his support from Moscow, 
was in large part due to his commitment to Abgrenzung. His initial approach was 
summed up in his warning to Ulbricht in 1970 (Kopstein 1997:71): that it is 
‘necessary to conduct the struggle against appearances of a "pull to the West", 
against the idea of a special relationship between the GDR and the FRG’. His 
regime’s Westpolitik was initially wary. Although important substantive shifts 
towards normalizing relations with the West were made in the first part of the 
1970s, these occurred beneath a strident rhetoric of Abgrenzung, in order to 
counter any suggestion that a reconsideration of German division could occur 
(Mählert 1998:124). And yet, by the early 1980s Honecker had become committed 
to precisely that ‘special relationship’ which he had earlier denounced. 
Inexorably, and not without resistance, the door to the West opened. Ideas began 
to change and old certainties crumbled. Before long a new Westpolitik had 
emerged. Economic dealings with DMEs were reevaluated to become, in the 
1980s, the primary focus of economic strategy. To illustrate the transformation, 
compare these two officially sanctioned pronouncements (Neubert 1990:18). In 
the 1970s a typical text read thus: 
 
 The growing power of socialism is impressing itself ever more 
directly upon the capitalist world economic system. The progress 
of the socialist world system is limiting the domination of the 
monopolies on the world market [...] The imperialist foundations of 
the international division of labour are being shaken under the 
impact of socialism. [...] Economic relations between the socialist 
and imperialist countries are thereby becoming a decisive 
battlefield of class struggle. 
 
By 1988 the change of tone was unmistakeable: ‘According to the reproduction 
theory of socialist political economy, East Germany has an "open" economy. It is 
connected in the most profound ways into the world economy, and is subject to 
its general laws.’ Similarly, and in the same year, a top functionary penned the 
following (Schmidt 1989:124): 
 
 The national economy of the GDR is characterised by one of the 
highest foreign trade intensities worldwide — more than 40 per 
cent of its national income is derived from foreign trade. Hence a 
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high degree of stability in foreign trade is imperative. The same 
conclusion applies to the GDR’s economic relations with the FRG. 
 
Attached to the Drip of the West 
 
The regime was trapped in a dilemma. Overcoming, or at least escaping the 
worst effects of, crisis and relative decline depended upon intensifying 
connections to DMEs, most obviously the FRG.141 But such ties, given the 
comparative prosperity of the FRG, tended towards one-sided dependence. 
Following the Kissingerian ‘linkage’ strategy, they were often, though not 
always, accompanied by political price-tags — for instance, the easing of 
restrictions on visits from the FRG (Table 5.7). Encapsulating the connection 
between ‘West-pull’ and the SED’s legitimacy, Lutz Niethammer (1994:112) has 
written that the ruling system, ‘attached to the drip of the West, completely lost 
its legitimating ability to provide hope, and oriented the masses instead towards 
the source from which the rulers themselves sought aid: the West.’ Increased 
trade and cultural contacts, telephone links, visits from Westerners, and the 
influence of West German television, heightened the immediacy of East-West 
comparison.142 Honecker’s signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, with its 
pledges of rights to international travel, familial contacts, and freedom of 
information, and promotion of cultural exchanges, tended to stimulate dissent by 
raising expectations that restrictions on civil liberties, including the right to 
emigrate, would be reduced. 
 
Table 5.7 Visits from West Germans and West Berliners (millions; from von 
Rüden (1991:52)). 
1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 
1.0 2.8 7.5 7.8 7.8 7.5 5.0 5.1 5.7 
 
                                                          
     141 Although the regime sought to spread its connections to DMEs, the FRG was always central (Jacobsen 
1983). 
     142 In 1985 West Germans and West Berliners made some 25 million phone calls to the East (Plock 
1993:79). 
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 One of the most far-reaching of Honecker’s reforms was legalizing the 
ownership of the Deutschmarks which began to stream. The sums involved were, 
by the late 1980s, enormous (Table 5.8). In 1988 DM 1,405 million flowed from the 
FRG to private GDR citizens alone. 
 
Table 5.8 DMs held, in cash, in private sector (millions; from von Rüden 
(1991:97)). 
1974 1978 1982 1986 1988 
0.3 1.3 2.2 3.0 3.6 
 
In an attempt to control and profit from the Deutschmark economy ‘Intershops’ 
were set up, supplying Deutschmark owners with western goods. Nevertheless, 
the inflow also fed the grey and black economies, which grew to between ten and 
fifty per cent of the official economy, according to which estimate one chooses 
(Bryson 1984:83).143 In the 1980s enterprises began to demand payment in 
Deutschmarks for certain transactions, obliging one another to amass large funds 
of Deutschmarks in ‘black accounts’ (Welzk/Wilde 1993:138). 
 The easing of restrictions on contacts with Westerners, the sanctioning of 
Deutschmark ownership, and the creation of Intershops combined to give 
practical encouragement to the cultivation of contacts with Westerners. As 
Kopstein observes (1997:188), the socialist dictum ‘to each according to his work’ 
was revised in the popular mind to ‘to each according to where his aunt lives’. 
The quality of goods displayed by aunts and Intershops heightened Easterners’ 
perception of their second-class status. 
 Bonn, meanwhile, became a sort of (rich and suspicious) ‘aunt’ to the 
official economy. It provided direly needed hard currency in the form of 
transfers and loans. Direct transfers included payments for improved rail links 
and motorways, but the most notorious were for political prisoners, whose 
freedom Bonn bought from the GDR. With prices per head averaging around 
DM 70,000 it was a lucrative trade both for the GDR and for the Western 
                                                          
     143 The black economy consisted mainly of services, especially car repairs, legal advice, health, plumbing, 
carpentry, and building. 
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institutions that organized it.144 Its total cost to the West German taxpayer, from 
1963 to 1989, amounted to some DM 3½ billion (Ash 1993:146). All in all, direct 
transfers represented a huge financial infusion. Together with private gifts they 
amounted to around DM 5 billion per year by the late 1980s. Assuming an 
exchange rate of 4.4:1, that represents fully 10% of national income (Lisiecki 
1990:513). 
 In addition to transfers, Bonn provided its Eastern twin with ‘soft’ loans. 
One such was the ‘Swing’, which became in practice a permanent cheap loan (as 
well as a means by which Bonn subsidized the annual exports of some 7,000 
West German firms). More famous were the interest-free loans of one billion 
Marks apiece in 1983 and 1984. These were initiated and arranged by Schalck and 
Strauss, and were then coordinated by the latter through a consortium of 
Western banks. Although small compared to the GDR’s total debt, they were 
crucial to rescuing the beleaguered economy in the eyes of international finance. 
Being so clearly propped up by one of the world’s strongest economies, East 
Germany’s credit rating returned to a tolerable level. Credits from international 
banks resumed, and difficult decisions could be postponed. 
 In short, East Germany grew ever more reliant upon relations with Bonn, 
which progressively undermined its ‘national economic sovereignty’. Many of 
the transfers and loans had political strings attached. The Strauss loans, for 
example, were informally exchanged for an easing of conditions for West-East 
travel, enabling more East Germans to emigrate. More subtly, the regime’s 
control over economic matters was eroded by the Deutschmark inflow, which 
circulated in effect as a parallel financial system. 
 Once entered, the currents pulling towards closer relations with the West 
proved difficult to control, let alone reverse. Economic and cultural links with the 
FRG were, as Günter Minnerup put it (1984:8), ‘double-edged’. To the extent that 
they ‘alleviate the difficulties of the SED leadership they also, like painkilling 
tablets, create a dependence on the beneficial drug.’ 
 
 
                                                          




West Germany’s economic muscle continued to develop, relative not only to the 
GDR, but also to the superpowers. This influenced several developments in 
international relations. As outlined in chapter three, fractures in Atlantic unity, 
and the US’s relative decline vis-à-vis West Germany, had formed the 
background to Brandt’s Ostpolitik. Although following the tracks of Nixon’s 
détente, Ostpolitik also ‘alarmed the Nixon administration’ (Powaski 1998:171). It 
demonstrated a new foreign policy assertiveness, and reawakened memories of 
German Schaukelpolitik. In the 1980s, Bonn continued to assert foreign policy 
autonomy, at times conflicting with the US. Although the FRG supported 
Carter’s grain embargo of the USSR and Reagan’s arms build-up, differences 
emerged. For example Bonn, along with many other DMEs, tended to turn a 
blind eye to the flouting of COCOM restrictions, which prompted the CIA, in the 
early 1980s, to launch an operation (code name ‘Exodus’) designed to stem 
embargo evasion (Macrakis 1997:70). Disputes flared between Washington and 
Bonn over the neutron bomb in 1977, and over EC companies’ participation in 
the construction of Soviet oil pipelines, which the EC won in 1982. Bonn also 
insisted on alterations in the Pershing programme, and on a delay in stationing 
the Lance missile, while a German veto over the firing of German-based US 
nuclear weapons was a cause championed by Strauss in particular. The Strauss 
loans should be seen in this context too. They were, as Clemens suggests 
(1989:290), a clear signal that the new conservative government, despite the New 
Cold War, ‘was thoroughly prepared to cooperate with the GDR’. Indeed, the 
appropriation by Strauss’s CSU of the SPD’s mantle of pioneering relations with 
the GDR, precisely when such a move cut across the grain of Moscow-
Washington relations, highlighted both the extent to which the FRG ruling class 
had quietly united behind Brandt’s strategy, and its new-found assertiveness vis-
à-vis Washington.145 
                                                          
     145 However, there was a fine line between recognition of the GDR and Bonn’s attempt to assume a ‘senior 
partner’ role. The latter encouraged increased discussion of German reunification to edge back onto the 
margins of Western political debate (Kaiser 1979:8). In the early 1980s the whispers grew louder, particularly 
when the new conservative government sent a minister to speak at a Bund der Vertriebenen rally. 
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 For East Germany, a number of factors contributed to its support for the 
‘mini-’ (or ‘inter-German’) détente. These included the general phenomena of 
Eastern Europe’s westward turn and the relative decline of the USSR, the 
Kremlin’s weakness following Brezhnev’s death, and the fear shared by Berlin 
and Bonn that Germany might become a central ‘theatre’ for nuclear exchanges 
between American and Soviet forces (Wolf 1998:220).146 However, as one West 
German diplomat has argued (Kaiser 1991:483), the decisive factor was East 
Germany’s increasing dependence upon West German markets and transfers. 
Symptomatic of Berlin’s shift is that, during West Germany’s economic recession 
of 1980-2, Honecker could telephone FRG chancellor Schmidt, not to wish 
damnation on his ‘imperialist’ economy, but to proffer his earnest wishes that the 
recession there would swiftly end (Nakath/Stephan 1995:72). 
 Apart from the Strauss loans, manifestations of mini-détente included 
new East-West telephone links (1983), an agreement over commuter railways in 
Berlin (1984) and a deal on cultural, sporting and scientific links (1986). Inter-
German détente became institutionalized, with semi-annual meetings of both 
states’ economics chiefs. Following a brief freezing of relations in 1986, thawing 
resumed in the form of a prisoner exchange, student exchanges, town twinnings, 
and the further easing of restrictions on private Deutschmark transfers. 
 These moves highlighted Moscow’s loss of influence over its junior 
partner.147 Solidarnosc had threatened to kill off Brezhnev’s doctrine even before 
his death, and now it was being undermined again, this time by a traditionally 
reliable ally. Moscow repeatedly voiced its disapproval of the mini-détente and 
especially the Strauss loans. This provoked equally frequent counter-attacks, 
including one, in Neues Deutschland, which accused the Soviets of advocating a 
disastrous course of ‘economic seclusion’. Moscow succeeded in preventing 
Honecker’s planned visit to the FRG in September 1984. Nevertheless, Berlin 
made clear that it would go ahead, which it did, despite Gorbachev’s opposition, 
in 1987. These were but particular examples of a general trend, which the 
                                                          
     146 GDR officials quietly but surprisingly indicated discontent over the stationing of new Soviet nuclear 
missiles on their territory. 
     147 For more on this, see Sieber (1994). 
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Economist (18.8.84) described thus: Moscow’s ‘usual arm-twisting is [no longer 
working], because too many east European leaders are coming to realize that 




The 1980s saw a dramatic rise in GDR-DME inter-firm cooperative projects, 
including various types of ‘compensation’, and to a lesser extent joint ventures.148 
In this field, East Germany moved from tail-light of the East European STEs to 
pole position, engaging in well over 100 collaborative ventures with FRG 
businesses alone (Nakath 1994:49, Bauman 1989:178). The most common form of 
cooperation involved production under license. Firms from DMEs (including 
Nivea, Blaupunkt and Adidas) erected plant or entire factories in the GDR. They 
usually received payment in kind, with the rest of the product allocated to 
domestic luxury outlets (‘Delikat’, ‘Exquisit’, and ‘Intershop’). Such ventures 
brought the benefit of ensuring supplies of quality consumer goods that were 
paid for through the direct exploitation of GDR workers rather than precious 
hard currency. Moreover, as Mittag put it (1991:39), ‘technical know-how from 
abroad — which could not be appropriated in any other way — could be gained’, 
as a beneficial consequence of East Germany’s ‘integration into the worldwide 
division of labour’ (1991:105). 
 East Germany’s integration into the world economy entailed partnerships 
with DME multinationals at home, but also abroad. GDR firms were keen to 
expand into extra-STE markets. As one top official wrote (BA-SAPMO Büro 
Mittag 10.2.87): ‘economic-technical cooperation between West German 
companies and East German companies in third markets of the non-socialist-
abroad should in the future be intensified and should become a long-term 
objective.’ A trickle of collaborative ventures with Western MNCs in the 1970s, 
for instance with Vöest-Alpine in Cameroon, became a stream in the 1980s, 
                                                          
     148 That joint ventures as such were relatively neglected was due to the political and geopolitical habits and 
fears of the SED leaders. Their cautious attitude on this question, according to two interviewees 
(Richter/Meier), frustrated many officials, middle managers, and even company directors. See also Nitz 
(1989:303, 1995:111). 
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including projects with British United Machinery, CCC Hamburg (in Sudan), 
DEMAG (in Bulgaria), and Mannesmann (in Bulgaria and Greece). By the late 
1980s one East German MNC (SKET) owned, among many other assets, 350 
rolling mills and 1,200 cranes in at least forty countries (Kombinate 1993:272). 
 By far the most extensive collaboration was with FRG-based firms. Many 
of these shared an interest in what one CDU leader, Kiep, called ‘the overall 
political aspect of the furthering of economic relations’ (Nitz 1995:275). They 
perceived the ‘special’ German-German political relationship as working to their 
advantage.149 Many were also, naturally, motivated by a ‘massive self-interest’ 
(Kiep) in particular business projects. In the words of Krupp’s Berthold Beitz 
(Nitz 1989:306), ‘the dynamism of trade with the GDR was of substantial 
importance to many FRG enterprises, both big corporations and specialized 
small and medium-sized companies.’ To illuminate the sorts of specific interests 
motivating both sides, cases from three industries, cars, steel and nuclear power, 
will be briefly discussed.150 
 The automobile industry was synonymous with one Kombinat, Ifa. Several 
Western companies, including Porsche and Citroen, explored cooperation with 
Ifa, but the one that engaged most successfully was Volkswagen. Volkswagen’s 
global strategy was fairly heavily geared to STEs, in particular China,151 as well 
as the USSR, albeit with less enthusiasm.152 Following approaches from Mittag 
and Schalck, Volkswagen arrived in the early 1980s. Inter-German détente was 
blossoming, and, equally significantly, Ifa was in the throes of breaking a joint 
                                                          
     149 The connection between economic and political interests was most apparent in the issue of inter-
German trade. When, for example, the special terms of inter-German trade were challenged as contrary to 
EU principles, Otto Wolff, steel magnate and head of the ‘East committee’ of the BDI, defended it in 
revealing terms. He declaimed to East German officials that he perceived himself ‘as a sort of Libero, 
defending the gates of the GDR against these attacks by the FRG’s west European allies on the status of 
inner-German trade’ (Nitz 1995:270). 
     150 Except where sources are stated, the following is based upon documents from BA-SAPMO (Büro 
Mittag). 
     151 As Hahn explained to East German officials, VW wanted to begin production in China because, first, 
the potential market is vast, and second, it would give VW ‘a headstart in the Chinese market over the 
Japanese competition.’ (Büro Mittag, 8.10.84). Indeed, by 1995 VW had gained half the Chinese automobile 
market (Time 25.9.95). 
     152 FRG politicians (including Genscher, Kohl and Schäuble) pressed VW to collaborate with the USSR by 
producing VW engines for Moskwitsch cars. VW did so, but offered a plant suitable only for outdated 
engines. When the Soviet Minister for the Automobile Industry later discovered that VW plant in East 
Germany was up-to-date he was ‘shocked’ (Büro Mittag 26.4.85). 
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venture agreement with a Czechoslovak enterprise (Sieber 1994:78). 
Volkswagen’s motivation, as explained to Beil by its president, Hahn, was to 
shift production from West Germany because it is ‘not stable enough’ and 
because of ‘the rising costs in FRG industry’.153 Whatever the significance of the 
former (with hindsight, ironic) motive, it is undoubtedly true that Volkswagen 
was attracted by East Germany’s supply of cheap and qualified labour-power. As 
its director of finance put it (Damus 1990:70), ‘[w]hy go to Korea when wage 
levels next door are only a quarter of West German levels?’ As for the East 
Germans, cooperation with Volkswagen was seen as a lever for directly raising 
productivity, and for benefiting science and industry in general.154 According to 
Przybylski (1992:189), Mittag hoped that an Ifa-Volkswagen joint venture would 
result. However, other leaders, worried about the degree of technical 
dependence that would result, not to mention the cost in scarce Deutschmarks, 
blocked such a move. In 1984 a compromise was reached whereby Ifa would 
build Volkswagen engines under license. A part of these would be supplied to 
Volkswagen as payment, the rest would be installed in improved Wartburgs.155 
 The second example is the steel industry. In this case, Western interests 
centred not on cheap skilled labour but markets. With world steel 
overproduction hitting crisis levels in the early 1980s, even marginal markets like 
the GDR could be vital to a company’s survival. As the director of Salzgitter 
insisted to Beil in 1981, ‘Salzgitter needs the trade with the socialist countries’. He 
added, significantly, that it ‘will use its influence on the West German 
government to make sure that no inconviences will arise.’ Similarly, a top Krupp 
manager, Scheider, confided to Beil in the same year that the FRG steel industry 
was in such a parlous state that ‘the consequence, in a "free market economy", 
                                                          
     153 At the same time he shamelessly used West German VW workers’ strength as a bargaining chip, 
passing on to Beil the demand of IG Metall that, if production is relocated to the GDR, it must agree — as 
‘compensation’ — to sharply increase its purchases of VW cars from the West. 
     154 In mid-1989, for example, a Volkswagen-funded institute was established to support cooperation 
between Hamburg and Jena universities. In Schalck’s words, this would bring vital ‘access to technical 
know-how that we are lacking.’ 
     155 Sadly, the VW-powered Wartburgs were so expensive that, when presented at the Leipzig trade fair, 
some enraged (and brave!) citizens pelted the Wartburg stand ‘with rotten eggs and other missiles.’ 
(Przybylski 1992:193). 
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would be bankruptcy.’156 Krupp desperately needed extra orders from East 
Germany, and suggested that payment for these could be, in part, through GDR 
firms supplying Krupp projects in third markets. At that time Krupp-GDR 
collaborative projects already existed in Yugoslavia, Greece, India, Ethiopia, 
Burundi, and Ghana. Plans were drawn up to extend collaboration to Tunisia, 
Nigeria, Dubai, Iran, Morocco, Libya, and Sri Lanka. ‘Krupp possesses very 
favourable terms’ in many of these countries, East German officials observed, 
‘thanks to the political intervention of the FRG and finance from the World 
Bank’. 
 The final example, nuclear power, is significant not because any major 
project resulted, but because political factors took centre stage. In 1982 the head 
of Hoffnungshütte wrote to Beil, on behalf of a consortium of major FRG firms, 
to propose that they construct a nuclear power plant in East Germany. He gave 
three motives. The ‘most important’ was that ‘the FRG government and industry 
want to establish an example that will act as a counterweight to the anti-nuclear 
movement’, then at its zenith. Secondly, as with steel, market conditions in DMEs 
were inclement. Hoffnungshütte, he wrote, had ‘gigantic stockpiles of high-value 
nuclear power plant which it would like to reduce.’ Thirdly, ‘East Germany has a 
clear nuclear power strategy and no problems with its population’ [italics GD]. He 
urged haste by informing Beil that the Schmidt government was in favour of the 
plan but that a future CDU/CSU government might not be. Finally, he warned 
that the USA might attempt to thwart an FRG-GDR nuclear venture, and urged 
Beil to the utmost secrecy. Although Hoffnungshütte’s plan was never executed, 
the motivations revealed in this letter underscored other FRG-GDR projects. For 
example, FRG firms used East Germany as a convenient, cheap dump for toxic 




The Clinking of Vodka-Cola Glasses 
                                                          




Increased trade and détente contributed to a growing mutual regard between the 
ruling classes of both Germanies. Amicable personal contacts flourished. 
‘Totalitarian dictators’ and ‘revanchist imperialists’ reinterpreted one another as 
valued partners at the negotiating tables of business and politics. 
 Typically for masters of relatively backward economies, nomenklatura 
members harboured an admiration for the DMEs, albeit perhaps a resentful one. 
Particular esteem was extended to the business methods of the Western ‘class 
enemy’, which were frequently held up as a model.157 Company managers and 
officers of the security services engaged in the practical recognition of DME 
superiority through their preference for, and sometimes dependence upon, DME 
imports, while the nomenklatura as a whole voted with their wallets for DME 
consumer goods. Among KoKo’s prime tasks each year was to provide DM 6-8 
million simply for the politbüro’s hard-currency consumption needs 
(Christ/Neubauer 1991:51). The receipts (some of which I have read, courtesy of 
Uwe Bastian) cover a vast array of items, especially electronic goods, but also 
manifold other items including orthopaedic mattresses, pampas grass, and 
ultrasonic vole killers! One wonders whether Mittag, whose artificial leg was 
made in Japan and whose daughters’ ten or more televisions were all of 
‘capitalist’ provenance (Janson 1991:238; Klemm 1991:73), or Honecker, as he sat 
in his Citroen smoking HB (his favourite cigarettes), or Egon Krenz, as he 
supervised the ‘grey market’ import of western cars for favoured functionaries, 
or the Stasi officers who sent their employees over to the West to purchase wines, 
cigarettes and videos, ever reflected upon their dependence upon ‘capitalist’ 
luxuries.158 Certainly, Schalck’s responsibility for their provision helped him to a 
formidable reputation amongst the SED elite.159 
                                                          
     157 For example, one Politbüro member suggested that East German central planning should be modelled 
on that of the American army, which deployed high-tech data processing to enable the smooth coordination 
of tens of thousands of discrete operations (Naumann/Trümpler 1990:126). For Schalck’s pioneering 
reverence for ‘capitalist’ business methods, see P-F Koch (1992:46). 
     158 Honecker would later justify his taste for luxuries by pointing out that other German leaders, from 
Hitler to Kohl, did likewise (Andert/Herzberg 1991:381). 
     159 Honecker himself (Andert/Herzberg 1991:351) lamented that ‘[s]adly the GDR did not have many 
businessmen like Schalck.’ 
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 The proliferation of collaborative ventures and political negotiations 
associated with increased trade and détente was central to modifications in 
perceptions of the ‘enemy’. The CSCE process in particular was a crucible of 
East-West fraternity, in which members and representatives of the respective 
ruling classes discussed and prepared cooperative agreements and projects. At 
meetings associated with the CSCE process, scientists, economists, diplomats, 
and officers exchanged experiences, discussed possible developments, sought 
compromise and agreement, and struck deals. Businessmen from all the major 
FRG firms, and from other DMEs, attended.160 Generally, a friendly, open 
atmosphere prevailed, which undermined Cold War preconceptions.161 As 
Mittag later admitted (1991:96) ‘The countless meetings [I had] with West 
German politicians and with important businessmen [...] shaped, both 
consciously and unconsciously, my thinking.’ 
 The relations of the GDR nomenklatura to its FRG counterpart came in 
some respects to resemble those of East Germans towards the ‘aunt in the West’. 
Helmut Kohl, his ministers, and other politicians regularly visited East Berlin for 
negotiations, accompanied by smiling photo opportunities with GDR leaders. 
Western business leaders were fawned upon. Beitz, for example, was one of the 
GDR leaders’ favourite friends and greatest admirers. In letters to Mittag (in BA-
SAPMO Büro Mittag), he described his feelings upon visiting East Germany; of 
being ‘overwhelmed by the beautiful presents’ he had received from the East 
German state; of his ‘great pleasure with my hunting success’ which he had 
enjoyed with SED leaders; and of his desire ‘to have a GDR artist paint my 
portrait’. Exemplifying the intricacies of Vodka-Cola clinking, West German 
officials even bothered to write to Mittag to suggest that, during Beitz’s 
forthcoming visit to his parents’ hometown in the GDR, officials there should 
                                                          
     160 Nitz recalls — with no apparent irony — that (1995:140) Robert Maxwell was ‘on board’. 
     161 ‘Openness’, however, was restricted to inter-elite discourse. Both sides concurred that their populations 
should be kept in the dark as regards German-German negotiations. The crucial post-Helsinki meetings 
were kept very secret. As Jürgen Nitz, one of the GDR’s main negotiators, writes (1995:131): ‘In reality, the 
professional and general publics were excluded from all questions concerning German-German economic 
relations. This area was — with the absolute agreement of both sides — declared "closed society". [...] I was 
always amazed that Bonn — representing an open society — supported and connived in this "conspiracy 
against openness".’ 
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arrange for the local priest to present him with ‘a little souvenir (such as an old 
hymn book) for his mother’. 
 Vodka-Cola relationships were prone to go beyond the realms of official 
business. For example, Otto Wolff was a frequent visitor. He loved East 
Germany’s Prussian aspect, especially the pageantry when he received an 
honorary doctorate at Jena University. However, his activities in the GDR were 
not always noble. One letter to ‘My very worthy dear Mr. Mittag’ begins with a 
friendly reminder: ‘You once told me that, should I ever deem it appropriate, I 
could contact you outside of our official roles, if something arose pertaining to 
affairs of my own company.’ He had heard, the letter continues, that a GDR steel 
works was inviting tenders for a major investment. His firm, he declared, would 
be interested in receiving the contract. Mittag ensured that indeed it did. 
 Strauss was notoriously adept at using his political position to further 
private interests. His initial contacts with Schalck had been facilitated by his 
friend (and CSU member) Joseph März. März was a Bavarian cattle dealer whose 
meat wholesaling business dealt, via KoKo, with East Germany. His chief rival, 
an SPD-connected cattle dealer, was generally preferred by the GDR. However 
März, scenting possibilities for reinvigorating his troubled business, introduced 
Schalck to Strauss. The three became friends. März’s business was promptly 
rescued, thanks to increased purchases from the GDR. In the mid-1980s however, 
his trade with the GDR slumped. Once again, Strauss intervened. He sent a note 
to Schalck which insisted that the GDR permanently increase purchases from 
März, or risk that the smooth relations between Schalck and Strauss (which were 
by now the linchpin of Ost-West-politik) would suffer (E Koch 1992:150). On 
several other occasions, Schalck and Mittag, at Strauss’s instigation, ensured that 
major contracts went to companies favoured by Strauss (Seiffert/Treutwein 
1991:348; E Koch 1992:145). When East Germany’s airline, Interflug, was 
considering leasing two Airbuses Strauss — who sat upon Airbus’s board of 
directors — used his political influence to clear aside the COCOM hurdles 
(Nakath 1994:50). Strauss was viewed kindly by SED leaders due to his espousal 
of intensified relationships, and his organization of the 1983-4 loans. But his 
relationship with Berlin was also cemented by information exchange. Although 
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Strauss knew that Schalck was a Stasi colonel, he willingly divulged much 
classified information that he received from Bonn ministries, the CIA and the 
BND — including the sites of Cruise and Pershing missiles. This posthumously 
earned him the appellation ‘the GDR’s most important spy’ (Przybylski 
1992:282).162 
 In the process of forging ‘Vodka-Cola’ relationships, both sides often 
found they shared a surprising degree of common ideological ground. For 
example, the Deutschnational Strauss and his wife greatly admired the GDR 
regime’s Prussian authoritarianism, and especially its reactionary family policy 
(Wochenpost 4.8.1994). The GDR effectively repressed three evils which Strauss 
most abhorred: ‘hashish, pornography, and [...] long hair’ (Strauss, in Engelmann 
1983:191). Strauss, a notorious anti-Communist (and friend of Pinochet and 
Apartheid), began to earn the admiration of Honecker and Mittag, and 
discovered his Weltanschauung to be far closer to theirs than to East Germany’s 
‘long haired’ oppositionists. He even went so far as to telephone Honecker to 
voice his contempt for the ‘crazy’ Krawczyk and his fellow oppositional 
‘dreamers’ (Sélitrenny/Weichert 1991:138). East German journalists who 
continued the age-old tradition of attacking Strauss as the epitome of revanchist 
imperialism, and even those who simply called him an anti-Communist, were 
called to order (Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:76). 
 In his attitude to oppositionists, Strauss was but an extreme example of a 
major, and cross-party, section of the FRG ruling class, which saw them as either 
irrelevant or annoying. For example, Joseph März expressed unconditional 
sympathy with the GDR authorities for refusing entry visas to ‘Greens and other 
politicians from the left scene’, and hoped that GDR dissidents would not 
emigrate, for ‘[w]e already have enough of those Bahros, Biermanns, Krawczyks 
and Kliers in West Germany’ (E Koch 1992:154). An FDP leader, Lambsdorff, 
encouraged East German Church leaders to give oppositionists ‘a good scolding’ 
(Schroeder 1998:312). Along similar lines, a leading CDU politician, Lothar Späth 
(Nakath 1994:52), told Schalck of his disdain for East German radical ‘clerics 
[who] pursue the interests of oppositional forces which otherwise have little to 
                                                          
     162 See also Sélitrenny/Weichert (1991), Nitz (1995:218), E Koch (1992:127). 
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do with the church.’ SPD leaders expressed similar thoughts to their East 
German counterparts (Neubert 1998:662-5). 
 In this light it seems that the increasingly positive attitude of the FRG elite 
to Honecker’s regime was not the result of ‘deception’ by wily GDR ideologues, 
as Robert Conquest claims (1995). Rather, it was the outcome of networks of 
cross-border trade, friendship and palm-greasing, all set within the overarching 
Ostpolitical framework of mutual recognition and the pursuit of stability. 
Ideological differences became muted and, where necessary, past records played 
down — for example, Strauss’s anti-communism or Beitz’s record as an 
administrator of Nazi-occupied Poland (Windsor 1971:52). During the ‘thaw’ 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s, Western leaders made a point of expressing 
admiration for their Communist counterparts (Helmut Schmidt for Gierek and 
Mittag, Strauss for Brezhnev), and justifying even the most abhorrent 
‘Communist’ repression (Nakath/Stephan 1995:68; Clemens 1989:200). Jürgen 
Nitz, who knew both sides intimately, remarked that he had always heard 
‘exceptionally positive opinions [...] towards the East German leaders [...] above 
all from the top people in the West German business community’, as well as from 
CDU leaders such as Kiep (1995:175). Mittag was seen ‘by many top managers in 
the West as absolutely one of their own’ (Nitz 1995:166). Best loved of the East 
Germans, of course, was Schalck. He was ‘a favourite conversation partner 
amongst members of the West German political establishment of all parties’, 
from Waigel to Schäuble to Lambsdorff (Christ/Neubauer 1991:48).163 
 Growing interdependence with DMEs tended to effect subtle shifts upon 
the mind-set of sections of the nomenklatura. They began to see their Western 
counterparts as constructive partners, even friends. For example, two SED 
officials involved in negotiating a ‘Joint Paper’ with the SPD in the mid-1980s 
have described the ‘human dimension’ of the talks. Both sides would ‘get to 
know one another, drink beer together in the evenings’, so that before long ‘we 
saw our SPD partners as colleagues, as friends’ (Meier/Richter interview). Even 
the notoriously unsociable Günter Mittag records that (1991:104) ‘[a]n 
                                                          
     163 After unification, Schäuble and other friends of Schalck would lead the call for a ‘generous amnesty for 
former employees of the Stasi’ (die tageszeitung 28.3.90). 
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atmosphere of mutual trust developed, since both sides were no longer engaged 





The contradiction between East Germany’s growing interdependence with the 
wider world economy, notably its dependence upon Bonn’s goodwill, and its 
existence as an STE, loyal to Moscow, was reflected in a return and deepening of 
tensions over Westpolitik in the 1980s.164 
 A degree of informal faction formation developed within the SED 
leadership. At one pole were the ‘Westernizers’.165 Included in this camp, 
according to Nitz (1995:60), were Politbüro members Mittag, Beil, Sindermann, 
Schürer, and Häber, as well as Schalck. They promoted cooperation with 
Western firms and states, emphasizing the exigency of technological 
modernization. They advocated furthergoing détente with the FRG, although 
they were aware of the dangers inherent in this strategy. Thus, Mittag warned a 
Politbüro committee that Bonn’s support for economic cooperation ‘is a plank in 
the FRG’s strategy of achieving "reunification"‘ (Büro Mittag 15.5.84). Similarly, 
Schalck warned of Bonn’s plans to ‘upgrade’ Berlin into the ‘potential capital’ of 
all Germans (Büro Mittag 6.1.83). 
 The other (‘Comecon’) faction comprised those who tended to ‘communist 
internationalism’, stressing the GDR’s common interests with Comecon and the 
Warsaw Pact. They too perceived the need to pursue economic integration, but 
argued that this should occur above all within Comecon. As Mittag put it 
(1991:40), they suffered from ‘the illusion that the GDR could get its international 
know-how from Comecon.’166 Their greatest fear was the incipient dissolution of 
                                                          
     164 Earlier clashes over Westpolitik had occurred, for example, in the late 1940s (Ackermann vs. Ulbricht); 
early 1950s (Herrnstadt vs. Ulbricht), 1956 (Schirdewan vs. Ulbricht) and 1970-2 (Ulbricht vs Honecker). 
     165 The term refers to economic and geopolitical inclination, and should not be taken as indicative of 
attitudes to democratic reform. Indeed, the Westernizing camp included the notorious authoritarians Mittag 
and Schalck, who in 1989 became prime targets for the anger of, respectively, SED members and the general 
public. 
     166 For case studies that demonstrate that the GDR gained surprisingly little from Soviet technological 
advance, see Hoffmann and Macrakis (1997). 
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Comecon, as expressed, for example, in Hungary’s accession to the IMF. They 
worried that intensified relations with DMEs would bring economic and political 
dependence, that DMEs would be able to ‘turn the tap off’ (Mittag 1991:223). 
They feared that East Germany would become, in Krolikowski’s phrase, an 
‘object of exploitation’ (Przybylski 1992:355). A clear exposition of their position 
was put, in 1980, by Mielke. He informed Stoph (Przybylski 1992:222) that, 
 
 throughout the economic departments of the Central Committee, 
comrades are seething over Honecker and Mittag’s West-strategy. 
[They] clearly perceive the danger of the GDR’s dependence on 
capitalist states, enterprises, and banks, and believe the only secure 
perspective lies in the utmost domestic performance and in 
cooperation with the USSR and the other socialist brotherlands. 
 
Alongside Mielke and Stoph, this camp included Hager and Herrmann 
(Politbüro members responsible for media, culture and science), Krolikowski, 
and Neumann. 
 As for Honecker, the ‘Comecon’ tendency perceived him, with 
considerable justice, as a paid-up Westernizer. They allegedly informed the 
Kremlin of their suspicions that he and Mittag were conspiringly engaging in a 
‘German-German flirtation’ with Bonn (Nakath/Stephan 1995:22). By the mid-
1980s, according to some reports, they were even discussing ousting Honecker, 
along with Soviet contacts (Hertle 1996a:125). In general, however, Honecker 
attempted to steer a course between the two poles. Although his commitment to 
Abgrenzung had waned, it remained strong. Although usually in favour of 
intensified cooperation with the West, he also pressed for deeper Comecon 
integration, including joint ventures with Soviet enterprise (Küchenmeister 
1993). If Honecker had one characteristic political accent, it was neither a leaning 




PART THREE — Crisis of Confidence 
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These crises and contradictions, as discussed in Parts One and Two, served to 
erode the confidence of the nomenklatura, and of the masses, in the ruling order. 
 As elsewhere in the world, the mid-1970s and early-1980s recessions 
prompted the SED leadership to take measures to reduce public outlays on non-
productive consumption. The regime’s commitment to welfare improvements 
was attenuated. The slogan ‘Without welfare policies, no intensification [of the 
labour process]!’ was inverted to ‘Without intensification, no welfare policies!’ 
Productivity growth, once again, took precedence over improved living 
standards. 
 By some yardsticks living standards did improve. Car ownership 
increased markedly, even relative to other countries (Table 5.9). 
 
Table 5.9 Cars per 1,000 inhabitants (adapted from Kornai (1992:305)). 
 1980 1987 % increase 
GDR 151 209 38.4 
Hungary 86 157 82.6 
Romania 11 12 9.1 
Japan 202 241 19.3 
Spain 201 251 24.9 
FRG 388 462 19.1 
 
Consumption of household goods also showed significant growth (Table 5.10). 
 






1980 17 80 12.5 
1987 46 97 37 
 
However, average figures such as these conceal the fact that, as elsewhere in the 
same period, tendencies towards social equality were sharply reversed. The late 
1970s and 1980s witnessed increasing differentiation in terms of income and 
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work conditions, as well as regional discrepancies (Glaessner 1991b:138).167 
Particularly badly affected were industrial workers, whose real wage growth was 
in the region of 1% per annum.168 Others, including proprietors in the private 
sector, which was granted greater freedoms from 1976, and those with access to 
hard currency — such as artisans and functionaries, some intellectuals and Stasi 
IMs, and anybody with generous relatives in the West — did better. Academic 
research (Neubert 1989:21) suggested that ‘social differentiation [...] is tending to 
increase! The more favourable conditions (income, housing, possession of 
consumer durables) are concentrated amongst groups of the intelligentsia; the 
less favourable amongst workers.’ Large sections of the population saw their 
living standards fall, relative to other East Germans and to most West Germans. 
In such conditions, the regime’s promises of the early 1970s tended to justify 




The proportion of East Germans in third-level education was consistently higher 
than in many DMEs, including the UK. Its expansion in the 1950s and 1960s, 
argue Huinink and Mayer (1993:158), was linked to widespread upward mobility 
and, if less directly, to tolerance of or loyalty towards the regime. However, 
admissions to further and higher education peaked in the 1960s and early 1970s 
respectively, and then slumped. In 1970 admissions to higher education (as a 
proportion of the relevant age cohort) had, at 17%, been superior to the FRG. By 
1980 they had fallen to 10%, and were surpassed by the FRG (Kohli 1994:54). 
Cohorts leaving secondary education thus faced diminished prospects of 
achieving higher qualifications. Many workers suffered from ‘qualification 
oversupply’ — suitably skilled jobs were unavailable. In the 1970s around 25-
30% of workers and ‘cooperative farmers’ were employed below their skill level 
(Pravda/Ruble 1986:65; Bust-Bartels 1980:153; Woods 1986). In the same decade, 
                                                          
     167 Resentment at Berlin’s privileged position was, for example, expressed in a strike in 1987, when 
Dresden truck drivers refused to deliver cucumbers to Berlin. 
     168 Steven Saxonberg suggests (1997:60) that it may even have been negative in the 1980s. 
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the criteria for assessing wages was altered. Workers were no longer rewarded 
according to qualifications, but only for skills actually used. 
 Social polarization and qualification oversupply undoubtedly affected the 
Zeitgeist. Older generations had, by and large, come to enjoy higher living 
standards and higher status employment than their parents’ generation. Now, 
many of their children faced the prospect of stagnating living standards and 
unsatisfactory employment. Commentary on the phenomenon often took the 
form of cynical jokes, such as ‘in socialism, everyone can become what they want 
to be, whether they want to or not.’ Frustration and discontent, as the critics of 
relative deprivation theory have shown (e.g. Rule 1988), do not of themselves 
lead to legitimation problems for regimes, nor to social movements. In the 1980s 
East Germany’s Stalinist social order was firmly in place, its regimented 
mechanisms were very well rehearsed, and its omnipresent official ideology 
emphasized the virtues of order and stability. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
the prevailing popular mood, as portrayed by observers of the period, was not 
critical and oppositional. If anything, the Zeitgeist was marked by malaise, 
hopelessness and resignation. One stark indication of this is that, from the late 
1970s, the suicide rate soared, prompting one doctor to declare that ‘[s]uicide has 
become fashionable’ (Simon 1990:87). Freya Klier, who conducted hundreds of 
interviews with young people in the 1980s (1990a:185), found that most evinced 
‘a depressing lack of questions and desires’. Girls seemed to harbour few 
aspirations other than to found a family. Many interviewees, Klier concluded, 
displayed a disturbing degree of apathy and acquiescence. They seemed to 
accommodate to the ruling order through limiting their horizons, rather than 
pushing against its limits. ‘Resignation’, as Fuchs describes (1984:75), ‘does not 
simply slouch around [...] it settles in and makes its little peace. [...] Persistent 
indignities and discouragement from above do not just provoke dignity and 
courage, but also bear conformist fruit’. However, many younger people also 
displayed greater tendencies towards a pronounced, often spirited, self-
assertiveness vis-à-vis authority figures and a rejection of condescending, 
domineering and officious attitudes (Stephan 1994:44). For such spirits, 
frustrations associated with low incomes and overqualification could nourish 
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politicized discontent rather than resignation. Thus, although no direct link 
between social problems and politicized discontent exists, there is an abundance 
of material, including Stasi reports and interviews with emigrants, which justifies 
the latter in terms of the former.169 
 In short, some major, structural, sources of popular frustrations with the 
social system accumulated in this period, which were exacerbated by the 
increasing visibility and influence of West German culture and society, and by 
the growing difficulties faced by the GDR’s socialist allies (Stephan 1994:43). 
Such grievances did not generate active expressions of deviance or political 
criticism, or other forms of behaviour that challenged the regime’s legitimacy or 
policies. They may, however, be said to have provided ammunition to those 
engaged in such behaviour, which proliferated in the 1976-89 period. Resistance 
centred on four main areas, which I will examine in turn. These are resistance to 
austerity and to workplace oppression, emigration, countercultures, and political 
social movements. 
 
Industrial Relations Stalemate 
 
The truncation of the much-heralded ‘social contract’, restrictive incomes 
policies, and consumer goods shortages, all provoked sparks of popular 
resistance. In the late 1970s a small but significant increase in strike activity 
occurred. Strikes broke out over wages and bonuses, but also in protest against 
price rises, and against austerity measures, such as the introduction of 
adulterated coffee to works canteens (Anonymous 1981:63). Several strikes were 
aimed at preventing the opening of Intershops (Ramet 1991:58), while builders at 
an Intershop in Karl-Marx-Stadt struck to demand that they be permitted to shop 
there with GDR Marks. The latter example is symptomatic of the growing 
demand for access to western commodities. Several strikes, particularly in 
industries producing goods for DME markets, demanded part payment of wages 
in Deutschmarks (Volkmer 1979:119; Bust-Bartels 1980:134). 
                                                          
     169 For example, Stasi reports insisted that politicized discontent amongst the young was, in part, ‘due to 
the absence of occupations adequate to their intentions’ (Mitter/Wolle 1990:48). 
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 Strikes, being illegal, were rare. Protest more commonly took diffuse or 
‘spontaneous’ forms. When consumer goods shortages became particularly 
severe in 1977-8, and again in 1980-2, the usual grumbling at shop counters was 
occasionally converted into collective protest. In 1979, sharp price rises provoked 
a wave of popular indignation, prompting the regime to hastily repeal the 
measure, and to follow through with the announcement of general wage rises 
and a cut in the working week (Dooley 1981). In this period, according to Günter 
Simon (1990:42-3), SED leaders were forced to recognize that ‘the people are 
enraged’, as they read incoming reports of ‘youths looking to the West’, workers 
‘turning against the state’, and of supermarkets being satirized as ‘sex shops’ 
(because the shelves are naked). 
 As described in Part One, the regime lacked the will and ability to 
seriously weaken workers’ bargaining position. Attempts to increase labour 
discipline, to hold down workers’ personal consumption and/or reduce the 
‘indirect wage’ (subsidized rents, basic goods, etcetera) repeatedly ran up against 
low-level but tenacious resistance.170 Labour indiscipline persisted as a major and 
worsening problem for the nomenklatura throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
(Markovits 1995:41; Kopstein 1997). A large proportion of the working class felt 
politically alienated. Few avenues offered means of influencing workplace 
politics, let alone the public political realm. A survey (of ‘low status’ workers) in 
one firm suggested that over 90% felt ‘barely represented’ at the national level 
(Mosler 1994:12). Workers frequently responded to speed-ups by taking either 
longer breaks (Anonymous 1981:29), or indeed legally mandated ‘housekeeping 
holidays’. The latter, Kopstein observes (1997:155), ‘really amounted to legalized 
work slow downs or strikes’. The SED leadership was terrified that the example 
of Solidarnosc would be followed by East Germans (Wolf 1998:315). It dared not 
attempt any swingeing attack upon living standards or workplace conditions. 
Relative to investment requirements, though not to workers’ expectations, wages 
remained obstinately high. From 1976 onwards, the persistent attempts to slow 
the growth of wages and to intensify labour, together with ageing equipment, 
                                                          
     170 In this, managers could show complicity. Thus, Kopstein (1997:160) reports that even major enterprises 
seriously delayed implementing the 1977 wage reform, and, ‘[i]n order to ensure labor peace and continued 
cooperation, management preferred to place workers into artificially higher wage categories’. 
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chronic shortages and stoppages in production, not to mention consumer goods 
scarcities, combined to worsen workplace morale (Anonymous 1981:33; Dennis 
1993:30). Having little material ability to make concessions in the face of 
economic crisis and intensified competition, and lacking the ‘whip’ of 
unemployment, managers and functionaries were left little choice but to exhort 
workers to greater effort. As Kopstein puts it (1997:161), ‘[t]rapped in this 
structural deadlock, the SED returned time and again to the theme of political 




One of the most rudimentary, if difficult, methods for pushing against the 
constraints of the ruling order was to leap over them, by applying for permission 
to emigrate. Under Honecker, due largely to the constraints imposed by 
rapprochement with the West, and the sheer export value of emigrants (see 
above), the Wall became, in Wolle’s words (1998:285), ‘technically more perfect 
but politically more porous.’ Unlike alcoholism emigration was an ‘active’, 
political form of escape. It necessitated a courageous and public rejection of the 
GDR. Those who applied for emigration faced the most invidious discrimination 
of any social group (except Gastarbeiter).171 Often sacked or demoted, often 
denied higher education and even the right to travel within the country, they 
faced possible rejection by friends and family, and the prospect of years of 
waiting for a leaving date that might never arrive. Despite this, applications 
boomed, and a snowballing logic ensured their acceleration, as potential 
emigrants came to perceive emigration as attainable. 
 
Table 5.11 Emigration applications submitted and granted (from Wolle 1998:285). 
Year Applications, total First-time 
applications 
Emigrants 
1977  —  8,400  3,500 
1978  —  5,400  4,900 
                                                          
     171 On Gastarbeiter, see Dale (1999d:144); Klier (1990b); Siegler 1991:140-4). 
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1979  —  7,700  5,400 
1980  21,500  9,800  4,400 
1981  23,000 12,300  9,200 
1982  24,900 13,500  7,800 
1983  30,400 14,800  6,700 
1984  50,600 57,600 29,800 
1985  53,000 27,300 17,400 
1986  78,000 50,600 16,000 
1987 105,100 43,200  7,600 
1988 113,500 42,400 25,300 
1989 (until 30 June) 125,400 23,000 34,600 
 
From its beginnings the emigration movement had a definite political edge. In 
1976 an organized protest in Riesa demanded the legalization of emigration. 
Significantly, it referred to the Helsinki Final Act (signed by the GDR) as 
justification of its own legitimacy. Oppressed, frustrated, and eager to accelerate 
their exit, applicants tended to find one another, exchange experiences, and 
concoct strategies for hastening their exit. As Wolle describes (1998:286), 
 
 The prospect of being able to turn their backs on the prison-state 
gave them confidence. [...] Applicants gathered together, and used 
church services and meetings of the emergent opposition to draw 
attention to themselves. They entered embassies, and decorated 
their cars with white wedding veils, or stuck a big "A" on the 
windscreen.172 
 
In 1983, one such group in Jena began to organize vigils demanding the freedom 
to emigrate, which attracted up to 180 protestors. In 1984, a huge increase in 
emigration was allowed. Rather than acting as a ‘safety valve’, this only 
heightened expectations and frustrations amongst remaining applicants, some of 
whom occupied FRG embassies in East Berlin and Prague, and successfully won 
their emigration. Moreover, as Plock describes (1993:126), ‘[t]he exodus of 1984 
                                                          
     172 A is for Ausreiseantragsteller (emigration-applicant). 
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also expanded the pool of remaining East Germans who could apply to visit 
relatives in the FRG, a consequence reflected in the record visits to West 
Germany in 1986 and 1987’ (Table 5.12). 
 
Table 5.12 Visits to FRG due to urgent family affairs (millions; from Rüden 
1991:53).173 
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 1.4 1.5 
 
By the late 1980s the authorities were at a loss as to how to deal with the 
movement. Decisions to permit higher levels of emigration, followed, in 1988, by 
a decision to favour those applicants who had participated in public protests, 
encouraged others to apply and to protest. This, in turn, put greater pressure on 
the authorities. As Eisenfeld relates (1995:218), ‘The scale, spontaneity, and the 
obstinate commitment of the applicants to demonstrative actions, repeatedly 
forced the SED power apparatus to make concessions on travel and emigration 
issues in order to prevent [...] massive, uncontrolled eruptions.’ The problem was 
clearly identified in a paper delivered to the Central Committee Security 
Department (Eisenfeld 1995:218): ‘The emigration problematic is confronting us 
with a fundamental problem of the GDR’s development. Experience shows that 
the current repertoire of solutions (improved travel possibilities, expatriation of 
applicants, etc.) have not brought the desired results, but rather the opposite’. 
This challenge, it added, ‘subtly threatens to undermine beliefs in the correctness 




Although the generation that came of age in 1976-89 was by no means innately 
oppositional it was, according to Uwe Kolbe (1992:257), the first that could not be 
                                                          
     173 The overall level of visits was much more stable, with between 1 and 1.6 million pensioners visiting the 
FRG annually throughout the Honecker era. 
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accused of ‘mass collaboration’ with the regime. The few available opinion 
surveys certainly bear this out (Tables 5.13, 5.14). 
 
Table 5.13 Identification with Marxism-Leninism amongst apprentices (per cent; 
from Förster/Roski (1990:42)). 
Degree of 
identification 
1975 1979 1981 1985 1988 1989 
(May) 
strong 46 33 28 14 13  9 
barely / none 14 18 22 46 41 56 
 
Table 5.14 Identification with the aims of the FDJ amongst apprentices (per cent; 
from Förster/Roski 1990:43)). 
Degree of 
identification 
1975 1979 1988 1989 
(May) 
Absolute 43 37 16  4 
barely / none 12 16 24 44 
 
 Older generations, with the awesome horrors of Nazism, war and 
Stalinism in mind, and benefiting from upward mobility, tended to accept the 
later, stable SED regime as a relatively tolerable framework for the pursuit of 
personal fulfilment (Minnerup 1984:11). Their children, however, were spared 
the intimidation of terroristic repression, and faced the prospect of diminishing 
returns for conformist behaviour. Moreover, their eyes could look westwards to 
the rebellious impulses from the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. 
 The late 1970s and 1980s witnessed a growing orientation to western 
lifestyles as normative, as well as a notable increase in aggressive, usually police-
hating, youth subcultures such as skinheads and ‘football hooligans’, and a 
plethora of anti-authoritarian subcultures (Stock/Mühlberg 1990). The latter, 
though rarely focused upon overtly political issues, dug infrapolitical warrens 
beneath the GDR’s conformist façade. In a seditious version of the ‘niche’ 
principle, illegal or unofficial projects blossomed. Squats, ‘backyard bands’, 
samizdat music and literature production formed a cornucopia of subversive 
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‘DIY’ culture. Punk, with its lyrics of catastrophe, damage and dirt and 
underground literature, with its revelry in unorthodox surrealist grammar, 
performed counterblasts to the decreed saccharine optimism of official Stalinist 
culture. These movements, as well as hippies and sundry ‘alternative’ groups, 
created countercultural niches in which the rejection of careerism and 
conformism, and of the suffocating Prusso-Stalinist official morality and 




Finally, a new generation of dissidents emerged, centred on church-based 
‘grassroots groups’, which organized discussions and protests over issues such 
as peace, ecology, and the ‘North-South divide’.174 As the Stasi saw it 
(Mitter/Wolle 1990:48), these groups ‘continually strive to amass and organize 
those persons whose aim is to aufweichen, undermine, politically destabilize, and 
even transform East German social relations’.175 Their rise may be explained with 
general reference to the popular grievances and regime delegitimation outlined 
above, and with the growth of youth ‘countercultures’. More specifically, they 
were connected to a widespread antipathy towards the government’s 
militarization drive of the late 1970s, and to the examples provided by Western 
peace and anti-nuclear movements, and Solidarnosc.176 
 This new opposition was small, but the most public since 1953. It 
persistently pressed against the limits of legality with mass bicycle rides, music 
festivals, street theatre, vigils, petitions, human chains and tiny but brave 
demonstrations. Imaginative in mood, it would initiate public ‘happenings’, send 
‘protest-postcards’ to random addresses, and the like. It brought new social 
                                                          
     174 The 1980s opposition movement is dealt with here summarily. For further analysis see Dale (1995a, 
1995b). 
     175 Aufweichen means ‘open by fomentation’ — a good example of the sort of concept beloved of Stasi 
officers. 
     176 Opinion polarized around the latter. On the one hand, the SED virulently attacked the movement, 
deliberately associating the terms ‘work-shy’, ‘strikers’ and ‘Poles’ (e.g. Neues Deutschland 8.9.81). Anti-Polish 
jokes circulated amongst the nomenklatura and elsewhere (Simon 1990). On the other hand, many East 
Germans felt considerable sympathy with Solidarnosc. As Herzberg notes (1988:73), the Polish events 
‘politicized many of the critically inclined.’ 
 187 
layers into collective dissidence and action, such as schoolchildren and workers, 
as well as intellectuals and a hard core of those, including punks, theology 
students and conscientious objectors, whose aesthetic or ethical stance met with 
official intimidation. A particularly active crucible was the Protestant Church’s 
youth work. This brought clerics together with social outcasts — including gays, 
and those who sported long hair or mohicans — and other quasi-criminalized 
groups. 
 
Diminishing Returns of Repression 
 
The four types of movement described above together represented a standing 
affront to the regime’s post-1976 turn towards hard-nosed repression. As 
elsewhere in the world during the same period (Harris 1983:162; Dale 1999c), the 
state responded to the social fallout of economic crisis through building up the 
repressive apparati. Budgetary allocations to the security forces, notably the 
Stasi, rose sharply (McCauley 1984:60; Fricke 1984:156). Preceded by a media 
campaign which drew attention to violent crime and burglaries, criminal law 
was sharpened. Its focus, despite the campaign, was not personal but ‘economic’ 
and ‘political’ crime. 
 The intensification of repression was in many ways counterproductive. 
For all the measures available to an experienced authoritarian regime, it failed to 
crush workers’ shopfloor strength, the emigration movement, youth subcultures, 
or even the tiny opposition. Although pervasive official intimidation of 
emigration applicants, punks and oppositionists presumably dissuaded many 
from joining their ranks, the abandonment of the social contract and the 
termination of the early-1970s cultural liberalization undermined the regime’s 
fragile support. In the long run its repressive turn may have served to broaden 
and harden the opposition’s ranks. 
 Outright intimidation alone could not solve the ‘problem’ of 
countercultural and oppositional movements. For this reason the state tacked, 
increasingly awkwardly, between hawkish and dovish measures. On the one 
hand, dissident intellectuals, including the famous (Biermann, Bahro), as well as 
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scores of members of critical discussion groups, were imprisoned and/or 
expatriated. Simultaneously, the militarization of education was deepened. On 
the other hand, repression was often surprisingly restrained. For example, 
despite acute condemnation in media organs, from the early 1980s not one single 
conscientious objector was actually imprisoned. In Markovits’s words (1995:48), 
the authoritarian ‘misuse of law’ was ‘usually low-key; if possible denying justice 
by bureaucratic rather than physical interference; in most instances not violent 
but evasive and dishonest.’ In a revealing passage, Mittig has testified that the 
Stasi sought to avoid penal persecution of its opponents out of fear of the 
protests, at home and abroad, that such measures provoked (Riecker 1990:179). 
By the late 1980s a hint of a liberal turn could once more be discerned, with the 
abolition of the death penalty (1987), and the introduction of judicial control over 




One of the regime’s more effective strategies was that of ‘containing’ opposition 
within the walls of the Protestant Church. In the late 1970s, Church and State 
signed a concordat, giving Church leaders acknowledged authority and security, 
as well as a variety of material and political concessions. In return, they were to 
police ‘grassroots groups’, containing them within enclosed and controllable 
church walls. 
 Following the concordat, and as the only legally acknowledged non-state 
institution, the Church quickly became the chief arena in which opposition 
formed. This was not an unmitigated blessing for oppositionists. Active church 
members were a tiny minority of the population, and were composed 
disproportionately of farmers and the middle classes. Confinement within the 
church, though welcome, therefore contributed to the isolation of dissidents.177 
The church was, moreover, a notoriously conservative and deferential 
institution. Its hierarchy tended to regard the maintenance of its own structures 
as the chief purpose of Church policy. Although oppositionists influenced some 
                                                          
     177 ‘Dissidence’ means, literally, ‘sat apart’. 
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clergy and some churches, Church leaders were in general emphatically 
apolitical, and insofar as they did recommend certain ethical or political 
positions, these were of a decidedly moderate sort, characterized by abstract 
pacifism and advocacy of patient argument with those in power — ‘dialogue’ 
between Church and state, 
 The Church acted to ‘contain’ opposition, in both senses of the word, it 
functioned as a host but also as a stern steward of its boundaries. Groups whose 
ideas or actions smacked of overt political opposition were disowned by the 
Church hierarchy, thus creating a wedge between (often non-Christian) radicals 
and (often church-going) moderates. Oppositional discussion and activity was 
permitted to a degree, and even encouraged by a few priests. In general, 
however, Church officials together with IMs acted to smother public political 
activity, and sought to counter politicization within grassroots groups through 
‘theologization’ and the ‘individualization’ of dissent (Besier 1995:495). They 
promoted an ‘inward turn’ to moral soul-searching and ‘lifestyle politics’ 
(Mitter/Wolle 1990:20). The quarantining of organized criticism within the 
Church thus served to promote the influence of priests and Christians over the 
formation of opposition, and contributed to the ‘moral’ turn of dissident opinion 
(Dale 1995b). Thanks to its dual position as ‘host’ and ‘steward’, the church 
functioned, in the wry formula of one cleric (in Neubert 1998), as ‘opium for 
frustrated young people’. Although the assembly point for critical spirits, its 
leadership often operated directly as an arm of the state in the task of what one 
Church leader described as ‘channelling’ opposition; that is suppressing radical 
and activist currents and encouraging pious moderation (Wolle 1998:269). 
 Oppositionists, tolerated within the cocoon of the Church, isolated from 
the public by harsh and systematic repression, and suffering from long decades 
devoid of collective revolt, tended to develop a ‘ghetto mentality’. There seemed 
to be few sources of hope for major political change. Some pinned their faith on 
the emergence of an SED reform-wing. Some avoided altogether the question of 
domestic reform and concentrated on issues at the furthest margins of their 
potential influence, such as tropical rainforest destruction and Third World 
poverty. Others turned inward, finding intellectual or spiritual nourishment in 
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Hegel study groups or religious contemplation. Even many of the more active 
oppositionists felt obliged to rely on little but their own strength. As Bärbel 
Bohley put it, in a description of IFM (Findeis et al. 1994:51),  
 
 Unfortunately, most [of its members] were outsiders. Their careers 
had been terminated due to their political activities, or they were 
not allowed to study. That way a kind of ghetto existence 
developed among us. In such a small group, which works together 
for years, contact is quite close. The group became a sort of 
family[.] 
 
 In isolating and containing the opposition, Church and state together 
succeeded in profoundly influencing its nature (Dale 1998). Radical individuals 
and groups tended to be marginalized, for example, those who, in Gerd Poppe’s 
words (Findeis 1994:178), ‘wanted to go public, or made contact with Western 
peace circles or Western media’. Those of a more theological bent, and those 
which accepted the Church as their ghetto, were tolerated. 
 
PART FOUR — Terminal Crisis: 1987-9 
 
In 1987 John Ardagh (1987:325) described how the GDR’s economic success and 
welfare system had contributed to Honecker becoming a popular leader, even a 
‘national father figure’. A year later Zbigniew Brzezinski (1990:234) drew up an 
‘Index of the Crisis Level in Communist States’, in which he suggested that, of 
fifteen countries, East Germany (along with Bulgaria) was least crisis-prone. At 
about the same time, the prominent GDR analyst G-J Glaessner (Löw 1991:125) 
could write that ‘during Honecker’s era of over fifteen years, the GDR [...] has 
gained internal stability’. And a year after that, Beitz (1989:xiii) could 
congratulate the SED leadership on the ‘increased sense of self-confidence’ it had 
gained over previous decades. 
 Many similar quotes can be found. They are not direct falsehoods so much 
as reflections of static and superficial interpretations of East German society of 
the time. Even before 1989 it was apparent that the GDR was caught up in the 
general crisis of the Soviet Bloc. Serious problems were visible, notably Berlin-
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Kremlin tensions, economic stagnation, growing popular disenchantment with 
the regime, and increasing resolve on the part of oppositionists. The dilemmas 
facing Honecker’s regime intensified over the course of the 1980s, for that decade 
witnessed not only the deterioration of STE economies and the Soviet empire, 




Although the mid-1980s brought a return from the edge of insolvency, thanks to 
an export drive and the Strauss loans (Schröder 1988:189), productivity growth 
rates declined, falling below wage growth (Przybylski 1992:71), and despite a 
worldwide trade upturn, exports stagnated (Table 5.15). 
 
Table 5.15 Trade (1980 = 100; from Statistisches Jahrbuch (1990)). 
Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1989 
Exports 49 74 100 137 131 131 
Imports 55 77 100 108 121 130 
 
Trade with other Comecon countries suffered (Table 5.16). Each increasingly 
prioritized relations with DMEs, as manifested in bilateral trade deals between 
the EC and Hungary, Poland and the USSR (van Ham 1993:142). Companies 
from these three STEs in particular began to make unilateral pricing decisions, 
much to the discomfort of their GDR partners (Hertle 1996a:66). Greater troubles 
were forewarned when the USSR informed East Germany in 1987 that oil 
supplies would fall further. Worse still, Comecon’s impending shift to dollar 
pricing posed a grave threat, for most East German imports from the USSR were 
‘hard’ raw materials whilst its exports to other STEs were overwhelmingly ‘soft’ 
manufactures. The GDR’s only ally in opposing this move was Romania (Hertle 
1996a:67). 
 
Table 5.16 Trade with Comecon (1980 = 100; from Statistisches Jahrbuch (1990)). 
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Year 1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1989 
Exports 49 78 100 124 122 123 
Imports 61 85 100 99 97 99 
 
Trade with DMEs fared little better. East German firms continued to lose world 
market share in manufactures to firms from DMEs and NICs (Welzk/Wilde 
1993). Compensation for these losses was sought in increased exports of raw and 
semiprocessed materials, notably oil and its derivatives. This represented a 
deepening of what Winiecki (1989:372) has termed the ‘reprimitivization’ of GDR 
exports. However, even this strategy suffered in the late 1980s, when the fall in 
supply and rise in price of Soviet oil closed the option of reselling it to DMEs. 
This alone was responsible for around half of a dramatic fall in exports to the EU, 
from ca. DM 4 billion in 1985 to ca. DM 3 billion in 1987 and 1988 (Schumacher 
1990:585). Thus, a planned export surplus for 1986-90 turned into an import 
surplus of fully six billion Valutamark (Schürer 1992a:1116; cf. also Table 5.17). 
Balance of payments difficulties with DMEs were partially counterbalanced by a 
positive balance with Comecon, but they nonetheless demanded a further 
increase in the GDR’s international debt (see Table 5.5). By the end of 1988 the 
GDR’s hard currency debt service ratio had, according to statistics circulating at 
the time (Schürer 1992a:1116), reached an utterly unsustainable 150%.178 
 
Table 5.17 Trade balance with DMEs (million VM; from Statistisches Jahrbuch (1990)). 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1987 1989 
- 1232 - 3543 - 5425 +19993 - 5433 - 8398 
 
 A renewed import squeeze and a slashing of funds for investment 
combined with a severe winter in 1986-7 to bring about a full-blown recession. 
Up to one thousand investment projects fell behind schedule, generating 
bottlenecks throughout the economy as shortfalls in one productive unit 
ricocheted up and downstream. Growth rates declined abruptly, especially in the 
                                                          
     178 Credit-worthiness is commonly defined as a quota of below 25%. 
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manufacturing and construction sectors (Bryson/Melzer 1991:24). The 
combination of a growing ‘monetary overhang’, resulting from consumer goods 
supply lagging behind wage growth, the deteriorating balance of payments and 
debt figures and a spiralling budget deficit, caused a dramatic fall in the Mark’s 
trade exchange value (Table 5.18). Imports thus grew abruptly more expensive, 
and problems associated with shortages (such as ‘import strangulation’) and 
with import substitution were aggravated. 
 
Table 5.18 Marks per Deutschmark (adapted from Hofmann/Stingl 1990:64; Kusch 
1991:45). 
1970 1976 1985 1986 1987 1988 




Economic crisis accentuated popular grievances. Although average wages may 
have risen a little, shortages of commodities abounded, resulting in declines in 
per capita consumption of countless products, including meat, fish, eggs, butter, 
bakery produce, vegetables, fruit, cocoa and its derivatives, coffee, tea, cigarettes, 
and cigars. Complaints over shortages and price rises soared (Bryson/Melzer 
1991:23). They also dominated the agenda at ‘countless meetings’ of the ‘trade 
unions’, according to the Stasi (ZAIG 5353). Stasi reports suggested, moreover, 
that commodity supply and price issues were not simply a major source of 
grievances but were becoming connected in popular discussion to dangerously 
political issues. A report in 1987 (ZAIG 5353) describes how 
 
 discussions of consumer supply questions are becoming influenced 
by individuals who have returned to their workplace from visits to 
the FRG with stories of the "overwhelming" range of commodities 




Workers, the same report continued, were increasingly expressing a lack of belief 
that the authorities would ‘solve consumer supply problems in the interests of 
workers’ (ZAIG 5353). Another document (ZAIG 5352) reports that ‘there is a 
widespread view that the proposed productivity increase will be achieved only 
at the cost of workers and cooperative farmers’. Many workers believed that 
‘living standards and real wages were falling’ (ZAIG 5353), and added that this 
represented, ‘after 38 years of the GDR’s existence, a dismal outcome.’ 
 Alongside wage, price and consumer supply issues, a common grievance 
amongst workers concerned problems of shortages and disruptions affecting the 
production process. The same Stasi report warned that ‘already there are many 
discussions, mainly in workplaces, that culminate in the observation that the 
GDR economy is in crisis. [...] Such discussions are on the increase.’ Another 
report in the same year (Grix 1998:135) noted that ‘the workers’ relationship to 
their place of work had experienced a marked change in recent years’. 
 The sombre tone of these reports is confirmed by post-1989 surveys, such 
as that done by Lawrence McFalls in 1990-1 (1995:177). Although a third of his 
respondents estimated that their personal economic situation had improved over 
the five years preceding 1989, only 2% said the same for the economy as a whole. 
Of the 87% who believed the latter to have deteriorated, most justified their 
position with reference to consumer goods shortages (53%), followed by 
shortages of supplies and spare parts in the workplace (35%), the increasing 
technology gap with the West (17%), and inflation (15%). Other ‘material’ 
grievances which, Stasi reports warned, were increasing in intensity included the 
decaying social and industrial infrastructure and environmental degradation 
(Mitter/Wolle 1990:30). 
 Popular awareness of deteriorating economic performance and social 
conditions contrasted with official reports of relentless progress. ‘Workers’, 
reported the Stasi, paraphrasing a popular grievance (ZAIG 5353), ‘are being fed 
false promises of a perfect world, which doesn’t exist in reality.’ The same 
document reports that the economic figures published each month had 
‘increasingly and massively [become] the butt of ironic, dismissive remarks’. 
Similarly, another Stasi document (Grix 1998:133) warned that ‘[t]he SED 
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effectively provoked reactions from citizens by publishing positive reports on the 
state of the economy which stood in stark contrast to the personal hands-on 
everyday experience of workers’. By the mid-1980s even official sources were 
beginning to refer to ‘the contradiction between official ideology and the 
underlying empirical societal experience’ (Grunenberg 1990:71). 
 Although the warnings contained in Stasi reports refer largely to the 
‘mood’ amongst workers and consumers, the late 1980s also witnessed growing 
unrest in workplaces. Documents from the FDGB archive show a 20% increase in 
‘extraordinary occurrences’, such as ‘mass illness’ and ‘provocative activities’, 
reported by ‘union’ branches between 1986 and 1988. FDGB membership figures, 
which had risen steadily for decades, now began to decline, due largely to a 
‘rising trend of resignations’. 
 
Economic Policy Dilemmas 
 
Among the policy problems that were caused by economic and social crisis, two 
issues came to dominate. The first was that, with decreasing surplus product but 
robust demand for funds (from workers for improved living standards, from 
managers for investment, and from international banks for debt servicing), cuts 
would have to be made. But where should the axe fall? In 1988, Schürer 
proposed candidates for sacrifice, including investment in microelectronics, and 
the security forces. The latter had grown considerably since the 1970s and now 
consumed some 10% of national income (Przybylski 1992:208). A further 
possibility, Schürer suggested, was to cut consumer goods subsidies. This would 
offer an inflationary solution to the burgeoning monetary overhang, and could 
lower the growth rates of the budget deficit and of business taxation. 
 However, powerful constituencies backed the status quo in each of these 
areas. Cutting subsidies threatened the ‘socialist’ legitimacy of the Honecker 
regime, particularly given that average personal purchasing power had declined 
to only 30% of the West German level, or only 7% at trade exchange rate 
comparison (Der Spiegel 17.6.96). Thanks largely to opposition from Honecker 
and Mittag, Schürer’s suggestions were rejected (Roesler 1993:569). However, 
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more moderate cuts in the budget for consumer subsidies and, of two billion 
Marks, for the security services were adopted by the Politbüro later in 1988. 
Significantly, even these relatively cautious measures led, ‘for the first time in the 
Honecker era’, to ‘open resistance’ from ministers, seven of whom refused to 
accept the Politbüro’s decision (Hertle 1996a:72). 
 The second field of policy dilemmas was geo-economic strategy. Trade 
with DMEs continued to outpace trade with Comecon. However, as can be seen 
from table 5.19, the balance declined precipitously from 1985. This was 
particularly marked vis-à-vis the FRG, with exports falling by ten percent in 1986 
and again in 1987 (Table 5.20). 
 
Table 5.19 Trade with DMEs as per cent of total, and trade balance with DMEs; 
(in VM, from Statistisches Jahrbuch (1990)). 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Imports 40 42 47 51 53 
Exports 48 45 44 46 49 
Balance 19,993 4,760 -5,433 -9,482 -8,398 
 
Table 5.20 Average annual GDR-FRG balance of trade; (million VM, from Nakath 
1994:44). 
1981-2 1983-4 1985-6 1987-8 1989 
+367 +634 -438 -583 -898 
 
 With inter-German trade relations about to become utterly strangled by 
the GDR’s hard-currency scarcity, a section of the nomenklatura attempted to 
promote further development of direct cooperation with Western business and 
government. Beil, for example, instructed Kombinat general directors to ‘prepare, 
and, if possible, conclude cooperation agreements with western firms’ (Falkner 
1994:27). However, this course was fraught with difficulties, not least the fact 
that, in the words of one general director (Falkner 1994:28), ‘there was obviously 
no unitary position in the government regarding external economic strategy’. 
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Similar problems confronted a plan proposed by Bavarian business leaders and 
politicians for the establishment of ‘special economic zones’ in Thuringia and 
Saxony. Although sections of the economic administration treated the proposal 
favourably, it foundered on what Nitz (1995:137) describes as the ‘sheer terror’ in 
Mittag’s department that a section of the economy might ‘slip out of the Centre’s 
control’. Other comparable suggestions, Nitz reports (1995:142), were objected to 
on the basis of a kindred terror, namely that ‘it was more doubtful than ever 
whether the GDR economy would be able to cope with the new dimension of 
competition’. Quite simply, as two senior functionaries put it (Meier/Richter 
interview), ‘in principle we recognized that we needed the world market, hard 
currency, opening up and cooperation. But we also knew that such a course would 
lead to losses’. 
 A final example of the critical nature of policy dilemmas in the late 1980s 
is that small but significant numbers of SED officials and leaders even began to 
discuss the possibility of major political concessions to, or even political 
confederation with, the FRG. As Schürer recalls (1992b:142), apart from the FRG, 
the GDR would ‘not be able to find anyone else to take twenty billion dollars of 
debts off our hands’. Already by 1985 Schalck seems to have voiced such ideas to 
his western friends (P-F Koch 1992:84). In 1987 Herbert Häber, a senior SED 
member and FRG expert, presented a paper to the Politbüro. He argued that the 
GDR would have no chance of survival if Bonn were to cut transfers, that the 
only chance of economic rationalization lay through integration with western 
business, and for that to happen, major political concessions would be necessary 
(P-F Koch 1994:394). Similar ideas began to be considered as serious long-term 
possibilities by many second-row functionaries and even, conceivably, by Mittag 
and Krenz (Nitz 1995:67; Dennis 1993:24). Such discussions were speculative, and 
the Politbüro’s response to Häber’s paper was dismissive. Nevertheless, that they 
occurred at all testifies to a growing awareness that radical change may be 
unavoidable. 
 
The Threat of Reform 
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If both economy and economic policy faced severe crisis from 1987 onwards, 
these were insignificant challenges compared to the threat posed by Glasnost and 
Perestroika. The SED’s dependence on the USSR, it is worth recalling, was 
absolute. Its core myths centred on the CPSU’s heroic role in world history. Its 
leadership may at times have bucked at Moscow’s interference in domestic 
affairs, but never could it forget its existential reliance on Soviet imperial power 
and on the will of the Kremlin to use it. Gorbachev’s reforms thus threatened to 
destabilize and delegitimize the GDR regime. They undermined the confidence 
and coherence of the SED leadership, committed as it was to the orthodox status 
quo. Its stable friend and ally was becoming a menace. 
 The greatest hazard came from geopolitical reform. Already in the early 
1980s, Soviet hegemony had begun to look shaky, in part due to increasing 
assertiveness of the Eastern European regimes, including East Germany’s 
friendlier Westpolitik. Gorbachev’s distinctive contribution, from late 1986, was to 
begin to reduce the Soviet military presence in Eastern Europe and to soften, 
then annul, the Brezhnev doctrine. From the mid-1980s a series of comments 
were made by top Soviet officials (Falin, Yakovlev, Portugalov, Dashichev, 
Schevardnadze) to the effect that the modalities of German division were up for 
discussion within a revamped ‘common European home’. More ominously for 
Honecker, when he asked Gorbachev (in 1986) to discipline the poet 
Yevtuschenko for advocating German unification, the latter refused 
(Küchenmeister 1993:19). From then on, Honecker’s attitude to his Soviet 
counterpart was implacably hostile. 
 If these early portents were verbal, practical steps soon followed, notably 
Gorbachev’s announcement, in 1988, of a major unilateral reduction in Soviet 
forces in Eastern Europe. In the first half of 1989 Moscow supported, or at least 
tolerated, a series of remarkable political and geopolitical shifts in Hungary and 
Poland, described at the time by Honecker (Hertle 1996a:92) as ‘the visibly 
accelerating erosion of socialist power, achievements, and values’. In January, 
non-Communist parties were legalized in Hungary. In February, round table 
talks began in Poland. In April, the Hungarian Politbüro resigned en masse. In 
May, Budapest, in the context of mounting debt and a succession of financial 
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sweeteners from Bonn, cut the iron curtain (Modrow 1991:24; The Fall of the Wall 
1994). In June, the Polish Communist Party rescinded its power, following one of 
the most extraordinary election results in history. In the same month, the Soviet 
Commander of Land Forces declared that German unification was a matter for 
Germans, and that the USSR would not oppose it (Plock 1993:159). 
 The threat to the SED leadership of Moscow’s geopolitical reforms was 
clear. East Germany owed its existence to its integration into a military and 
economic ‘bloc’, defined according to Cold War political and ideological 
faultlines. Gorbachev promoted or tolerated the unravelling of Comecon, the 
Warsaw Pact and the economic and political structures that defined the STEs as 
distinct. This inevitably brought the prospect of undermining East Germany as a 
sovereign entity. 
 The Kremlin’s new-found warmth towards the West, moreover, put 
Berlin’s ‘special relationship’ with Bonn in the shade, much to the dismay of 
many SED members (Meinel/Wernicke 1990:94). Whereas in 1985 Gorbachev’s 
relationship to Bonn had been distinctly cool, by 1987 it had improved 
immensely. Inter-German détente reached its climax with Honecker’s red carpet 
treatment on his official visit to the FRG in 1987. From then on, however, Berlin 
was sidelined into an envious cameo role, while the Bonn-Moscow axis 
blossomed. The GDR had been a pioneer of Soviet Bloc Westpolitik; now it lagged 
almost at the rear. Honecker’s trip was his last foreign policy initiative that 
evinced even a modicum of self-assurance and success. 
 Moscow’s new melodies put the SED-regime in a quandary. To reform 
brought the danger of splits even worse than those that currently blighted the 
CPSU, and could catalyze domestic upheaval or worse. Given the politicized 
nature of surplus extraction, the centralization of the apparati of exploitation and 
oppression, and the weakness of ‘economic’ disciplining mechanisms, the 
nomenklatura’s unity and cohesion was of special importance to political stability. 
The spectre of Party splits and social upheavals haunted the defenders of 
orthodoxy. GDR officials were thus ever keen to remind the domestic audience 
as well as the Kremlin that ‘reforms in East Germany could lead to an 
uncontrollable situation which the Soviet Union would be the first to regret’ 
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(Financial Times 3.6.88). But not to reform entailed a cool relationship with the 
SED’s political and ideological Godfather. The resulting tensions between Berlin 
and Moscow further undermined the self-confidence of the nomenklatura. 
Honecker’s prestige cannot have been helped by comments, attributed to Soviet 
officials, that he ‘may soon be a candidate for retirement’ (Financial Times 3.6.88). 
One senior SED member even worried that the Honecker-Gorbachev hostility 
was placing his country in an unwinnable ‘war on two fronts’ 
(Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:171). 
 Moscow’s reforms gave the green light to reformist thinking in the SED. 
‘From about 1986’, write Mitter and Wolle (1993:509), ‘there were powerful 
rumblings amongst the SED rank and file’. Stasi documents confirm this, 
reporting that many SED members greeted Gorbachev’s identification of 
problems ‘which we have in East Germany too’, such as ‘varnishing the truth’ 
and ‘poor labour discipline’ (ZAIG 4205). Some began to discuss reform plans, in 
preparation for ‘when an East German Gorbachev arrives’ (Kessler interview). 
Second-row functionaries began to promulgate concepts of market reform (Nitz 
1995; Meier/Richter interview). The obverse of the reformism of such groups 
was a decrease in their confidence in, and an increasing propensity to contradict, 
the leadership (e.g. Nitz 1995). The most dramatic example of the latter came 
with the banning of the Soviet journal Sputnik in November 1988, which 
provoked hundreds of official protests by local party organizations and even 
SED functionaries (Brown 1991:143).179 1988 saw a record number of Party 
disciplinary hearings (23,000), and a very high number of ‘Party punishments’. 
 Even some prominent SED members began to push against the 
boundaries of orthodoxy. In 1988 Alfred Kosing published an article asserting 
that East Germany ‘does not stand outside of the great process of change taking 
place in all socialist countries’ (Süß 1989:178). In the same year Hans Modrow, a 
Politbüro member with close links to Moscow, published an article praising 
China’s market-friendly ‘special economic zones’. And in early 1989, Modrow’s 
friend Markus Wolf gave an interview praising Glasnost, followed by a novel 
                                                          
     179 The ban signalled the SED’s rejection of Glasnost, for the suppressed issue hinted at the KPD’s gross 
blunders in failing to defeat fascism. This questioning of the KPD’s antifascist credentials, by a Soviet 
publication, brought the two touchstones of SED legitimacy into explosive contradiction. 
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which referred to some of the ‘blind spots’ in the history of German 
Communism, such as the imprisonment by Stalin of German Communists, and 
the brutality of the Red Army’s invasion of Germany. Even Krenz, according to 
Die Andere (2/92), responded sympathetically to an argument for market reform 
proposed by his friend, the nuclear physicist Manfred von Ardenne, although 
insisted that Ardenne keep his views to himself! 
 If Moscow’s reforms brought fear and misery to Honecker and sections of 
his Party, they brought hope and expectation to wide swathes of the working 
and middle classes. They provided a concrete (and ironically kosher) inspiration 
for those who sought democratic change. The word ‘Glasnost’ and Gorbachev’s 
portrait materialized on walls, tee-shirts and badges. The Soviet embassy was 
‘deluged’ with ‘letters calling for glasnost to be applied in East Germany’ 
(Financial Times 3.6.88). Stasi documents describe how ‘broad layers of the 
population’ attentively followed all media reports on the USSR (Mitter/Wolle 
1993:504). Rudi Mittig warned his colleagues that ‘destructive discussions have 
markedly increased, often entailing open criticism of, and political demands 
upon, the SED,’ and which commonly refer to Glasnost and Perestroika (ZAIG 
2828). The ban of Sputnik provoked some two hundred thousand letters of 
protest and a plethora of other forms of protest (Wielgohs/Schulz 1990; Stephan 
1994:56). Party members and non-members were equally outraged, observed the 
Stasi (Klein 1995:137-8). Most worrying of all, several protest strikes in the giant 
‘Leuna’ works occurred, with workers demanding an explanation for the ban 
from SED officials (Rüddenklau 1992:196). 
 By Spring 1989 the popular mood was described by Stefan Heym 
(1990:223), not inaccurately, as ‘waiting for perestroika’. 
 
 
‘A thoroughgoing "anti" mood’ 
 
The transformation of the CPSU encouraged the politicization of discontent in 
East Germany, with Gorbachev’s reforms effectively legitimating critique and 
delegitimating SED orthodoxy. ‘Material’ grievances increasingly took on a 
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political edge. Stasi documents (e.g. ZAIG 5352) reported increasing scepticism 
amongst the populace that social and economic problems could be solved within 
a socialist framework, and a decreasing faith in state functionaries (Mitter/Wolle 
1990:30). In the workplaces, distrust of SED members remained strong 
(Anonymous 1981:29), while the decrepit nature of the production process and 
stagnation of living standards lent the heroic rituals of socialist competition an 
increasingly farcical edge (Kopstein 1997:164-5). Questions concerning the 
porosity of the Wall, and especially the right to travel, became a chief focus of 
popular attention. In connection with Honecker’s visit to the FRG, Stasi 
documents reported (Nakath/Stephan 1996:339), young people asked dangerous 
questions such as ‘do we still need a Feindbild [enemy-image]?’ and ‘is the Wall 
still necessary?’ In this period, opinion surveys show marked declines in young 
East Germans’ identification with Party and State (Tables 5.21, 5.22). 
 
Table 5.21 Identification with GDR (per cent responding ‘strong’; from Friedrich 
1990:30). 






Apprentices 41 57 40 46 51 48 28 18  
Young 
workers 
37 53 38 55 57 46 32 19  





Table 5.22 Identification with SED (per cent responding ‘strong’; from Friedrich 
1990:29). 




1970 24 23 32 87 
1986 26 26 45 81 
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1989 (spring) 10 21 24 48 
 
 By 1988 at the latest, SED leaders were being forced to recognize that 
popular grumblings and criticisms were ‘coalescing into a thoroughgoing "anti" 
mood’ (Simon 1990:114). The head of an opinion surveillance institute sent a 
report to Krenz which painted a stark picture of a popular mood characterized 
by ‘declining optimism in the future’ and ‘increasing doubts about the 
superiority of the socialist system’ (Stephan 1994:39-53). The SED’s refusal to 




Following something of a slump in the mid-1980s, oppositional activity increased 
significantly from 1987. Estimated numbers of active oppositionists rose from 
several thousand to ten or even twenty thousand. Identifying the causes of this 
change is inevitably somewhat speculative. Likely contributing factors included 
the evidently increasing difficulties faced by the SED leadership; the implicit 
challenge to SED orthodoxy posed by the Kremlin’s reforms; the crumbling of 
the Brezhnev doctrine, and the gradual fragmentation of Comecon and Warsaw 
Pact; the pervasive ‘"anti" mood’; and the regime’s apparent inability or 
unwillingness to ruthlessly crush opposition.180 Evidence from interviews with 
oppositionists and other critical spirits (Bert, Antje, Mario, Gabi, Steff) suggests 
that these factors underlay a distinct diminution of fear of repression, a 
revitalization of hope that some sort of democratic change may occur, and 
sharpened irritation at the regime’s intransigence. If these interviews reflect 
general changes, they suggest that many critical individuals gained confidence to 
participate in oppositional activity with greater endeavour and risk. 
 In 1987-8 two major developments occurred. The first was that opposition 
activity began to receive greater levels of popular support. An early sign of this 
was the splendid popular reception given to oppositionists who participated — 
                                                          
     180 The latter was presumably due to the fear of sparking resistance, and perhaps also to the strain such a 
course would place on Berlin-Bonn relations (Minnerup 1989:73). 
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independently — in a state-sanctioned peace march, as they entered Berlin 
(Wollenberger 1992:82). Shortly afterwards, the Stasi forced entry into a leading 
centre of opposition, the ‘Environmental Library’ in a Berlin church building, 
hoping to catch oppositionists red-handed in the production of the only major 
non-church samizdat publication, ‘Grenzfall’. Although the Environmental 
Library had always been harassed by the authorities, this incident evoked shock, 
as no church building had been forcibly entered since the 1950s.181 A meeting 
was quickly called, to which around two hundred came. It organized a 
permanent vigil to demand the release of those arrested in the raid, and an end 
to repression (Frankfurter Rundschau 5.1.88). The vigil received considerable 
support, and was even supplied with food and drink, gratis, by neighbouring 
residents and shopkeepers. Thanks to such support, and in the face of efforts by 
the Church to sabotage the vigil, the immediate aim of forcing the release of 
prisoners succeeded. The campaign centre, however, continued to function even 
after its victory. Moreover, the publicity surrounding the conflict led, in 
Neubert’s words (1998:696), ‘to a perfect wave of openings of similar institutions’ 
in at least seventeen other cities, most of which began to function as opposition 
communication centres. 
 Only weeks later the state hit back, arresting several leading 
oppositionists and even charging some with treason. Once again the reaction was 
huge. ‘For the third time in four days’ wrote the Financial Times (3.2.88), ‘tens of 
thousands of largely non-religious East Germans have squeezed into normally 
empty Protestant churches in a powerful display of solidarity’. In the Leipzig 
Nikolaikirche, traditional Monday evening weekly ‘peace prayers’, first organized 
in 1982 to protest the stationing of new missiles by Warsaw Pact and NATO, 
were converted into solidarity services.182 Solidarity groups were founded in 
around forty towns, drawing in layers beyond the ranks of the grassroots groups 
and church. Petitions of solidarity were circulated in workplaces, prompting 
intense concern at FDGB headquarters. Reports spread that some workers were 
                                                          
     181 An additional contributing factor to the blundering character of the operation was lack of coordination 
between SED and Stasi (Wilkening 1990:59). 
     182 Church leaders attempted, in vain, to stop them (Wagner 1994). 
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donating a whole months salary (ca. 900 Marks). In all, some 30,000 people 
participated in the campaign and around 35,000 Marks were collected (Wolfram 
1995). Although the prisoners were not released into the GDR, as demanded by 
campaigners, their (temporary) banishment to the West only served to encourage 
the applicants movement, as senior SED functionaries were forced to admit 
(Stephan 1994:32). Moreover, the sheer scale of the protests marked a huge step 
forward for oppositionists. It enabled them to perceive at last that, in Neubert’s 
words (1998:699), ‘the mobilization of citizens was achievable’. As Helena Flam 
has observed (1997:152), it was only now, through these collective protests and 
solidarity actions, that a solidaristic collective identity really took root amongst 
oppositionists, supplanting the more individualistic attitudes of the preceding 
period. 
 The second advance involved the formation of emigration applicants into 
a real movement and, in Leipzig at least, the cultivation of what the regime 
feared most; cooperation between applicants and oppositionists (Eisenfeld 
1995:210). As their numbers grew, the oppression of applicants became, 
alongside the environment, the dominant topic of discussion in grassroots 
church groups. In 1987, applicants formed a ‘Citizens’ Rights’ group, which 
(eventually) affiliated to an opposition group, the IFM. Before long it had 
attracted 200 members and began to spread nationwide, organizing protests in 
several cities. Applicants were making their presence felt as the vanguard of 
public protest. The real breakthrough occurred in Leipzig, on the back of the 
resuscitated weekly ‘peace prayers’. According to Wagner (1994:30), ‘the 
"emigrants" recognized the potential of the peace prayers for the pursuit of their 
interests. They streamed in their hundreds into the Nikolaikirche.’ Attendance 
sometimes exceeded nine hundred. The authorities, Wagner continues, ‘reacted 
hysterically, i.e. they were enraged, and complained about the meetings to the 
church leaders, but found no effective means to assert themselves.’ Church 
leaders were equally frustrated, for those attending the ‘prayers’ were becoming 
increasingly and outspokenly critical of their servile stance. 
 The applicants’ defiance in the face of Church and State authorities 
encouraged the formation of oppositional groups in Leipzig, many of which 
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contained oppositionists and applicants (Besier/Wolf 1991:556). From March 
1988, both groups began unite in public demonstrations which ‘spontaneously’ 
emerged from the peace prayers. These attempted to raise a variety of issues, 
including the demand of the right to emigrate, and opposition to the oppression 
of applicants (Wagner 1994:142-3). The example of Leipzig began to catch on 
elsewhere. ‘Peace prayers’ across the country began to function as contact points 
and arenas for political discussion, both for oppositionists and applicants 
(Hildebrandt/Thomas 1990:32). 
 This upward curve of opposition activity continued throughout the first 
half of 1989. Four flashpoints deserve special mention. 
 Firstly, the applicants movement grew bolder still. From January, as a 
consequence of CSCE negotiations and ‘a wave of criticism in East Germany’ 
(Hertle 1996a:89), the process of application was liberalized. In the first half of the 
year, more exits were permitted than in any of the previous four years. However, 
applicants also increasingly took their protest onto the streets, and a soaring 
number began to occupy Western embassies (Eisenfeld 1995:208). Secondly, the 
Church authorities in Leipzig, assisted by the state, attempted to enforce a 
depoliticization of the peace prayers. They were decisively beaten, in February, 
following months of what Neubert describes (1998:786) as ‘tumult and protest’, 
including petitions and weekly demonstrations of up to five hundred people. 
From then on the ‘prayers’ were consistently political, airing criticism over 
themes such as repression in Czechoslovakia, the education system, 
conscientious objection, human rights, and the local elections. Thirdly, the local 
elections in May were themselves a flashpoint. The vote was relatively low. 
Amongst workers, the Stasi estimated (ZAIG 5352), only around 50% voted, but 
in some districts this figure fell to 25%. Stasi reports complained that even 
members of the ‘bloc parties’ were showing reluctance to participate in the 
organization of the elections, on the grounds that they suspected official 
gerrymandering (Sélitrenny/Weichert 1991:218). Oppositionists called for a 
boycott, or a ‘no’ vote. They distributed leaflets, painted graffiti and asked 
questions at hustings (Rüddenklau 1992). Suspecting that many voters would 
reject the official candidates and that results would be faked, they organized to 
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oversee the vote in as many polling stations as possible.183 In some districts they 
counted at least 10% ‘no’ votes, only to hear that the official result was virtually 
100% ‘yes’. In some places direct evidence of gerrymandering was observed. 
Activists and their contacts were outraged. In Berlin demonstrations were called 
on the seventh day of every month to protest the electoral farce.184 Although 
most of these were broken up by the security forces numbers attending, largely 
emigration-applicants, steadily grew, until on September 7, at least two hundred 
demonstrated.185 In Leipzig, demonstrations were more successful, with up to 
1,000 present. These activities surrounding the election farce became widely 
known, in part through western media. The regime was severely embarrassed. 
Wider layers of the population became aware of the existence and success of 
oppositionists. In Meuschel’s words (Glaessner 1991a:47), with the opposition’s 
‘call for election boycott, they broke out of a marginal status. The SED’s obvious 
gerrymandering in turn contributed to the disintegration of loyalty’. ‘In this 
sense’, he adds, the opposition groups ‘did contribute decisively to the 
revolutionary uprising.’ 
 Finally, protests flared over the butchery at Tiananmen Square. Given the 
SED’s brazen support for the massacre, these protests were particularly poignant 
(cf. Gabi Horn interview). Dozens of small public protests occurred, including 
collective drumming and marches to the Chinese embassy. The number of critical 
letters to newspapers shot up (Wielgohs/Schulz 1990), while several groups of 
workers wrote collective protest letters to the Chinese ambassador (FDGB 
archive). 
 The two years preceding the revolution witnessed an upward curve of 
oppositional activity. This involved increasing numbers, greater public defiance 
and the confidence to emerge from behind church walls and to challenge the 
Church hierarchy. The opposition was gradually transformed from grassroots 
groups focused on single-issues into a better organized and more overtly 
                                                          
     183 This had already occurred in 1988, but on a far smaller scale. 
     184 Barred from publicizing dates for protests, calendar regularities came to be invested with a mobilizing 
function. 
     185 On June 7 over one hundred protestors were taken by police for questioning. A protest meeting held 
the next day, in the Gethsemane church, attracted over 1,500 (Hildebrandt/Thomas 1990:28). 
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political opposition which was capable of organizing protest over a variety of 
issues in succession. The 1987-8 protests and the May election supervision in 
particular, ‘generated a measure of trans-group solidarity and the capacity to act’ 
which boosted the confidence of those who sought to found or organize overt 
oppositional associations (Wielgohs/Johnson 1997:347). 
 By June 1989, Stefan Heym described the situation thus: ‘Something is 
moving. Something is breaking through. The people here won’t take no for an 
answer’ (The Guardian 17.6.89). 
 
Nomenklatura Confidence Ebbs 
 
The structural contradictions which have been the guiding theme of this and the 
previous chapter — profitability decline, the STEs’ relative economic decline and 
the weakening of the USSR vis-à-vis West Germany — impacted on the 
behaviour, thinking, and confidence on the makers and executors of policy, and 
their supporters, whether CC members, enterprise managers, SED members or 
security service personnel. Their aims became more limited and increasingly 
difficult to achieve; their decisions more difficult to justify and more prone to 
critique. 
 The SED’s cohesion and self-confidence did not erode nearly as sharply as 
its Polish counterpart (cf. Barker 1990). However, from the mid-1970s and 
especially from the mid-1980s symptoms of deteriorating confidence appeared at 
all levels of the political, economic and Party apparati. In the 1960s leaders had 
exuded confidence. Ulbricht could even assert (Kopstein 1997:67) that the GDR 
could ‘succeed politically’ by overtaking its Western rivals ‘on the economic 
front’. By contrast, the 1980s witnessed widespread demoralization. In the words 
of one functionary, overheard in a Stasi sauna (Wolf 1998:318), a mood of 
‘frustration with the aging and unresponsive leadership in Moscow and East 
Berlin’ grew. From the mid-1980s, Kronisch and Lapp report (1992:129), many 
managers developed a decidedly sceptical and critical attitude. Even general 
directors were, in private, scathing of the SED leadership (Meier/Richter 
interview). As for the SED grassroots, Jens Reich has observed that, whereas in 
 209 
the 1950s members would intervene vigorously in workplace political 
discussions, by the 1980s they were more likely to try to change the subject 
(Reich 1990:83).186 Particular cases of nomenklatura demoralization may be traced 
to the increasing problems in suppressing emigration and opposition 
movements. Thus, Neubert (1998:669) reports that the defiance of the applicants’ 
movement engendered ‘helplessness and resignation [amongst] even the most 
hardened of functionaries’. More frequently, demoralization can be traced to 
economic problems. For instance, Stasi files (ZAIG 5352) report that consumer 
goods shortages had resulted in ‘increasing signs of "fatigue symptoms" and 
sheer resignation amongst leading cadre and employees in the retail sector’. 
Similar testimonies come from economic functionaries (Zimmermann/Schütt 
1994:38). Economic problems, moreover, spawned divisions amongst 
policymakers which further undermined morale. A classic example is the 
aforementioned Mittag-Schürer clash, which prompted the Stasi’s economic unit 
to warn of ‘how demoralizing an effect Mittag’s attack was exerting on economic 
debate within Party ranks’ (Maier 1997:72; Meier/Richter interview). 
 Above all it was the fracturing of the Soviet Bloc and Moscow’s reforms 
which undermined confidence. Gorbachev increasingly came to symbolize not 
only the worrying decline of Soviet power but also, by contrast, a resolve and 
initiative that the SED leadership blatantly lacked. Although only a small part of 
the nomenklatura clearly supported the direction of Gorbachev’s reforms, many 
believed that the fact that he advocated change was an example that should be 
applauded. The few who believed that the status quo was the best there could be 
were increasingly undermined as the walls it rested on cracked and crumbled.187 
 From 1987 the steadfastness and loyalty of state-bearing groups was 
subjected to severe strain. Within the ruling class respect for the leadership 
disintegrated further (Meier/Richter interview). A typical remark is that of the 
Minister of Culture (Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:126): 
                                                          
     186 Stasi reports on the evasive behaviour of SED functionaries when confronted with criticism in the 
workplace confirm this (ZAIG 5353). 
     187 Ironically, according to Meier and Richter (interview), it was often those who perceived the true extent 




 When Gorbachev arrived, my hopes rose once again. But the 
attitude of the SED leadership shattered my last illusions. [...] I said 
to my PA: Hermann, now the big catastrophe is about to begin; 
now we’re missing the last opportunity. We could have jumped on 
board this train, but from now on we’ll only be seeing the red lights 
go by. 
 
A mood of panic began to infiltrate the lobbies and offices of the nomenklatura 
(Simon 1990). In February 1988 Mielke summoned his generals to a crisis meeting 
at which he warned that failure in the economic and ‘scientific-technical’ fields 
was threatening the GDR’s ‘defence capabilities’ and could result in ‘extremely 
transformed living conditions’ (Koch 1994:393). A month later Jürgen Kuczynski, 
the ‘Nestor of GDR social sciences’ (Cerny 1992:260), wrote in his diary (1991:189) 
that ‘a chasm between leadership and masses is opening up absolutely 
everywhere — in both civilian and military populations. If the leadership does 
not change course soon, a serious situation could arise.’ The leadership itself was 
aware of the dangers. During a discussion of economic crisis in 1988 
(Hertle/Stephan 1997:37), Mittag warned that ‘a situation has arrived where it 
could all capsize.’ By June 1989 signs of, if not disloyalty, then at least 
unreliability on the part of officials were widespread. The ‘agitation commission’ 
complained of ‘indiscipline’ amongst media employees (Simon 1990:123). The 
‘workplace militias’ (BKGs) were showing signs of ‘dissolution’ (Neubert 
1998:788). The army reported that it was becoming increasingly difficult to 
recruit officers. Amongst Stasi officials levels of ‘unreliability’, early retirement 
and nervous breakdowns grew (Die Andere 39/1991; Riecker 1990). Some Stasi 
officers (Wilkening 1990:56) have expressed particular annoyance that the SED 
leadership sought to displace long-term political problems onto the Stasi, for 
short-term ‘administrative, repressive’ solutions. 
 
Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t 
 
The habitual formulae of rule no longer seemed to work. Tactics of harsh 
repression and liberal concessions were both tending to excite stronger protests 
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and emigration movements. Westpolitik was in crisis, as the GDR failed to 
consolidate its status as favoured partner of DMEs, but its dependence on the 
West was greater than ever. The SED-state was wedded to a Great Power whose 
leader wanted to maintain its Bloc, yet the logic of whose reforms hastened its 
dissolution.188 There was a widespread sense that ‘something must be done’, but 
no easy solution appeared. The great unspoken question was whether to 
introduce sweeping reforms or to hold firm. Particularly after perestroika, there 
was growing support in the nomenklatura for market reforms, but it was 
relatively diffuse, with no clear concepts, and never became manifested in an 
organized reform wing of the SED. Gregor Gysi, a reform-minded functionary, 
later admitted (in Rüddenklau 1992:283) that ‘we did not see ourselves as an 
opposition within the Party.’ SED reformers were conspicuous by their absence 
and timidity. As far as LDPD leader Gerlach could recall, no reformist SED 
member ‘had, to my knowledge, fought for a change of course in the Honecker 
period’ (1991:296). There was not even any organized public declaration by SED 
reformists until extremely late in the day, in November 1989, when Michael Brie 
and others at the Humboldt University wrote to the Central Committee 
demanding democratic reforms in Party, polity and economy. 
 With hindsight many commentators have criticized the resistance to 
reform as a ‘policy failure’. But this ignores the entrenched nature of the 
contradictions involved: the ever narrowing room for manoeuvre of a 
nomenklatura caught between the imperative to massive investment and the 
stubborn strength of the working class, and between the imperative to open 
further to the world market and the fear of its own demise. It is also to ignore the 
dangers of liberalization. The crises and transformations of 1953, 1956 and 1968 
had instilled a deep fear of major reform initiatives and the inner-Party divisions 
that they entail, not least on the dangerous question of relations with the FRG. As 
one Politbüro member recalled, (Hertle/Stephan 1997:325), the ‘decisive brake’ 
on reform was always ‘the spectre of splitting the Party’. The settlement of 1970-1 
had powerfully reaffirmed the principles of orthodoxy and stability. Despite 
                                                          
     188 Some East German Communists and West German pundits, unfamiliar with the concepts 
‘contradiction’ and ‘unintended consequences’, developed a stab-in-the-back legend about a Berlin-Moscow 
perestroikist conspiracy to dismantle the GDR (e.g. Reuth/Bönte 1993). 
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repeated crises the Honecker regime had managed to avoid major misfortunes, 
and the belief in its ability to at least muddle through was strong and 
widespread. The fear of reform, moreover, was strengthened by amassing signs 
of the failures of liberalization processes, whether under ‘hawks’ such as 
Jaruzelski or ‘doves’ such as Gorbachev. Few other STEs could offer a model to 
follow. Intransigent regimes, such as Romania, were mired in serious crisis, as 
were most reforming ones (Barker 1990; Brzezinski 1990; Harman/Zebrowski 
1988; Haynes 1988). And whereas liberalization threatened the erosion of SED 
power, turning towards autarky ran up against the constraints of economic 
relations. One can sympathize with Honecker’s dilemma. Though rejecting the 
path taken by Poland or Hungary, he recognized that (in Hertle 1996a:71), ‘nor 
can we go the Romanian way, the situation vis-à-vis the FRG will not allow that.’ 
Similarly, one can sympathize with Schürer’s disillusionment with liberalization 
(Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:185): ‘When Gorbachev appeared, truly hopeful 
political thoughts came to me. However, the longer perestroika went on, the more 
disappointed I became. For the country underwent economic regression and 
national fragmentation.’ 
 
An Autistic Outcome 
 
Schürer’s dilemma is symptomatic. Even those who believed that ‘something 
must be done’ could not answer the question ‘what?’ Consider, for example, this 
recollection by Politbüro member Lorenz (Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:154): 
 
 even I gradually came to realize that there was something wrong 
with our economic system, that fundamental changes would have 
to be made to our economic policy. But adequate conceptions were 
beyond me too. [...] 
 Especially since the mid-1980s there was no doubt that 
fundamental changes and reforms were necessary in the GDR. 
There was much discussion about this, say, with Egon Krenz and 
Werner Felfe. And yet at the end of the day we just kept our 
mouths shut, ultimately we had no plausible and comprehensive 
alternative — not even when it came to ousting Honecker. 
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Krenz, in the Politbüro’s crisis sitting of May 1989, similarly bemoaned the ‘lack 
of a clear conception for the way forward’ (Mittag 1991:323). 
 In paralysing objective circumstances the only path, it seemed, was to sit 
tight and concentrate on questions of immediate security. In Kopstein’s words 
(1997:104), ‘[t]he SED elite believed that it faced an extreme version of the 
Tocquevillian paradox: unpopular governments become unstable when they 
start to reform themselves.’ Though none may actually have read Tocqueville, 
‘their conversations in the final years reveal an intuitive understanding of their 
predicament. Reform seemed to be both necessary and unimaginable.’189 Those 
in charge held tighter and tighter to the certainties that had underpinned their 
survival thus far, becoming ever more demoralized the more their course led into 
the mire. One journalist (Kuppe 1989:722) captured the ‘Tocquevillian intuition’ 
in his description of an important Central Committee meeting in June 1989: ‘The 
message of the 8th CC plenum is the following: No experiments, or else the 
entire edifice of rule will start to crumble.’ 
 By this stage, the SED leadership’s conservatism was tending to the naive. 
Some hoped for a ‘biological solution’, that the Grim Reaper would clear the way 
for (hitherto silent) ranks of reformists to take over before it was too late.190 
Some, from the early 1980s, reacted dogmatically and autistically to their 
worsening predicament. They shut themselves off, disbelieved bad (in reality, 
true) news, surrounded themselves with admirers, invested their hopes in rigid 
discipline, and turned to the bottle.191 Schabowski has described the 
‘speechlessness’ and paralysis that afflicted SED leaders, who had no other 
choice but to ‘soldier on perversely, like a mammoth with rigor mortis’ (The Fall of 
the Wall 30.10.1994). CC member Günter Sieber describes his attitude to the 
world, even as late as December 1989, as characterized by ‘self-censorship’ 
(Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:228). Honecker tended to self-censorship too. In 1987, 
                                                          
     189 One would think that 1989 would confound those who interpret Tocqueville’s aphorism as a law. 
However, Kornai (1992:427) attempts to rescue such an interpretation by arguing that ‘the lack of internal 
liberalization was made up for by the external example of reform elsewhere.’ 
     190 Krenz allegedly held such hopes (Zimmermann/Schütt 1992:186). 
     191 The belief that all was well was in part sustained thanks to media censorship. As Marx put it (Fine 
1984:67), the government hears ‘only its own voice’, which it mistakes for that of the people, whose actual 
voice is suppressed. 
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for example, when passed (correct) information that Kremlin officials were 
seriously discussing the eventual possibility of releasing the GDR from the 
Warsaw Pact, he recalls (Nitz 1995:69), ‘we neither could nor wanted to believe 
such warnings’. On another occasion, he denied the existence of any sort of debt 
problem (Stephan 1994:205). In retrospect, the political autism he and his coterie 
displayed on the eve of the East German revolution seems astonishing, and 
resembles that of Tsar Nicholas on the eve of the February revolution (cf. Trotsky 
1980:53). However, its explanation lies not so much in the age of the SED leaders, 
as is often suggested, as in the intractable nature of the predicaments they faced. 
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Chapter Six: Scenting Opportunity, Mobilizing Protest 
Previous chapters have focused on structural contradictions, economic and 
political crises, and how these affect, and are interpreted by, different sections of 
the population. Here the focus shifts to the transformation of what some social 
movement theorists (e.g. Tarrow 1994) refer to as the ‘political opportunity 
structure’ in the summer and early autumn of 1989. The centre of concern is now 
less the tightening structural constraints upon regime behaviour, and more its 
strategy and tactics, as well as the manner in which individuals of the working 
and middle classes become conscious of systemic contradictions, scent expanding 
opportunities, and act to effect political change. The shift is from the causes to the 
drama of crisis — expanding ‘alternativity’, contestation between social forces, 
and the emergence of ‘movement entrepreneurs’ who attempt to organize and 
give ideological shape to protest, to promote particular strategies, define goals, 
and attempt to win popular support. 
 
The ‘Hungary Hole’ 
 
The weakening of Hungary’s section of the ‘iron curtain’ precipitated the crisis 
that led to the end of the GDR. Three main forces were directly involved. First, 
the emigrants themselves. Increasing numbers of East German holidaymakers 
spotted and seized the opportunity to depart. This was by no means a risk-free 
enterprise. They had to physically break through, and often received injuries at 
the hands of Hungarian security forces (Hertle 1996a:101). Others, in their 
hundreds, occupied West German embassies in Berlin, Budapest, Warsaw and 
Prague. As Oberschall points out (1996:110), this was an effective innovation in 
the ‘collective action repertoire’. 
 The second group of players was the Hungarian government and 
opposition. On May 2 the government began to dismantle the fortifications on its 
border with Austria. On July 21 it made a decision to stop deporting 
apprehended emigrants back to East Germany. Consequently, numbers of 
would-be emigrants in Hungary grew — including those occupying the West 
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German embassy. They became a permanent reminder of Hungary’s divided 
loyalties. On August 19 the head of government, Imre Poszgay, along with the 
West German parliamentarian (and friend of Strauss), Otto von Habsburg, 
organized a ‘border-picnic’ for East Germans. It provided the opportunity for a 
much publicized collective emigration, and, along with pressure from the liberal 
opposition, pushed the Hungarian reform process further towards its break with 
Berlin. By late August, as Stent describes (1998:86), 
 
 With conditions in the embassy becoming intolerable, and with 
10,000 East Germans wanting to emigrate having to be housed in 
temporary camps, Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn 
decided that this situation could not continue. Hungary and the 
GDR had signed a treaty obliging Hungary to repatriate any East 
German citizens who were trying to flee to the West. Horn decided 
that Hungary could no longer honor this treaty. West Germany 
had become Hungary’s major Western economic partner, had 
given it substantial credits, and had encouraged its reformist 
government. In a series of intense discussions between Hungarian 
and West German officials, especially Horn and Genscher, the two 
sides worked out an agreement whereby the Hungarians, in a 
move that was unprecedented in the history of the Warsaw Pact, 
would break their treaty with the GDR and allow the East Germans 
to leave for West Germany, with financial and transportation 
assistance from Bonn. 
 
On September 10, Hungary decided to formally open its borders to the West. All 
East Germans on its territory could now emigrate — to the exasperation of the 
SED leadership (Krenz 1990:169). This announcement set off a huge rush of 
applications for visas for ‘holidays’ in Hungary. On the 11th an unprecedented 
2,250 families applied, and in the following three days fully 15,000 emigrated 
(Table 6.1). 
 
Table 6.1 Numbers of emigrants (from Hirschman (1993:185)). 
March April May June July August September 
5,700 5,900 10,600 12,400 11,700 21,000 33,300 
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 The third actor was the West German ruling class. At one level Bonn 
attempted to maintain the Ostpolitik status quo. Thus, on July 23 a government 
minister broadcast a call for East Germans to stay in their country. Bonn, like 
Washington and London, closed its embassy in Berlin in order to discourage 
occupation by emigrants. However, the exodus radically destabilized the 
traditional, carefully calibrated, inter-German relationship. Despite the July 23 
appeal, West German officials, editors, and politicians energetically encouraged 
the exodus. 
 The SED leadership was not only confronted by these ‘class enemies’ that 
directly undermined its position. It also suffered from four major constraints on 
its room for manoeuvre. The most important was the Soviet ruling class. Despite 
TASS’s vociferous attacks on West German encouragement of emigration, 
Moscow did not back the SED. It expressly tolerated Budapest’s actions, 
effectively accepting the demise of the iron curtain. SED leaders desperately 
attempted to swing opinion in the Kremlin. Honecker flew to Moscow to attempt 
to mend fences with Gorbachev (Stent 1998:85). East German officials met with 
their Soviet counterparts to warn them of the catastrophic consequences for 
socialism and for the Warsaw Pact (Stephan 1994:127). But to no avail. 
 A second constraint which, according to Mittag (1991:45-6), was a major 
cause of the regime’s relative restraint, was the fear that either dramatic change 
or open repression might provoke a 1953-type uprising.192 This dread was fed by 
a rapidly mounting volume of reports describing heated political discussion 
breaking out in workplaces. For instance, when FDGB leader, ‘Dirty’ Harry 
Tisch, refused to speak with emigrants while on a trip to West Germany, 
thousands wrote in protest to the FDGB head office. 
 Third, the GDR’s hard currency debt-service ratio was ominously high. In 
September, Schürer, Schalck and Herta König penned a paper warning that 
balance of payments stability could only be rescued if exports were rapidly 
increased and if ‘credit lines of VM 8-10 billion actually can be secured’. This, 
they warned, inevitably entailed ‘a high degree of dependence on capitalist 
                                                          
     192 The most famous reference to this concern is Mielke’s question to colonel Dangriess on August 31 
(Mitter/Wolle 1990:125): ‘Is it the case that a June 17 will break out tomorrow?’ Dangriess’s smug reply was 
‘It won’t happen tomorrow, it won’t happen at all, that’s what we’re here for.’ 
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banks’ — especially the Japanese banks which owned over three quarters of GDR 
hard-currency debt (Przybylski 1992:212). Indeed, foreign banks were showing 
signs of concern for their profits. Because much East German debt was short 
term, this development was especially worrying. The general director of the 
Bank of Tokyo, for example, demanded in mid-September that the head of the 
State Bank present an assessment of how the exodus of so many young people 
would affect the GDR’s economic performance. The president of Crédit 
Commercial was expressing similar concerns (Przybylski 1992:75). Such banks 
normally display an aloof amorality concerning the political methods that 
regimes deploy to ensure the flow of interest payments — an apposite example is 
the rapid resumption of loans to China following the Tiananmen massacre. But 
in East Germany’s case, financial credibility ultimately depended upon Bonn’s 
goodwill. In this context, SED leaders felt continued solvency to be a very heavy 
constraint on domestic policy (e.g. Mittag 1991:29). In short, as Szabo avers 
(1992:15), ‘the GDR leadership was restrained in the severity of its response [to 
the exodus and protests] by the fear of the consequences for its economic 
relationship with the FRG.’ 
 Finally, the pillars of the regime began to crack. By early September signs 
of unreliability amongst the BKGs were appearing (Tetzner 1990:22). Dissent 
flourished amongst soldiers, particularly regarding prospects of domestic 
deployment of the army (Hertle 1996b:195). From August, the numbers of 
soldiers deserting increased dramatically (Friedrichsfelder Feuermelder, December 
1989). Several dozen army officers, including a colonel, joined the exodus. Even 
the Stasi was affected. Stasi officers were more aware than most of the depth of 
the crisis. Many were exasperated that their warnings of impending trouble were 
being ignored (Der Spiegel, 23.4.90). Elizabeth Pond concludes from her evidence 
(1993:125) that ‘[f]or all Stasi officers, then, the failure of the top leadership to act 
in response to the exodus of mid-1989 led above all to demoralization.’ 
 Demoralization and dissent swept through the SED. On August 31 a Stasi 
general complained (Mitter/Wolle 1990:127) that ‘how we imagine the Party 
should behave, going on the offensive [...], that is at present not taking place’. In 
September the Stasi reported a catastrophic situation in the SED. Members felt 
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overwhelmed by the flood of anger directed at the Party. The Stasi observed that 
many members shared the critical, even aggressive, tones of their non-Party 
fellows, and warned that ‘the trust of the people in the Party is declining 
constantly’ (Mitter/Wolle 1993:510). Many members felt unable or even 
unwilling to defend the line. At SED meetings even ‘[f]ull-time Party 
functionaries seem "helpless" in their arguments’ (Mitter/Wolle 1990:149). 
Members’ faith in the leadership was rapidly disappearing. Many were torn 
between their support for the system and criticism of their leaders. ‘Already now 
— they argue — the GDR is in a situation like the one just before the 
counterrevolutionary events of 17.6.1953’ reported the Stasi (Mitter/Wolle 
1990:204). SED higher education teachers (Wolle 1998:317) ‘are going into 
lectures and seminars with growing unease, because students are addressing 
politically sensitive topics ever more frequently, and are asking questions to 
which they cannot give adequate answers without calling the fundamental 
position of the Party into question.’ Resignations were rising rapidly — motives 
given centred on the regime’s failure to oversee the provision of a decent quality 
of life, and its failure to take problems seriously and to allow proper discussion 
of them in the media. Swathes of the Party grassroots shared the mass revulsion 
at their leadership’s attitude of ‘good-riddance’ to emigrants, and some even 
emigrated themselves. Even the Central Committee was not unaffected, with 
some of its members feeling ‘left in the lurch’ by the Politbüro (Krenz 1990:13). 
 
Loud Bark, Feeble Bite 
 
The SED leadership could not abolish the aforementioned forces and constraints. 
Diplomatic representations to Bonn, Budapest and Moscow were futile. No 
confident crisis-management strategy was developed. Instead its reaction to the 
exodus can be grouped under three headings: passive (confusion, complacency 
and denial); aggressive (demonization of emigrants and glorification of the status 
quo); and desperate administrative measures. 
 The dominant tenor until mid-August was passivity and denial. Privately, 
severe annoyance was expressed at what Honecker described as Hungary’s ‘slide 
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into the bourgeois camp’ (Stephan 1994:88). But outwardly, a stiff silence was 
maintained, as if in the hope that the crisis would resolve itself. Passivity resulted 
from a combination of the realistic insight into the fact that, in Heym’s words at 
the time (1990:237) the exodus ‘threatens to completely destroy the GDR’, and an 
arrogance and complacency derived from decades of uninterrupted rule, 
including the successful mastering of previous crises. Mittag, who was acting 
SED leader at the time, has been criticized — with hindsight — by Krenz for 
postponing any serious discussion of the crisis until late August (e.g. Krenz 
1990:31). At the time, however, Krenz himself was no less sanguine, and showed 
no inclination to return to Berlin from his three-week holiday. 
 As the exodus dragged on, denying the crisis became absurd. Apart from 
its political consequences, emigration aggravated economic problems. Although 
the numbers leaving were significantly lower than net emigration from many 
other countries (such as Eire), labour shortages were in East Germany were 
intrinsic and severe, and the effect therefore especially detrimental. As Mielke 
put it (Mitter/Wolle 1990:134): ‘[e]ven though they’re such useless riff-raff, the 
fact remains that labour-power is disappearing.’ In early September, SED leaders 
began to search for solutions. Given the constraints, these tended to be either 
utopian or counter-productive. An example of the former was Mielke’s insistence 
that ‘we have to produce more and earn more hard currency’ (Stephan 1994:124). 
Until early October, two main strategies were pursued. One was based upon 
vilification of the emigrants as an ‘enemy within’, duped by Western propaganda 
and best combated with ideological weapons. Thus Sindermann, in the Politbüro 
meeting of September 5 (Stephan 1994:122), asserted that ‘[t]his is about the 
growth of revanchism, neo-nazism, fascism. It is about a general attack on 
socialism. [...] It is also the effect of chauvinist propaganda about Germany and 
against the GDR. We must declare war against this ideology’. The East German 
media attacked the FRG in torrents of purple propaganda. Each day brought 
fantastic ‘news’ stories of Bonn’s dirty tactics — the seduction of East Germans 
through kidnapping and drugging, or even alleged shots fired by West Germans 
at an East German border village. The purpose of the propaganda campaign was 
to demonstrate the regime’s hawkish determination and sow fear. A further aim 
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was to remind SED members of the ‘class war’ taking place, as a precondition for 
‘mobilizing the Party’, which SED leaders believed to be essential to overcoming 
the crisis. 
 The second strategy was to seek to stem the haemorrhage with 
administrative sticking plasters. Major measures — such as stopping issuing 
visas to Hungary or closing the border to the CSSR — were ruled out, largely 
because they would, in the words of one Politbüro member (Stephan 1994:150) 
‘incite the mass of the population against us’. Instead, an assortment of piecemeal 
initiatives were taken, including the denial of visas to some applicants, and the 
drafting of extra customs officers to airports and borders. 
 Instead of galvanizing its supporters, the regime’s shrill rhetoric tended to 
expose its actual weakness — rather like an inebriated old man loudly 
proclaiming his fighting prowess to smirking bystanders. Impotent diplomatic 
appeals and half-hearted administrative remedies, as Ralf Ulrich describes 
(1990:20), ‘demonstrated to many East Germans the deep insecurity of the SED 
leadership and its inability to react to the situation’, and increased scepticism and 
demoralization amongst SED members. The force which the leadership hoped to 
mobilize was itself weakening rapidly. 
 Thus, the leadership’s strategy of attack as the best form of defence was 
ultimately counter-productive. In the absence of viable solutions, the emphasis 
was placed on the demonization of emigrants, glorification of ‘socialist 
achievements’, and exhortations to Party members.193 But the weakness of this 
strategy only served to further undermine the latter’s faith in their Party. The 
exodus, and the inability of the regime to prevent it, accelerated the decline in the 




Popular Conceptions of Emigration 
 
                                                          
     193 Neues Deutschland, for example, published countless articles instructing SED members on how to 
maintain a ‘firm standpoint’, and demanding that they display ‘unswerving loyalty to the Central 
Committee.’ 
 222 
The basic problem confronting the regime’s offensive strategy was that wide 
sections of the population sympathized to some extent with the emigrants, and 
extremely few perceived them as ‘brainwashed neo-fascists’. The Stasi’s 
investigations into the motives for emigration never mention ‘brainwashing’. 
Instead they list grievances that were shared by huge swathes of the working 
and middle classes.194 These included low wages and inflation; shortages and the 
poor quality of consumer goods; the freshness of food; the need to queue and 
search for vital goods; shortages of spare parts and long waiting times for 
repairs; and the crisis in the health service (Mitter/Wolle 1990:141-7; die 
tageszeitung 28.8.89). Amongst workers considering emigration, Stasi documents 
single out the poor ‘working climate’, thwarted promotion, and ‘troubled 
relations between managers and workers’. Workers’ grievances frequently 
evinced a class-political edge. Thus, the perceived ‘price explosion’ was widely 
seen as a means by which ‘flaws in economic policy are "ironed out" at the cost of 
the workers’ (Mitter/Wolle 1990:145). Bottlenecks and other problems hindering 
the work process were widely interpreted in class terms, as in this report 
(Mitter/Wolle 1990:144): 
 
 Failures and disruptions arising in the process of production have 
to be compensated for by additional physical exertion of the 
workers and also in part by risking blatant defiance of health and 
safety laws. There is a widespread opinion that the required 
increase in economic productivity will only be achieved at the cost 
of workers and Bauern.195 
 
Another focus for the grievances of would-be emigrants was the lack of 
possibilities for self-fulfilment, and for participation in social and political 
processes. The restriction on travel to the ‘non-socialist abroad’ was especially 
deplored, as were the limited educational and career prospects open to their 
children, and the lack of democratic opportunity to assert their ideas and 
interests (Lemke 1991:115).196 The latter grievance connected to a widespread 
                                                          
     194 For evidence, see documents in the Stasi and FDGB archives, also Eckelmann et al. (1990). 
     195 Bauer means, literally, peasant; here, ‘agricultural labourers’. 
     196 For example, ‘their own ideas and thoughts are not taken note of [...] they are not treated as mature 
citizens, who wish to make their own decisions about issues affecting their individual interests’ 
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criticism of the regime’s media policy, summed up in the complaint that ‘[r]eal 
life is the opposite of what the mass media shows’ (Mitter/Wolle 1990:146). In 
particular, the continual reporting of economic success against a backdrop of real 
crisis was reviled.197 The feeling was widespread that the privileges and isolation 
of the nomenklatura blinded them to the real situation, as evinced by the following 
quote: ‘[t]hose right at the top [...] have their luxury suites [but] don’t know how 
bad it is for those at the bottom (Zurück zu Deutschland 1990:261ff.). Fear and 
hatred of the apparati of repression, above all the Stasi itself, was a factor 
understated in reports compiled by the Stasi but abundant in those based on 
interviews with actual emigrants in the West. Finally, those considering 
emigration expressed not only an optimism that life would be better in the West, 
but a pessimism that significant improvements would occur in the GDR. 
 Stasi reports (e.g. Meinel/Wernicke 1990:133) indicate that emigrants’ 
grievances were generally taken seriously by the general public, and were 
perceived to be rooted in deep-seated domestic problems, rather than 
brainwashing by Bonn. Even before the summer exodus, the SED Central 
Committee was made aware of the fact that there was widespread sympathy for 
the desire to emigrate ‘even amongst Party members and FDGB functionaries’, 
and that the ‘indispensable broad atmosphere of opposition to this phenomenon 
does not yet exist’ (Stephan 1994:34). When the exodus swelled, nearly everyone, 
from the shop-floor to Mielke himself, had a good idea of the motives behind it, 
and a majority — perhaps two thirds of the population — expressed sympathy 
(Kuhn 1992:106). Even many of those who criticized the haste and chosen 
destination of the emigrants nevertheless empathized with their motives (e.g. 
Ramona interview). One can imagine the thoughts and emotions that arose when 
people read in the press that responsibility for the exodus was solely Bonn’s, and 
that domestic reality was nigh perfect. The exodus, therefore, did not simply 
reveal significant public disaffection with and rejection of the regime. It also 
                                                                                                                                                                         
(Mitter/Wolle 1990:146). 
     197 The contrast was especially stark during the summer and autumn of 1989. The media amplified its 
trumpeting of the GDR’s ‘achievements’. Typical of the desperate promotion of supposed success stories was 
a report in the Leipziger Volkszeitung of September 30, when the protest movement was about to achieve 
critical mass, that ‘[c]ountless factories have recently significantly improved their canteen service’ (Neues 
Forum Leipzig 1989:44). 
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functioned as a ‘signal’, as Susanne Lohmann has put it (1994:64), whose impact 
‘was all the stronger because these tourists [emigrants] were a fairly 




East Germany in this period was ‘seized’, in Jens Reich’s phrase (1990:71), by an 
‘emotional frenzy’. In Cornelia Matzke’s words (Philipsen 1993:71) ‘[t]here was 
an incredible atmosphere [...] a sort of depression, a feeling of being severely 
oppressed, a sense that all the things we had put up with and we had suffered 
could not go on much longer.’ The air was thick with questions. Would one’s 
friends return from holiday in Hungary? Would the exodus continue to swell? 
Would political change occur, and if so, how soon and in what way? There was 
considerable sadness, over friends, colleagues and relatives emigrating to the 
inaccessible West (e.g. Gabi Engelhardt interview). Fatalism was widespread, a 
sense that possibilities of reform were being missed, and that the regime would 
remain as intransigent as ever. There was fear, and a strong sense of foreboding. 
Few saw clearly the shape of the coming storm. But many were aware of a 
looming political emergency. Frequent were the references to previous crises, 
including 1961 but in particular the recent crackdown in China. Nobody needed 
reminding that the SED still had tough options available, from closing the 
borders (which was repeatedly rumoured to be imminent), to the widely 
dreaded ‘Tiananmen solution’. The SED’s pro-massacre propaganda in June had 
been intended as a warning, and was interpreted as such. 
 Resignation, sadness and fear were overlayered with rage, expectation 
and hope. Some were simply heartened by the opportunity to emigrate 
themselves. Many sympathized with the ‘refusal’ implicit in the emigrants’ 
stance. Their actions exemplified ‘passive resistance’ — a non-compliance with 
the ruling powers which implicitly challenged their legitimacy. As such, many 
thousands could identify with them. Other common forms of ‘refusal’ included 
refusing promotion at work because of the compromises entailed; refusing to join 
the FDJ or FDGB; refusing conscription into the army; refusing to perform certain 
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duties in the army; refusing to call ‘the Wall’ by its official title (‘antifascist 
protection wall’), and so on (cf. Ollie interview; Kowalczuk 1995). Thus, one 
interviewee, Andrea Vogt, recalls that she identified with the emigrants simply 
because they expressed in practice the equation ‘GDR = Shit’. Others admired 
them for the courage they displayed in breaking with their habits and 
surroundings. Many people perceived the regime’s inability to solve the crisis 
and rejoiced in its weakness (e.g. interviews with Ollie, Andrea, Antje). They 
privately cheered Budapest’s reforms and Moscow’s unwillingness to intervene, 
and congratulated the emigrants and embassy occupants for having successfully 
snookered the GDR government. 
 The regime’s intransigent and arrogant response to the exodus inspired 
fear, but also rage, and hopeful anticipation that something must change. The 
disintegration of the regime’s aura of inevitability and omnipotence threw 
questions concerning the future into a new light. By September the country was 
aflame with discussion about the exodus (Kuhn 1992:95). Stasi reports referred to 
‘open, massive and critical discussion’ in workplaces (Meinel/Wernicke 
1990:133). Such discussions, they warned (Wolle 1998:316), were ‘showing a 
growing tendency to place responsibility for the situation on the Party and state 
leadership, which is held to be incapable of solving the manifold problems.’ 
Already in the first half of 1989 signs of a politicization of grievances had been 
evident, notably a tendency for the problems of everyday life to be related to the 
reforms and dissolution of the Soviet Bloc (Meinel/Wernicke 1990:81,106). By 
September, this process of politicization was accelerating rapidly. Anger and 
discontent over personally experienced problems were increasingly related to 
criticisms of the social system and the effectiveness of the state leadership. As the 
changes in the USSR and Poland accelerated and began to elude the control of 
the ruling parties, and as the exodus surged, the coordinates and yardsticks of 
the ruling order — for so long accepted as given and enduring — began to be 
called into question. Now there were pressing reasons to think about and to 
discuss social problems and political strategies. Many of those excluded from 
power began to alter their perceptions of how their interests could be pursued, 
and began to think of what they themselves could do to alter the constitution of 
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political forces. Political discussion, amongst friends, families, neighbours, and 
colleagues, blossomed. One interviewee (Ollie) recalled ‘I’ve never read 
newspapers like I did then; discussing each article with friends’. 
 The regime’s transparent weakness in the face of a rising tide of problems 
began to educe greater confidence in those who were weighing up the chances 
and risks of public protest. 
 
‘We Want Out!’ 
 
Emigration applicants formed the vanguard of protest. Highly oppressed, so 
with little to lose, and hopeful that participation in protest might speed their exit, 
their ‘protest thresholds’ (Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1991) were peculiarly low. In 
Leipzig, on the first two Mondays of September, they were at the forefront of the 
demonstrations which emanated from the Nikolaikirche. Chanting ‘We want 
out!’ and holding placards, they both inspired and provoked ‘stayers’ to protest, 
too. In Hirschman’s terms (1993:177), ‘exit’ reinforced ‘voice’.198 Already on 
September 4, ‘We want out!’ began to provoke the counter-slogan ‘We’re staying 
here!’.199 Banners calling for ‘freedom of association’ and for ‘freedom of travel 
instead of mass exodus’ were unfurled. Thus, the small, brave beginnings of the 
uprising were already soured and spurred by inter-factional conflict — one which 
would return, in altered forms, later on. Notwithstanding a degree of acrimony 
between applicants and ‘stayers’, these demonstrations proved to many potential 
participants that protest was possible, and that individuals could be sufficiently 
brave and committed to take the risks entailed. 
 If ‘We want out’ demonstrators can take much credit for inspiring others 
to take to the streets in September, their role in bruising the forces of the state in 
early October was equally significant. In this period the regime was attempting 
to intimidate protestors into submission, whilst making concessions to those 
would-be emigrants who had already made their intentions public. The key 
                                                          
     198 Hirschman argues that this case was an exception to the rule that he had earlier propounded, that the 
relationship between exit and voice is an inverse, or ‘hydraulic’, one. 
     199 If a date is to be set for the beginning of the uprising it must surely be early September, as opposed to 
Mary Fulbrook’s bizarre choice of August 26 (1991:325), the day a handful of oppositionists (and IMs) met to 
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repressive moves were closing the border to Czechoslovakia to visa-free travel, 
and ordering the suppression of all protest through massive police and Stasi 
operations. Closing the border was a high-risk gamble. It slowed the exodus but 
raised the temperature at home. Passport offices filled with enraged citizens, and 
applications for emigration soared to 188,000 (Hertle 1996b:89). Demonstrations 
everywhere grew sharply in size. Political strikes broke out in Ruhla, amongst 
refuse collectors in Pirna, in the Ifa car factory in Eisenach, and elsewhere 
(Dresden Region Stasi files; Telegraph no. 4; Neubert 1998:851). Miners in the 
Erzgebirge (near the Czech border) began a go-slow, demanding the reopening 
of the border and freedom to travel.200 In these days, as Keithly observes 
(1992:226), ‘there was considerable discussion of industrial strike action’, not only 
in reaction to the border closure, but also against the use of BKGs against 
protests. 
 Alongside the escalation of repression, a key concession was granted to 
the occupiers of the FRG’s embassy in Prague. They were allowed to emigrate, 
albeit with a crucial condition — appended to demonstrate the regime’s resolve 
and sovereignty — that they must exit from the GDR. It was a blunder, 
displaying a combination of arrogant resolve in form with defeat in substance. It 
only drew attention to the regime’s hubris and weakness. When the trainloads of 
emigrants arrived in Dresden en route to West Germany, up to 20,000 people — 
many of whom had previously been turned back from attempting to enter 
Czechoslovakia — besieged the station. They blocked the tracks and tried to 
board the emigration trains. Some stormed an Intershop, while others occupied 
the station office. Stasi reports (Hertle 1996b:79) suggest that ‘there was a danger 
that the entire station area would come under complete occupation.’ The police 
prevented this, but failed to stop the demonstrators regrouping. As crowds 
streamed to the station, Dresden’s SED chief, Hans Modrow, called on the army 
to prepare to intervene, and ordered police to deploy batons and water cannon 
against the crowds which, in a telegram to Honecker, he described as ‘terrorists’. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
discuss the founding of what was to become the Social Democratic Party. 
     200 The miners justified their demand by arguing that poor consumer goods provision in the GDR made 
shopping trips to Czechoslovakia inescapable. The state responded with limited concessions: the miners 
would be allowed to travel freely, as would residents of their town, Altenberg. 
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The crowds responded with stones, and set a police car alight, in the biggest 
street battles since 1953. Despite displaying extreme aggression, with 1,303 
arrests and savage treatment of demonstrators, the police failed to disperse the 
crowd, which reformed into a permanent demonstration (of fluctuating size) 
which trailed through the city, chanting ‘We want out!’ and ‘We want reforms!’, 
and periodically battling with police, for a marathon four days. Some went on to 
occupy three churches until the authorities met their demands. These four days 
in Dresden marked a crucial trial of physical and moral strength in which the 
security forces, though not beaten, were exposed to onlookers and to wider 




Concurrent with emigrant-led protests, an alternative vanguard of opposition 
began to crystallize from out of the ‘grassroots groups’. As seen in chapter five, 
these groups had experienced an upward curve in activity and confidence since 
1987. A major breakthrough occurred in the summer of 1989, when the IFM was 
at last joined by other groups in organizing outside the confines of the church. 
These represented the organized response of a relatively confident faction of 
dissident opinion to the urgent demands and new opportunities which had 
arisen with the exodus and ensuing political crisis. While other ‘oppositionists’ 
were still arguing timidly that criticism should only be voiced within church 
walls, or privately amongst colleagues and relatives, these were committed to 
making public their suggestions for democratic change (die tageszeitung 4.9.89). In 
the words of Hans-Jürgen Fischbeck (of the church-linked group ‘Rejection of the 
Principle and Practice of Abgrenzung’) oppositionists should stop ‘waiting for a 
"GDR Gorbachev"‘, and instead ‘get active ourselves’ (Meinel/Wernicke 
1990:78). Fischbeck also proposed, in mid-August, that a nationwide platform be 
established to stand as an ‘identifiable alternative’ in the 1991 elections (die 
tageszeitung 15.8.89). ‘We are no longer’, he said, ‘simply concerned with 
surviving as grassroots groups throughout the GDR. We want to make clear that 
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there are people here who are developing ideas, and can propose conceptions for 
change’. 
 By late August at least seventeen separate initiatives aimed to establish 
some sort of independent oppositional organization (Gutzeit 1993:95). The one 
that made the greatest impact was New Forum (NF). Announced on September 
10, its ‘Aufbruch 89’, in contrast to the ‘refusal’ stance of emigrants, called for 
‘democratic dialogue’ between ‘state’ and ‘people’. ‘Aufbruch 89’ was an 
influential diagnosis of the crisis. It named symptoms of crisis — exodus and 
‘apathy’ — and located the chief cause in the disrupted ‘communication between 
state and society’. An alleviation of the symptoms and a serious tackling of the 
causes of crisis required a ‘democratic dialogue concerning the tasks of the 
constitutional state, of the economy and of culture.’ NF announced its intention 
to become a nationwide, legal ‘political platform’. 
 NF quickly assumed an organizational existence. Its initiators were 
inundated with phone calls and letters requesting information. Within fourteen 
days of its formation, 4,500 people had signed their names to its list of 
supporters. Throughout the country groups of activists established (or redefined) 
themselves as NF groups. Contact addresses were set up in all the main towns, 
often in churches, where the curious and the sympathetic could find out about 
this strange and controversial new phenomenon. By the end of September NF 
leaflets were pinned up in dozens of contact centres, and were beginning to 
circulate in workplaces, schools and universities.201 By early October large NF 
meetings were taking place, even though they still could not be openly 
publicized. Further support for NF’s central demands came through resolutions 
publicized by pop groups, musicians, and groups of radio and theatre 
employees. Public support for ‘open discussion’ began to be expressed even by 
establishment bodies, such as the Berlin section of the Writer’s Union and the 
Presidium of the Academy of Arts. 
 Alongside NF and IFM, other groups announced their existence and 
began to organize, notably Democracy Now (DN), the United Left (UL), 
Democratic Aufbruch (DA), and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Each had a 
                                                          
     201 For the most daring example of producing and circulating NF leaflets at work, see Klein (1995:209). 
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distinct profile. NF, IFM and DN emphasized the goals of democracy and 
ecology. The SDP and DA leaned to social-democracy; UL was a radical left 
coalition including reform-communists and anarchists. DN and DA were 
simultaneously more affirmative of socialism and more openly opposed to the 
SED’s ‘leading role’ than NF. As for their organizational structures, DA and SDP 
rapidly began to establish party structures while UL, NF, DN and IFM were 
committed to a looser ‘movement’ form. Despite their differences, all of these 
organizations shared basic — if vaguely defined — principles and goals. They 
fought for a reformed socialist order, with democratic polity and a decentralized, 
‘ecologically responsible’ economy. That they did not formally unite is in part 
due to the differences mentioned, but also to personal rivalries and the role of 
IMs in stimulating interpersonal antagonisms and counselling against coalition. 
 
Did ‘Movement Entrepreneurs’ Mobilize Protest? 
 
None of the opposition organizations (or ‘Citizens’ Movement’ (CM)) can claim 
much responsibility for directly mobilizing the large demonstrations in Leipzig 
and elsewhere which broke the back of the regime. It is not true to say, as does 
Reinfried Musch (1990:97), speaking for many, that ‘[t]he Citizens’ Movements 
brought the people onto the streets’. The most prominent critics of this view have 
been Karl-Dieter Opp and his colleagues (Opp 1993; Opp et al. 1993). They argue 
that organized oppositionists contributed little, if anything, to the emergence and 
mobilization of the demonstration movement in Leipzig. Opp et al. attempt to 
refute those social movement theorists who assume that a vital part in the 
emergence of a mass movement is necessarily played by what Tarrow (1994:189) 
calls ‘movement organisers’, who create ‘focal points for people who [...] often 
lack direct connections with one another and have few, if any, internal resources’. 
They propose that East Germany in 1989, where ‘[t]he revolution had no head’ 
(Opp 1993:213), proves that ‘resourceful’ organizers are unessential. Instead, the 
demonstrations can be explained essentially as the result of the ‘silent 
coordination of behaviour’ (Opp 1993:211), whereby large numbers of isolated 
(and ‘resourceless’) individuals who share similar grievances came to make the 
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same rational choice: to demonstrate. At most, they argue, conscious 
mobilization took place at the micro level, with individuals persuading friends to 
accompany them to Leipzig city centre. This was a ‘spontaneous revolution’, a 
‘revolution without revolutionaries’ (Opp et al. 1993:202).202 
 Opp et al. efficiently challenge the widespread myth that organized 
oppositionists ‘led’ the movement. However, their alternative is equally one-
sided. Organized activists exploiting ‘external resources’ (most obviously the 
Nikolaikirche) were crucial to the movement’s origins. The Nikolaikirche did not 
automatically become a meeting place for demonstrators, and thereby a widely-
known site of protest, but was actively created as such by ‘movement 
organizers’. Radical ministers stood up to the church authorities and braved 
death threats in order to maintain the Nikolaikirche as a radical centre. 
Opposition activists politicized the content of the ‘peace prayers’ (even when the 
ministers counselled caution or cancellation. The applicants, more than anyone 
else, turned the weekly political worship into that weekly public protest which 
later appeared to take on a ‘spontaneous’ life of its own. Thanks to the 
determination of oppositionists and applicants the Monday prayers became a 
regular, seemingly ‘unorganized’ or ‘spontaneous’, event; one which was 
therefore difficult to prevent. As a Stasi Lieutenant General put it (Zwahr 
1993:20), ‘these "peace prayers" don’t need to be organized any longer; over 
months they have become such a customary gathering for these people that they 
go there completely autonomously.’ ‘These people’s’ consciousness of their 
historical role may have been dim and their goals may have differed from those 
of the later movement, but such developments are typical of mass movements. 
The point is, although the early demonstrations they organized were small 
compared to later, more ‘spontaneous’ ones, the latter were triggered by the 
former. The early organizers’ historic importance is therefore out of all 
proportion to their numbers. Conversely, those small towns which lacked such 
people and thus missed, in Neubert’s words (1998:856), the ‘initial spark’, ‘slept 
through the revolution’. 
                                                          
     202 Used loosely, ‘spontaneous’ certainly captures an aspect of the movement. Opp, however, uses it in a 
peculiar way which assumes that spontaneity is a principle in diametric opposition to organization. 
Organization, in turn, is misleadingly equated with heteronomous imposition. 
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 As to the role of CM members in particular, Opp’s own survey data 
(1993:150,207; n.d.) suggests that such people took part in significantly more 
demonstrations than average and that their contribution to other forms of protest 
was outstanding. Their vanguard role was particularly pronounced in the early 
stages of the movement, as Carsten Johnson’s data shows (1992:89). These 
findings may not warrant the designation of the organizations as the ‘organized 
core of the masses’, as Karl Bruckmeier has pointed out (1993:42).203 Indeed, it 
may even be true to say, with Detlef Pollack (Opp et al. 1993:33), that ‘it was not 
NF that set the masses in motion, but rather the converse: the masses shoved NF 
to the forefront of their movement.’ However, if NF and the other groups were 
really marginal, as Opp et al. suggest, why were they shoved to the fore rather 
than the rear? 
 The answer, I submit, is that although the CM organizations rarely 
excelled at the actual mobilization of demonstrators, they nevertheless played an 
important role in generating a confident, forward-thinking culture of protest. 
First, they propagated a ‘master frame’ of the national crisis which attributed 
culpability to the regime and raised the demands for ‘communication’ and 
democratic reform as possible solutions.204 To use the vocabulary of Snow et al. 
(1986:477), this master frame ‘resonated’ widely.205 Their call for public debate 
connected with a widespread desire that political debate be permitted in the 
open. Their advocacy of popular pressure for reform inspired greater numbers of 
people to realize that, at last, something could be done about the crisis, and that they 
themselves could be part of the process. ‘Aufbruch 89’ in particular strengthened 
the sense of such people that at last a movement was forming which sought 
immediate and real change. It acted as a focus for hopes in political change, and a 
                                                          
     203 See also the next subsection of this chapter. 
     204 The concept of ‘framing’ has been developed by Snow and Benford (1992). In general (1992:136-8), 
framing ‘denotes an active, process-derived phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of 
reality construction.’ In social movements, ‘collective action frames serve as accenting devices that either 
underscore and embellish the seriousness and injustice of a social condition or redefine as unjust and 
immoral what was previously seen as unfortunate but perhaps tolerable.’ Secondly, collective action frames 
entail ‘diagnostic and prognostic attributions.’ Third, they ‘enable activists to articulate and align a vast array 
of events and experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and meaningful fashion.’ 
     205 As in any social movement, participants who did not belong to formal organizations were also active 
in creating and shaping the movement’s frames. In Eyerman and Jamison’s words (1991:94), ‘[a]ll activists in 
social movements are, in some sense, "movement intellectuals"‘. However, those such as Oberschall (1996:99) 
who claim that such people ‘initiated and provided the interpretative frame’ are overstating the case. 
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stimulus to work towards alternative perspectives. It helped to fire tens of 
thousands with a sense of shared purpose, a belief that change was possible, and 
thus raised their confidence and commitment to movement building. As one 
young woman put it (Probst 1991:46), ‘Aufbruch 89’ ‘really was a clarion call. I 
was electrified.’ Similarly, demonstrators who had been chanting ‘We’re staying 
here!’ as a courageous but helpless counter-slogan to ‘We want out!’ now raised 
an independent and concrete demand: ‘Legalize New Forum!’206 This 
development, above all else, gave credibility to NF. It bound NF into the actual 
protest movement, imparting it with a ‘movement identity’ based around 
activism and street protest. 
 Second, the organizations facilitated and encouraged the gathering of 
activists. As platforms claiming national scope they assembled into a central 
force activists whose primary identification had hitherto been primarily to local 
church-based groups, as well as wider layers with no political experience. 
Thousands of individuals now felt connected through a shared (political, 
oppositional) identity. By late October some 100,000 had signed their support for 
NF alone. This strengthened those feelings of solidarity and confidence which 
were especially important in the early, fearful stages of revolt. Activists set up 
‘contact centres’ where the oppositional and curious could gather, discuss, and 
read and obtain petitions and leaflets. That they were contact centres is 
significant: contact encouraged a generalized and actualized awareness of 
common cause. Individual dissenters and grumblers were now linked to others, 
in purposeful organization. The centres were hives of organization and debate. I 
recall one, in a Berlin church. Outside, a candlelight vigil demanded the release 
of those arrested on demonstrations. Within, sometimes as many as a thousand 
people queued to read CM propaganda. Tina Krone, of Berlin NF (interview), 
recalls the contact centre at her home, where ‘queues of people waited on the 
stairs; several were still arriving at 2:30 a.m. — every day! Some poured out their 
life stories to us; others would say "We want to do X; how did you do it?"‘ 
                                                          
     206 As protestors’ confidence grew, and the horizon of achievable demands widened, this slogan 
increasingly became coupled with ‘Criminalize the Stasi!’ 
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 Third, oppositionists set about transforming their organizations from 
formal platforms into real forces, in the form of members connected through 
structures, and building protest in general. They copied and distributed their 
platforms, and organized and mobilized for meetings. They encouraged others to 
do the same. Leaflets were handed around at work, or passed on to friends. 
Donations were collected to build campaigns for detained demonstrators. Where 
fear was intense, leaflets were surreptitiously placed in prominent places and 
graffiti appeared overnight. Activities were also publicized — often with 
extraordinary success — via ‘whisper propaganda’. However, Stasi documents 
(Meinel/Wernicke 1990:142) report that the purveyors of oppositional 
propaganda met alarmingly little resistance and need not be especially fearful. 
 Overall, the conclusion is inescapable that the CM organizations helped to 
establish bridgeheads of an activist, optimistic protest culture. This did much to 
dispel the spirits of resignation, fear, and passivity, which had dominated the 
lower orders until September. The announcement of NF, and its unexpected 
popularity, electrified CM activists and sympathizers. In the words of Klaus 
Wolfram (interview): 
 
 we were happy, thrilled, impressed that the spark had at last 
ignited, that the opposition had broken out of its ghetto, [and] that 
NF had become such an astonishingly big movement, winning 
approval across the land and, above all, in every layer of society. 
 
The CM contributed to a virtuous circle of protest. Its positive and forward-
looking framing of issues, and structured networks of activists, helped to give 
confidence and ideological direction to protestors. These then appropriated the 
names and (selected) ideas of the CM as their own, as a ‘banner’ to wave against 




Legality and Dialogue 
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Although the CM groups helped to ignite the movement, their strategy towards 
active protest, particularly demonstrations, was ambivalent. At an astonishingly 
early stage — in early October — several leaders distanced themselves from the 
demonstrations. They called publicly for a halt, even before the demonstrations 
had succeeded in forcing Honecker’s resignation. They also distanced themselves 
from the activists who had joined their organization and appropriated their 
slogans. Thus one NF leader, in an interview on October 5 (die tageszeitung), 
insisted his organization was not one which ‘organizes activity nationwide’. 
Warning against ‘actionism’, which NF ‘rejects’, he insisted that not mass protest 
but ‘negotiation’ was ‘the decisive factor’. 
 This ambivalence was rooted not simply in pragmatic fears of a 
clampdown, but also in the CM leaderships’ general strategy. Insofar as they 
sought political influence it was to be achieved not through building a movement 
to overthrow the regime but by attempting to benefit from the movement’s 
strength just sufficiently to ensure the legalization of opposition and to negotiate 
a number of democratic reforms. With this in mind, an aura of respectability was 
essential. Demonstrations could help pressure the government to come to the 
negotiating table, but too close an association with ‘actionism’ might mark CM 
leaders as irresponsible and unfit to negotiate the future of the land. Accordingly, 
mass mobilization had to be controlled as much as encouraged; demonstrations 
posed a threat as well as a promise. Thus, Sebastian Pflugbeil insisted (Joppke 
1995:156) that ‘[w]e look at these demonstrations with a very critical eye. They 
have no form and contours. This worries the security forces and we well 
understand their concerns.’ Pflugbeil saw the masses as a stage army. 
 The two principles which CM leaders prioritized over mass mobilization 
were legality and dialogue. That the demand for legalization of their organizations 
was sensible few would doubt: it served to delegitimize the regime and to 
amplify the ‘resonance’ of the CM’s frames. However, it could undermine 
movement building. As Pollack describes (1997:311), because NF’s leaders were 
primarily concerned with gaining recognition and legalization from the state, they 
‘therefore desisted from calling for demonstrations.’ 
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 The CM’s second core demand — dialogue and ‘public communication’ 
— tended to be difficult to decipher. For example, one of NF’s central demands 
was for ‘dialogue with equal rights’, but this left open the questions ‘between 
whom?’, ‘about what?’, and ‘how is the outcome to be determined?’. However, in 
context, one can differentiate between three uses of these terms. The first was 
dialogue as an immediate goal. This had been a central slogan of the 1980s 
opposition (Poppe 1997:253). In effect it meant ‘freedom of speech’, the 
permission of critical voices in the public sphere. But its implication was also 
‘listen to us!’ — that demand for and celebration of ‘voice’ which characterizes all 
social movements, especially their early stages. Secondly, dialogue referred to a 
medium-term programme for resolving the crisis and recasting relations of 
power, centred on negotiations between representatives of the ‘people’ and the 
regime. If ‘dialogue’ in the first sense could coexist within a wider strategy aimed 
at sweeping the SED from power, in this sense it represented a declared 
alternative to confrontation. It signalled that the opposition’s strategy was 
moderate, aiming for negotiated transition rather than revolutionary rupture. 
Communicative interaction was counterposed to instrumental action. As an 
illustration consider these words of Jens Reich (Financial Times 3.10.89): ‘[t]his 
society needs a constructive dialogue like in the Soviet Union. Otherwise people 
will demonstrate in the streets and flee across the border like rabbits’. 
 Thirdly, dialogue and communication evoked a utopian promise, as the 
central structuring principle of an alternative future. Although it is doubtful 
whether many oppositionists had read his works, a pure expression of this 
general conception is given by Habermas (1973:140-152; 1989).207 In Die 
nachholende Revolution (1990:199-203), he advocates a political process based upon 
‘communicatively created power’, entailing a ‘communicatively dissolved 
sovereignty’ constituted by ‘free floating public communication’. The latter 
becomes transformed into policy via ‘the decisions of democratically constituted 
institutions’, that express a consensus achieved through rational debate. In this 
schema, the role for radicals is to stimulate a ferment of political communication 
                                                          
     207 It is worth noting that Rolf Henrich, NF’s main theoretician and the author of an extremely influential 
oppositional text (published April 1989), acknowledges Habermas, alongside Rudolf Steiner and Rudolf 
Bahro, as his major influence. 
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which acts as a solvent upon material, social contradictions and invests systemic 
institutions with democratic life. Habermas’s ideas were common amongst CM 
supporters — a typical example, penned by an author in support of NF, argued 
that (Oktober 1989, 1989:198): ‘[w]hat is required is a state that can endure 
discourse.’ The CM ideologues’ thinking was Habermasian. As Findeis et al. put 
it (1994:278), ‘their conception of politics was harmonistic; they understood 
politics as above all a form of discussion to enable the achievement of a broad 
consensus.’ Their utopia could be described as ‘domination-free dialogue’, a sort 
of ‘ideal speech situation’ which posits nationwide consensus as a precondition. 
This, it was hoped, could ultimately culminate in a broad concordance in favour 
of new participatory forms of regulation. These would be necessary to the rebirth 
of a ‘civil society’, comprising what Paul Hirst has described (1991:223) as the 
‘illusions of the Enlightenment’: a conflict-free economy, representative 
government, free trade, and perpetual peace. By illustration, consider the 
following vision of DN leader Konrad Weiss (Knabe 1989:299): 
 
 I wish for a Germany that stands neither above or below other 
peoples, but beside them — a motherland. A Germany with no 
soldiers, neither its own nor those of others; whose economic 
power also benefits the poor peoples of the world; and which is 
able to share. A human Germany. My wish is for a colourful, 
friendly, diverse motherland. 
 
 In prioritizing consensus, opposition leaders tended to seek cooperation 
rather than conflict with the regime; in prioritizing recognition by the state, they 
bolstered the legitimacy of its institutions. The state, it was believed, was corrupt, 
but reclaimable for democratic governance. As an NF leaflet put it (Rein 1989:18), 
‘[t]he state exists for the people!’ Bärbel Bohley’s chief concern, according to a 
fellow CM leader (Hilsberg 1993:140), was to intensify the ‘identification of GDR 
citizens with their state’. The emphasis was upon limiting the powers of 
politicians, rather than revolutionizing the structures upon which their power 
rested (Degen 1992:107). Several CM leaders repeatedly endorsed the existing 
constitution, even though it enshrined the SED’s ‘leading role’ (i.e. power 
monopoly). Many of them, including Bohley and Henrich, and Ibrahim Böhme, 
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explicitly advocated acceptance of the ‘leading role’ (Wolle 1998:313; Gutzeit 
1993:98,108). One NF leader (Meinel/Wernicke 1990:145) even saw the Politbüro 
as a ‘potential coalition partner’, while Reich stated that he ‘strongly rejects any 
hostility to the SED and to its State’ (Die Zeit 29.9.89). Instead, his ‘vision’ was 
(Financial Times 3.10.89): 
 
 of cooperating with those who govern [...] We do not want power 
and are not calling for the Party to give up its leading role. We only 
want the Party to seek a dialogue with the population, with us, 
New Forum.208 
 
Likewise, Friedrich Schorlemmer of DA (die tageszeitung 6.9.89), argued that 
reform ‘must be tackled in cooperation with the SED’, while the UL declared its 
desire to work in ‘coalition’ with the SED (die tageszeitung 4.9.89). As for DN, one 
of its leading lights, Ludwig Mehlhorn, could insist even in late October that 
oppositionists must avoid conflict with the regime and focus instead on 
establishing ‘understanding between people’. Reform, he contended, was a 
process that must occur with, not against, the SED (Rein 1989:81; 
Links/Bahrmann 1990:71). 
 In line with the strategy of ‘dialogue’, CM leaders tended to see their role 
in ‘think-tank’ terms, centred on the elaboration of programmes for reform. As 
Fischbeck put it (Knabe 1989:200), ‘the task of our Citizens’ Movement is to 
collectively think about the means and ends of democratic change’. Reich at one 
stage suggested that NF should switch from being a political to a media 
organization. Even in early autumn, with the fate of the revolution still in the 
balance, NF leaders encouraged an emphasis on ‘themes’, advising their 
members to set up ‘theme groups’ in which experts analyzed social and 
environmental problems and developed blueprints for an ‘ecologically 
sustainable’ economy and radical democracy. These groups tended to be 
dominated by professionals who worked in the field of the ‘theme’, and 
maintained little communication with local and workplace groups (Krone 
1990:60). DN’s ‘think-tank’ approach was similar. Ulrike Poppe, for example, 
                                                          
     208 Note the elision of ‘population’ and ‘New Forum’. 
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advised DN members to devote their energies, apart from establishing basic 
organizational structures, to discussing ‘themes’ (Knabe 1989:162). Even the UL 
had a similar orientation. Meetings, and even its conference in November, were 
dominated by arguments over blueprints for a future socialist society. Debates as 
to what sort of soviets would hold power, whether there would be money, and 
how to convert state property into ‘people’s property’ were emphasized at the 
cost of analysis of current events and how UL should intervene in them. A telling 
self-description of UL was: ‘[w]e don’t exist as a formal organization but as a 
group initiative which works out perspectives in different areas, like political 
democracy, economics and art’ (Marion and Ronald Selig, Socialist Worker 
18.11.89). 
 The CM’s framing of its strategy emphasized ‘grassroots democracy’, the 
need to encourage equal participation of all citizens in the political process. In 
theory, anti-elitism was highly valued (Savin 1997). But in practice their strategy, 
by prioritizing ‘themes’, and negotiations between the CM and regime elites 
rather than the mobilization of non-elites, undermined the principle of anti-
elitism. CM leaders were ambivalent towards mass mobilization, and 
increasingly prioritized the activity of an elite of activists, for example in the 
‘round tables’ (Dale 1996a, 2001). In order to comprehend this tendency to 
‘substitute’ for the mass activity that they advocated in theory, an excursus 
concerning the CM’s origins is required. Its focus is the oppositional circles of the 
1980s, followed by an examination of the CM’s class base. 
 
Agency of Change 
 
The 1980s opposition stemmed from dissident traditions of the 1960s and 1970s, 
those long decades marked by regime stability and a dearth of open, large-scale 
workers’ resistance. Not since 1953 had any such activity taken place; memories 
of that uprising had faded (Dale 1995b; 1996b). A cognate ‘downturn in class 
struggle’ (Cliff 1979) afflicted those areas that exerted the greatest influence on 
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East German dissidents: Western Europe from the mid-1970s, and Poland from 
1981 (Barker/Dale 1999).209 
 As described in chapter five, a ‘ghetto mentality’ developed in the 
grassroots groups. It entailed an inward orientation, a fixation upon, or even 
celebration of, one’s own narrow milieu, and a basic scepticism toward the 
possibility of drawing large numbers into oppositional activity. As Werner 
Fischer put it (Findeis et al. 1994:104,109), ‘we lived in isolation, as if inside a bell 
jar [...] and not even particularly aware of the degree of our aloofness from the 
common people’. Of the oppositionists interviewed by Pollack et al. (1992:50), 
most lived — and engaged in oppositional activity — almost entirely within ‘a 
church or otherwise alternative’ milieu. In Pflugbeil’s words (Philipsen 1993:165): 
 
 you had these typical "insider circles" of a limited few who 
regularly met, all of whom knew each other well. Attempts [to 
communicate with others] were completely dependent upon the 
individual efforts of a few people. We virtually never reached 
wider circles[.] 
 
According to Pollack et al. (1992:50), typical oppositionists were preoccupied 
with their own milieu. They gave ‘astonishingly little thought’ to the social and 
economic conditions determining the lives of the mass of the population, or to 
why the latter seemed so oblivious to their concerns. Activists could easily feel 
trapped between what seemed to be apathetic masses and the intransigent state, 
reliant essentially upon their own beleaguered (and infiltrated) forces. Their 
activities entailed significant personal risk which was taken on behalf of what 
could seem to be an ungrateful public. An attitude of heroic altruism tended to 
result; a conception of political activity in which a courageous few acted in 
isolation from and on behalf of the ‘apathetic’ majority. The search for a lever of 
change tended, in practice and even in theory, to emphasize their individual 
behaviour as activists or even as mere ‘consumers’. Libertarian individualism 
flourished, albeit in an uneasy relationship with socialist and Christian currents. 
                                                          
     209 As Gerd Poppe has suggested (interview), the defeat of Solidarnosc and the subsequent turn towards 
liberalism of much of the Polish Left (Barker 1990, Ost 1989) undermined revolutionary and syndicalist 
currents in the GDR opposition. The same is undoubtedly true of the influence of the (decreasingly radical) 
FRG Left of the 1980s. 
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Oppositionists of the latter persuasions, however, tended to share the liberal 
philosophy that the crucial contradiction in society is between individuals and 
‘society’ or ‘the state’, and not between classes (Henrich 1989; Degen 
1992:83,115). 
 The experience of downturn, repression and isolation influenced 
oppositionists’ ideas and strategy. First, their general lack of political experience 
correlated with a lack of developed ideas. Reinhard Schult was only overstating a 
little when he complained (die tageszeitung 15.8.89) that ‘the opposition’s 
conceptions are as vacuous as those of the SED.’ Second, the difficulty of 
organizing openly in such a comprehensively policed society led many to ignore 
strategies based upon the potential for future open protest and focus solely upon 
general discussion and the development of reform programmes (Pollack et al. 
1992:9). In particular, most activists rejected revolutionary strategies as both 
unlikely and undesirable, and placed their faith instead in gradual reform. ‘For 
the opposition,’ Ulrike Poppe explains (1997:260), ‘reform meant democratization 
and the rule of law, achieved non-violently, in small steps, as an evolutionary 
change.’ Even many of the more radical oppositionists were extremely 
pessimistic as to the possibility of any sort of popular uprising. In a revealing 
statement, Bärbel Bohley lamented in mid-1989 that ‘[h]ere, change from below is 
out of the question. [...] Too many of those who would be in a position to take on 
political responsibility have left’ (Hirschman 1993:185). 
 Finally, oppositionists’ attitude to ‘the masses’ was at best ambivalent. 
The masses were seen as a ‘target of [oppositional] political activity’ but also an 
‘obstacle’ to the achievement of reform (Pollack et al. 1992:48.). They tended to 
appear only at the ‘margins’ of oppositionists’ conceptions (Pollack et al. 1992:50). 
The working class in particular, as Bruckmeier argues (1993:73) was seen as 
apolitical and ‘consumerist’. The long absence of workers’ struggles was 
interpreted by most oppositionists as that class’s rejection of political change. It 
was widely held that workers were content so long as their calorific intake was 
adequate. This prejudice was connected to influential radical-Christian ideas of 
self-sacrifice and asceticism, which combined with ‘post-socialist’ and ecological 
impulses from the Western Left to produce a ‘Green’ consensus that was 
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antipathetic to ‘consumerism’ and favoured instead an austere lifestyle politics. 
Thus, for Schorlemmer (1990:62), it was mass greed that ‘forced’ the state to 
prioritize capital accumulation over ecological interests. 
 The analysis of the working class as conservative, or even reactionary, was 
pursued most forcefully by the dissident and former apparatchik Rudolf Bahro. 
In the 1970s Bahro abandoned the production-fetishism of his youth and began 
to doubt that ‘socialism’ would ever succeed through out-accumulating its 
capitalist rivals. Instead, he now believed, the way forward lay through a 
‘cultural revolution’, centred on a ‘revolution in people’s requirements’, and 
fuelled by an ‘erupting revolt of individuality’ (1982:117). Underlying this 
argument was the belief that, thanks to consumer sops and educational 
deprivation, workers had become a ‘conservative’ class. Workers required re-
education away from their material greed, a task which, Bahro argued, should be 
shouldered by a ‘vanguard of emancipatory interests’ led by critical intellectuals 
(Stark 1981). Bahro’s hostility to ‘consumerism’ and his rejection of the working 
class as potential agent of progressive social change chimed with the sensibilities 
of the 1980s opposition. Whereas previous generations of dissidents had 
commonly seen workers as potential future allies, it now became increasingly 
prevalent to see them as a major cause of what Bahro (1982:32) defined as the key 
contemporary problem: ‘the explosion of material needs’. Workers were 
generally blind to this, having been ‘bought off’ with consumer goods. The 
conclusion — nourished by western imports (e.g. Gorz, Fromm, and Marcuse) — 
and adhered to by oppositionists of most political hues, was that workers had 
become addicted to the material output of the ‘system’, were incorrigibly 
apathetic and slavishly obedient towards the rulers who organized their material 
comfort. 
 Perhaps the best-known exponent of such ideas within the 1989 CM was 
the ex-apparatchik and NF leader Rolf Henrich.210 In his influential text (1989), 
Henrich counterposed the ‘new politics’ of ecological and spiritual 
consciousness-raising to the ‘old’ demands of material security. With the 
                                                          
     210 Although these examples are taken from opposition leaders, Wilkens-Friedrich (1992) confirms that 
their ideas were prevalent amongst rank-and-file members too. 
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industrialized world awash with affluence, the satisfaction of material needs had 
become a reactionary desire. Addicted to consumer goods, the supply of which 
was in state hands, workers were dependent upon the state and therefore 
structurally conformist. Workers are, he argues, (1989:72-3) ‘conservative’, they 
‘cling grimly to the futile prosperity they have won — apathetic and piously 
patriotic’. Social change will not be effected through collective rebellion but by 
individuals releasing their ‘inner voices’, discovering their ‘souls’, learning to 
love, and displaying ‘civic courage’, as exemplified by members of grassroots 
groups. 
 Working within a similar ‘New Social Movement’ paradigm (Barker/Dale 
1999), Ehrhart Neubert, drawing on Ulrich Beck, proposed (1989:15) that ‘[t]he 
old class issues and class conflicts are now overlayered by global dangers’. 
Whereas the ‘old’ politics of class struggle and revolution merely sought to alter 
relations of power, the ‘new’ politics pursues the higher task of transforming the 
aims and nature of ‘technical-economic progress’. Whereas the ‘old’ coveted 
higher living standards for exploited classes, the ‘new’ seeks to demonstrate to 
them, through individual example and moral persuasion, the geo-existential 
necessity of adopting ascetic ‘post-material’ lifestyles. Whereas the ‘old’ sought 
to expand consumption, the ‘new’ aspires to expand democracy. In short, as DA 
leader Edelbert Richter put it (Neubert 1989:10) ‘the ersatz satisfaction of 
consumerism must be replaced with true satisfaction: Free communication!’ 
 
Middle Class Horizons 
 
The turn of theory and strategy outlined above are related to the history of 
resistance, and of the Left, in East Germany and the wider world. They also 
express the specific interests of the social groups which hegemonized the 
production of the opposition’s ideas. Especially during periods of quiescent class 
struggle, social movement organizations tend to be dominated by elements of the 
population that possess the requisite individual ‘resources’.211 These include 
leisure time; experience in analyzing information, articulating ideas and 
                                                          
     211 For a fuller exposition of this point in relation to the East German opposition, see Dale (1995a). 
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influencing opinion; and confidence in one’s ability to intervene effectively in the 
public realm. Those who possess such resources tend to become 
disproportionately ‘selected’ as movement activists and, even more so, as leaders 
and ideologues. 
 Those who emerged from the 1980s opposition to found and lead the CM 
were disproportionately higher educated and lower middle class.212 Were a 
rhyme to be written of their most common occupations it would not be ‘tinker, 
tailor, soldier, sailor’ but ‘scientist, artist, doctor, priest’. Of the few who did not 
pursue a profession, most were culturally bound into a middle-class milieu 
through marriage or university education. Two-thirds of the founding members 
of DA were theologians, as were almost half of the forty-three founding 
members of the SDP (Neubert 1990:66). As for DN, its leading members were 
scientists, clergy and artists. Although NF began with few clergy, of its thirty 
leading members only three were workers, the rest being professionals and 
artists. Its membership list, according to one journalist (Der Spiegel, 18.12.89), read 
‘like a "Who’s Who" of the fine arts’. 
 The frames developed by the CM were heavily influenced by the history 
of the 1980s opposition and the middle-class horizons of its leaders. Pace 
prevalent assumptions (e.g. Tarrow 1994) that the movement of 1989 was a 
‘peoples’ movement’, that the revolution involved a ‘decoupling’ of political 
process from class divisions (Crook et al. 1992:138-9; Lemke/Marks 1992), and 
that the CM organizations were ‘non-ideological’, the behaviour of individuals 
and organizations of the CM as well as other actors in the revolution was in fact 
strongly conditioned by class. At one pole, those in senior positions of power did 
everything possible to prevent the movement arising at all and to curtail, control, 
and impede it once it had become unstoppable. The other pole, the working 
class, largely moved in the opposite direction. For all the rhetoric of the 
proletariat’s ‘lead role’, workers had the smallest ‘stake in the system’, whether 
measured by control over the process and products of labour, income, the quality 
                                                          
     212 This was, however, much less true amongst the CM rank and file (Pollack 1990:134). Many of these had 
not entered or had dropped out of higher education; many worked in more or less menial jobs, often in the 
employ of the Church. 
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of welfare and housing, or conditions at work.213 As seen in previous chapters, 
workers tended to perceive society as starkly divided into ‘us below; them 
above’. They displayed relatively little commitment to the SED regime. The SED 
lost support particularly rapidly amongst workers, who comprised around 70% 
of the first 200,000 resignations, according to CC figures (tageszeitung 27.11.89; 
Menge 1990:117). Workers (of both blue and white collars) contributed the great 
majority of participants in the protest movement and tended to display least 
regret at the demise of ‘their’ ruling class (Rein 1989:57; Lindner 1990:23; 
Förster/Roski 1990:60-63). 
 The behaviour of the middle classes was more variegated. Some, 
particularly functionaries in the party and state apparati, formed a dwindling 
band of regime loyalists. A centre fraction, including many academics, formed a 
vociferous layer of ‘critical loyalists’ — critical of the regime but suspicious of 
active protest. A radical layer identified with the CM. The political polarization 
of the middle classes was connected to the social contradictions characterizing 
such groups. They generally possessed substantially greater freedoms in their 
professions and were delegated greater responsibilities than workers. Some, 
including teachers and journalists, were carefully selected from the most loyal 
school-leavers and were entrusted with the task of propagating Communist 
ideology. In addition to such freedoms and responsibilities, the middle orders 
benefited from relatively comfortable living conditions, as well as the material 
benefits that come through connections to individuals with 
resource-distributional power.214 For their power and privilege they could thank 
their superiors in particular and the system in general. This, one suspects, 
explains why their political behaviour was on the whole, to borrow Rolf 
Henrich’s phrase, ‘cowardly’ (Plock 1993:201). However, their power and 
freedom was severely constrained. Those who were professionally concerned 
with the articulation of ideas were especially constricted by the stranglehold of 
censorship and the rigid imposition of conformity to state-decreed norms. 
                                                          
     213 For substantiation of this point, see Fuller (1999). 
     214 For empirical substantiation of this assertion, see Fuller (1999). 
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 The reformism of the CM was therefore not that of a Gorbachev or a 
Poszgay, representing a wing of the nomenklatura. Its calls for ‘dialogue’ and 
democratization expressed above all the alienation of sections of the middle class; 
their protest against a regime that largely excluded them from participation in 
public life, and cramped their freedom of speech and action. Questions of 
exploitation and economic democracy were, at most, secondary issues. NF 
repeated the quintessential petit bourgeois myth that the interests of different 
classes could be ‘properly reconciled’. As radical reformists, the CM 
organizations asserted that change must come ‘from below’ as well as ‘from 
above’ (Rein 1989:18). Their stance was marked by the desire to compromise, 
seeking a balance between order and reform; between maintaining social 
stability and criticizing the political framework. Although collective action to 
achieve their demands — such as civil liberties — challenged the limits of the 
ruling system and helped to spur a revolutionary movement, they hoped to 
achieve them through non-revolutionary means. As Reich put it (1992:23), during 
a revealing comparison between the CM and the Sorcerer’s apprentice, ‘We had 
not wanted, had not expected, it that way. Evolution, reform and reason slipped 
out of our hands and towards revolution.’ As such, the CM attracted in 
particular the middling layers of the population, people who maintained faith in 
the possibility of effecting change within the bounds of the existing system, 
preferring a stance of reconciliation towards the SED, a strategy which stressed 
‘dialogue’ rather than demonstrations and cooperation rather than conflict. 
 Above all, the CM attracted ‘intellectual’ sections of the middle classes. 
Surveys suggest that individuals with university degrees, although 
underrepresented on demonstrations, were massively overrepresented in CM 
membership (Opp et al. 1993:214; Müller-Enbergs et al. 1991:20). Although 
educational qualification is no strict measure of class position, these findings 
nevertheless hint at the pattern of class divisions within the movement. A survey 
of Berlin NF in December found that almost three-quarters were educated to 
tertiary level. Thirty-nine per cent described themselves as ‘intelligentsia’, 10% as 
‘managers’ [Leiter], and 10% as ‘students and apprentices’. Only an eighth 
described themselves as ‘workers’ and only 1% as unskilled workers (Schulz 
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1991:20-1). A survey of DN’s membership in May 1990 (Wielgohs/Müller-
Enbergs 1991:137), gave the following occupational breakdown: 51% academics; 
20% managers and white collar workers; 15% skilled workers; 9% students. The 
preponderance of ‘intellectuals’ helps to explain the utopianism which the CM 
invested in the demand for free speech and its tendency to reify the realm of 
ideas as the key source of historical change (e.g. Henrich 1989:144). It probably 
explains the premium placed upon recruiting ‘experts’ to the CM. NF, for 
example, made an appeal to SED members which expressed veneration for their 
‘huge potential of expertise and achievement’. UL representatives argued that 
their organization’s prospects were particularly exciting ‘because at the base of 
the SED, in academic circles and even among top cadre there is great sympathy 
for our project’ (die tageszeitung 4.9.89). The SDP’s first programmatic paper 
emphasized that the country’s problems would be best solved if citizens in 
possession of the ‘necessary competence’ were to govern the country. 
‘Expertocratic’ thinking produced one of its most curious flowers in Rolf 
Henrich’s writings, notably his proposal that all key posts in the economy and 
polity should be appropriated by members of the cultural elite (cf. Hürtgen 
1989). 
 Complementing their regard for intellectual experts, CM leaders tended 
to display aloofness towards ‘the masses’. Already in the 1980s oppositionists 
had displayed relatively little ability to communicate with the common people. 
The ‘ghetto mentality’ entrenched the traditional rift between dissidents and the 
working class. As Bohley put it (Findeis et al. 1994:53), the CM groups ‘were 
detached and aloof from the problems faced by the people.’ ‘It was always 
difficult’, said one worker (Rottluf interview), ‘to make worldly problems 
intelligible to the intellectuals and artists [of the CM].’ They ‘seemed unable to 
bring us comprehensible arguments from their ivory tower [...] They split hairs 
over their sectarian differences, ignoring the need to communicate.’ They were, 
in short, ‘out of touch with reality’. 
 This incommensurability of discourses, and the CM’s lack of strong roots 
in the working class, were to critically affect its attempts to shape the course of 
events in 1989. Even as the crisis broke, much of the opposition remained in the 
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ghetto. In die tageszeitung of August 15, with the exodus already swelling, Roland 
Jahn summed up this problem:  
 
 Where are the peace, ecology and human rights groups? Their 
remoteness from the population is almost as great as that of the 
SED. They refer to the emigrants as naive suckers en route to a 
fool’s paradise, while they themselves escape to vegetarian cookery 
courses in the countryside. 
 
The subsequent rise of a mass movement pleasantly shocked oppositionists. As 
Pollack et al. put it (1992:50), they were ‘forced at least to recognize the reality of 
the population acting politically.’ But despite their desire for an ‘ideal speech 
situation’, CM leaders in practice were ill-equipped to communicate with the 
masses. Jens Reich, talking of NF’s failure to address young people (Financial 
Times 3.10.89), admitted that ‘[w]ith my moderate language I cannot get them to 
listen.’ With hindsight (1992:55), he recalled that because CM leaders were 
widely perceived as addressing their major themes — ‘constitutional democracy 
and civil society’ — in abstractions, a widespread interpretation was ‘that these 
prattlers are "yet again at the microphone — just as for the past forty years"‘. 
From her interviews Fuller (1999:101) ascertained that ‘[w]orkers complained 
that [CM] communications were long on ideology, theory, philosophical calls for 
abstract rights and freedoms [...] and dense academic language and short on 
concrete programs and practical ideas for implementing them, expressed in a 
straightforward fashion.’ ‘Workers’, she continues, ‘sensed something 
disingenuous about supposedly "all-class," "above class," and even "classless" 
appeals to "citizens," which emanated from predominantly middle-class groups.’ 
The very vocabulary of the reformist middle classes was all but indistinguishable 
from that of the nomenklatura, and contrasted with that prevailing in the mass 
movement. As Maier puts it (1997:134), an abstruse and systems-theoretical 
jargon was ‘invoked both by the regime and by the intellectuals who would 
transform it. On the other hand, a rhetoric of primeval popular assembly — the 
language of "antistructure," of shoulder-to-shoulder community — arose 
anonymously from the crowd.’ The CM’s aloofness from the concerns of 
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ordinary people meant that even as late as mid-November ‘none of the groups, 
not even New Forum’, according to Bohley (Philipsen 1993:301), ‘had yet actually 
entered a real process of communication with the population.’ The consequence, 
and ‘[o]ur biggest failure’ according to Ludwig Mehlhorn (Philipsen 1993:369), 
was that ‘we were completely unable to analyze the mood and the sentiments 
among the population, and we thus did not succeed at all in becoming the 
authentic voice of these sentiments.’ 
 The conciliatory frames and moderate strategies of the CM leaderships 
were strongly conditioned by their social and political biographies. As Fuller 
observes (1999:84), 
 
 Put simply, in terms of their political experience and skills, the 
GDR intelligentsia was advantaged when the struggle began. 
Members of all segments of the middle class, not just those critical 
of the regime, had practice doing politics and some familiarity with 
the major topics of revolutionary debate, and their comparative 
advantage in both areas partially explains their high political 
visibility during the critical months of the revolution. 
 
Such individuals, she continues, dominated the initial organization of the CM. 
‘The middle-class complexion of major arenas of pre-Wende civil society was thus 
reproduced through activists’ personal friendship networks, in nearly every one 
of the [CM] groups and political parties of significance’. These networks 
frequently overlapped with the milieu of the ‘official’ conformist intelligentsia, 
but seldom with that of workers. The upshot was a profound aloofness of CM 
intellectuals towards the latter (cf. Fuller 1999:98-100). 
 The points set in the early days put the CM onto a trajectory that tended 
to attract moderate, middle class support, and increasingly distanced it from the 
movement’s majority.215 As such it exemplified a common phenomenon that 
appears when evolutionary change gives way to revolution. Those features that 
explain the overrepresentation of the educated middle classes in oppositional 
activity when collective action is at a low ebb tend to cause the same layers to 
                                                          
     215 This was no neat process, as was seen in the movement’s early stages when supporters on the streets 
imparted NF with a bold streets-centred identity that was partially at odds with its leaders’ conceptions. 
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adopt more moderate strategies when large-scale struggle breaks out. ‘The early 
stages of a popular upsurge’, as Barker observes (1987:235), are typically 
 
 marked by a sense of profound unity, in which oppositions and 
tensions are submerged. Commonly those who first leap to the 
head of mass movements are people of quite moderate politics, 
reformists of various stripes who have won some popular 
credentials in the pre-revolutionary phase. They rise to leadership, 
in part, because they are able to articulate the still cloudy and half-
formed aspirations of newly awakened masses of people. The 
everyday life of workers under "normal" conditions of class society 
does not promote self-confidence in public speech, but that 
capacity is more developed among "intermediate layers" within 
society: [...] sections of the intelligentsia, liberal clergymen, 
"professional" workers of various kinds — in short, the non-
commissioned officers of class society. Their conditions of life may 
engender a limited kind of oppositional politics, but their natural 
habitat is the activity of mediation between opposed social forces, of 
manoeuvring within the everyday institutions of capitalist society. 
 
Trials of Strength and Strategy 
 
In late September and early October the regime was determined to crush the 
movement and signalled unmistakeably that it would not follow the 
democratization strategies of its sister parties in Hungary or Poland. The security 
forces were put on alert. Weapons were issued. Before deployment soldiers 
received extra rations. Messages were sent to officers emphasizing the 
seriousness of the situation and insisting that everything possible be done to 
prevent the CM from gaining a mass following. Honecker and Mielke issued 
instructions to Stasi, SED, FDJ, and FDGB officials that the demonstrations must 
be stopped at once. Top cadre from these organizations were brought together in 
regional ‘crisis cabinets’ to ensure steadfast and united execution of repressive 
measures. On September 22, Honecker ordered regional SED chiefs to ‘nip 
enemy activity in the bud’, prevent it achieving a ‘mass basis’, and ‘isolate the 
organizers of counterrevolutionary activity’. Modrow trumped Honecker by 
ordering the ‘systematic isolation of all counter-revolutionary forces’ (Hertle 
1996a:110). On the 25th, NF was ordered to stop all activities immediately. In the 
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first week of October, Stasi units drew up lists of hundreds of oppositionists for 
possible ‘isolation’ in internment camps. On October 5, Mielke issued his famous 
order commanding Stasi units to aspire to omnipresence (Bahr 1990:57; Lasky 
1991:33): ‘[e]nemy-negative activities to be resolutely prevented by any means. [...] 
Allow no surprises! Allow the opponent no chance to begin activity on the 
assumption that we are not present!’ 
 During the weeks between September 18 and October 9 a decisive trial of 
strength unfolded. The regime’s strategy was put to the test and failed. It failed 
for three reasons. In addition to the growing popular protest — in the form of 
letters and resolutions — against its hard-line stance, these were the numbers 
and commitment of demonstrators; the lack of support from Moscow; and 
vacillation in its own ranks. These issues shall be looked at in turn, followed by 
description of the turning points of October 8-9. 
 The demonstration in Leipzig on September 11 had been dispersed, with 
over a hundred arrested and many more fined. Activists organized solidarity 
‘worships’ on subsequent days to ‘pray-demand’ the release of those arrested. 
Confidence had been generated by the previous week’s announcement of NF 
(see above) and by Budapest’s decision to allow unhindered emigration. This 
contributed to attendance on the 18th actually rising. For the first time the most 
popular chants were of the ‘We’re staying here!’ variety. Despite police trucks 
being deliberately driven into the crowd and injuring dozens, brave resistance 
was displayed, and one police car was forced to retreat (Hawkes et al. 1990:68). 
At the ‘peace prayers’ on September 25, the question of police brutality was 
addressed amidst what the Stasi chose to describe (Mitter/Wolle 1990:175) as an 
‘inflamed atmosphere and aggressive mood’. Afterwards, for the first time, 
demonstrators did not remain in the vicinity of the Nikolaikirche but marched 
through the town singing the Internationale and ‘We Shall Overcome’, and 
shouting ‘Freedom!’ and ‘Legalize New Forum!’. Significantly, the police did not 
intervene to stop the march, although eventually they dispersed it. By this stage 
demonstrators were proving that even brutal and systematic policing would not 
deter them. Police reports from the time worried that ‘a new quality has been 
reached’ in terms of the ‘public effectiveness’ of protest (BDVP Leipzig, 12.10.89). 
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Even as the regime’s orders to its forces grew fiercer, their ability to contain the 
movement was ebbing, as Table 6.2 shows. 
 






















Arrests as % of 
attendance 
(approx.) 
10-40 10 8 0.11 0.09 ? 0 
 
 On October 2 the authorities desperately tried to prevent the 
demonstration. Cadre in the workplaces warned workers to keep away from the 
city centre. Students were threatened with expulsion if they participated. BKGs 
were deployed, and instructed to ‘use any means to tackle the demonstrators’ 
(Neues Forum Leipzig 1989:47). Stasi units were instructed to use armed force if 
necessary. Thousands, however, filled the Nikolaikirche. Ignoring the preacher’s 
advice to desist from demonstrating, they streamed towards the town centre 
chanting slogans, including ‘Legalize New Forum!’ and ‘Liberty, Equality and 
Fraternity’ (Pollack 1993:258). The police did manage to block the march. 
However, their lines were, against the advice of CM members, persistently 
punctured (Mitter/Wolle 1990:190). Despite massive policing thousands of 
demonstrators managed to reassemble, signalling the irrepressible confidence of 
the movement.219 It took a long time, and the use of truncheons, dogs, and water 
cannon, resulting in serious injuries to several demonstrators, before the police 
eventually dispersed the throng. 
                                                          
     216 According to Leipzig police files, there were at least seventeen demonstrations in this period. 
     217 This was the first demonstration to occur without ‘peace prayers’ beforehand. 
     218 Opp et al. (1993:47) calculate that the usual estimate of 70,000 is extremely conservative, and could 
have been anything up to twice that figure. They also argue that estimates for later demonstrations were 
consistently understated. 
     219 A measure of the security forces’ difficulties is that fully sixty-five police caps and two truncheons were 
lost that day. For other similar examples see Dale (1996a:96). 
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 The next six days witnessed a determined but unavailing effort to smash 
the movement. In these few days up to 5,000 arrests were made (Rees 1999:41). 
The brutality displayed must at least qualify any use of the word ‘nonviolent’ to 
describe the revolution. Apart from the repeated assaults on protestors in 
Dresden police intimidated and attacked demonstrations in Magdeburg, Leipzig, 
Karl-Marx-Stadt, Halle and Potsdam. Perhaps the cruellest attacks occurred in 
Berlin. Chance had it that the GDR’s fortieth anniversary took place on the very 
day of the month which had, since the May 7 elections, become demonstration 
day in Berlin. The regime celebrated with deliberately undiminished pomp. As 
usual, allied leaders from around the world, including Gorbachev, attended. In 
the Palace of the Republic assembled dignitaries listened to a boys choir singing 
‘Peace in the Land’, even as a demonstration of some 5,000 gathered outside. 
Chanting ‘Gorby!’ and ‘We are the People!’, they showed the audacity to 
challenge the regime on its birthday. One senior official described the scene 
(Reuth/Bönte 1993:109): 
 
 On all floors there was top-class entertainment with famous artists 
and comedians, refreshments, and delicacies — and through it all, 
unmistakably audible from outside, on the bank of the Spree, came 
the chants of the demonstrators: "Freedom, Freedom!" It was 
unearthly. An oppressive mood dominated the occasion; twilight 
of the gods [...] It was just like on the Titanic. 
 
Behind the scenes instructions were issued for the police and Stasi to crush the 
protest, with the proviso that blood should not flow near the Palace of the 
Republic. The demonstrators moved on, to Prenzlauer Berg, now in a state of 
occupation by the security forces. On this and the subsequent two evenings 
16,000 police were deployed, plus numerous Stasi employees. They went on the 
rampage, arresting over 1,000 demonstrators (Maier 1997:148). Some were 
dragged along the ground by the hair for twenty or thirty meters before being 
shoved into trucks and transported to police buildings for further intimidation. 
Witnesses were shocked at the ferocity of the police and Stasi, and also at the 
chauvinist and racist abuse that some were shouting (Behrend/Prenzel 1990:111). 
And yet, demonstrators stood their ground. The forces of order did not triumph. 
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In a letter to Honecker (Die Andere, no. 10, 1991) Schabowski complained that ‘the 
security forces deployed were not sufficiently prepared for such massive 
resistance’, and had not intervened swiftly enough. Undaunted, thousands of 
protestors gathered at the Gethsemane Church in the aftermath of the clashes to 
demonstrate solidarity with those arrested. 
 The second reason for the failure of the hard-line strategy was lack of 
support from Moscow. The essential truth of this fact has often been obscured by 
exaggeration and controversy. Exemplifying the former, Jon Elster (1996:8) has 
contended that ‘[t]he mass demonstrations in East Germany that led to the 
downfall of the regime might not have taken place were it not for [Gorbachev’s 
comment that] "life punishes those who come too late"‘. This comment surrounds 
several questions: Did Gorbachev actively encourage the overthrow of Honecker 
(Stent 1998:89); were Soviet military commanders instructed to remain in their 
barracks if ‘trouble’ arose and, if so, was Honecker informed of this (Leonhard 
1990:212; Gedmin 1992:102; Kuhn 1992:29,31). Personally, I have come across no 
evidence to suggest that Gorbachev overtly encouraged SED leaders to reform, 
or to overthrow Honecker. However, in his discussions with Honecker on 
October 7, with other Politbüro members present, the persistence with which he 
referred to severe social problems, to the need for rulers to ‘listen’ to the public, 
and to the necessity of swift ‘restructuring’, contrasted markedly with 
Honecker’s complacent platitudes (Küchenmeister 1993). Many of Gorbachev’s 
comments, including ‘life punishes those who come too late’, ostensibly referred 
to the Soviet situation, but he was presumably aware that they would be 
interpreted as generally applicable. 
 Whatever position one takes on these details, two central processes are 
beyond doubt. One is that Moscow had committed itself to opening its economy 
to the world market, normalizing relations with the West and renouncing the 
Brezhnev doctrine. The other is that perestroika had, already by the summer of 
1989, ‘spun out of control’, in David Remnick’s phrase (1994:223).220 By 1989, the 
Kremlin’s paramount concern was holding the line at home. According to one of 
                                                          
     220 Remnick locates the decisive blow in the ‘working-class rebellion’ of July, but other factors included 
national risings, economic chaos, and declining cohesion of the CPSU. 
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his advisors (Kuhn 1992:30), Gorbachev was well aware that any involvement of 
the Soviet army against an East German uprising would have jeopardized his 
entire strategy, even his hold on power. However one interprets his comments to 
SED leaders, he certainly gave no support to their strategy of harsh repression. 
Many interpreted Gorbachev’s statements as indications that the Soviet army 
would not intervene to prevent protest. This was widely assumed at the time and 
has never been denied. Accordingly, rumours abounded. Gorbachev had, it was 
alleged, told bystanders that ‘if you really want democracy, then take it, and you 
will get it!’. Amongst the nomenklatura, the lack of support from Moscow 
undermined the case for a repressive strategy (Simon 1990:131; Kuhn 1992:32), 
and induced some elite members into considering what Judy Batt (1991) has 
described as a strategy of ‘defensive liberalisation’ (see below). 
 The Kremlin’s reformist inclinations connected to the third difficulty that 
faced proponents of full-scale repression. Their strategy depended upon high 
degrees of commitment and cohesion amongst the regime’s forces, especially the 
SED, state functionaries and the security forces. Yet these layers were racked by 
doubts and demoralization, as we have seen. 
 Even the SED leadership was unable to maintain a confident, resolutely 
hardline, course. Significant concessions were made, such as permission to 
emigrate for embassy occupants. Further from the central SED leadership 
deviation from the official line was greater. Sections of the media began to give 
space to conciliatory positions.221 Middle-level officials sensed the paralysis and 
confusion of their superiors in the face of the crisis, and were exposed to pressure 
from lower level functionaries and grassroots SED members. These, in turn, were 
influenced by the increasing anger and political criticisms of ordinary people. 
Many functionaries doubtlessly remained stoically scornful of the swelling 
chorus of criticism, but others showed increasing signs of independent thought 
and action. The bloc parties, notably the LDPD but also the CDU, began to make 
‘off-message’ statements, such as ‘[w]e must not prevent change, but foster and 
channel it’, and ‘[t]he GDR needs questioning, impatient, curious people; it needs 
                                                          
     221 For instance, Junge Welt (12.9.89) on emigration: ‘The fact that even younger citizens of our state are 
unable to take the stress of the class struggle, that is a cause for sadness.’ On October 9 the same newspaper 
published an article by the SED novelist Herrmann Kant that criticized media policy. 
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those difficult customers who cut against the grain of "normality"‘ (Keithly 
1992:148; Knabe 1989:303). LDPD functionaries even offered meeting rooms to 
the (still outlawed) CM (Neubert 1998:847). For such thoughts and deeds the 
LDPD’s leader was accused by SED hardliners of ‘fomenting counterrevolution’ 
(Gerlach 1991:7). As this example shows, acrimony grew between doves and 
hawks in the nomenklatura. 
 Advocates of repression were also obliged to worry about signs of 
vacillation amongst the security forces. Some army units were approaching, and 
even reaching, conditions of mutiny (Opp et al. 1993:290; Hertle 1996b:121). Many 
reservists refused to receive special truncheon training. In one unit, when officers 
requested volunteers for deployment at demonstrations, not a single soldier 
stepped forth (Liebsch 1990:95). On at least one occasion an army officer was 
arrested for participating in a demonstration (Mitter/Wolle 1993:537). Nor were 
mutinous attitudes restricted to the army. In early October many police were 
jailed for refusing to use force (Keithly 1992:225), and police reservists showed 
particular signs of vacillation (BDVP Leipzig 12.10.89). Even some police officers 
disobeyed orders on the Leipzig demonstrations in early October. Demonstrators 
deliberately encouraged the breakdown of police confidence. One eyewitness 
gave the following description (Reich 1990:87): 
 
 I have seen how uneasy the [police] making the cordon looked 
when verbally attacked by women. The women reproached them, 
"Aren’t you feeling ashamed of yourself standing against your own 
population? I could be your mother and you stand here with your 
truncheon. Put it away!" 
 
As to the ‘mobile police’, some reportedly broke down in tears upon hearing 
instructions that arms should, ‘if necessary’, be used. Entire sections that were 
considered unreliable, or seen fraternizing with demonstrators, were ‘purged’ 
(Pond 1993:112). The Stasi, similarly, reported growing unreliability, especially 
amongst IMs (Mitter/Wolle 1990:230). Although around 80% of IMs continued to 
cooperate with the Stasi (Mitter/Wolle 1993:533), others sought to withdraw 
from their role or to genuinely support the CM groups upon which they were 
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spying (Telegraph no. 10). However, of all the security forces the greatest degree 
of vacillation and mutiny was found in the BKGs. Many of these troops, 
including SED members, invented excuses to dodge deployment (Liebsch 
1990:19). Hundreds refused to train for street fighting, disobeyed orders, or 
resigned from their unit. Many mutinied, including those deployed along the 
route of the westward bound ‘emigration trains’ and those deployed to combat 
demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden, and elsewhere in the South. In Karl-Marx-




On October 8 and 9 SED leaders were forced to confront the fact that their 
strategy was failing. In preceding weeks none of the Party leadership, 
Schabowski suggests (1990:189), had been ‘prepared for an open outbreak of 
conflict, and even less so for tackling new questions of society’. The leadership 
was united around the aim of suppressing protest with force but without 
recourse to arms. Any qualms some leaders may have had were kept quiet in the 
interests of unity. However, as this strategy began to run aground, differences in 
attitude developed. The options were to escalate or deescalate. Some leaders 
were prepared to risk unleashing armed force, others emphasized the need to 
avoid civil war. The former group included Honecker, and possibly Mielke and 
Krolikowski (Hertle 1996a:121). The latter included Lorenz and Schabowski, and 
also several heads of security: Krenz, Herger, Dickel and Mittig (cf. Riecker et al. 
1990:188). The latter group was decisively strengthened by, and contributed to, 
the turn of events surrounding the demonstrations of October 8 and 9 in Dresden 
and Leipzig respectively. 
 In Dresden demonstrators faced a tough opponent. Not only were police 
and BKGs deployed, but Modrow even deployed the army, in the first recorded 
instance of its use against demonstrators in years (Pond 1993:109). The security 
forces were brutal and made mass arrests (Wenzel 1993:53). However, they were 
ill-prepared for the sheer size of the demonstration. The police’s strategy of 
‘caging in’ protestors misfired, as the police ring itself became ‘encaged’ (Bahr 
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1990:129). More and more officers disobeyed orders to attack with truncheons 
(Spiegel 23.4.90). It was at this point that two crucial agents of the regime broke 
with established tactics. An officer, after consultation with a curate, gave an 
unauthorized order for riot shields to be laid down and truncheons sheathed so 
that negotiations could take place (Friedheim 1993:104). Demonstrators voted 
twenty of their number, the ‘Group of Twenty’, as their representatives. 
Secondly, Dresden’s mayor, Wolfgang Berghofer, agreed to meet this group for 
talks on the following day. These two events represented the first major example 
of a regional leadership losing the will to deploy brute force to suppress protest 
and agreeing instead to ‘dialogue’. In the negotiations themselves Berghofer 
generally kept to the official line. He opposed the legalization of NF and refused 
to recognize the ‘Group of Twenty’ as a legitimate negotiating partner.222 
Nevertheless, he did make concessions, granting an amnesty to ‘non-violent’ 
political prisoners, and even agreeing to the need for free elections. For 
protestors, enjoying accepted, peaceful mastery of the streets, these events 
marked a great victory. 
 The next milestone, in Leipzig on October 9, was still more decisive. A 
harsh crackdown was expected. The authorities stoked fear as best they could. 
On Friday a letter in the local paper from a BKG commander had made the 
state’s position ominously clear (Neues Forum Leipzig 1989). It warned that the 
attitude of the security forces to the protests was that they be ‘finally and 
decisively thwarted; if necessary, with arms at the ready!’ The army was put on 
alert. Rumours circulated that extra blood plasma and emergency beds in 
hospitals had been prepared. Workers were sent home early and instructed to 
avoid the city centre. Parents were advised to collect their children from 
kindergarten early. Hundreds of SED members were sent to occupy the 
Nikolaikirche in order to disrupt the protest-worship. Tens of thousands of 
security force members, including mobile police, army, BKGs, and Stasi, were 
very visibly deployed around the city centre. Many were issued with live 
ammunition. Officers impressed the urgency of the task upon their troops. For 
                                                          
     222 It was not until the 30th that he did so, and that was in part because an astonishing 100,000 people had 
each, as a sort of vote of confidence, contributed a symbolic 1 Mark to the Group’s bank account. 
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example, one battalion of mobile police was told (Neues Forum Leipzig 1989:92) 
‘[c]omrades, today the class war begins. Today is the day — it’s either them or 
us. If truncheons are inadequate, arms will be used.’ However, the regime lost 
this particular ‘class war’. There was no bloodbath. Four interconnected reasons 
can be identified as to why the day ended peacefully, with victory for the 
protestors. 
 Firstly, the SED leaders were unable to unite around a planned escalation 
of repression; they could have ordered a massacre but did not do so.223 Honecker 
apparently pushed for the deployment of tanks but, according to one top general 
(Hertle 1996a:130), was dissuaded with the argument that a large proportion of 
demonstrators, being young men above conscription age, had received training 
in anti-tank combat. Even for hardliners such as Mielke, armed force was to be 
fully unleashed only if conflict between demonstrators and security forces arose 
(cf. Stent 1998:90; Krenz 1990:138). 
 Secondly, protestors were huge in number, strong in commitment and 
intelligent in tactics. As evening approached, all four city centre churches filled to 
overflowing. Calls to go home or at least to avoid demonstrating in the city 
centre, voiced by Rainer Eppelmann and sundry Church worthies (including 
Bishop Forck and a top IM, Manfred Stolpe) were ignored (tageszeitung 1990:43; 
Reuth/Bönte 1993:110; Kuhn 1992:125).224 The 6,000 in the churches were joined 
by up to 100,000 more to form the biggest single protest thus far in the country’s 
history. This was a tremendous physical force.225 Keenly aware of the potential 
dangers protestors, particularly CM supporters, chanted ‘No violence!’. 
Signalling their peaceful intentions, they offered no pretext for the security forces 
to attack and stood to gain greater sympathy from non-participants. According 
to a Leipzig Stasi report, demonstrators were ‘anti-state’ but not, as at some 
previous protests, ‘aggressive’ (BVfS 136/89). 
                                                          
     223 According to Reich (Prins 1990), a decision that live ammunition be used was lost by one vote at a 
Politbüro meeting. 
     224 Edward Tiryakian (1995:278) is one of many commentators who mistakenly believe that these 
demonstrations received ‘the active support of the church’. 
     225 Those such as Oberschall (1996:101) who claim that the movement consisted of ‘moral’, as opposed to 
physical, force are presenting a false dichotomy. 
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 Thirdly, sections of the security forces, especially the BKGs, were in 
disarray. A report by BKG members makes for fascinating reading (Neues Forum 
Leipzig 1989:90ff.). Demoralization set in even before deployment, when working 
class BKG members, having expected ‘that the functionaries from the local and 
regional leaderships’ would be with them, noticed that ‘none of these comrades 
were to be seen’. As the demonstration gathered they witnessed the paralysis of 
the professional security forces. ‘Police officers ran hither and thither, without a 
clue what to do.’ One even ‘told us we should just disappear, as quickly as 
possible’. The BKG members were scared and confused. ‘It was an apocalyptic 
mood’, said one. Their assumptions and expectations were being turned upside 
down. The ‘enemy’ before them consisted to a surprising extent of fellow 
workers. As one put it, ‘[w]e could see that it was ordinary people who were 
shouting "We are the People!", and we felt we belonged to them too.’ Many 
agreed with the slogans they heard and felt abused by the regime which they 
had always proudly defended. Faced with the arguments of demonstrators many 
were persuaded to withdraw, if not won over. 
 Even given these factors, it would still have been quite possible, as the 
evening wore on, for a tense or trigger-happy officer — with or without 
‘provocation’ — to open fire. The chances of this happening, however, were 
markedly lessened thanks to a fourth factor: the actions of middle-level 
functionaries. Local SED chiefs, in particular, were in a quandary. Ordered to 
suppress an impossibly large demonstration ‘by any means necessary’, they 
appealed for more specific instructions from Politbüro members. Their appeals, 
however, were either ignored or evaded, which indicated a surprising degree of 
equivocation at the top. Many of their colleagues and friends, moreover, 
counselled caution. The editor of the local newspaper had published a piece that 
morning calling for ‘patient and open dialogue’ (Zwahr 1993:76). The local Stasi 
chief, by his own account (Riecker et al. 1990:218), recognized that the security 
forces would be unable to prevent the demonstration. Caught between an 
uncertain Politbüro and a growing demonstration, the local chiefs ordered their 
forces to hold back and disseminated an appeal for calm that several local 
luminaries had drafted. 
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 These days in Dresden and Leipzig broke the pattern of repression. They 
revealed the exhaustion of a strategy based entirely on police methods, and 
weakened those who were most committed to that strategy, most notably 
Honecker himself. The way was prepared for a shift from intransigence to 
‘defensive liberalization’. The ensuing period will be considered in chapter 
seven, following a discussion of the dynamics of mobilization that marked this 
first phase of the uprising. 
 
Algebra of Mobilization 
 
We are now in a position to reflect upon the question of how a mass movement 
developed, so quickly and as if from nowhere. To begin with, one might concur 
with rational choice theorists (e.g. Opp et al. 1993) in examining the changing 
cost-benefit calculations made by individuals as they scented changes in the 
political opportunity structure. These included the transformation of the Soviet 
Bloc, reduced chances of Soviet intervention, the weakening of the regime as 
exemplified by its inability to stem the exodus or the protests, and a widespread 
developing sense of crisis amongst the population. In this situation of evolving 
‘alternativity’, confidence in the perceived potential efficacy of public protest 
grew, as did the ‘benefits’ of personal participation in protest. As demonstrations 
grew in size the expected ‘costs’ of participation — as measured for instance by 
the likelihood of arrest — fell. This information spread amongst the population 
by two crucial channels of communication; word of mouth and the western 
media. In the longer run, as the movement gained momentum and began to 
chalk up successes, anticipations of reform rose, as did expectations that reforms 
would bring (individual and collective) benefits. Expected costs, such as 
discrimination at work, diminished. 
 Cost-benefit schema, however, can only offer limited insights into the 
dynamics of mobilization, not least because the criteria and scales by which costs 
and benefits are weighed up become altered through the process of revolution 
itself. Consider, for example, October 9 in Leipzig. The previous week had seen 
an impressive demonstration that held firm against the security forces. 
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Demonstrators suffered heavy beatings and arrests, although perhaps not 
enough to deter determined and angry individuals from following their 
example. However, as Leipzigers were aware, many signs pointed to a bloodbath 
on the 9th. Table 6.3 indicates the sanctions that respondents recalled having 
expected to face if they participated in demonstrations up to and including 
October 9. 
 
Table 6.3 Perceived risks of demonstrating (from Opp et al. (n.d.:6)). 
 Highly 
improbable 




Arrest  3.9%  6.7% 39.7% 55.7%  
Injury by security 
forces 
 3.3%  8.9% 45.9% 41.9%  
Trouble at one’s 
workplace 
 9.2% 16.9% 25.4% 33.9% 14.6% 
Trouble for 
family members 
 2.1% 19.0% 33.3% 32.5% 13.1% 
 
These fears notwithstanding, attendance was four times that of the previous 
week. Many of those present travelled to the demonstration despite an explicit 
awareness that ‘civil war’ was expected (Zwahr 1993:96).226 
 How can this apparently irrational behaviour be explained? First, it is 
worth noting that as the dramatic contest between protest movement and regime 
unfolded attitudes, towards protest itself and towards the regime, could rapidly 
change. As the range of strategic possibilities altered, so did conceptions of state 
and society, of what was proper and legitimate.227 Evidence of the government’s 
hardline stance — in particular, brutal repression — strengthened the case that 
the regime was illegitimate or at least in need of reform. Its ruthless and 
                                                          
     226 Rational choice explanations, as Thompson (1996) and others have noted, have great difficulty in 
accounting for such behaviour. Lohmann’s attempt to rescue the approach is particularly valiant (1994:90): 
‘Of course, participants in the critical demonstration of October 9, 1989, faced the very real possibility that 
their protest would end in a massacre; but even then they could reasonably expect that only a few dozen — 
in the worst case perhaps several hundreds — out of tens of thousands of participants would meet their 
death. For any one demonstrator, the implied probability of death is rather low.’ 
     227 As Therborn suggests (1980:44), conceptions of what is possible and what is good are, in practice, 
intimately interrelated. 
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blundering reaction to the exodus, followed by its attempts to crush protest and 
demonize protestors as ‘rowdies’, was widely interpreted as evidence of the 
government’s inability to deal with the crisis. The crass disparity between the 
SED’s smug claims that order reigned and the reality of dire crisis further 
contributed to the shift in mood. For many, the brutality of the security forces 
dispelled the last traces of faith in the legitimacy of the regime. Interviews with 
workers (e.g. Rottluf; also Kuhn 1992:76) indicate that criticism of the 
government grew sharply following reports of the vicious behaviour of the 
security forces in early October. Amongst participants and bystanders the effect 
was particularly stark (e.g. Barbara Fuchs interview; Wolle 1998:323). Repression 
delegitimized the regime in the eyes of many of its erstwhile supporters and the 
general public and thus spurred protest. It also corroborated the protestors’ 
framing of the conflict as one between a non-violent and peace-loving ‘people’ 
and a brutal, illegitimate elite. Shared fear, moreover, could deepen bonds of 
solidarity between protestors. When Marianne Pienitz (interview) and her 
colleagues wrote a letter to Mielke to plead that the security forces refrain from 
attacking the October 9 demonstration, ‘we said "farewell" to one another when 
we sent it, fearing that the next time we met would be in prison.’ Such shared 
risks facilitated the formation of oppositional collective identities. Finally, 
repression strengthened protestors’ belief in the urgency of their cause. 
Following police assaults and mass arrests, protestors would organize vigils and 
hunger strikes against the effects of repression, signalling to potential protestors 
and government alike that they were not about to retreat. 
 Confronting and defeating the might of the security forces was the cutting 
edge of a wider transformation. Possibilities for meaningful intervention in the 
political process opened up to millions who had become accustomed to exclusion 
from public affairs. The expansion of political opportunities and the actions of 
protestors encouraged others to re-evaluate their abstention. As Rule puts it 
(Klandermans 1992:86), ‘seeing others take seriously a cause that might 
previously have seemed a strictly hypothetical possibility for action may revamp 
participants’ perceived options for behavior’. Revamped perceptions of possible 
behaviour stimulated rethinking of the questions ‘what is this society?’ and ‘what 
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can we do to change it?’.228 Millions of hitherto powerless people began to feel 
that their political opinions actually mattered, that there were immediate and 
pressing reasons to ponder, voice, and act upon them. Oppositional discussions 
that once seemed impossibly abstract now became urgent questions. Collective 
action thus facilitated and was empowered by what McAdam (1982:34) terms 
‘cognitive liberation’, a process whereby oppression and injustice become 
popularly redefined as ‘subject to change’. 
 The fact that ordinary people had collectively hijacked the political 
process and revealed hitherto hidden potentials underlay the explosion of 
political discussion that occurred in these months. Before the revolution political 
decision-making had seemed only remotely related to most citizens’ life 
experience. It was the exclusive fief of distant, powerful figures. Now, movement 
participants felt they could exert some influence. This discovery tended to 
encourage social problems to be reinterpreted in more directly political and 
systemic terms.229 Discussion and argument abounded, in part regarding acts of 
protest themselves.230 What should the content of a work brigade’s letter to the 
FDGB be? Should we go to the demonstration? What slogans should we write on 
placards? Practical deliberations of this sort necessitated and nourished 
wider-ranging discussion, such as whether the analysis in a newspaper article 
was correct or whether German unification was possible and desirable. 
 As a collective practice, mobilization entailed the invention and reshaping 
of collective identities. The demonstrations did not develop simply because 
individuals sharing common grievances and antagonism towards the regime 
separately and ‘spontaneously’ decided that participating in protest was 
worthwhile. Rather, as surveys (Opp et al. 1993:156-8) and anecdotal evidence 
(Neues Forum Leipzig 1989:139; interviews with Ollie, Marianne Pienitz, ZFI 
employee) show, decisions to participate were frequently taken collectively, 
typically within the same social groups in which the crisis had been collectively 
                                                          
     228 On the connections between the emergence and organizational form of social movements, and 
participants’ redefinition of their identity and interests see Therborn (1980), Clemens (1996), Barker (1997c). 
     229 McAdam et al. (1996:7) note that the tendency of people to explain their situation in terms of systemic 
features rather than individual deficiencies generally grows when social movements are strong. How people 
assess the world relates to how they are organized. 
     230 Revolutions, Trotsky remarked (Barker 1995:17) are ‘very wordy occasions’. 
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analyzed and evaluated.231 At their workplace or amongst friends or family, 
individuals discussed whether to participate, and often proceeded together to the 
demonstration. During these processes of collective decision-making, the 
attachment to ‘protest norms’ that valued solidarity and participation tended to 
rise (Pollack 1997:325). Amongst ever-larger groups it became ‘fashionable’, in 
the words of one interviewee (Ollie), to say ‘there’s a demo taking place; let’s go!’ 
 As multiple ‘micromobilizations’ merged into single protests and these, in 
turn, into a greater movement, collective identities, norms and values underwent 
further redefinition. By acting together individuals created a movement and 
developed new conceptions of their collective identity. As Barker observes 
(1997c:14), ‘[c]ollective action entails envisaging the world as open to 
intervention and change and thus, commonly, to re-evaluation of the self and the 
group, and of the possible meanings of such terms as solidarity and community.’ 
The experience of participation in a large oppositional crowd was, according to 
all testimonies, extraordinary and empowering (e.g. Baule 1991:43; 
Lindner/Grüneberger 1992:29). Individuals felt strength in numbers and a 
shared desire for change; they thereby gained sufficient strength to resist the 
temptation to flee. Thus one young demonstrator on October 9 (Kuhn 1992:128) 
described how she 
 
 met up with friends, and we gave one another courage. Some cried, 
and some wanted to leave. But, we said, we are going to stand our 
ground together. And then we moved towards the church, and 
could hardly believe how many people were amassing. [...] we 
looked around, furtively, nervously, and suddenly realized we 
could no longer see the state’s forces [...] And suddenly a feeling 
arose, an incredible feeling of solidarity.232 
 
Another characterized the collective mood as ‘euphoric’ (Lindner/Grüneberger 
1992:51). ‘For me’, she added, 
                                                          
     231 The utilitarian individualism of rational choice theory is ill-equipped to deal with question of this sort 
(cf. Oberschall 1973). 
     232 The Potsdam meeting I attended in early October exemplified how the experience of collective protest 
combined with appropriate tactics could dissipate fear. An indescribable mixture of anxiety and excitement 
filled the air. Gradually the former emotion faded, in part through participants’ perception of the sheer 
numbers involved, in part through collective singing (‘We Shall Overcome’, if I remember right). 
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 the best moment was when, completely alone, I walked into the 
crowd and, at first quietly and then ever louder, cried "We are the 
People! We are the People!" [...] I saw police but felt no fear. I felt 
strong, raised my arms in the air, and shouted at the top of my 
voice. 
 
Collectively experienced empowerment helped to inspire participants with the 
confidence and urgency to mobilize others. Demonstrators’ recollections, 
according to Hartmut Zwahr (1993:45), reveal that it is the generation of 
solidarity through collective action that explains how mobilization in early 
October could accelerate despite the perceived probability of military 
crackdown. In part this occurred ‘naturally’, as the experience of collective 
protest catalyzed changes in the chemistry of individuals’ desires and political 
goals. For example, consider this story of the normally patriotic son of a 
functionary who, out of curiosity, went to a Leipzig demonstration (Königsdorf 
1990:69ff.). He witnessed the police and their dogs. He beheld the exuberance 
and solidarity of the demonstrators. Already, these experiences began to nudge 
him towards a more critical view of the ruling order, and to a more urgent 
commitment that it be reformed. Eventually, he joined the protest. In part, 
solidarity was produced by deliberate action. Demonstrators encouraged others 
— friends, colleagues, strangers — to join in, or to come next week. They shouted 
‘We need everybody!’ and ‘Get out! Join us!’ to bus and tram passengers and 
other onlookers (Gabi Horn interview). Such tactics were effective in converting 
the curious or the accidentally present into participants. After attending political 
prayers in Leipzig on October 9, Sybille Freitag recalls how she initially stayed 
outside the church, ‘still undecided’ (Neues Forum Leipzig 1989:85). But then: 
‘[a]gain and again the demonstrators called "join in" — until we spontaneously 
followed their appeal.’233 From mid-October collective mobilization assumed a 
highly organized form, with demonstrators chanting alternately ‘Next Monday 
we’re here again!’ and ‘Each of us, bring someone along!’ 
                                                          
     233 ‘Spontaneous’ here means ‘voluntary’, as opposed to the imposed ‘voluntary’ attendance at official 
demonstrations. 
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 In short, the demonstrations should be understood as not only embedded 
in preexisting ‘moral economies’ of discussion and dissent, but also productive of 
new values. These included the worth of and need for protest itself, as expressed 
for example in the banners ‘The Street is the Tribune of the People’, and 
‘Demonstrations there must be, Or reforms we’ll never see’. Related to this was 
the propagation of moral incentives and imperatives to participate and mobilize. 
What Rick Fantasia (1988) calls ‘cultures of solidarity’ flourished. The fact that 
the experience was of necessity collective and confrontational conditioned the types 
of values and norms which came to the fore, as expressed in participants’ beliefs 
and behaviour. As one survey suggests (Opp et al. 1993:68,179), individuals 
placed great importance on the need to form group actors, and rated values of 
solidarity especially highly — notably the principle ‘only unity brings us 
strength’. 
 The value attributed to solidarity was not a simple product of collective 
action but of groups united through conflict with a third party. This is a general 
phenomenon. For example, Steve Reicher has noted (1996:11), that police 
attempts to contain crowds tend to have ‘the effect of uniting crowd members 
and hence empowering them in resisting police action.’ In the process, members 
of crowds recategorize themselves and tend to come to act as a common 
category. What this reveals is that, in Reicher’s words (1996:11), ‘[c]ontext and 
subjectivity are not external to each other.’ In the flux of events, individuals are 
constantly redefining themselves, their relations to others, and their interests (cf. 
Rule 1988:40). ‘Collective identity’, in Barker’s words (1997c:4), is relational: it 
refers to ‘who we are in terms of our relations with others in our group, who we 
are as a group orienting to others, and who the others are in their orientations 
towards us.’ Participation entailed a re-categorization of protestors’ attitudes — 
towards co-protestors, towards the security forces and the regime and, indeed, 
towards their own goals and desires. 
 Processes of recategorization of attitudes and the reconstruction of 
collective identities were not ‘automatic’, but were influenced by conscious 
‘framing’. For example, chants of ‘No violence!’ affirmed the peaceable ‘collective 
identity’ of the demonstrators and appealed to the security forces to pacify theirs. 
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Also, during this first phase of demonstrations the ‘Internationale’ was sung. 
This gave out a signal. It deliberately blurred lines of conflict between regime 
and protestors, making it more difficult for repression to be justified.234 It also 
signalled the demonstrators’ cheeky, defiant appropriation of the regime’s 
symbols as their own, in an implicit denial of its monopoly control over symbols 
of socialist solidarity. Its lyrics, in their urgent claim for justice and ‘rights’, 
doubtlessly also appealed. Consider, too, the slogan ‘We are the People!’ It 
expresses a sentiment commonly found during the first stages of revolutions, 
when ‘middling’ and ‘toiling’ layers of society unite against the regime before 
differentiating into reformist and radical currents. It harks back to the classic 
republican framing of political conflict as pitting the patriotic ‘people’ against a 
dynasty, elite, or regime defined as illegitimate and, implicitly, as alien. As such 
it suited the first, largely united, phase of the movement, albeit with the twist 
that the regime itself laid claim to republican frames, following Communist 
orthodoxy since the ‘People’s Front’ period. ‘The People’ found themselves 
pitted against a ‘People’s Democracy’, particularly its ‘People’s Police’ and 
‘People’s Army’. The slogan thus signified an ironic assault upon the ruling 
class’s definition of its collective identity as embracing the entire population. As 
one banner put it, ‘The GDR belongs to the People, not to the SED’. It 
simultaneously challenged the regime’s conception of the general interest and 
acted as a ‘bridging frame’ towards the not-yet-mobilized masses. It asserted the 
protestors’ belief that the vast majority backed their basic aims, and that this 
majority should determine the political agenda. As another banner put it, ‘The 
people should have the leading role!’ Moreover, in a context in which 
demonstrators were vilified as dangerous deviants, the detournement of the 
meaning of ‘people’ — particularly when conjoined with other slogans such as 
‘Prison for the Stasi’ — implied that the dangerous deviants were in fact to be 
found in uniforms or wearing SED badges. 
 
Psychology of Liberation 
                                                          
     234 Hall (1990:106) relates a similar example, from Berlin on October 7, where ‘none of the eager 
plainclothes Stasi officials knew whether the chants of "Gorby, Gorby" hailed from loyal FDJ members or 
from "disgusting" oppositionists.’ 
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A final crucial component of this phase of the revolution, which comes to mind 
especially when I read my diary of the time, was the intoxicating atmosphere. 
The country was awash with a tremendous excitement, the desire for change, for 
participation and for discussion. Social scientists, from Durkheim to Lenin to 
Zolberg have referred to these heightened experiences of revolution in terms 
such as ‘collective effervescence’, ‘festive energies’, and ‘moments of madness’. 
Colin Barker has critically engaged with and advanced these theories, and the 
following is loosely based upon his writings (1995, 1997a, 1997c). 
 Broadly, one can point to three aspects of a revolutionary situation that 
foster ‘effervescence’. The first is the dramatic character of political crisis. As 
discussed in chapter two, a sense of ‘alternativity’ arises, a feeling that ‘anything 
might happen’ and ‘everything is possible’. Important matters are being 
determined within a condensed time period — ‘it is "now or never" [...] "one 
thing or the other"‘ (Debray 1973:104). The role of conscious human agency is 
decisive. The second is the new-found sense of power amongst the formally 
powerless — that they can actively influence the political process. The final factor 
is the novelty of unfolding constellations of social relations, behaviour and 
consciousness. With society in upheaval, new possibilities are espied, and new 
hopes formulated. Grievances and desires are rearticulated. New questions arise 
for discussion. What is the nature of this or that aspect of society? Should it be 
so? Can it be changed? If so, how do we get there? These processes of rethinking 
and reformulation drive innovation and the search for knowledge. In East 
Germany a feverish curiosity in public affairs stimulated a huge thirst for 
learning and reading. One interviewee (Ramona) recalled that she ‘watched 
every news programme, East and West German, every evening, for months.’ The 
revolution entailed a profound rupturing of routine behaviour. If social life is 
imagined as a drama, in revolutions the usual script crumples and the emphasis 
shifts to improvisation. The possibility of stepping out of one’s role and the 
cognitive transformations necessitated by this tend to evoke states of heightened 
consciousness — ‘stepping out’, as Peter Berger has observed (1963:157), is the 
root of the term ‘ecstasy’. As Barker remarks, such ‘processes are simultaneously 
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affective and cognitive, for there is a potential pleasure-shock in the intellectual 
appreciation of a new situation’ (1995:17). In rapidly changing constellations of 
power and collective identities, individuals begin to relate to others, not least 
their immediate superiors, in radically different ways. As Barker writes 
(1997a:10), participants in collective action ‘regularly report that they "discover" 
aspects of their selves, and their capacities, which they had not previously 
tested’. ‘Heightened and re-focused energy and attention,’ he continues 
(1997a:11), 
 
 the formation of new relationships, the undertaking of new tasks, 
the emergence of new forms of understanding, the affective shock 
of treating one’s self and one’s fellows as centres of significant 
decision and action, promotes a new sense of dignity and a new 
"status order" — even if only temporarily. 
 
With changing relations of force, relations of consent and the ‘status order’ alter 
too. Attitudes of resignation and deference, rooted, as Therborn suggests 
(1980:94), in the seeming omnipotence of the ruling class, are cast aside. Injustices 
previously seen as inevitable become reinterpreted as subject to conscious 
human intervention. In East Germany ‘the experience of the power of collective 
uprising and the surprise at the creativity of the protest brought about a 
therapeutic liberation’, according to one psychologist (M Schneider 1990:132).235 
Humiliating years spent stooping to those in authority and speaking their 
bloated phrases through gritted teeth were cast aside. Millions gained an 
undreamt of feeling of freedom, of self-respect. Even if seldom named, this was 
the most vital achievement of the revolution. 
 Such processes — the ‘revitalization’, ‘empowerment’, and mutual ‘self-
enhancement’ of the lower orders — had already developed to a significant 
degree, particularly in and around Leipzig, by mid-October. The question for the 
regime, meanwhile, shifted from how to crush collective action to how to contain 
it. 
                                                          
     235 For a similar view see Maaz (1990:145-6). Interestingly, an employee on a psychiatry ward in a Leipzig 
hospital (Marianne interview) observed that ‘suddenly, with the Wende, we had no more patients.’ 
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Chapter Seven: The Wende and the Fall of the Wall 
The month which followed the decisive breakthrough in Saxony may be seen as 
the summit of the revolution. It is remembered for two great events — the fall of 
Honecker on October 18, and that of the Wall on November 9. 
 The SED leadership’s failure to quell the protest movement marked an 
end to its immediate dilemma of whether or not to unleash armed force, but 
raised new questions and quandaries. If the movement could not be directly 
suppressed, how could it be mollified and contained? How could the ever-
worsening problems of the continuing exodus and approaching bankruptcy be 
resolved? To what extent should the domestic political structure be reformed, 
and what degree of personnel reshuffle should occur? The ruling group was 
uncertain and divided as to how to confront these concurrent and dangerous 
dilemmas. Its actions were generally cautious, sometimes muddled, and 
persistently conservative, thus provoking intensified criticism from within SED 
ranks and accelerating public protest. Each week additional concessions were 




‘The victory of the demonstrators in Leipzig’ on October 9, recalls Gerlach 
(1991:284), ‘horrified Honecker.’ Combined with mounting evidence of popular 
criticism of the government’s obdurate position and haughty tone, and reports 
that strikes threatened (Mitter/Wolle 1990:226; Reuth/Bönte 1993:112), 
Honecker’s co-leaders began to express concern over the regime’s dwindling 
legitimacy (Przybylski 1992:121-33). For the first time significant dissent was 
voiced at the top of the Party. Three regional SED secretaries, led by Modrow, 
expressed disagreement over the handling of the crisis. At the Politbüro meeting 
on the 10th the hardliners’ view that ‘everything will collapse if we give an inch’ 
did not dominate (Hawkes et al. 1990:70).236 Although the Politbüro’s public 
                                                          
     236 Symbolic of the hardliners’ predicament, Mittag’s usual confident fluency degenerated into a stutter 
(Schabowski 1990:90). Barker notes (1995) that during uprisings the masses tend to gain fluency while rulers, 
if anything, lose it. 
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statements remained hubristic and saturated with venomous condemnations of 
protest, they also evinced the first small signs of tactical reconsideration and 
hints of a lack of unity at the top. The needs for ‘renewal’ and for ‘sober dialogue’ 
were admitted, although, as Hager explained, the latter would be only with those 
citizens who do not call into question the existing social order. A number of 
senior functionaries, such as Harry Tisch and Wolfgang Vogel, sensed which 
way the wind was turning and proposed minor reforms, such as the 
decriminalization of illegal emigration. Even the usually stalwart FDJ leadership 
adopted a (mildly) critical stance, both in a letter to Honecker and through 
publication of some unusually dovish views in Junge Welt. The media somewhat 
tempered its anti-Bonn vitriol, and television news conceded that ‘suggestions 
concerning a more attractive socialism are important’ (Keithly 1991:160). 
 The second week of October witnessed an unstable equilibrium between 
signs of repression and liberalization. The pace of change varied between 
institutions and between personalities. The LDPD’s newspaper published a 
critique of the SED’s media policy, while Neues Deutschland scarcely changed. 
Police brutally attacked demonstrators in Halle on the 10th, while the vigil in 
Berlin was left in peace. On the 12th travel to the CSSR was restricted still further 
but a day later arrested demonstrators were released. On the 13th the SED 
leadership vaguely reaffirmed its acceptance of the need for ‘dialogue’ but 
already a day later local officials in Karl-Marx-Stadt, Leipzig and Potsdam 
admitted contact with NF representatives. 
 Despite cautious hints of reform the road towards military crackdown 
was not yet closed. Although the Politbüro now clearly supported a policy that 
the security forces in Leipzig should not fire upon the next demonstration unless 
seriously provoked, this left the option of deliberately inciting or even organizing 
such provocation. Honecker’s proposal to send a tank regiment through Leipzig 
on the coming Monday suggests that this path was at least possible (Przybylski 
1992:130). In the event, local officials, backed by Politbüro members (notably 
Krenz), once again favoured pursuit of political rather than military solutions. 
 Proponents of a tactical retreat now acted to remove Honecker — the 
keystone of the hardline position — from his post. Although initially a messy, 
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tentative process, in its final stage the coup was astonishingly smooth, and 
received unanimous validation at the Politbüro. Honecker resisted, but 
ultimately accepted Schürer’s proposal that he retire ‘honourably’ — i.e. on 
grounds of health — and even voted for his own usurpation.237 Along with 
Honecker the two most unpopular hawks, Herrmann and Mittag, were removed 
from the Politbüro.238 
 The change of leadership, however, did not mark a sharp break with the 
past. Despite the loss of three hardliners the rest of the leadership remained at 
their posts. Old habits governed the very procedure of the changeover. With a 
mafia-like sense of decorum, all present at the Politbüro meeting accepted that 
Honecker’s departure should be presented not as an overthrow but a voluntary 
resignation. Krenz had long been seen as Honecker’s ‘crown prince’, but in his 
resignation speech Honecker wilfully recommended Krenz as his successor. If he 
believed that his commendation would impart legitimacy to Krenz, this was a 
backhanded blessing. The CC was convened, not to discuss or vote on, but 
merely to rubber-stamp the Politbüro’s decision, thus confirming the impression 




Honecker’s ouster was belated. The new leadership recognized the need to 
reform but feared the ‘Tocquevillian predicament’ that it now faced. Krenz was 
conservative, and not in favour of any sweeping review of policy or personnel. In 
Schabowski’s words (1990:127), he wanted ‘to carry through the Wende 
[turnaround] with minimal sacrifice’. In his inaugural speech Krenz promised 
that the SED ‘is going to introduce a Wende, with immediate effect’ (Brunssen 
1998:112). The term implied that a new direction was to be charted but that the 
change would be of a ‘steering correction’ sort. The new course was ill-defined 
and developed piecemeal, under constant pressure from the streets. It was less a 
                                                          
     237 His decision was doubtlessly assisted by Mielke’s threat to open the safe which contained evidence that 
Honecker had collaborated with the Gestapo whilst in prison. 
     238 Mittag attempted to escape this fate by offloading all blame onto his mentor Honecker (Schabowski 
1991:117). Many other erstwhile allies would turn on each other in these months, each trying to save their 
skins by scapegoating others. 
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positive strategy for reform than a series of indistinct promises and small 
concessions. These, it was hoped, would appease and stall the protest movement, 
impart the government with much needed credibility, and enable it to win time 
and reestablish stability. Having regained a powerful position, whether and how 
to make significant reforms could then be considered, in a suitably dignified 
manner. 
 The reforms initiated, though slight, were nonetheless significant. Those 
imprisoned for attempting to emigrate were freed. Sputnik was permitted again. 
The regular publication of ecological data was promised. The media began to 
report more truthfully.239 Critical letters now appeared in the press, the Leipzig 
demonstrations were covered by television news, and the ‘ordinary’ people 
interviewed were no longer predominantly selected stooges. In some places NF 
meetings were permitted. Finally, ‘dialogue’ was promised, in which regime 
representatives would ‘listen’ to popular grievances. 
 Dialogue, for the regime, signified its attempt to redirect the popular 
desire for political discussion from oppositional demonstrations on the streets 
into spaces, such as universities, that were controlled by ‘progressive forces’. 
Initially, CM leaders — still considered ‘the enemy’ — were to be excluded. At 
one ‘dialogue’, on the 19th, an NF representative was even refused access. 
However, a redefinition soon ensued. Now, much of the movement was to be 
treated ‘sensitively’; harsher measures were to be reserved for those who rejected 
socialism and/or advocated radical methods of protest (Mitter/Wolle 1990). By 
the 22nd, SED functionaries in some districts, particularly around Dresden, were 
engaging in debate not only with ‘experts’ and clergy, but with CM 
representatives too. By the 26th, direct talks were underway between local SED 
and CM leaders in various towns, including Berlin. Dialogue qua public debate 
began to be supplemented with dialogue qua negotiation. 
 The new course was not entirely without success. Even meagre reforms 
were enough to satisfy certain groups, notably the church leadership (cf. Neubert 
                                                          
     239 This measure was particularly welcome to many members of the nomenklatura. They required reliable 
information. When more accurate reports of social and economic life began to be published, some expressed 
indignation at having been ‘deceived’ (Hertle/Stephan 1997:246). 
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1998:868).240 As a holding operation, it provided a framework within which the 
nomenklatura could begin to restructure in something approaching an orderly 
fashion. The more far-sighted functionaries began to develop and discuss ideas 
for furthergoing reforms of government, economy, and foreign policy. Stasi 
officers began to destroy or sequester the more sensitive and valuable files. 
 On balance, however, the strategy must be judged a failure. SED leaders 
seem to have believed that, whereas repression had provoked protest, 
concessions would appease it. According to Schabowski (1990:111) they therefore 
‘believed to have months’ in which to retrench and restructure. They were 
mistaken. Despite — or because of — the decline of repression, the 
demonstrations continued and grew in force.241 The government’s dilatory 
attitude to reform had two effects on the protest movement. First, even minor 
reforms were seen as a step in the right direction, a victory for protest. The 
movement gained confidence. In particular, the retreat from a ‘Tiananmen 
solution’ reduced the risks of protest and encouraged wider layers to 
participate.242 Second, the government’s pretence that it was suddenly converted 
to reformism was widely seen as hypocrisy. The same politicians who had 
defended the most sordid tyranny now pretended to be champions of democratic 
reform. Krenz in particular was simply not credible as a reformist. He had 
headed the commission that fixed the May election results. He had loudly 
applauded the Tiananmen massacre. As chief of the security forces, he was 
responsible for the violence of the preceding weeks. Thus, a banner on a Leipzig 
demonstration read ‘Egon Krenz, don’t settle yourself in — we won’t forget 
China, elections, police deployment’. Similarly, a worker in Berlin recalls: ‘[a]nd 
then we got Egon Krenz, who had been fed the same shit, who was, in fact, the 
same old shit. Nothing, absolutely nothing, was possible with him’ (Philipsen 
1993:285). Even the more plausibly reformist amongst Politbüro members were 
                                                          
     240 When meeting church leaders (on the 19th), Krenz even felt able to ask them to pray for the police and 
Stasi of Leipzig, ‘because it is not easy for them to have to face hate-filled [demonstrators]’ (BA-SAPMO 
Archiv). 
     241 For data showing that both repression and concessions tended to boost the protest wave, see Eberwein 
et al. (1991:30-1). 
     242 However, emergency rule remained a serious possibility until November. Tens of thousands of 
soldiers remained on alert until after the fall of the Wall (Hertle/Stephan 1997:59). 
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largely stuck in traditional ways. Modrow, for example, began to argue for a 
more systematic approach to reform. However, he too remained committed, in 
his own words, to ‘the old framework of order and security’ (Modrow 1991:23). 
He too had been implicated in the May election fraud and was responsible for 
the worst police brutality of the autumn. As Michael Brie described him 
(interview), ‘Modrow is no reformist, but knew that reforms would have to be 
made.’ Although favouring ‘renewal’, he insisted that its impetus and content 
must come from the Party — ‘and not from those on the streets or in the church’ 
(Stephan 1994:160). 
 During these weeks the regime was clearly committed to reforming as 
little and late as possible. Reforms were granted, but, as Schabowski recalls 
(1990:110), ‘under duress, not voluntarily’.243 Beneath the rhetoric, traditional 
ways showed through. In Schwerin, for example, the organizers of a pro-regime 
demonstration called in army loudspeaker trucks to broadcast supplementary 
applause (Neubert 1998:866). In Berlin, SED leaders attempted to block a church-
initiated inquiry into security force brutality.244 On the following day, parliament 
voted Krenz to the position of head of government (in addition to his role as SED 
leader), prompting a spontaneous gathering of 13,000 — including many SED 
members — to protest the decision.245 The persistence of such ‘old tricks’, 
combined with the government’s reluctance to reform, contributed to a feeling 
amongst protestors and wider layers that protest must continue, if only to ensure 
that recent gains be solidified. The feeling that protests had delivered reform 





                                                          
     243 In early November a CC delegate was to complain that all reforms — even those that had, apparently, 
‘been ripening for long’, appeared as victories for street protest (Hertle/Stephan 1997:254). 
     244 To his embarrassment, a technician secretly taped Schabowski’s speech to parliament — in which he 
recommended that the inquiry be ‘minimized and formalized’ — and passed the tape to oppositionists 
(Neubert 1998:866). 
     245 That an unheard of fifty-two members of parliament refused to vote for Krenz’s accession, however, 
reflected the increasing autonomy of the ‘block’ parties. 
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The most egregious examples of the government’s inability to appease and 
contain protest were the ‘dialogues’. The intention was to encourage grievances 
to be voiced passively; Berghofer described the exercise as centred on ‘listening’ 
and ‘introspection’ (Links/Bahrmann 1990:59). They were designed to attract the 
more moderately inclined. Transcripts evince an emphasis upon discussion of 
relatively abstract questions, such as ‘conceptions of socialist democracy’. 
However, they did signify the defeat of the SED’s traditional ‘monological’ form 
of rule. On the defensive, SED representatives — especially those who were 
rigidly set in monological ways — tended to perform poorly.246 Although 
initiated as fora for anodyne discussion, the dialogues could be reinterpreted as 
opportunities for verbal confrontation. Their very existence raised furthergoing 
political questions. If the SED’s monological claim upon truth is ending, what 
about its monopolistic claim on power? If the SED forms one partner in dialogue, 
should the other be CM representatives or ‘the general public’? If the latter, how 
can meaningful dialogue be institutionalized? The dialogues, thus, were sites of 
contest in their form as well as content. As Maier puts it (1997:176), ‘The rulers 
hoped for controlled and private parleys; the crowds demanded public 
exchanges.’ Already during the first such occasion (in Dresden on October 16), 
crowds outside the town hall, where ‘dialogue’ was occurring between the 
mayor and ‘citizens’, demanded that a microphone connection be installed so 
that they could hear (Maier 1997:176). 
 Whether or not dialogue involved the ‘crowd’, the SED seemed to lose. 
When presented as a form of mass democracy, the limitations of dialogue were 
clear. For example, in Dresden on October 26 the SED invited the public to a 
‘public dialogue’ with Modrow and Berghofer. One hundred thousand attended, 
but the occasion was not so much dialogue as repeated appeals for moderation 
by local officials and worthies. The alternative — public discussion in controlled 
spaces — did not become established as a substitute for demonstrations. 
                                                          
     246 An impression of this is given by the following vignette, which describes the ‘dialogue’ of an NF 
member with Rostock’s SED chief (Probst 1992:52). ‘I am initiating dialogue with you’, said the oppositionist. 
‘I have a question. What do you understand by the dictatorship of the proletariat?’ To which the functionary 
could only repeat ‘Ah... ah...’ before breaking into a stutter. The entire audience burst out laughing, 
prompting the functionary to cry out: ‘Hang on! First I’ll have to look up what Lenin said.’ At this point ‘the 
audience lost all respect for this most powerful man in Rostock.’ 
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Frequently, the SED representatives were simply not credible as genuine 
proponents of debate and reform — some even carried pistols with them (Hertle 
1996a:136). More significantly, much of the protest movement mistrusted the 
Wende, and began to formulate demands that challenged the very framework of 
the dialogues. They criticized the dialogues as little more than focus groups 
staged to divert attention from the lack of real democratic change. A postal 
worker interviewed on Leipzig radio (Neues Forum Leipzig 1989:112), put it thus: 
‘[t]he majority of the population is not content that it remains just talking; instead 
the majority expects clear signals from the government’. On the demonstrations 
popular slogans and banners stated ‘No dialogue with Party bosses!’, ‘Dialogue 
is good, deeds are better!’ (Die Welt 8.11.89), and ‘Dialogue has become cliché; so 
on the streets we shall stay!’ (Schüddekopf 1990). A journalist at the Leipzig 
demonstration on November 6 reported (taz 1990a:88) that ‘the anger has 
increased. By now only the SED representatives are talking of dialogue.’ 
 With the exception of a meeting of some 1,500 at the Karl-Marx University 
dialogues were not especially well attended. Establishment opinion was 
disappointed. Already on October 24, the Leipziger Volkszeitung (W Schneider 
1990:59) bemoaned the fact that ‘[m]any of the chants and slogans [on the 
previous day’s demonstration] showed hardly any inclination to take a serious 
part in the open dialogue about all society’s problems that is currently 
underway.’ A few days later, in the Dresden region — which was the pioneer of 
dialogue247 — one Communist could argue (albeit, perhaps, with exaggeration) 
that ‘the people don’t even want dialogue — that’s shown by the fact that, out of 
the twenty dialogue meetings on offer, only one hundred people in total 
attended’ (Liebsch 1991:96). 
 From the regime’s perspective, the strategy may have succeeded in 
widening divisions between moderates and radicals in the movement,248 but it 
clearly failed in its main objective. As Dönert and Rummelt put it (1990:154), 
‘[a]fter October 9 there was no lack of attempts to bring people off the streets by 
                                                          
     247 On the 23rd, Modrow announced that over 500 committees would be set up in the region to organize 
dialogue between representatives of state, church and the general public. 
     248 That this was a key motive, see Stephan (1994:164,175-6). 
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offers of "dialogue": the street should not be the place for dialogue. In vain. The 
attempts failed.’ 
 
The Regime Squeezed: Political Economy 
 
Superficially it could appear that the GDR elite’s inability to master the evolving 
crisis was due to their rigidity and stupidity. Whatever the truth in this, their task 
was made immeasurably more difficult by a set of objective constraints that 
reinforced and intensified one another. Each of these threatened either the SED’s 
hold on power or the sovereignty of the state itself. Perhaps the gravest was the 
deepening economic crisis, with its associated crisis of geo-economic policy. 
 Although economic crisis was, naturally, not the focus of the Krenz 
leadership’s attention, its grew continually more severe. The exodus of workers 
and professionals was damaging certain sectors, and contributed to the persistent 
underachievement of export targets (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2.10.98). With 
political turmoil increasing, the GDR’s international creditors were sounding 
nervous. West German business leaders and politicians stressed that a ‘calming 
of the situation’ was imperative (Nakath/Stephan 1996:218).249 
 In late October two key papers analyzed the situation and proposed 
remedies. One was by General Kleine for the attention of the Stasi’s economics 
department. The other was prepared by Schürer, Schalck, Beil, Donda and 
Höfner, for the Politbüro (Schürer 1992a). Both presented an alarming picture of 
crisis. They drew attention to a long-term decline in rates of accumulation and 
investment, and to the explosion of state debt to the domestic credit-system as 
well as to foreign banks. The latter, for Schürer et al., threatened the state with 
‘immediately impending insolvency’. If this occurred, the result would be a 
moratorium of international lending (Hertle 1992:1023).250 
 Kleine’s report rendered connections between emigration, economic crisis, 
and the protest movement especially clear (Bastian 1994:6-7): 
                                                          
     249 This suggests that those institutions that were accusing the Kohl government of breaking with the 
established Ostpolitical priority of stability were presenting a one-sided view. 
     250 Although their conclusion was based on a significant overestimate of the level of hard currency debt 
(Volze 1996:711), the diagnosis of severe crisis was nonetheless accurate. 
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 [M]aintaining our solvency is a question of the existence of 
socialism in the GDR.251 
  That is why it is a question of the highest security-political 
importance for us when competent personalities estimate that, in 
connection with the current internal situation in the GDR, bankers 
from the non-socialist-abroad question us ever more persistently 
about the credit-worthiness of the GDR. 
  An article in the F.A.Z. on 12.10.1989 points out that in the 
biannual credit assessment of an American finance institute, the 
GDR has fallen into disgrace and has been demoted in the ranks of 
credit-worthiness. 
  Then it goes on: "In the light of the GDR’s loss of prestige 
due to the mass exodus of its populace, another demotion within 
the next half year should be inevitable. This, as is well known, has 
consequences for the rate of interest that the GDR must pay to the 
West on its debts." 
  That also means, of course, that if we do not manage, in the 
next days and weeks, to bring "tangible calm" to the process of 
social development, consequences for procuring new loans are 
foreseeable. 
  In this regard it is worth remembering that the current 
developments in Poland and Hungary to a certain extent had their 
beginnings in these countries’ insolvency. With the dearth of 
Western loans came a drastic worsening of the economic situation 
and of living standards, and counter-revolution could steadily gain 
ground. 
 
The old policy dilemma of whether to impose austerity and risk revolt, or to 
settle for economic stagnation, had been superseded. Now there was stagnation 
and revolt and the need for austerity. Given the scale of protest, however, the 
times were hardly auspicious for cutting budgets, closing firms, or shedding 
workers. When visiting Gorbachev on November 1, Krenz disclosed his 
dilemma. Living standards, he said, must ‘immediately’ be slashed by 30%. 
However, he continued, with magnificent understatement, ‘politically, that 
would be irresponsible’ (Hertle 1992:1027). Gorbachev could provide no solution. 
Aid was impossible, given the USSR’s own crisis. Apart from advising him not to 
be ‘scared of the people’ all he could suggest was that Krenz, although keeping 
                                                          
     251 The urgency and frequency with which Kleine’s paper intones the need to ensure ‘the survival of our 
republic!’ is remarkable. 
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the full severity of the situation secret, should warn the population that they had 
been ‘living above their means for years’, and should take steps towards the 
easing of inter-German travel (Stephan 1994:200; Hertle/Stephan 1997:64).252 
 If both papers presented a devastating picture of the depth of crisis, their 
policy proposals were altogether different. Kleine’s paper reflected the views of 
the ‘Easternizers’ (cf. chapter five). Many of its recommendations were mere 
vague exhortations (including the imperatives to raise productivity, raise the rate 
of accumulation, strengthen the export sector, introduce new technologies, 
increase investment, restructure R&D, and improve conditions in workplaces). 
Its one major policy proposal was that the GDR massively step up economic 
cooperation with other Comecon countries, especially the USSR (Bastian 
1994:16). During October, however, nomenklatura opinion had swung further 
against such views. A large proportion of managers and of second-row 
functionaries who scented prospects for greater influence after Honecker’s 
demise, were ‘Westernizers’ (e.g. Nitz 1995:164). The ideas they were discussing 
included lifting the state’s foreign trade monopoly, introducing market reforms, 
and even orienting the GDR’s economy around West Berlin — as Guangdong to 
Hong Kong (Nakath et al. 1998:64). Schürer and his co-authors were 
‘Westernizers’, and the fact that their paper was presented to (and taken 
seriously by) the Politbüro attests to the rise of that current. Their 
recommendations included austerity measures such as a reduction of subsidies 
of consumer goods, market reform, and heightened cooperation with the West — 
particularly Bonn. Loans, they insisted, were urgently required. Some might 
come from those OECD countries (such as France and Japan) which, SED leaders 
averred, had an interest in keeping Germany divided, ‘so that a large competitor 
does not get larger’ (Roesler 1993:571). However, major new credits would have 
to come from Bonn too, and that would inevitably require major political 
concessions. Following exploratory talks by Schalck in Bonn in the previous 
week, Schürer et al. therefore recommended that ‘before the end of the century’ 
                                                          
     252 Coming but a week after Gorbachev’s first formal commitment to the ‘Sinatra doctrine’, this was a 
striking admission of impotence, an abdication of leadership. 
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the border to the FRG be opened, if major financial aid from Bonn could be 
gained in exchange (Hertle 1992:1023-4).253 
 
The Regime Squeezed: Borders 
 
The transformation of East Germany’s border regime was also being pressed by 
other forces. The protest movement was growing and radicalizing every day. 
From October 16 it concentrated increasingly upon the demand for visa-free 
travel. The SED leadership began to realize that major concessions would have to 
be made. In late October the question of the border-regime rose to the top of the 
policy agenda. A new law on travel began to be drafted; it would, said 
Schabowski (in private), become law in December (Reuth/Bönte 1993:136). On 
the 27th it was announced that, as before October 3, no visa would be required 
for travel to Czechoslovakia as from November 1. 
 On that date, however, would-be emigrants once again occupied West 
Germany’s embassy in Prague. Fearful that the issue might spark domestic 
politicization, as had occurred in Hungary, the Czechoslovak government 
permitted East Germans to emigrate across its western border from November 3. 
Around 8,500 per day proceeded to do so — a rate that, if sustained, would 
amount to the equivalent of Magdeburg or Rostock disappearing each month. 
Emigrants and protestors were forcing doors open. Scores of those who had, 
supposedly, emigrated to the West now returned to the GDR. To perplexed 
border guards they gave their motives as ‘adventurism, day-trips, and testing the 
plausibility of the GDR media’ (Hertle 1996b:121). Their re-entry, however, 
increased the problem of maintaining travel restrictions for ‘mere’ 
holidaymakers. As Interior Ministry officials admitted (Hertle 1996b:121), 
discriminating in favour of emigrants would be ‘politically irresponsible’. On the 
other hand, barring emigration — which in practice would entail resealing the 
border to the CSSR — was barely even mooted. As the Foreign Minister put it 
(Nakath/Stephan 1996:226), that would provoke an exceedingly dangerous ‘trial 
                                                          
     253 The possibility of meaningfully easing travel to and from the West in return for economic advantages 
had long been under consideration at the margins of nomenklatura strategizing (e.g. Nitz 1995:58). 
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of strength’. In this sense therefore, as Hartung wrote days before the actual fall 
of the Wall (tageszeitung 7.11.89), it was ‘the revolutionary movement itself that 
has deprived the Wall of its existence.’ 
 In the first week of November the draft travel law was published. It was a 
difficult law to formulate. On the one hand, the streets, especially in Leipzig, 
were by now resounding with chants of ‘The Wall must go!’ On the other, 
officials were aware that opening the border to the FRG would have 
‘uncontrollable consequences’ (Nakath/Stephan 1996:226), and would probably 
require additional supplies of scarce hard currency.254 Those that drafted it 
sincerely believed that, through explicitly permitting travel to the West, it would 
‘give grounds for hope that many people will find new reserves of courage [with 
which to build] a strong, attractive socialism’ (Stephan 1994:195-6). 
 In fact, its publication elicited widespread public outrage. Phrased in the 
SED’s traditional tortuous style, and with no reference to when the law would 
come into effect, it smelt to many of duplicity. It set a maximum of thirty days 
sojourn abroad, and retained the requirement of a visa (which take weeks to 
process). Most inflammatory of all, no provision was made for the exchange of 
local into hard currency. This effectively put travel to the West beyond the reach 
of most people, except high earners and those with generous Western relatives. 
The reaction of demonstrators to the proposals was graphic. Banners were 
painted with slogans such as ‘Egon, get the hard currency out!’; ‘Real freedom of 
travel, with hard currency!’; ‘Visa but no real money — the whole world finds 
that funny!’; ‘Put the Stasi’s hard currency into the travel account!’; and ‘Alu-
tokens abroad? No way! — We need hard currency straight away!’255 In addition 
to wrath on the streets, the draft law provoked strike threats. According to 
Schabowski (1990:135; 1991:304), the government took these especially seriously: 
 
 We were particularly alarmed that strike threats were [...] coming 
from the workplaces. The workers felt discriminated against by the 
law, because it in effect denied them the material prerequisites for 
                                                          
     254 This latter consideration was the subject of Schalck’s negotiations in Bonn in mid-October (Hertle 
1996a). 
     255 GDR coins were aluminium. 
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travel in the West. In this situation, strikes were the last thing we 
needed. 
 
The Regime Squeezed: Workers’ Discontent 
 
By October, according to the Stasi’s ‘situation reports’, it was above all amongst 
workers that radical anti-regime opinions were voiced. The bulk of 
demonstrators in Leipzig and elsewhere were workers; their preponderance 
increased as the movement developed. By mid-October the revolution had 
begun to enter the workplaces on a broad scale.256 Although no major industrial 
action had occurred, SED leaders were nevertheless deeply worried that it might. 
As Otto König put it, speaking to the CC on November 9 (BA-SAPMO: IV 
2/1/709) ‘[t]he working class is so enraged they’re going to the barricades! 
They’re shouting: Party out of the workplaces! They want to get rid of the 
[FDGB], get rid of the Party secretaries.’ There is abundant testimony both from 
workers and observers (e.g. Rathenow 1989:286; Löw 1991:13), to the effect that 
workplaces were bubbling with discussion about the political crisis, and about 
the pros and cons of industrial action — albeit seldom about whether to actually 
strike forthwith. The Stasi’s sources in workplaces (e.g. Mitter/Wolle 1990:226; 
Bastian 1994:33) warned incessantly of ‘impatience’ amongst workers and that 
‘spontaneous’ strikes were an ever present danger. A worker in Berlin (Rottluf 
interview) reported that, after October 7, political discussion in his factory 
exploded: 
 
 It was an incredible and rapid politicization, an enormous process 
that went on everywhere — on the shop floor, in the toilets, in 
lunch breaks, at FDGB meetings. Initially you found one or two 
others you could talk to, then, gradually, more and more. All the 
time you had to test who you could talk to and about what, what 
demands could be raised and who would listen to them, who 
would take them on and spread them. 
 
                                                          
     256 A tremendous amount of activity had occurred from August onwards, but, except for the examples 
given in chapter six, it was invariably of a low key sort, such as the collective writing of letters to SED 
leaders. The most famous example of the latter was that sent by workers at Bergmann Borsig (the largest 
heavy engineering plant in Berlin) to Tisch, demanding that he appear at their factory in person in order to 
respond to their demands, and threatening strike action if he refused (Simon 1990:134; Philipsen 1993:116ff.). 
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Workers’ concerns may be grouped into four types. One was national political 
questions. Demands raised here, alongside those of the protest movement in 
general, included the call for the state to publish economic statistics, to ‘come 
clean’ about the state of the economy. A second demand involved pushing back 
managerial control. Concrete demands here included calls for firms’ accounts to 
be subjected to workers’ (or public) scrutiny, for the resignation of particular 
managers, and for permission to disseminate and publicize workers’ political 
opinions and opposition propaganda in the workplace. Third, the FDGB was a 
major theme. Hostility to it was widespread, and resignations rose sharply. More 
worrying for the regime, an employee at a factory near Potsdam announced the 
formation of an independent trade union. Although his proposal came to little (in 
part because he was promptly sent on ‘official business’ to Bulgaria), even the 
FDGB’s newspaper was forced to admit that the demand for new trade union 
structures was being widely discussed (Tribüne 30.10.89). Last, but not least, 
workers commonly demanded the abolition of SED workplace organization. 
 
The Regime Squeezed: Crisis in the SED 
 
The crisis afflicting the SED continued to accelerate. It was manifested in three 
processes: division, dissent, and disintegration. In October and November over 
200,000 resigned.257 
 SED members in positions of authority were forced to address a variety of 
questions raised by the national crisis. Should reforms be made of Party, polity, 
and economy? If so, of what kind, and how fast should they be introduced? A 
variety of answers were given to such questions. Differentiation was an 
inevitable process. The rise of reform-inclined figures such as Modrow, who 
could push forward projects for the restructuring of the relationships between 
Party and polity and between polity and economy, certainly helped the SED to 
maintain some sort of grip on power throughout the autumn and winter. 
However, the breakdown of tried and tested strategies and established relations 
of authority within the SED, and the different styles and speeds with which 
                                                          
     257 For biographical details, see Klemens (1990). 
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functionaries reacted to events, also contributed to divisions and uncertainty. If, 
for example, one district leadership permitted an NF meeting to occur already in 
mid-October, as in Zittau, their peers elsewhere were immediately confronted 
with the question as to whether they should follow suit, stay silent, or check with 
Berlin. If the latter course was adopted, the advice given could vary substantially 
depending upon whom the question was addressed to. Differentiation amongst 
SED members tended to breed antagonisms and even outright hostility. A report 
to the CC in late October (Stephan 1994:189) complained that hardline 
Communists ‘are often left to fight alone. At public meetings other Party 
members stab them in the back, so that ever more conflicts between comrades are 
breaking out in public.’ Even the CC meeting of November 8-10 witnessed 
aggressive clashes in which political arguments were supplemented by insults 
and accusations (Hertle/Stephan 135-437). Thus, in their very form, the reform 
process generated problems for the SED; the substance of reforms did so too. The 
most noteworthy example of this is that the new openness permitted to media 
organs enabled a series of corruption scandals to reach the public from late 
October onwards.258 Some officials believed that the revelations of corruption 
resulted from a ‘conspiracy’, organized by Schabowski (Weinert 1993:140), but a 
far more widespread reaction from Party members was sheer outrage. As soon as 
the first scandals broke, the CC was informed of the mood of the rank and file 
(Stephan 1994:190):  
 
 impatient and sometimes very aggressive discussions concerning 
the privileges of leading Party and State functionaries have sharply 
increased. Mention is repeatedly and ubiquitously made of the 
special shops, privileged travel to the non-socialist-abroad, 
remuneration in and ownership of hard currency, and, above all, 
the privileges granted to the children and relatives of members of 
the Politbüro and government. 
 
By this stage, the Party rank and file was aflame with dissent. Countless SED 
branches passed critical resolutions. They called in particular for open debate 
                                                          
     258 The first of these emerged when a worker tipped off a journalist about an FDGB leader who had 
diverted FDJ brigades from employment on railway construction to his luxury villa. SED leaders, including 
Krenz, raged in vain at journalists (and at the bloc parties) for their treachery towards the SED. 
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about the crisis. Many even espoused ‘positions and demands that were similar 
to those of New Forum’ (Stephan 1994:189). Although the displeasure of many 
members focused on their leaders’ turn towards the market and the West, others 
targeted their criticisms at the sluggishness of democratic reform. Dissenting SED 
members began to agitate publicly against the leadership. They made critical 
contributions in the ‘dialogues’ and even took to the streets.259 Many took part in 
the mammoth demonstration in Berlin on November 4, and again on the 8th, at 
which several tens of thousands voiced their lack of confidence in the leadership. 
To chants of ‘We are the Party!’, they demanded that a special Party congress — 
which would enable the entire leadership to be replaced — be convened.260 
 Disintegration, division, and dissent in the SED critically constrained the 
regime’s ability to control events. With the shift in emphasis from military to 
political means of crisis management, the SED leadership was more reliant on the 
efforts of the Party rank and file to contain and direct the protest movement. 
Until about October 25, SED members were advised to ‘be resolute and allow 
oppositional forces no room for manoeuvre’.261 After that date they were 
instructed — bizarre though it seems — to present themselves as the leaders of 
‘the movement for socialist renewal’. Neither of these strategies worked. To the 
consternation of the SED leadership, Party members and other ‘progressive 
forces’, when faced by oppositionists or other critics of the regime, tended either 
to sympathize with them or simply evade their questions. Stasi reports from the 
time persistently bemoan the spinelessness of ‘progressive forces’. For example, 
at a student gathering in Berlin ‘progressive forces’ were ‘all but completely 




                                                          
     259 McFalls’s survey (1995:121) found that 35% of SED members participated in demonstrations, as 
compared to 48% of non-members. 
     260 On November 12 the leadership at last caved in to this demand. 
     261 The quote is taken from a letter sent by Krenz to SED regional and district secretaries, shown to the 
author by Ingo-Sascha Kowalczuk. 
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The growth and radicalization of the movement was a further — and especially 
compelling — constraint on the government’s room for manoeuvre. It both 
intensified and gained impetus from the government’s inability to overcome the 
other constraints. 
 The dynamics of radicalization are basically the same as those discussed 
under ‘algebra of mobilization’ in chapter six. A weakening regime and lowered 
risks of public protest, and other factors, stimulate sections of the population to 
redefine perceived injustices as subject to change. These groups form and join 
protest movements. Pressure rises for the regime to reform, and the values 
popularly attributed to participation grow. As protests multiply, the confidence 
and perceptions of success amongst participants and sympathizers grows. The 
regime faces the choice to reform or risk further undermining its legitimacy 
through intransigence and repression. Both these courses, given a weak regime 
and confident protest movement, may well accelerate the upward spiral of 
revolt. In the process, new possibilities are scented, new horizons discerned, new 
collective identities forged, and new layers of the population enter the 
movement. Elaboration of this abstract model of ‘protest cycles’ may be found 
elsewhere (Tarrow 1994; Barker 1996; Barker/Dale 1999); here I shall focus on the 
East German case. 
 From mid-October the numbers demonstrating climbed exponentially. 
Regular demonstrations were organized in most major towns. In Plauen and 
Halle tens of thousands took to the streets on the 15th. In the following week at 
least twenty-four (still illegal) demonstrations were organized, including some 
125,000 in Leipzig (population 530,000) and 35,000 in Plauen (population 74,000). 
The final week of October saw well over 500,000 attend over 130 demonstrations 
(Mitter/Wolle 1993:537), including some 300,000 in Leipzig on the 23rd. Even 
small towns witnessed sizeable demonstrations, such as 5,000 in Ueckermünde 
(population 12,000). 
 The rising movement transformed the collective identities of participants 
and sympathizers. Their recollections invariably emphasize values of solidarity. 
One major survey (Opp et al. n.d.), for example, shows large majorities agreeing 
with the statements ‘coming together with so many people who wanted the same 
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thing was a wonderful feeling’, and ‘I felt that each individual was necessary for 
goals to be achieved’. Growing numbers came to define themselves explicitly as 
active participants in the political process and as critics or opponents of the 
regime.262 Slogans such as ‘We are the People!’ that had dominated the early 
phase of the revolution expressed the demand that ordinary people have an 
influence upon government. Such demands, by raising the prospect of ‘the 
people’ opposing the government, prepared the way for more confrontational 
positions. Already in early October, combative slogans such as ‘Stasi out!’ could 
be heard on demonstrations. As the month wore on these flourished, with 
placards proclaiming, for instance, ‘Get those arses out of their seats!’ (Lang 
1990:56), and ‘Enough talking, let’s see action!’ (Tribüne 31.10.89). Slogans 
expressing mistrust of ‘reformers’ abounded too: ‘Snakes that shed their skin are 
still snakes!’; ‘No Markus Wolf in sheep’s clothing!’; and ‘a Wende is not a loop-
the-loop!’ (Lang 1990; W Schneider 1990). 
 The concessions granted during this period tended to stimulate protest. 
For one thing, the post-Honecker course change, being forced, sudden and 
unplanned, tended to divide and weakening the ruling class. Some concessions, 
notably the loosening of control over the media, spurred this development. 
Another factor was that many concessions, such as instituting ‘dialogues’ or 
televising demonstrations, contributed to the legitimization of protest. 
Concessions were widely (and correctly) interpreted as a sign of the regime’s 
weakness. Throughout the land, those whose authority derived from that of the 
Politbüro (which meant virtually all powerholders) saw their position weaken — 
the ‘balance of class confidence’ shifted. Orders began to be openly questioned 
and challenged, traditional habits scrutinized. One example that stands for many 
was related to me by Jens König, a student at a naval college. ‘After the fall of 
Honecker, discipline crumbled. We stopped wearing our sailor’s uniform, and, 
although teachers tried to force us to wear it they didn’t dare threaten the usual 
serious punishments, so they failed.’ 
                                                          
     262 What individuals ‘consent’ to, as Therborn (1980:108) suggests, always depends upon their perceptions 
of what exists and what is possible. These perceptions are largely determined by economic and political 
forces. As regards patterns of popular consent granted to the SED regime, transformed experiences and 
interpretations of what is and of what is possible were more fundamental than changing norms of what is good 
and what is right. 
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 As protestors’ confidence grew and concessions continued, further-going 
demands appeared. Like a hill climber reaching successive ridges, each 
concession wrung from the regime raised the prospects of new horizons and new 
goals. Sometimes the shift in perspective was dramatic, as ‘impossible’ events 
suddenly unfolded. That Honecker would ‘resign’, for example, was quite 
unthinkable for most people (e.g. Ramona interview). Nobody believed that he 
would depart so soon — it had not even been a demand raised by 
demonstrators. His fall, however, helped to encourage the formulation of new, 
more radical, questions, such as ‘should we give the next one a chance?’ 
Similarly, when the border to the CSSR was re-opened, hitherto unthinkable 
questions could come to the fore, notably ‘if they can re-open that one, what 
about the ones with fences, dogs and walls?’ 
 As people perceived that they could ‘make a difference’, both within their 
immediate environment and on the national political stage, the new-found 
democratic space was exploited with relish. Political and social criticisms and 
alternatives were expressed on demonstrations in the form of banners, chants 
and songs. They formed the most colourful surface of a cauldron of discussion. If 
the formal ‘dialogues’ meant relatively little to most people, other channels of 
dialogue were opening up or deepening: amongst neighbours, demonstrators, 
and colleagues; on street corners, in cafés, and in theatres after performances. 
‘Every day’, Petra recalls (interview) ‘there was discussion about something 
new.’ ‘The GDR has become a debating club’ wrote a Western journalist (Menge 
1990:175). As opinion surveys indicate (e.g. Opp et al. n.d.:21), this period was 
characterized by a remarkable and widespread politicization. Media organs and 
state institutions were bombarded with letters demanding reforms. The FDGB, 
for example, received hundreds of letters and resolutions every day right 
through October and November. Meetings were called in workplaces and 
educational institutions in which the old ways were enthusiastically and 
thoroughly criticized. Petra (interview) recalls teachers’ meetings which 
discussed what changes should be implemented in the school environment — 
such an end to saluting the flag — and how to achieve them. I recall a student 
gathering at which the demands collated included the establishment of 
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independent student councils, student co-determination of university decisions, 
the establishment of partner universities and student exchanges, a five day study 
week, the abolition of military training in schools and military service, more 
pianos, better heating, and a systematic investigation into the ‘blank spots’ of 
official historiography. People tested their newly won room for manoeuvre and 
proceeded to occupy it with countless initiatives. Committees were formed to 
launch investigations into brutality by the security forces. Interviewees (e.g. 
Kessler and Pienitz) recall how swiftly they began to lay the planks of long 
dreamt of projects (in their cases an Independent Historians Association and a 
project for young criminals respectively). 
 In this phase of the revolution popular creativity blossomed. The banners 
and placards on demonstrations alone can be viewed as a cinematic 
representation of the creative reappropriation and rewriting of public culture. 
Reading them now, one is struck by the breathtaking range of issues addressed 
and demands raised, as well as by the extraordinary care taken and wit 
displayed in the slogans. Language was reinvented, words and songs reclaimed, 
and symbols refashioned. The culture of the political joke — that seam of ‘hidden 
transcripts’ of criticism and opposition — now emerged in public; ironic and 
ebullient humour emblazoned upon hundreds of banners.263 The banners and 
chants on demonstrations did not simply express discontent or the joy of 
‘cognitive liberation’. They were directed expressions, seen and heard by co-
participants. The chanting of ‘No violence!’, for instance, was aimed at the 
security forces and at demonstrators themselves. Many placards were written 
with the express aim of influencing participants and observers, whether they 
were at the demonstration or watching it on television. Collective action thus 
automatically entailed political debate and education. The formulation of 
criticisms and demands was a dialogical process. For example, Marianne Pienitz 
recalls (interview) how  
 
                                                          
     263 The sharpest irony involved puns on SED propaganda, e.g. ‘As we demonstrate today, so shall we live 
tomorrow’ (from ‘As we work today, so shall we live tomorrow’). The pervasive surrealism found 
throughout Eastern Europe was also common (‘FDGB with Tisch is like jam with fish). 
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 each Monday at work, after locking the doors to keep management 
out, we would paint placards. We — the workers on my ward — 
would take an hour or so to discuss what to write: at first things 
like ‘For Alternatives to Military Service!’; later on, ‘For Free Trade 
Unions!’ 
 
On demonstrations, slogans were consciously rejected or taken up, played with 
and revised. One protestor recalls that his chant of ‘No visa for Czechoslovakia’ 
was refashioned by adventurous minds to ‘No visa for China!’ 
(Lindner/Grueneberger 1992:303). Demonstrations were nodes where a 
polyphony of different interests and issues intersected and, in a process of 
‘generalization’, altered each others’ meanings. The plethora of specific slogans 
— for longer holidays, equal opportunities in education, ‘filter installation in the 
Espenhain plant’, ‘freedom for the conscientious objectors in Schwedt, and the 
like264 — promoted the conclusion that for specific demands to succeed, general 
political questions — including the nature of the regime and the social system — 
needs must be addressed. 
 Collective learning, generalization, and the diffusion of ideas and practical 
innovations, was central to the process of radicalization.265 As a demonstrator 
describes, recalling a day shortly after the inauguration of the Krenz government 
(Lindner/Grueneberger 1992:93), 
 
 I was forced to realize that other demonstrators were miles ahead 
of me, in that they frontally attacked Krenz for shoring up the old 
system. Thus the mood of the demonstration was for many of us a 
kind of learning process. 
 
Central to this learning process was the diffusion of collective action to ‘less 
mobilized’ sections of the population. Workers possess the least individual 
movement-building resources and tend to be ‘less mobilized’ during stable 
periods, but have the least stake in the existing system and are obliged to rely 
heavily on movement strategies for which numbers count. With the mass 
infusion of workers into the movement from early October onwards, its character 
                                                          
     264 For other demands and slogans see Dale (1996a:93) and W Schneider (1990). 
     265 It should be noted that the rapid unfolding of logics of generalization and radicalization was also due 
 293 
changed. As Rotluff explains (interview) ‘Workers were especially sensitive to 
economic and material questions. They were asking "what can the country 
afford?"; "should so much money go to arms, or Third World aid?"; and "are my 
wages enough"?’ Demands and slogans on demonstrations changed accordingly. 
Some concerned the terms and conditions of work — ‘For the forty hour week!’, 
or ‘It’s outrageous — your prices, our wages!’ Many more thematized questions 
of class relations and economic justice, particularly when the scandals exposing 
ruling class corruption and high living emerged. Most famous of such slogans 
were — in parody of Marxism — ‘Privileged of the world, abdicate!’ and 
‘Expropriate the privileged!’ Similar sentiments were expressed in ‘We earn your 
money!’; ‘Managers [or ‘Functionaries’] onto the shop floor!’; Minimum pension 
for the CC!’; ‘The "people’s servants" should drive the people’s cars’; and ‘Evict 
the Stasi from their quarters — make decent homes for our sons and daughters!’ 
 A final aspect of the radicalization process that, although interconnected 
with those outlined above, requires separate consideration could be called the 
logic of strategic differentiation. To a greater or lesser extent it occurs during any 
mass movement or revolution. As Hal Draper wrote in 1965 (Johnson 1997:8-9), 
the first steps in uprisings are typically ‘unitedly directed against the visible 
enemy, and the first demands are easy, being a direct response to the intolerable 
conditions.’ There is ‘greater certainty on what one is against than on what one is 
for (what we can call "anti" politics).’ But beyond this elementary stage, 
 
 the problems of perspective and program multiply, as more basic 
issues and powers are brought to the surface. Even to know what 
those basic issues are requires a broader and more general 
conception of what the fight is about — in effect, an ideology. 
 
Once a mass movement and prospects of major social change arise, merely moral 
denunciations of the existing order are no longer sufficient to give direction to 
protest. Axial questions have to be addressed with greater clarity: what change 
do we want, and what are our concrete demands?; who are ‘we’ anyway — and 
                                                                                                                                                                         
to the severity of the crisis, its national scope, and the centralization of political and economic power. 
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who are ‘they’?;266 who can effect change, and how should it be done? are SED 
reformists our allies, or enemies? what about the CM? does it have the social 
weight and strategy appropriate to achieving our goals? can we trust them? if 
not, should we join them, or place our faith in our own forces, or in Bonn? 
 Answers to these questions, for most protestors, remained fairly vague at 
this stage. However, a distinct shift in tone and perspectives did occur. Slogans 
on demonstrations became sharper. Those attacking the regime had previously 
tended to be light-hearted (‘SED — it hurts me!’). Now they attacked the Party’s 
power monopoly, called for a political trial of Honecker and his accomplices, and 
for the abolition of the Stasi and the redeployment of its employees into ‘the 
economy’ or ‘into their own prisons!’. As Reich perceived it (1991:171), the 
movement began to develop ‘aggressive traits’; demonstrators were now 
demanding ‘everything’ and ‘at once’. Stasi documents reported (Mitter/Wolle 
1990:250) that the content of banners and chants 
 
 are now directed with greater strength and aggression against the 
Party and its leading role, and also increasingly against the 
activities of the [Stasi]. From the comments of demonstrators, 
demonstrative applause, and the public toleration of these chants 
in particular, it is apparent that people are increasingly identifying 
with them. 
 
Slogans now addressed broader issues. They were no longer simply against 
Krenz and the Stasi but also against the regime, system, or ruling class. One 
banner, for example, read ‘The cat won’t let its mouse flee — every boss before a 
jury!’. Even specific demands were now largely of the sort that directly 
challenged the ruling order (‘For freedom of travel!’; ‘Free elections!’). 
 By late October the first phase of the revolution, in which popular hopes 
focused on pressuring the government to make reforms, was coming to an end. 
A new and more politicized mood gained ground amongst large sections of the 
movement, one which expressed the desire for radical change, for the rapid 
destruction of the entire edifice of the old regime. 
                                                          




CM and Radicalization 
 
Within the wider movement’s exponential expansion, the CM grew rapidly. By 
mid-November 200,000 had signed a petition showing support for NF. CM-
organized meetings attracted large numbers. The Stasi’s estimates show that in 
the week of October 16-22 over 100,000 attended such meetings (including one in 
Potsdam, of over 6000, that required five separate sittings). From October 30 to 
November 5, 230 meetings were attended by some 300,000. The CM’s 
organizational networks expanded too. Already by the time of Honecker’s 
downfall local NF groups had been set up in every district of Berlin.267 CM 
influence extended into workplaces and ‘to a substantial degree’, according to 
Stasi reports (Hertle 1996b:195), into the army. 
 However, the CM organizations were wary of the movement’s 
radicalization, and based themselves on its moderate, disproportionately middle 
class, sections. Consequently, the frames they developed ‘resonated’ ever less 
with the bulk of protestors; the CM developed relatively shallow roots in the 
wider movement. As described in chapter six, although their members did help 
to build demonstrations, CM leaders tended not to prioritize this form of 
movement building. The CM did not excel at creating the ‘cultures of solidarity’ 
that gave the demonstrations strength and cohesion, and hence were not directly 
credited for their success. As part of the process of politicization mentioned 
above the CM’s strategies and ideas were discussed and assessed by the wider 
movement. Alternative ideas and strategies were debated, and refined (or 
discarded). In the process, the movement’s rank and file developed rafts of 
demands that were frequently either outside the scope of or even in direct 
contradiction to those of the CM. The outcome was most visible on the mass 
demonstrations. According to Hartung (1990a:50), when some 420,000 
demonstrated in Leipzig on October 30, ‘the little group of "New Forum", with 
their two megaphones, made as much impression as a few Jehova’s Witnesses on 
                                                          
     267 By the end of November NF groups in Berlin alone numbered 106. Of these eighty were thematic and 
only twenty-six geographic. 
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the margins of bawling crowds at a football cup final.’ Despite enormous passive 
support, actual NF members could be counted in tens of thousands and its 
activists numbered only several thousand. Of the other CM organizations, even 
nominal members could be counted only in thousands, at a time when millions 
were attending demonstrations. 
 In this period the CM organizations moved from leading to tailing the 
movement. This was already apparent in their response to the Wende. One of the 
main purposes of Krenz’s strategy (notably the ‘dialogues’), as NF’s Pastor 
Tschiche warned (Mitter/Wolle 1990:233), was to ‘fragment the "critical 
potential"‘. In this, it achieved at least partial success. Divisions grew, both within 
the CM organizations and between these and the rest of the movement. The 
streets witnessed ever angrier slogans targeting Krenz and his government. SED 
speakers who addressed demonstrations, as, for example, the newly appointed 
Party chief in Leipzig, were commonly shouted down with chants of ‘You’re to 
blame!’ and ‘Too late! Too late!’. One CC member complained (Hertle/Stephan 
1997:139) that ‘these debates are less like dialogue and more like tribunals 
directed against our Party and its leading personalities.’ Meanwhile, CM leaders 
— although still, of course, mistrustful of the SED leadership — were pleading 
‘Give Krenz a Chance!’ (Hawkes et al. 1990:80). 
 The attitude towards demonstrations of CM spokespeople continued to be 
luke-warm. In mid-October, with the fate of the revolution still in the balance, 
Eppelmann called for a halt to demonstrations (tageszeitung 18.10.89). NF warned 
of the ‘incalculable risks’ of ‘spontaneous mass demonstrations’, and advocated 
immediate talks between the regime and opposition leaderships as an alternative 
(Neues Forum Leipzig 1989:105). In the same period, DN called for negotiations 
around a ‘four sided table’, with two sides reserved for forces of the old regime, 
one for the (immutably conservative) Church leadership, and only one for the 
CM. By late October most slogans raised on demonstrations went beyond those 
of the CM. Vast numbers voiced support for the punishment of corrupt officials 
and the sacking of SED and Stasi functionaries, demands in which the CM 
leaders showed no interest. While demonstrators en masse demanded freedom of 
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travel NF spokesperson Pflugbeil rejected it as unrealistic, an issue of secondary 
importance (Rein 1989:26). 
 The CM could have begun to plan the ousting of the SED from power and 
its immediate replacement by a transitional government, or at least elections to a 
constituent assembly. Such a course would have forced the CM to commit its 
members to strengthening the movement on the streets, supporting and 
consolidating the process of radicalization, and mobilizing workers’ power to 
withhold labour. Even a mere declaration of intentions would have galvanized 
protest — as Klaus Hartung argues (1990a:58), the very ‘consciousness that 
power is at stake’ acts as a mobilizing force in a revolutionary situation. The CM 
leaderships were aware of these options. A minority considered them seriously, 
but they were decisively rejected. They refused the mantle of revolutionary 
leadership. Thus, writes Hartung (taz 1990a:84), on the immense ‘permitted’ 
demonstration of November 4 in Berlin, ‘[n]one of the speakers tried to mobilize, 
to advance battle plans’. Similarly, Mosler (1994:15) notes that on the same 
demonstration, at a time when freedom of travel was the main popular demand, 
‘not a single one’ of the speakers demanded that the Wall be opened. The 
moderation of CM leaders’ political demands was reflected in their tone. During 
the entire revolution they made, in Hartung’s words (1990a:58), hardly any ‘great 
speeches, only "spokesperson-statements".’ 
 As described in chapter six, the CM leaderships’ attitude to ‘the masses’ 
was marked by aloofness, even elitism. Their strategy of mobilizing public 
activity against the regime was marked by ambivalence. Their goal of inter-elite 
negotiations could even lead them to demobilize, and to show an unusual degree 
of deference towards their potential dialogue partner, the SED. Their cooperative 
attitude to the regime — decreasingly justifiable in terms of fear of repression — 
set them apart from the movement on the streets. As a result, although they 
gained extensive passive support, their active implantation in the process of 
politicization within communities and workplaces remained weak. As Hartung 
put it (1990a:60), 
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 By mid-October it was clear that the CM’s process of organization 
lagged behind the masses. By this date at the latest, the process 
should have been given direction through propagating an action 
programme aimed at taking over government. Instead, New 
Forum’s explicit aim was to offer the masses grassroots democracy 
as an alternative form of political engagement. This was little but 
an attempt at political pedagogy. 
 
 The CM’s refusal to encourage or even accompany the process of 
radicalization was especially evident in its attitude to workplace organization. 
CM activists placed little or no emphasis on organizing in workplaces (Fuller 
1999:100). Despite this, NF in particular did begin to gain a hearing in 
workplaces. Already on the 17th an FDGB report warned that ‘forces linked to 
"New Forum" and other oppositional groups are at work in a series of 
workplaces’ (FDGB Archive). Sometimes work brigades collectively attended 
CM meetings. Slowly, NF meetings did begin to be organized in workplaces. 
‘Many workers’ who supported the opposition, Fuller claims (1999:148) aired 
their views in ‘numerous meetings, forums, and dialogues held at many 
workplaces [...] and in wall newspapers, which cropped up at workplaces and 
other public gathering spots’. In one factory, where the SED leadership removed 
an NF leaflet from the wall newspaper, over fifty workers struck until it was 
pinned up again. This was no isolated case. Stasi documents (Mitter/Wolle 
1990:247) report ‘strike threats in connection with activities of "New Forum" in 
other workplaces too’. Meanwhile, in public meetings and on the streets, calls for 
strike action gained momentum. For example, such calls at a meeting in Dresden 
of some 5,000, received huge applause (Liebsch 1991:71). On demonstrations, 
slogans such as ‘Legalize New Forum — Be prepared to strike!’ now appeared. 
According to Klaus Wolfram (interview) workers from large factories (including 
SKET in Magdeburg and KWO in Berlin) offered to strike if NF would but say 
the word.268 As he relates, 
 
 That particular offer [from SKET] could have played a very 
important role. In October and November there was a high 
willingness to strike in many other large factories — the workers, 
                                                          
     268 Cf. also Klaus Wolfram, Die Andere nr. 40, 1991. 
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as it were, wanted to get involved but weren’t quite sure what the 
strike’s slogan should be. One of [our members], a worker in [a 
large factory in Berlin], repeatedly reported a situation in which his 
colleagues were extremely curious and continually asking: "OK, 
what’s going on?: if we strike, then tell us what for, and we’ll do it!" 
 
GD Was that type of situation not an exception? 
 
KW No, we didn’t have that impression. I would say that the question 
was not about whether such a situation existed in many 
workplaces; there was no doubt about that. Rather, for us [the NF 
leadership] the question was whether, for what demands ... for 
what, strikes are appropriate. [...] Indeed, in the committee 
meetings where this was discussed, nobody had any idea why 
strikes should take place; the opinion was: they should participate 
in the reform process, they should attend district public meetings 
in the evenings and at weekends, or indeed meetings in the 
workplaces. Or they should elect their managers. But why on earth 
should they strike?! In short, we had no ideas on the subject, nor 
issued any active encouragement to strike, even though we knew 
that there was a great readiness for such action. 
 
NF did win a following amongst the one class that possessed sufficient power to 
topple SED, Stasi, Wall and all. But rather than seek to encourage workers’ self-
activity and mobilize workers’ power, let alone to advocate organs of popular 
power capable of asserting control over the transition process, NF turned against 
its working-class supporters.269 After the latter had established hundreds of 
workplace NF groups their leaders instructed them all to be closed down, so that 
all resources be concentrated upon local and theme groups. As Rottluf recalls 
(interview), ‘the argument was we should focus on one thing: politics. The 
intellectuals [in the leadership] fought shy of any association with "union" 
activity. [...] This decision of the centre pissed off many of the workers.’ 
 In short, the cleavage between CM and masses widened, and the former 
steered towards rapprochement with the SED. Its political philosophy (notably 
the Christian, pacifist, and utopian-socialist influences), its lukewarm attitude to 
popular mobilization, and its lack of roots in communities and workplaces, 
                                                          
     269 It would be interesting to discover whether IMs in the NF leadership encouraged this position. The 
Stasi was obsessed with the need to prevent the CM gaining influence amongst workers, and, in particular, 
with the threat of political strikes (Bastian 1994:49). 
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combined to keep it from directly challenging the SED’s hold on power. The 
question did arise, repeatedly. Each time, a radical minority — particularly at the 
local level (Mitter/Wolle 1990:246), but also leading members (e.g. Pastor Richter 
and Ehrhart Neubert of DA) — raised their voices. But the dominant view 
amongst CM leaders was that they were too weak to take power, and that 
intense political conflict would be counterproductive. The SED’s rule was seen as 
a lesser evil because they perceived the alternative, as did the SED, as ‘anarchy’. 
In Reich’s words (Financial Times 8.11.89), there was, at the time, ‘no alternative’ 
to the SED — if it was overthrown without the country would ‘fall into chaos’. In 
a phrase that sums up the CM leaders’ Weltanschauung Reich recalls (Maier 
1997:169), that ‘[w]e never wanted power. It would have conflicted with our 
commitment to legality.’ NF leaders concluded that they had no interest in ‘an 
exacerbation of the social contradictions in the GDR’, nor even in ‘questioning 
the lead role of the SED’ (Mitter/Wolle 1990:247). At around the same time, SDP 
leader Böhme, backed by his comrade Momper from the West Berlin SPD, 
confirmed that his party had no intention of deposing the SED. In DA’s 
leadership election, meanwhile, only sixteen delegates voted for Richter, as 
against 108 for the SED-friendly Wolfgang Schnur (Reuth/Bönte 1993:134). 
 The division between CM and mass movement deepened further in early 
November. At the Berlin demonstration of November 4, Schorlemmer declared 
(Schüddekopf 1990:212) ‘[w]e neither can nor do we wish to rebuild our country 
without the SED.’ The same demonstration was addressed not only by LDPD 
leader Gerlach — who had belonged to the GDR leadership since the mid-1950s 
(Gerlach 1991:10) — and Markus Wolf, but also by Schabowski. When the latter 
faced a chorus of booing, Schorlemmer, in a telling gesture of solidarity, patted 
Schabowski on the back (Schabowski 1991:283). Around this time, and partly in 
response to growing calls for German unification, CM leaders began to voice an 
idea which sharply accelerated the cleavage of the movement (and the demise of 
the CM), namely that the country faced a choice between ‘participation’ and 
prosperity. On November 8, a statement signed by representatives of NF, DA, 
SDP, DN, IFM, and various authors (including Christa Wolf) demanded a 
renewal of socialism, and called on East Germans to stop emigrating. 
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Significantly, it added ‘[w]hat can we promise you? No easy life, but a useful 
one. No quick prosperity, but participation in a great transformation.’ Thus, as 
the movement on the streets was moving ever closer to direct confrontation with 
the ‘socialist’ regime and with the borders of the SED-state, the CM reaffirmed its 
‘socialist’ (read, ‘reformist’) credentials and swore loyalty to the GDR.270 Its 
promise of ‘participation’ in a nebulous democratic experiment tended, in this 
context, to exacerbate its isolation from the bulk of the movement. 
 The divergence between CM and mass movement outlined in this passage 
did not come from nowhere. It stemmed in part from the early phase of the 
revolution, notably in the antagonism between emigrant-applicants and ‘stayers’, 
and in the CM organizations’ preoccupation with ‘purely political’ questions 
(such as civil liberties and democracy) at the expense of questions of economic 
injustice, conditions of work, and living standards. However, the period between 
the fall of Honecker and the fall of the Wall saw a rapid growth, politicization, 
and radicalization of the bulk of the movement while the CM, its internal 
divisions notwithstanding, adopted a moderate approach geared increasingly 
towards negotiation with the SED leadership. Although this diremption is 
commonly framed in terms of the antagonism between the GDR-patriotic CM 
and the nationalist proponents of pan-German unification that reached its climax 





During the ‘feverish days’ from the end of October, writes Darnton (1991:334), 
‘the protest movement acquired such force that the regime collapsed before it.’ 
The multiple ‘squeezes’ on the regime, as described above, grew ever tighter and 
interlocked. Demonstrations peaked in Berlin, with around half a million on 
                                                          
     270 For CM members to profess socialism may sound radical to readers from non-Stalinist societies. In one 
sense it was. It signified commitment to a more just, equitable, demilitarized society, with a strong welfare 
system. However, in another sense it signified conservatism. Being in favour of socialism, given the 
appropriation of that term by the GDR’s ruling Party, meant advocating reform of the system rather than its 
overthrow. For example, on October 22, when Leipzig SED leaders met a local NF spokesperson in public 
dialogue, the latter insisted that NF was not actually oppositional, ‘because we are in favour of socialism’ 
(Reuth/Bönte 1993:131). 
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November 4, and in Leipzig, where roughly the same number braved sleet and 
rain on the 6th. That day also saw Dresden’s biggest demonstration so far, of 
several hundred thousand, while 60,000 gathered in both Halle and Karl-Marx-
Stadt. Organized protest was by now so ubiquitous that, according to a West 
German intelligence source (Allen 1991:198) ‘the Stasi had so much information 
coming in to its headquarters that it was immobilized in trying to digest it.’ By 
now, CC members were admitting that the Party leadership had experienced a 
double legitimacy haemorrhage — vis-à-vis the Party rank and file, and the 
general public (Hertle/Stephan 1997:71). They were also informed of the full 
extent of economic crisis.271 The SED leadership was in a dangerous situation and 
knew it. As Gorbachev warned Krenz in early November (Hertle/Stephan 
1997:64), 
 
 These processes are very dynamic and could accelerate yet further. 
The Party leadership must react appropriately. If the processes 
were to gain in spontaneity, or political orientation were to be lost, 
that would be most unfortunate. If that happened, a hopeless 
situation could arise. 
 
 Pace Darnton (and countless others who argue similarly), the regime did 
not ‘collapse’. In Gorbachev’s terms, the situation did not become entirely 
‘hopeless’. Instead, the regime restructured and regrouped. First, an attempt was 
made, simultaneously laughable and intelligent, to steer ‘progressive forces’ to 
the leadership of the ‘reform movement’. Its comical aspect involved regime 
institutions wrapping themselves in reformist guise and proclaiming that the 
political transformation was taking place at their instigation. They appropriated 
the language of radical change, seeking to blur the distinction — so conspicuous 
on the demonstrations — between ‘us’ and ‘them’. For example, the FDJ 
suddenly declared that it had become an entirely new organization. To prove 
this, its new leader — an old functionary — even dared to criticize the 
government. Various parties, including the LDPD and even the SED tried, 
                                                          
     271 The details stunned CC members (Hertle/Stephan 1997:366). One shouted ‘I request that this 
discussion remain unpublished! [...] It’s outrageous! Our last people would run away!’ Krenz agreed: ‘It 
would shock the entire republic!’ 
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ludicrously, to claim the Wende as their own (Gerlach 1991:316). Berlin SED 
members were instructed to attend the November 4 demonstration and to 
celebrate the Wende as an already accomplished event. The intelligent aspect 
involved placing greater weight upon influencing the CM elite from within. 
Already, several CM leaders were IMs, notably Schnur and Böhme. On October 
21, Mielke told his generals that the CM would be even more systematically 
penetrated (Wolle 1998:339). The plan was carried out, with some success, at least 
in terms of achieved infiltration. For example, Dresden MfS reported 
(Mitter/Wolle 1993:533) that ‘[w]e have succeeded in infiltrating 80-100 IMs into 
the new movements, both in leadership positions and as members. This will 
enable us to improve the detection and manipulation of anticonstitutional 
activity.’272  
 Second, ever greater emphasis was placed on cooperation with the CM as 
a means to shore up the SED’s weakening grip on power. Already in mid-
October, government strategy focused upon the ‘differentiated incorporation of 
individuals’ — especially Church members — ‘who are interested in solving 
problems of the further development of socialism in the GDR’ and ‘encouraging 
critical spirits towards constructive engagement within the existing framework 
of social structures’ in order thereby to ‘expose the enemies of socialism’ 
(Stephan 1994:175-7). On November 1, Gorbachev gave this strategy strong 
support, advising Krenz to combat ‘anti-socialist and criminal elements’ but to 
pull others into the ‘socialist’ camp (Stephan 1994:218). A week later, Lorenz 
advised the CC (Hertle/Stephan 1997:199) that ‘a situation has arisen whereby 
we must approach certain representatives of "New Forum" in a constructive way, 
particularly those who clearly show a readiness in public to exert a calming 
influence, who seek to prevent chaos’. Support for this strategy came notably 
from Otto Reinhold (Hertle/Stephan 1997:336). He called for negotiations with 
the CM, as the best means of ‘proving in practice our power and our leading 
position.’ CM leaders responded favourably, and eventually even accepted 
powerless positions in government (Dale 1996; 2001). 
                                                          
     272 The Stasi was still pursuing this strategy for managing the CM as late as November, and possibly later. 
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 Third, major reforms were announced, (albeit with cautionary appendices 
asserting that promised changes could not occur swiftly). Legal proceedings 
began against officers of the security forces in Dresden (although the chief 
culprit, Modrow, was spared investigation). Emigration was decriminalized, the 
draft travel law announced, and a media law drafted. Compulsory military 
training in schools was ended, conscientious objection recognized, a 
constitutional court promised, and NF, at last, was legalized. The lineaments of 
furthergoing reform could also be discerned. A group of business leaders called 
publicly for radical economic reform. Krenz, Schabowski, and Modrow, called 
for market reform and accelerated integration into the world economy, in 
particular an intensification of relations with West German business. Other CC 
members (such as Winter and Ehrensperger) advocated greater pay differentials, 
enterprise autonomy, exposure to the world market for all enterprises, and 
making the Mark convertible. Even the introduction of party pluralism and a 
parliamentary system were quietly mooted by some senior functionaries. 
Although Krenz continued to hold to the traditional oxymoronic formula — that 
‘pluralism’ already existed, and was guaranteed by the SED’s ‘lead role’ — he 
nevertheless propounded reforms that would undermine that formula, namely 
the disassociation of Party and State, and greater independence for the bloc 
parties and for Parliament. 
 Fourth, under incessant pressure from the mass movement, from second-
row functionaries and the SED rank and file, and from more astute members of 
the Establishment, heads continued to roll. In the first three days of November 
dozens of senior officials resigned. Under pressure from mass resignations, 
protest letters, and strike threats, Tisch was forced to step down as FDGB leader 
(Simon 1990:139; Haug 1990:107). Margot Honecker, the leaders of the CDU and 
NDPD, several district SED and FDGB leaders, and several mayors followed. 
 In these weeks, thousands of loyal supporters of the old regime 
abandoned Communism, planned economy, and Moscow, to become more or 
less devout acolytes of market capitalism. The phenomenon was especially 
marked amongst senior members of the bloc parties, such as Gerlach (1991:314-
70). These functionaries had been completely bound up in the old order, had 
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faithfully supported it, and had shared in the spoils that such positions bring. 
Sensing the wind turning, they discovered that socialism had always been 
flawed and market capitalism and parliamentary rule was the ideal solution. 
Many insinuated that they had always ‘secretly’ known this. The phenomenon 
was so striking and abrupt that it earned a popular epithet: ‘Wendehals’ (literally, 
Wryneck). 
 By November 7 it was apparent that most of the regime’s attempts to 
restructure and regroup had failed. Establishment institutions’ attempts to 
present themselves as pioneers of reform were widely ridiculed. SED leaders, 
whether ‘hard-liners’ (such as Gerhard Müller) or reformists, were roundly 
booed if they attempted to persuade protestors of their ‘genuine’ belief in reform. 
For espousing reformist views only when they made for better career prospects, 
‘Wendehälse’ were disdained. Banners on demonstrations read ‘Away with the 
"Wendehälsen"‘, and ‘Those who always cried "Stalin hooray!" now suddenly 
shout "Reform! Today!"‘ 
 Although the reforms announced in the three weeks since Honecker’s 
ouster equalled those passed in Gorbachev’s USSR in as many years, such was 
the persistence and scale of popular protest that even these concessions were too 
little, too late. Popular indignation at the restrictive clauses in the draft travel law 
lay behind the Parliament’s unprecedented decision to reject it. In effect, this was 
a vote of no confidence in the government, which resigned in its entirety on 
November 7. The next day, acceding to pressure not only from the streets but 
also from centres of the Establishment (including Junge Welt, Tribüne, and even 
professors of the arch-conservative ‘State Jurisprudence’ college), the Politbüro 
tendered its collective resignation. 
 
Who Breached The Wall? 
 
The economic and political history narrated in chapters five and six can be seen, 
with hindsight, to point towards the fall of the Wall. Economic crisis and 
dependence upon Bonn matured until the point was reached when the 
possibility of permitting freedom of travel changed from being a future option 
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discussed seriously by only a few ‘Westernizers’ to a tactic adopted without 
serious dissent by the entire SED leadership. However, if this step was inevitable, 
its timing and nature was determined by the actions of emigrants and protestors. 
In October, the Politbüro considered a plan to exchange a gradual and calibrated 
lifting of restrictions on travel for West German credits. By November 9, when 
Schabowski announced the lifting of all major restrictions, the SED and security 
forces were in unprecedented disarray. Now, the measure appeared as nothing 
but a concession forced by popular pressure, a last ditch resort with no other aim 
but to rescue some final vestiges of SED legitimacy and win more time for 
further regrouping. As Schabowski recalls (1990:139), ‘[w]e did not guess that the 
opening of the wall would spell the beginning of the end of the republic. On the 
contrary, we expected a process of stabilization’. Moreover, the events that 
followed the announcement can only be understood in terms of the radically 
altered balance of class forces — the increasing scale, politicization and 
radicalization of the (working class dominated) protest movement, and the 
decreasing confidence, and cohesion of the ruling class (especially its political 
centre). 
 The decision to permit freedom of travel was an extremely difficult one. 
Krenz, at the CC on November 9 (Hertle/Stephan 1997:305), described it thus: 
‘Whichever way we do will be wrong’. The last thing that any of the leaders or 
officials involved with the decision wished was an uncontrolled mass exit. Only a 
week earlier Krenz had told Gorbachev (Fulbrook 1995:260), in connection with 
fears surrounding the November 4 demonstration, ‘[m]easures must be taken to 
prevent any attempt at a mass breakthrough across the Wall. That would be 
awful, because then the police would have to intervene [with force] and certain 
elements of a state of emergency would have to be introduced.’ At the CC on 
November 9 itself, Dickel, to loud applause, attacked those who shouted ‘"Away 
with the Wall!"‘ and declaimed that ‘[t]his border exists and this border must be 
defended’ (Hertle/Stephan 1997:297). 
 The regulation of November 9 allowed freedom of travel, but only to 
passport holders (who were then a minority), and even they would first have to 
procure a visa. Although freedom of travel was thereby enabled, it was to be 
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orderly, with passport and border officials, as ever, fully empowered to refuse 
exit to whomsoever they wished. It would modify but not sabotage the State’s 
control of its borders. The regime would gain at least a modicum of credit from 
the measure. 
 The reality was very different. Although the officials who drew up the 
regulation were painfully aware that any mistakes in its wording could, given 
the current political turbulence, lead to an ‘explosion’ (Hertle 1996b:122), 
something resembling an explosion indeed occurred. SED leaders seemed 
confused over their own decision, and blind to its consequences. The CC was 
informed, but, according to Lorenz, none realized what it would mean (Hertle 
1996b:133). Even Schabowski, whose task it was to announce the measure on 
television, was visibly unsure of the details. Although the intention was for 
passport holders to be permitted to travel from the following morning only, 
when asked, he replied, uncertainly, ‘immediately’. 
 As Sarotte has argued (1993:280), it was only an extremely optimistic 
interpretation of Schabowski’s words by curious and politically alert Berliners 
that could justify what ensued. Thanks to the successes of the movement, 
confident and impatient crowds congregated at the Wall. When border guards 
tried to turn them back, insisting that passports and visas were necessary, the 
crowds refused. The border guards themselves were in an unusually weak 
position. Their sense of purpose had been steadily eroded, as political 
developments rendered their role ever less central to ‘state security’. Morale was 
low. Even though the pressure of numbers steadily grew, no clear instructions 
from political leaders were forthcoming. Guards decided, some autonomously 
and others following hastily issued orders from above, that the gathering throngs 
be allowed egress without the requisite documents. As Schabowski described the 
event (Allen 1991:189), ‘[t]he border guards had received no instructions. [They] 
were just overwhelmed by the masses.’ In his monograph on the subject 
(1996b:163-183), Hertle shows in detail that the Wall opened in precisely the 
opposite manner than that desired by the government: prematurely, hastily, and 
fully. Credit was earned not by the bumbling SED leadership, but by scores of 
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thousands of determined Berliners. Acting upon a cheeky reception of 
Schabowski’s words, they tactfully stormed the Wall.273 
 Reactions to the fall of the Wall speak volumes. Foreign leaders, notably 
Kohl, Bush and Gorbachev, were shocked and pensive. East Germany’s rulers, 
assembled at the CC, took many hours to realize what had happened. The CC 
meeting on the 10th began with an address by Krenz which did not even 
mention, let alone address, the overnight drama and its consequences. Nor did 
any of those present raise the matter. Gradually, reality dawned, upon which 
‘wild tumult broke out’, followed by the spread of ‘impotence and resignation’ 
(Hertle/Stephan 1997:73). 
 For many East Germans, by contrast, this was the highpoint of the 
revolution. The crowds crossing the Wall, and millions of others, were jubilant at 
their easy victory. Many had initially reacted with disbelief. Thus, Andrea Vogt 
(interview) recalls, ‘I was listening to the radio news; thought "that can’t be true, 
they’re talking rubbish", and went back to reading my book.’ But after the initial 
shock, the popular mood ranged from intoxication to celebration to wide-eyed 
wonder. Millions took their first trip westwards. On subsequent weekends the 
country emptied out. In Berlin, whole workplaces went West for the day, or even 
just for lunch. 
 Finally, the mood amongst CM leaders was in many respects closer to that 
of the SED leadership than to the crowds. Pflugbeil ‘had the very same physical 
reaction’ to the news of the Wall’s fall as he had to its construction. Irene Kukutz, 
a co-founder of ‘Women for Peace’ in the early 1980s and a co-founder of NF 
succumbed to ‘a deep depression which lasted for three days, in bed’. Werner 
Fischer felt ‘extreme rage’ at the ‘mean and undignified’ decision to open the 
Wall on the same date as Kristallnacht. The artist and NF leader Bohley, who had 
just returned from a sojourn in the West, ‘went to bed and pulled the covers up 
                                                          
     273 Theoretically, the Wall could have been retaken by force. Security chiefs and SED hardliners did 
seriously consider that possibility. However, with the core of the SED leadership having committed itself to 
non-military methods of containing protest, such an action would have risked unleashing civil war. 
Moreover, the army leadership was in disarray (Hertle 1996b), and morale in the army as a whole was at 
rock bottom (Stent 1998:96; Hertle 1996b:194-7). Previous weeks had seen ever more soldiers declaring 
openly that they would not confront demonstrators. Late October saw the first initiatives to form soldiers’ 
councils. And soldiers were particularly aggrieved by the draft travel law, which exempted them — even for 
years after leaving duty — from the freedom to travel. 
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over her head’ (Andrews 1999:132). Famously, she publicly denounced the 
government for its decision to open the Wall. Albeit guided by an 
understandable fear of what was in fact to come — rapid unification, NATO 
membership, and mass unemployment — her reaction expressed the elitism of 
the CM at its worst. Her argument, which resembled the SED’s justification for 
having built the Wall, sealed the break between CM and mass movement. As 
Reich recalls (1991:201), it ‘had devastating consequences [and marked] the 
watershed of our popularity curve’. A western journalist reported (taz 1990b:60) 
that ‘if one inquires about Bohley anywhere in the GDR, one soon hears the 
comment: "people will never forgive her for what she said about the opening of 
the Wall."‘ Similarly, Neubert recalls (1990:94), ‘at that point a saying began to 
circulate amongst the people: "We won’t let Bohley paint us, let alone govern 
us."‘ NF brought out a leaflet which, it hoped, would repair the damage done by 
Bohley’s remarks. It only made matters worse. Warning of the consequences of 
the freedom to travel, it insisted that, in NF’s scheme of things, ‘[w]e will be poor 
for a long time, but we do not want a society in which profiteers and egotists take 
it all.’ In a language unique to CM leaders, blending the tones of radical 
pedagogue and Thatcherite treasurer, it appealed to citizens not to ‘allow 








November 9 was a watershed for the mass movement too. Its effect was complex 
and ambivalent. For the first time, the tempo of accelerating protest was slowed. 
Numbers demonstrating temporarily subsided in most towns. In Leipzig only 
190,000 demonstrated on November 13. However, it also stimulated a renewed 
revolutionary logic. The fall of the Wall marked a major defeat for the regime 
and a huge victory for the mass movement. In this respect it was a radically 
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empowering moment. But the resumed revolutionary logic proceeded along a 
new tangent. The masses’ experience of West Germany was, fundamentally, one 
of curiosity and desire fused with an acute awareness of their lack of means of 
fulfilment. The latter recognition was frustrating and disempowering. As 
Hartung put it (1990b:176), ‘East Germans emerged from shortage into poverty. 
Whereas in the GDR they could get no goods for their money, in the West they 
had no money for the goods.’ From out of this ambivalent reaction the mass 
demand for unification arose. It simultaneously expressed a powerful and urgent 
demand that the regime be completely replaced, and a belief that the only social 
force capable of organizing an alternative was the FRG state. The waxing mood 
of collective empowerment, described in the section entitled ‘radicalization’ 
above, changed abruptly. A new tone infiltrated the demonstrations, a somewhat 
desperate, begging address to West German politicians to come to the rescue of 
poor East Germany. 
 Finally, November 9 was a watershed for the regime. It did not lead, as 
Mary Fulbrook has argued (1995:259), to a ‘loss of the will to rule’. The SED 
leadership still hoped and believed that the opening would appease the 
movement sufficiently to allow further time for the regime to restructure, and 
that the SED would head any transitional government that might eventuate. SED 
leaders continued to talk of the ‘revolutionary renewal of socialism in the GDR’. 
If they envisaged a parliamentary republic, then it was one with the SED, at the 
very least, a major party. However, the fall of the Wall did undermine such 
schemes. It further lessened the government’s room for manoeuvre, and the 
cohesion, confidence, and sense of sovereignty of the nomenklatura. It meant that 
economic restructuring would be completely dominated by relations with the 
West German economy, if not by Bonn itself. And, of course, it enabled 
emigration to soar. 133,000 — the equivalent of the city of Potsdam — emigrated 
in November, followed by 43,000 in December, bringing the annual total to 
344,000. For these reasons, not to mention the rise of pro-unification sentiment, 
some sort of confederation, if not unification, with the FRG now became 
inevitable. The transition to a democratic republic followed by unification was 
absolutely not a desirable goal for institutions of the old regime. However, they 
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were able to exert significant influence over the transition process. In the year 
leading up to unification, they were able to destroy many of their more sensitive 
files, transform bureaucratic power into monetary wealth with considerable 
success, grant comfortable pensions to leading functionaries, and ensure that 
many lesser known members of the nomenklatura had good chances of remaining 
in powerful and privileged positions. There can be little doubt that this was a 
lesser evil than the alternative — that of an angry and organized protest 
movement taking direct control over polity and society. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
As a first approximation to a conclusion, I would argue that the evidence in this 
thesis confirms that the events in East Germany in 1989 should be understood as 
a revolution. There is by no means a consensus on this point. Numerous authors 
hold that more appropriate terms are ‘Wende’ ‘implosion’, or ‘collapse’.274 The 
most determined critic of the use of the term revolution in this context is Claus 
Offe. His case is based on two main arguments. First, the term revolution is 
defined strictly. A revolution, Offe asserts (1996:187) entails ‘the construction of a 
new order built upon new ideas’. It can only occur after the elaboration of a set of 
theoretical assumptions and normative arguments which address the questions 
of who should do what, when, and in what manner (1996:30-1). ‘In all of the 
revolutions of the last two centuries’ he argues (1996:134), ‘some kind of answer 
to these questions had been available before revolutionary action was 
undertaken.’ The actors that organize revolutions form a ‘revolutionary elite’ 
whose actions are informed by a theory of revolutionary progress and gain 
power by ‘non-institutional means’ (1996:134). The historian can discern a 
‘premeditated sequence’ of events, as well as ‘proven principles, interests, and 
organizational forms about which the participants were clear.’ ‘[T]he events of 
1989-91’, by contrast (1998:2), 
 
 were essentially triggered by contingent and erratic personal 
decisions at the top level of the Soviet elite that followed no known 
rule or pattern whatsoever and in the absence of which the system 
might well have survived for some undeterminable span of life. 
 
In East Germany there was (1998:11) ‘no counter-elite, no theory, no 
organization, no movement [...] according to whose visions, instructions, and 
prescriptions the breakdown evolved.’ Instead, Offe argues, 1989 was 
characterized by amorphous contingency; the events involved nothing but 
‘individuals and their discoveries of the moment.’ In short, political transitions, 
                                                          
     274 For a list of terms used, see Kowalczuk (1994). 
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to deserve the term revolution, must evince a novelty approaching that of a 
virgin birth combined with militaristic precision in planning and execution. 
 Complementing this argument, Offe suggests that the causes of the 
‘crumbling’ of the regime were located exclusively in institutional changes and 
not in social movements. The implosion of the SED’s authority occurred because 
the ruling elite had lost confidence in the economy and, with the raising of the 
iron curtain and Gorbachev’s indications that Soviet military support could not 
be counted upon, in their ability to wield the repressive apparatus with success 
(1996:12). ‘The demise of the regime was thus caused’, he insists (1996:20), ‘by the 
loss of repressive pressure, not the rise of counter-pressure.’ Mobilization 
occurred only after ‘the collapse of the regime’s ability to use repression was 
already well underway, and thus the citizens’ movement could unfold in a 
relatively risk-free way’. ‘It was not the movement that brought about victory’, 
Offe concludes (1996:21), but ‘just the opposite: the obvious weakness of the state 
apparatus encouraged and triggered the growth of a democratic movement.’ 
 Offe is not alone in his dismissal of the role of the masses. A surprising 
number of studies of 1989 — including Habermas (1990) and Fuller (1999) — 
ignore the demonstration movement altogether. Many more seem to interpret 
the divide in the protest movement according to a reified, Cartesian mind-body 
dualism. A strict contrast is posited between the (noble) demand for democracy 
and the (animal) demand for material well-being. The CM, representing the 
former, is described as ‘mature’, ‘responsible’, ‘self-active’, ‘autonomous’, and 
‘living in truth’. The mass movement — particularly when its majority began to 
demand unification — is described as driven by greed and the ‘seductive’ 
attraction of Western commodities (Bauman 1992:171). It was, generally, rather 
lemming-like.275 For the Observer (Hawkes et al. 1990:82), the masses ‘wanted only 
higher wages and better benefits’ [italics GD]. For Robert Kurz (1991b:48), the 
‘collapse of the DDR’ was catalyzed by an exodus that expressed ‘not conscious 
action directed against Prussian-Saxon war socialism’ but merely ‘blind and 
helpless flight’. The protest movement itself was driven by ‘nothing but 
                                                          
     275 Such approaches are strongly reminiscent of the most anti-democratic formulations of elite theory. 
Compare, for example, with Robert Michels’ description of ‘the masses’ as ‘stormy, elemental’, ‘suggestible’, 
dumb, and dependent upon leaders (1989:29). 
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unconscious and untamed resentment’. ‘That is what things are like during a 
power cut in New York’, Kurz adds disparagingly, ‘or when fire breaks out in a 
prison.’ Klaus Bittermann (1993:108) refers to the ‘immaturity’ of the masses, 
who behaved like ‘little children who hurl their toys into a corner and trample on 
them, under the thrall of an idee fixe’. Thomas Schmid declares that ‘the bawling 
Leipzig masses infantilized [...] themselves’, and reserves particular disdain for 
the movement’s ‘vengeful proletarian’ section (1990:35-9).276 
 The authors just quoted exemplify what Maier (1997:119) describes as 
‘those West German social scientists’ who, being ‘used to thinking in terms of 
abstract processes’ perceived ‘the powerful intrusion of crowds and 
demonstrations [as] vaguely threatening’. Similar attitudes were also prevalent 
amongst East German intellectuals, not least former dissidents and 
oppositionists. One well-known anarchist, for example (Rüddenklau 1992:366), 
bemoaning the collapse of the GDR, blamed ‘the masses’. These had become 
‘blind aimless cogs, lacking initiative and obeying only their needs’.277 
Commentators with Green or Communist sympathies became especially hostile 
to the mass movement when it steered towards unification; the former resented 
its ‘consumerism’ while the latter scented ‘betrayal’.278 The former dissident 
Stefan Heym (1990b:71) wrote that ‘[t]he people [...] became a raging mob which 
flocked towards Western department stores in their chase for glittering kitsch.’279 
 These arguments, all of which dismiss the idea that 1989 was a revolution, 
are misplaced. To begin with, Offe’s definition of revolution is indefensibly 
narrow. In defining revolutions as organized by elites who follow preordained 
strategies it is incapable of apprehending the messiness and fluidity of actual 
revolutionary situations. Even revolutions in which highly organized 
                                                          
     276 Schmid’s trajectory from student activist (and friend of Cohn-Bendit) to editor in chief of the arch-
conservative Die Welt is described in Le Monde 2.9.1999. 
     277 For similar sentiments see Philipsen (1993), Findeis et al. (1994), Fuller (1999). 
     278 The obverse of many Leftists’ apparent turn against mass movements was a (hypocritical) discovery by 
some conservatives of the wonders of demonstrations and revolution. As Schneider puts it (1992:68), ‘it’s 
strange to see rather senior standard-bearers among the conservatives — Joachim Fest, Karl-Heinz Bohrer, 
Johannes Gross, consistent and often brilliant defenders of the elite — suddenly [...] discovering their love of 
the people.’ 
     279 Heym’s essay, as Monika Maron pointed out (1991:37), netted him over 3000 D-Marks. It was his third 
in a series. Maron described Heym’s tone as ‘the arrogance of the man with his stomach full, the man 
disgusted by the table manners of the starving.’ 
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movements are prominent entail a complex cross-cutting of different social 
interests. Each of these backs competing suggestions as to how to resolve the 
crisis, generating clashes both between and within social movements. Events, in 
consequence, twist and turn in unpredictable and dramatic fashion. Where 
revolutionary crises lead to situations of dual power, entailing radical 
innovations in the institutional basis and legitimizing principles of power on the 
part of contenders (as in 1789-94 France and 1917 Russia), Offe’s criterion of ‘new 
ideas’ is likely to be satisfied. But such moments are invariably reached as a 
consequence of the radicalization of an already existing revolutionary situation. 
Theoretical innovation is stimulated by and contributes to the radicalization of 
revolutions, but there is no reason to see it, with Offe, as in itself a key defining 
feature of revolutions. 
 Secondly, mass social movements, from Solidarnosc to the Afghan 
resistance, from the Polish strike wave of 1988 to the national risings in the USSR, 
from the streets of Leipzig to the squares of Timisoara, all made decisive 
contributions to the demise of Soviet hegemony and the continent-wide crisis of 
Communism. Without denying that important factions in all the East European 
regimes looked to parliamentary democracy as a means of restructuring their 
rule on a new basis, it is undoubtedly the case that the mass movements helped 
to expedite and secure that transition. These movements, as is clear from 
chapters six and seven, did not consist of automata, driven by brute material 
need and greed. Firstly, as chapters five and six described, demonstrators reacted 
with intelligent self-discipline to provocation from the security forces. Recall too 
the creativity and wit of the demonstration banners. The ‘masses’, in stark 
contradiction to the elitist approaches described above, did not blindly follow 
their leaders but instead listened to, discussed and often rejected their 
recommendations. Secondly, democratic demands were central to almost all 
sections of the East German movement, as were other ‘non-material’ issues, 
including the environment, gender equality, and the demand for an alternative 
to military service. Pro-unification protestors were driven not by ‘merely’ 
material factors. Most perceived the Western social system as more democratic 
than the GDR, and offering greater scope for individual self-fulfilment. Far from 
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being consumed by ‘greed’ for ‘kitsch’, Easterners, on their first shopping trips to 
the West after the fall of the wall, generally ‘bought one or two small items, 
perhaps some fresh fruit, a Western newspaper and toys for the children’ (Ash 
1990:62).280 
 That the events of 1989 were, in a general sense, revolutionary is a 
conclusion that accords well with the concepts of Marxist theory, as I hope this 
thesis has shown.281 Speaking personally, my experience of 1989, though 
characterized by the surprise that every revolution necessarily brings (cf. Kuran 
1991), was also informed by a perspective that, given the system-wide crisis, 
revolution was eminently possible. Events seemed to confirm this. The East 
German nomenklatura had become trapped in a series of inescapable dilemmas. 
The masses, in the latter part of the 1980s, had experienced what Kuran (1991:37) 
describes as ‘a massive rise in discontent’, in which grievances became 
increasingly interpreted as political issues. This both undermined the confidence 
of state-supporting sections of the population and sustained seedbeds of critical 
opinion from which organized resistance was to emerge. When a mass 
movement did arise it was, as in the first phase of any modern revolution, united 
around democratic and republican slogans that were sufficiently broad and 
vague to appeal to a coalition of diverse social groups. As with most recent 
uprisings (including Portugal and Iran in the 1970s and Poland and South Africa 
in the 1980s) the movement was carried predominantly by urban workers.282 It 
then began to split between the CM and the ‘crowds’, a political divide which 
broadly expressed a polarization between workers and the middle classes. 
 Nevertheless, in one sense 1989 confounded Marxists’ expectations. 
Unlike in East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956 or Poland in 1980-1, not to 
mention Russia in 1917, the revolution was not based in workplaces. 
                                                          
     280 Ash’s observation is supported by the relevant statistics. When in possession of Deutschmark incomes 
Easterners were not driven to frenzies of spending. In fact the savings-rate rose from 12.7% in 1989 to around 
14% in late 1991, before stabilizing at the (moderate) figure of 11% (Sinn and Sinn 1992:79; Akerloff et al. 
1991:33). 
     281 This thesis and others like it should provide food for thought to those — such as Kux (1991) and Opp et 
al. (1993:323) — who claim that Marxism is not equipped with theoretical tools adequate to understanding 
the revolutions of 1989. 
     282 Those such as Dix (1991:234) and Fuller (1999) who assert that the ‘intelligentsia’ formed the bulk of the 
movement must be assuming that superior publicity signifies superior numbers. 
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Independent working class institutions did not develop. As Barker and Mooers 
put it (1994:7), ‘large numbers of workers participated in the various 
demonstrations, but they did so as individuals or in small groups.’ An admirable 
attempt was made by the IUG to organize a movement of independent trade 
unions, and countless individual workplaces witnessed initiatives to reform 
trade union structures (Fuller 1999), but these were small and/or local affairs. 
 A number of factors explain the absence of autonomous working class 
intervention in 1989. Firstly, although the Soviet and East German ruling classes 
were, in Lenin’s phrase (1975:99), ‘entangled’, ‘at loggerheads with each other’, 
and generally in a state of weakness, neighbouring West Germany was 
prosperous and stable. Its political and economic rulers confidently asserted their 
willingness and capacity to extend their power over the East. Their offer, as is 
well known, proved popular especially amongst GDR workers.283 The 
radicalization of the revolution entailed a degree of class polarization, as the 
movement’s more working-class section began to raise demands for higher 
wages and the root-and-branch destruction of the regime. This process was 
‘captured’ by Bonn’s offer of unification (cf. Dale 1996a, 2001). Secondly, the 
working class had suffered an unremitting industrial ‘downturn’ ever since 1953. 
Memories of the workers’ struggles of the 1920s, 1940s and 1953 had faded; 
socialist and syndicalist traditions had largely died out (cf. Dale 1996b). Workers 
had experience of ‘infrapolitical’ workplace struggle on the shopfloor and within 
the lower echelons of the FDGB. However, this was not on the scale of, for 
example, the Polish working class before Solidarnosc (cf. Goodwyn 1991). Despite 
considerable ‘tacit’ shopfloor strength, workplace politics was dominated by 
state-run institutions. Workers entered 1989 weighed down by the burden of 
decades of oppressive dictatorial rule and industrial passivity. Politically 
inexperienced, they were ill-equipped to intervene in the revolutionary process 
as an independent force. This might not have been an insurmountable obstacle 
had it not been for a third factor, the character of the organized opposition. As 
described in chapters six and seven, CM activists generally did little to encourage 
                                                          
     283 For me, it was summed up by a banner pinned to a crumbling factory in the Erzgebirge. It read 
‘Economic Vigour Through Reunification!’ 
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political organization in workplaces and at times even opposed such activity. 
There were exceptions, notably the IUG (see preface), as well as some members 
of the UL and NF (including Bernd Gehrke, Reinhard Schult, Klaus Wolfram and 
Uwe Rottluf), and if such individuals had been trebled in number, confidence 
and political experience the process of radicalization between the fall of 
Honecker and the elections in March 1990 could have begotten not only a pro-
Kohl majority but also significant minorities of organized revolutionary socialists 
or syndicalists. 
 In the event, the absence of radical organizations capable of relating 
sympathetically to pro-unification sentiment helped to ensure that the phase of 
unity around republican-democratic demands was not succeeded by a ‘revolt 
after the revolution’, as had occurred in the English and American revolutions in 
1647-9 and 1786 (Rees 1999). Rather, the movement split between a pro-
unification majority and a minority, consisting largely of CM leaders and 




The absence of any major political organization arising from within the mass 
movement itself and capable of representing its interests vis-à-vis the 
governments of West or East Germany explains why some, such as Michael 
Schneider (1990), have termed 1989 an ‘aborted revolution’.285 That major 
political and economic restructuring occurred, however, is not disputed. The 
‘controlled collapse’ of the regime culminated in its embrace of integration with 
West Germany, beginning with currency union and culminating in political 
unification.286 
                                                          
     284 For detailed discussion of this process see Dale (1996a, 2001). 
     285 Compare also Cliff (1963). 
     286 ‘Controlled collapse’ is used as an alternative to the usual presentation of the East European transitions 
as either ‘collapse’ or ‘negotiated transition’, with the GDR exemplifying the former term. Thus Daniel 
Friedheim (1993b:511) claims that the SED ‘regime quickly collapsed, surrendering control of the streets, and 
even its Stasi archives, to peaceful demonstrators.’ This is a profoundly misleading view, as I argue in Dale 
(1996a, 2001). 
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 In a purely economic sense the outcome of 1989 can be read as an 
aggressive takeover of a crisis-ridden conglomerate (‘GDR Inc.’) by Western 
business.287 The process involved spectacular degrees of both capital 
centralization and its usual concomitant, devaluation. West German capitalists in 
particular made astronomical profits thanks to the (largely transfer-based) boom 
of 1990-2, and through purchases of East German assets that were priced — 
because sold rapidly and wholesale — at artificially low levels. Other Western 
businesses bought up their GDR counterparts simply in order to close them 
down as unwanted competition.288 Together the modalities of currency union, 
the breakdown of CMEA markets, and the policies of the Treuhandanstalt and of 
Western businesses, led to an unprecedented collapse of East German industry. 
West German capital and the West German state effectively annexed their East 
German counterparts and dramatically extended their influence throughout 
Eastern Europe. Many members of the GDR nomenklatura, with the exception of 
most of the SED leadership, were able to maintain positions of power and 
influence, albeit frequently as junior partners in Western-based institutions. 
 Deindustrialization, mass unemployment, welfare cutbacks, the 
dominance of Western institutions, and the lack of Eastern input into the 
restructuring of German society are among the many reasons for the 
disillusionment with the outcome of 1989 that has been common in East 
Germany over the intervening years. As a revolution with a ‘bourgeois’ outcome, 
the exploitation, oppression, inequality, social atomization and alienation that 
characterized class society under the SED were bound to reappear, if in altered 
guise, in the class society of the new Germany. Nevertheless, the revolutions of 
1989 did bring several ‘unqualified gains’, as Barker and Mooers put it (1994:12): 
 
 First, if popular self-mobilization was not the basis of these 
revolutions, nonetheless the political conditions they achieved — 
rights to freedom of speech, assembly and organization, and to 
vote — are precious victories in themselves. 
                                                          
     287 For this and the following see Liedtke (1993), Hickel/Priewe (1994), Flug (1992), Köhler (1994), 
Christ/Neubauer (1991). 
     288 For this reason closures affected some of the most efficient GDR enterprises, in addition to the 
hopelessly antiquated. 
 320 
 Second, the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution saw a 
thousand pundits [...] proclaim the impossibility and undesirability 
of revolution. History replied: European revolutions were 
celebrated. 
 Third, Stalinism was dealt a death-blow. That was significant far 
beyond Eastern Europe and the USSR. For over half a century, 
Stalinism dominated the world’s Left ideologically and 
organizationally. It spoke Marxist words and practised counter-
revolution. [...] Stalinism’s death [...] clears the way for a 
rediscovery and redevelopment of a Marxism that does centre on 
the self-emancipation of the working class. 
 
The revolutions of 1989 inspired participants and observers alike. In the early 
1990s, for example, African democracy campaigners assailed their home-grown 
Honeckers with cries of ‘Stasi out’. In East Germany itself, the experience of 
protest and the freedoms gained helped enable the organization of significant 
waves of resistance to closure programmes and austerity measures in the 1990s. 
These are reminders, should any be needed, that capitalism in its ‘parliamentary, 
mixed economy’ form is, pace the views of many former CM members (Pollack et 
al. 1992:23,27), far from being immune to crisis. Many of the ruling class practises 
that so accelerated and radicalized the protest movement during the latter stages 
of 1989 — including lying to the public, corruption, living in luxury whilst 
preaching austerity, and selling arms to Third World dictatorships despite a 
professed ‘ethical’ foreign policy — did not expire along with the SED regime. 
Further Leipzigs can be predicted with some certainty. 
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